Labour Unity in Union Diversity

Trade Unions and Social Cleavages in Western Europe, 1890-1989

Bernhard Ebbinghaus

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE

(Florence)

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to
obtaining the Degree of Doctor of the
European University Institute (EUI)

Florence, 14 May 1993

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Die Spaltung zwischen den beiden Internationalen entsprang unvereinbaren Gegensätzen, aber sie war nicht überall deutlich zu erkennen und verschob sich beständig. (...) Diese neuen, hier offenen, dort heimlichen Spaltungen und die alten blutgetränkten Gräben der nationalen Gegensätze liefen nebeneinander, widereinander, kreuz und quer durch ganz Europa und befanden sich in Bewegung wie Spalten eines dauernd von Erdbeben geschüttelten Kontinents. (MEINRAD INGLIN, *Schweizerspiegel, Roman, 1931-38, Gesammelte Werke V.2, Zürich: Amman Verlag* 1987)

A la mémoire des mes grands-parents passionnés,
Für das liebevolle Verständnis meiner Eltern,
And for Lee's enduring patience.

PREFACE

Ich betrachte meine Karten als eine Maschinerie zur Produktion von Hypothesen ... (STEIN ROKKAN 1980: 128)

"Where does union diversity come from?" was the *Leitmotif* that hummed through many years of collective research on THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRADE UNIONS IN WESTERN EUROPE (DUES), a VW-*Stiftung* research project initiated by Peter Flora at the MZES, University of Mannheim. I am indebted to Jelle Visser for seven years of intellectual dialogue and exchange of ideas that kept us going on the comparative endeavour. While in the midst of painstakingly assembling data for collective use, it was a challenge and relief to reflect from afar about the sources of union diversity. The fascination for comparative sociology had been stimulated already many years earlier by my teachers Peter Flora and Charles Tilly, both admireres of Stein Rokkan's encompassing *oeuvre*.

A year in Geneva, the last three years in Florence, and many trips to Amsterdam and Mannheim in-between, have given me the chance to broaden my comparative and European perspective. The EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE *sopra* Florence (not far from a change-inducing Italian union school) was surely an appropriate place to undertake such a thesis project. Thanks to the DAAD/EUI grants, I profited from the institute's dedication to interdisciplinary research and its truely European character. My supervisors, Gösta Esping-Andersen and Hans-Peter Blossfeld, both gave me thankfully the freedom to draw a European map of union diversity wit large from a bird's-eye-view.

For the opportunity to sketch my preliminary outline in various seminars, my gratitude goes to Werner Abelshauser, Jean Blondel, Hans-Peter Blossfeld, Gösta Esping-Andersen (at the EUI), Charles Tilly (CSSC, New School, New York) and Peter Flora (MZES, University of Mannheim). Moreover, for having been invited to present some preliminary sketches, I am thankful to Jelle Visser (ISA Congress, Madrid, July 1990), Justin Greenwood (EC conference, Teeside, July 1991), and Willy Bürklin and Hansjörg Nielsen (ECPR workshop, Limerick, May 1992), and the EUI for travel grants.

For challenging discussions, comments and encouragement along the itinerary I am thankful to Axel Körner, David Purdy, Jens Bastian, Johan De Deken, Jürgen Grote, Katrin Behaghel, Lee R. Whelchel, Leopoldo Moscoso, Magaret Herden, Mary Daly, Maurice Glasman, Paul Thurner, Peter A. Kraus, and Steve Hopkins (a special *merci* to Jens, Katrin, Mary and Peter for having time while labouring on their own first 'academic child'). They all have pin-pointed at some remaining blank areas on my European map of union diversity. My hope is that it will provide a useful guide for further explorations.

B.E. *Mannheim, February 1993*

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> *'Just what questions is a theory of labor organization supposed to answer? Only after this task has been explicitly recognized can there be critical discussion of the development of the labor movement (...) 1. How is one to account for the origin or emergence of labor organizations? What conditions are necessary and what circumstances stimulate the precipitation of labor organization? Why have some workers organized and others not? 2. What explains the pattern of growth and development of labor organizations? What factors are responsible for the sequence and form in which organizations have emerged in various countries, industries, crafts, and companies? Since there is great diversity in the patterns of development, any theory of the labor movement must account for these differences.'* (DUNLOP 1948: 164.)

Union diversity, not labour unity, prevails in Europe today. This contention may be astonishing in a decade when the dividing wall between the East and West crumbled, when European integration tears down century-long barriers, when World Markets become increasingly intertwined. Adherents to bygone modernization theories of convergence may rejoice in the light of these changes the final victory of the logic of industrialism. Modernization theorists of the 1950's expected developed capitalist countries to converge in their economic, social and political development along one path set by the United States of America. Yet, today, we remain puzzled over persisting social differences across countries despite the global trends and similar challenges. Indeed, century-long man-built social institutions have resisted the convergence logic of industrialism. One of the social institutions that shows the most important institutional divergence across countries are organizations, practices and regulations in industrial relations (cf. KAELBLE 1987: 82). In fact, "diversity rather than uniformity characterizes the industrial relations experience of nations (POOLE 1986: 3)". Ironically, it is in one of the main areas of convergence theory (ROSS & HARTMAN 1960, KERR et al. 1960) that modernization theorists had to acknowledge - though belatedly - an "exception to the rule" (cf. KERR 1983: 73). In particular, trade union movements with their century-long history vary across Western Europe in the degree of unity, centralization, and strength (cf. VISSER 1990). We may even expect union diversity to increase in the future (cf. POOLE 1986: 34-6) as heterogeneity of interests proliferates (cf. STREECK 1987) and institutional differences amplify in periods of crisis.

Theories of labour movements, according to DUNLOP (1948, see cit. above), should explain both the origins of unions and their growth. *How can we account for the differences in*

the emergence of labour interest organizations? And further: *what where the consequences of these differences for their development?* It is the origins and patterns of national diversity in the social organization of labour interests that are at the centre of this study. Hence, the *Leitmotif* of my investigation can be transcribed into a question: "*Where does trade union diversity come from?* (EBBINGHAUS & VISSER 1990)". In order to advance a theory of labour movements I will try to import insights from political sociology, sociology of organizations and comparative-historical sociology (see Chapter 2). This study attempts to overcome the tendency to fall into ahistorical, ethnocentric, and atheoretical statements (cf. SHALEV 1980), as some observers of industrial relations seemed too enthralled by current involvement, national debates and political convictions to reflect from a distance on long-term developments.

CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO EUROPEAN UNIONS

Nevertheless, a historical, cross-cultural, and analytical study on union diversity cannot disregard but has to acknowledge the contemporary context, if not derive its rationale from today's pressing problems. Three major recent changes have provided a challenge to trade unions and stimulate current debate on the future role of unions and their role in politics and society. First, since the oil-crisis, economic and political changes led in many Western countries to a crisis of union movements that questions the future role of unions. However, union movements were differently affected by global pressures towards increased flexibilization, the intensifying international economic interdependence, and the limits to growth of Welfare States (cf. BOYER 1986, BAGLIONI & CROUCH 1990, FLORA 1986). In fact, the level of union organization has diverged in recent decades as a result of differences in labour market institutions and different responses to the economic crisis (cf. VISSER 1991). Second, the challenge of European political integration and international economic interdependence call for new forms of cooperation of labour across national boundaries and overcoming differences within national union movements, if labour still wants to be reckoned with in the future (cf. VISSER & EBBINGHAUS 1992). Third, after the recent break-down of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, these countries look to the Western world for models how to shape their own economic and political institutions, including the role and relationship of unions.

All these challenges pose two immediate questions: *Can we learn from the past experience, those countries or union movements that fared best, how to adapt for the future?* And related: *Can one translocate, implant or harmonize political and economic contexts from one country to another despite their differences in social fabric, political and economic structures?* Although an answer to these questions is beyond the scope of this study, it should be evident that an analysis of union diversity can provide insights about enduring institutional arrangements and long-term processes that have a bearing not only on yesterday's, but also on today's and even tomorrow's problems. It is my conviction that in times of crisis we should not merely lament over the current symptoms of crisis, dispute its likely causes, or be polemic about apologetic future scenarios, but have some more distant, long-term perspective of the

different contexts, various trajectories, and varying responses of union movements facing these challenges. A comparisons of union diversity across Europe indicates how much long enduring social cleavages have been an obstacle to labour unity. The conclusion that will be forwarded is that these divisions are relative persistent to change. Moreover, given the institutionalization of cleavages in union structures, similar or global challenges to unions will have different results and ask for different solutions in each country. With this study I would like to contribute to an understanding of the long-lasting differences in union diversity and the obstacle to European labour unity.

LABOUR UNITY AND UNION DIVERSITY

Labour unity is not a value in itself but a requirement that arises from the particular position of labour in society *vis-à-vis* capital (employers and their associations) and the state (cf. OFFE & WIESENTHAL 1980, KORPI 1983). Even if all potential workers are strongly organized and well represented, divisions of interests that cut across labour will weaken the bargaining power and influence of unions *vis-à-vis* these two main contenders. Thus the degree of unity in the organization of labour interests is of crucial value. Unity is then endangered when differences in the social structure give rise to *cleavages* (or enduring conflicts of interests) that became entrenched into separate organizations through the process of *institutionalization* (see Chapter 2).

But why is it so difficult to achieve *labour unity*? The best avenue to an understanding of the problem of labour unity is, in my view, to study the reverse problem: what are the origins of *union diversity* and why does it persist? Hence, the analysis will concentrate on the origin and pattern of the social organization of labour interests. I will adapt the cleavage analysis of party systems (LIPSET & ROKKAN 1967) to explain the origins and development of union diversity. The aim is to explain variations in union diversity across countries and time by examining the transformation of cleavages into organizations. There are many parallels between party systems and union systems, that make an adaptation (and comparison) of the cleavage analysis of party systems worthwhile for a study of union systems.

As will be shown, working-class party and allied unions as institutions, their relations, their embeddedness in the social structure, and their interlinkages were moulded in a similar way at about the same time before and around the First World War. As a consequence, cleavages in society at the time had an impact on the party systems as well as on the union systems. However, one of the problems in applying a thesis on party systems to union systems is related to the more complex organizational structure of unions: a union movement is an *'action-set'* (ALDRICH & WHETTEN 1981) that is composed not only of one organization, like a political party with an internal structure, but of a loosely coupled network of relatively autonomous unions, that are only incompletely coordinated by a

higher order peak association: the *union centre*[1]. One of the pitfalls of political science has been to compare too naively union centres and the allied party, disregarding the large heterogeneity within each union movement (cf. critique by MARKS 1989). Moreover, one further difference is that union systems reflect not only general political divisions in society but also sectional differences of interests that arise from the particular position of occupational groups in the labour market and in society. Therefore, I will extend Rokkan's cleavage analysis to develop a systematic view of functional intra-labour cleavages that cross-cut political cleavages.

The approach taken here assumes that the particular forms of labour interest organization became institutionalized at an early time, at the time of founding and early consolidation of these organizations. As a consequence, individuals face a limited, historically derived, set of interest organizations, parties and unions, from which they can choose. Although this *freezing* hypothesis, as originally developed for party systems (LIPSET & ROKKAN 1967), remains to be empirically tested for union systems, it serves here as a theoretical proposition. I use the freezing hypothesis as a heuristic tool to explore the origins of institutions: *how far have the unions been marked by the context of their emergence?* And second, *how much are the alternatives for subsequent adaptation to change limited by the previously institutionalized organizational decisions?*

A number of organizational theories, however, support this heuristic assumption. They stress the importance of the institutionalization of the organizational structure at the time of founding and early consolidation. The organization's internal structure (degree of centralization, hierarchical authority) and its relationship with the environment (social structure, supporting organizations) which were dominant at the time of foundation were then socially imprinted (cf. STINCHCOMBE 1965) and are thereafter difficult to be dislocated. For various reasons, organizations once *institutionalized* tend to *structural inertia* (HANNAN & FREEMAN 1984), resisting radical changes in their internal or external structure. It will be argued that the specific form of organizational formation and consolidation (PANEBIANCO 1988) constrains the possibilities of reaching consent and, more importantly, implement decisions to adapt the organization to a changing environment.

Even though organizations may adapt to changing environments by strategic decisions at critical junctures, the claim developed in this study is that "developments or decisions at one step set conditions or constraints for the next" (ROKKAN 1977: 564). Hence, even after social, political and economic changes have altered the context in which an organization emerged, the initial structure once institutionalized remains an obstacle to profound and immediate change. Although there may be new cleavages challenging an established party or union, these organizations may be able to secure their survival through adaptation and exploitation of institutionalized links.

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[1] I use the term "union centre" to denote various national and historical forms of union peak associations, such as union commissions, congresses, central organizations, or confederations (or federations, in American usage), with varying degrees of centralization and power.

UNIONS AS COLLECTIVE ASSOCIATIONS AND CORPORATE ACTORS

However, unions have a dual function in modern society and economy that bring them under tension to adapt to changes in the social and political environment. According to the famous definition of the WEBBS (1894/1920), a trade union is "a continuous association of wage-earners for the purpose of maintaining or improving the conditions of their working lives (employment) (WEBB & WEBB 1894/1920: 1)". Unions are *collective associations*, organizing and representing the interests of wage-earners. On the other hand, unions are *corporate actors*, that is, organizations that represent these interests to the outside. Unions are in their internal relations collective associations and in their external relations corporate actors. Unions aggregate the interests of labour and then represent these interests *vis-à-vis* their contenders, the state and the employers. Hence, unions take the function of *intermediary organizations* (cf. MÜLLER-JENTSCH 1983, STREECK 1987). They are as collective associations embedded in the social structure and as corporate actors interweaved into the web of industrial relations. This dual institutionalization in the social structure and within the social system is the main reason why union systems reflect (or are subject to) cleavage structures in society.

Unions as *collective associations* of interests are largely based on voluntary membership - though group pressure and other forms of coercion may limit in some cases the freedom to join a union or not. Am important consequence is the particular relationship between the union and its membership base is the 'social embeddedness' (GRANOVETTER 1985) of unions. Yet the question arises: *what interests are actually organized through collective associations?* Not all potential interest groups are equally represented by unions, some groups may be prevented from organization by missing initiative, external force, high organizational costs, or lack of solidarity. Moreover, unions must as collective associations recruit and mobilize enough members to finance their task, have enough broad support from the public, and enough legitimation to be considered a representative. As Olson observed, unions face a collective action problem, *how can they prevent individuals from free-riding by consuming public goods but not contributing to their production* (cf. OLSON 1965)? In short, unions as collective associations have to deal with the consequences of the *logic of membership* (cf. SCHMITTER & STREECK 1981, STREECK 1987).

Unions as *corporate actors* have to recruit a leadership, build up an administrative structure and internal processes of decision making that allow them to represent their members' interests *vis-à-vis* their contenders. There is a general drive in modern society to organize, and unions arise in the labour market out of the need to check the concentration of economic power (MARTINGALE 1966). Though due to the collective action problem not all interests become equally well represented. The larger the organization, the more it is a part of an exchange relationship with other organizations and the more the leadership may depart from its membership base. The problem of 'oligarchy' has become a common critique of modern, bureaucratic, big unionism since its emergence (see MICHELS 1911). A further consequence of the role of unions as corporate actors is the increasing importance of organizational interdependence from its environment. How much is unity and

centralization of labour interests achieved *vis-à-vis* the state and employers? In short, unions as corporate actors have to face the consequences of the *logic of representation* (cf. SCHMITTER & STREECK 1981, STREECK 1987).

UNIONS AS INTERMEDIARY ORGANIZATIONS AND INSTITUTIONS

This study of trade unions aims to fill a "missing link" in comparative sociology between macro-sociological analysis at the system level (cross-national) and micro-comparisons of individual behaviour and attitudes. It is my conviction that organizations at the *meso-level* are an important intermediary structure between both macro-level and micro-level (cf. COLLINS 1988), between structure and agency (cf. ÅHRNE 1990). Thus there is a need to elaborate on this "missing link", the intermediary structures linking individuals to the social structure and organizations to the social system.

As intermediary structures unions provide the dual function of *social integration* and *system integration* (LOCKWOOD 1964, cf. STREECK 1987), they bring people with similar interests together and also represent their interests within the political and economic system. In order to perform these functions, cleavage-organizations, whether parties or unions, use the strategies of social and organizational *closure* to mobilize and represent interests. I will discuss the process of *social closure* (cf. WEBER 1922), or segmentation, and the process of organizational closure, or *pillarization*, in more detail in the following chapter (see Chapter 2). Yet, unions are themselves also subject to social and system integration, they are affected by the social integration of their members into society and by the integration of the organization into the political and economic system. This in turn, so the claim of this study, will lead to the processes of desegmentation and depillarization, that undercut the bases of social cleavages of these organizations (see Chapter 10).

The missing link in the explanation of union diversity is not only a problem of the level of analysis but also the need to combine micro-level and macro-level processes. There is also a gap in many accounts as to the process by which institutions last. It is not sufficient to explain differences between countries in union diversity by mere reference to differences in the environment. Though today's organizational structure reflects the outcome of processes that were at work in the past. An explanation that links today's diversity to past differences is not sufficient. We need to demonstrate how these differences became institutionalized within a society and how past practices became frozen into institutions that last beyond changes in the factors that were initially responsible for their formation.

Recently, Coleman has stressed that "social theory must concern itself with the problem of constructed social organization" (COLEMAN 1991: 8). This study will focus at the meso-level of organizations, examining their relations to the macro level environment and their social embeddeding. In so far, I will depart from the long tradition in theories of labour movements to consider countries as cases of invariant national characteristics that are often conceived as a result of national differences in value systems (a tradition from PERLMAN

1928 to LIPSET 1983).[2] For example, French exceptionalism will be discussed not as a particularism of the French nation-state or her people, but as a particular failure of institutionalizing modern differentiated labour organizations due to adverse circumstances. Cross-national union diversity will be explained by reference to the differences in the process of institutionalization of labour organizations. The selection of the unit of analysis is a "decisive first choice" (GALTUNG 1969), and leads to a particular avenue of explanation. I base my focus on the meso-level on the contention that intermediary structures are the locus of institutionalization processes that structure organizational alternatives.

FOR A COMPARATIVE-HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY OF UNIONS

In searching for the forms and causes of union diversity, I adapt a particular research philosophy. To study the origins and development of union diversity across countries and time is to compare the dynamic long-term development of an institution namely the organization of labour interests. The focus of the study lies on the particular configurations under which differences in labour organization arose as well as their long-term consequences. This study aims to be both comparative *and* historical, examining different configurations and trajectories of union diversity across Western Europe during the last one hundred years. There are two dimensions along which both the object of the study as well as the explanatory factors may vary: across space and time. At any particular point in time, the outcome (union diversity) and the social context changes from setting to setting, while the timing and trajectory may also vary. In order to account for union diversity in Western Europe one has to pursue a *comparative* and *historical* sociology.

Comparison will not only allow us to highlight the differences across countries in the different forms of organization of labour interests but will also permit us to compare the varying or similar contexts under which union diversity exists. Since my assumption in this study is that the organization of labour interests is thoroughly embedded in the social structure and contingent upon the socio-economic and political environment, a cross-national comparison becomes pertinent to look systematically at the impact of variation in the context on the organization of labour interests. The comparative method allows us to go beyond the ethno-centric perspective of a country case study, it has been an important research strategy in institutionalist approaches to industrial relations (SHALEV 1980, POOLE 1986).

However, synchronical comparison alone will be misleading, as, for example, today's union system is not necessarily strongly related to the contemporary social structure, it does not highly correlate. Instead, today's union system reflects - in its aged tectonic structure - encrusted practices derived from past social structures that were successful in surviving in spite of ongoing social change (cf. STINCHCOMBE 1968). Hence, for an explanation of diversity we have to search for its origins. My claim is that differences in the

[2] The comparative study of MARKS (1989) on the variation of political activity of selected national unions is a step in this direction.

organization of labour interests between countries have been long lasting and date back to past divergent steps taken at critical junctures under varying configurations. Therefore, I will combine the comparative method and a historical perspective, partly in a diachronical, partly in dynamic comparative approach. The former view looks at critical conjunctures in the development of trade unions, while the later will analyze the social process across time.

A *historical* perspective, particularly in industrial relations, is "more helpful if we wish to understand both the variety in the type of organizations and the reasons of their existence (FLANDERS 1968: 27)". However, there is the pitfall of "hindsight", if we were to interpret history backwards, when in retrospective analysis we attribute inevitability to earlier actions that were only a precondition to later developments (ELIAS 1970: 178-179). We project teleological necessity into the development from its origins, though the outcome was in fact undecided at the time. In industrial relations theory, the gap between an account of the different origins and varying patterns of diversity has often lacked an explicit treatment of the process by which past structural differences have an impact on later decisions. I will return to this "linking" process of the social organization of interests, that is the transformation, social embedding and institutionalization of cleavage structures into organizations, in the following chapter in more detail.

THE SELECTION OF CASES AND THE TIME FRAME

A crucial choice is the selection of cases and time. This is based on the very purpose of comparison: *do we want to highlight differences or similarities*? In principle, comparisons are based on one or both of Mill's classic methods of *agreement* and of *difference* (MILL [1881], SKOCPOL 1984: 378-9). According to the method of agreement, one searches for crucial similarities in the outcome as well as the one variable that may not vary with the others. The contrary is the case with the method of difference, crucial differences exist in the outcome and one searches for one variable that correlates, while the other crucial variables remain constant. The research design of this study with its interest in explaining union diversity surely stresses the method of difference. However, since social reality is more complicated then simple logic allows, we face situations where more than one crucial variable correlates with the outcome making the causal relationship spurious. I have used two possible strategies to deliberately limit the large diversity: comparison of numerous units that have enough similarity and comparison over time of the same unit allows us to keep some variables constant.

Related to the question of the method of comparison is the question of the number of units being compared. The question of the number of units (often noted as: "N") has important practical consequences but also theoretical implications as to how much variation or similarity one encounters. Adherents to a "large-N" method tend to be *variable-oriented*, amassing large numbers of mainly quantitative indicators that are statistically correlated, while those with a "small-N" design are *case-oriented*, stressing the particular configuration of an individual case and use mainly qualitative material (RAGIN 1987). The dilemma is that the "small-N" researcher stressing differences in the outcome faces too

much variation between too few cases to systematically discard them. The "large-N" researcher on the other hand is confronted with the reverse problem, he can keep some differences statistically constant and stress the similarities in outcome under similar conditions but cannot account for the process at work in each case.

The selection of countries with a similar setting helps to reduce some of the spurious variations ("most similar country design", cf. PRZEWORSKI & TEUNE 1970, LIJPHART 1971). The twelve countries chosen are all part of one world region (Western Europe). They share enough commonalities to make a comparison fruitful and not arbitrary.[3] These countries have all been exposed to the same social processes, albeit with varying speed and intensity, the Industrial and National Revolutions, the transition towards a capitalist industrial economy and a democratic nation-state (cf. CROUCH 1986, ROKKAN 1975). Trade unions as a specific institution to represent the interest of the dependent work force *vis-à-vis* employers and the state can be seen as a European innovation that spread across Europe and from there elsewhere. As in the case of Nation-State building, European development represents a unique configuration compared to other world regions (cf. ROKKAN 1975). Since this analysis limits itself to one world region, regarding only the more comparable twelve country cases, it limits consciously the range of diversity. As has been pointed out, generalizations based on "limited diversity" such as in the works of ROKKAN (1970, 1975) make simplifying assumptions about the non investigated cases by ruling them out as non instances or disregarding cases outside the realm of study (RAGIN 1987). This may be a reasonable price to be paid for being able to come to regionally bound hypothesis or "middle-ranged theories" (MERTON 1957) that can be challenged thereafter by more general applications.

If the selection of cases has to be defended, so has the choice of the time frame. I have chosen the year 1989 as the point to end my analysis, not just for the reason that I started writing in that year but that the situation after demise of Communist regimes remain still unclear. As in event history analysis, right-censoring, the cut-off point of a study may be less problematic than left-censoring (TUMA & HANNAN 1984: 47), that is, *where do we start?* Given the interest in long-term processes of the social organization of labour interests, I had necessarily to go far back in history. For the magic of numbers I have tried to collect information more systematically for one hundred years if possible from 1890 to 1989. Although I will consider some events before the 1890s, it is a good starting point to compare differences in development of trade unions. The 1890s were the period in which new unionism came to its breakthrough in England, and spread from there, in Germany with the lifting of the political restrictions the Free labour movement started to become a

[3] These countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, (West) Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom. Finland, Iceland and Luxembourg have been excluded due to lack of documentation and data. Greece, Portugal, and Spain, now members of the European community, have been excluded since they had more than thirty years of non-democratic regimes and again documentation and data are difficult to obtain.

coordinated centre, and in France, regional labour exchanges became organized parallel to the dispersed local and national unions, to indicate only some major countries.

THE COMPARATIVE DESIGN: ENCOMPASSING VARIATIONS

Let me stress in concluding that the purpose of this exercise in comparative historical sociology is to develop relative general macro-sociological hypotheses that are grounded on a particular organizational perspective. The aim of this study is to account for union diversity in two ways: first, to analyze the causes for the differences in the way in which labour interests became organized across Europe, and second to relate the major differences of labour organization across Europe to variations along the major constitutive features (or master variables). The former may fall - using Tilly's schema of four comparative designs - into the category of *variation-finding*, while the second, as Tilly warns a "more risky" venture, can be called *encompassing comparison* (TILLY 1984).

First, *variation-finding comparison* will be conducted in each of the six main chapters (Chapters 3-8), explaining the differences in the pattern of union organization as the outcome of different organizational choices at critical junctures under particular configurations. My aim is to explain the variation in the "structuring of alternatives" (ROKKAN 1977). The sequence of these choices are path dependent (NORTH 1990) where previous decisions lead to a reduced set of alternatives (or a "nested game" situation, cf. TSEBELIS 1990). Thus differences are not only found in the form of organizations but also in the process at stake, there are ramifications in the developmental paths, or - in a more belligerent picture - these "trajectories" differ. Hence, union diversity should be accounted by differences in the particular configurations and organizational decisions taken at critical conjunctures and the consequentially different sequential paths. For example, I will later claim (in Part II) that the particular form of the division of labour between working class political parties and unions as it was established at an earlier time had different consequences for the consecutive relationship and development of the two interest organizations.

Second, *encompassing comparison* is a synthetic approach that draws attention to the configuration of factors that led to the diversity across countries (cf. TILLY 1984, RAGIN 1987). In the last concluding chapters, a Rokkanean *conceptual map* (ROKKAN 1975) will be sketched for an encompassing view on union diversity. A conceptual map is a diachronical-comparative typology placing each case along the major cross-cutting axes that represent the variation of the master variables (cf. FLORA 1981, TILLY 1984). These maps are not only a summary representation of the variation-finding explanation but an encompassing view of the interrelations of particular outcomes within the larger system. One of the important, often overlooked features of these conceptual maps is that they can serve as a guide in our understanding of the processes of trans-national integration. From these conceptual maps of union diversity we can read the commonality and its diversity across *l'espace social européen* (an European social space, J. Delors). Over the last hundred years we find many cross-national influences on the community of discourse (WUTHNOW 1989) and increasing

pressures towards economic and political integration of Western Europe. This will lead to further "conectedness" within the conceptual map, not so much for reasons of similarities in configurational contexts, but due to trans-national influences and supra-national integration. These transnational interdependences are more evident in the case of nation-state systems (cf. ROKKAN 1975) than in the case of trade unions. However, it will gain more visibility and attention in the future. In so far, these conceptual maps of union diversity may be a guide to search for clusters of dominant forms and tensions within a more integrated, future European industrial relations system.

Figure 1.1
Cleavage Structures and Union Diversity



ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL AND FUNCTIONAL CLEAVAGES

Finally, I should give a rationale for the scheme of cleavages that I take to be the major sources for variations in labour unity and union diversity in Europe. Certainly, following Marx' class analysis the dominant cleavage that gave rise to the labour movement is the *labour-capital* cleavage. Both political parties and trade unions are relatively universal organizational responses to the labour-capital cleavage (cf. LIPSET & ROKKAN 1967) as will be described later (see Chapter 3). However, union diversity points at internal fragmentation of labour interests. The class cleavage is in many societies cross-cut by other - older and newer - social cleavages. As WEBER (1922) and many of his followers pointed out MARX erred in assuming that the class conflict - arising from the opposing interests between owner of the means of production and those with labour power only - would become the dominant cleavage in society. *What are the cross-cutting class cleavages?*

WEBER (1922: 177) has proposed two additional bases of class interests besides the Marxian view of *Besitzklasse* (property class): *Erwerbsklasse* (employment class) and *soziale Klasse* (social class). In my view, the two main cleavage axes that can intersect the labour-capital cleavage (the property question) are conflicts based on subdivisions in the labour market (Weber's employment class) and social divisions in the society (Weber's social

class). I will subsume the two cleavages under the concepts of *functional* cleavage and *political* (or segmentational) cleavage, following partly LORWIN (1971). "Thus, a trade union organized solely on lines of skill or industry or employer unit is a functional organization, while a Catholic or Protestant or Socialist trade union is a segmented organization" (LORWIN 1971: 141).

Political (or segmentational) cleavages based on *Weltanschauung* (LORWIN 1971) have the potential for cross-cutting the labour-capital cleavage, since "who one associates with is not completely predictable from one's occupation" (COLLINS 1975: 82). Ethnicity and religious community, but also political orientation, have given rise to the formation of different interest groupings within labour. *Weltanschauung* becomes the base of identity and social relations for a *famille spirituelle* (a community of believers). However, these cleavages cross-cut the labour-capital cleavage (cf. LIPSET & ROKKAN 1967) differently across Europe, depending on the particular salience of these cleavages in a society. When labour movements emerged and consolidated around the First World war, each national labour movement found a varying number of political cleavages that had already been mobilized and divided the society. European labour is, in my view, most importantly divided, by three political cleavages: the labour-capital, State-Church and reform-revolution cleavages (cf. LIPSET & ROKKAN 1967, ROKKAN 1968). The cleavages became transformed into Social-Democratic, Christian and Communist labour movements, with some significant variations, such as syndicalism. Each line of conflict arises as a consequence of the interaction of the National and Industrial Revolution (cf. ROKKAN 1968): the claim of the working-class for *democratization* of the polity, the Church reaction to *secularization* and secular expansion of the Nation-State, the reaction of the Left to the *International* communist revolution. In the following chapters on political cleavages (Part Two), I shall examine the impact of the labour-capital cleavage, the Church-State cleavage and the revolution-reform cleavage.

In addition to political cleavages, differences in the labour process and labour market give rise to different *Interessenlagen* (interest bases) of section in the workforce. This is the second major axes of union cleavages: conflicts that arise from the segmentation of the labour markets (MACKENZIE 1982). "*Segmented Work, Divided Workers*" (GORDON, EDWARDS & REICH 1982) may be dubbed the punchline of functional union diversity. This is not to fall into technical contingency arguments over the interest base. Although these cleavages became mass phenomena in the course of modern capitalism, they have their sources in pre-industrial social divisions in society, such as craft tradition, status distinctions and state authority structures. Functional cleavages derive from the social division of labour (cf. DURKHEIM 1893), they reflect social divisions and the distribution of power in a society (cf. RUESCHMEYER 1986).

The processes that gave rise to the cross-cutting *functional* class cleavages are relatively universal but their mitigation varied from society to society. The rise of mass production, the advance of white-collar work, the growth of public employment were all common phenomena to modern advanced capitalist societies. Yet, as will be shown later their timing, scope and pattern varied across Europe (see Part Three). Following the Industrial

and National Revolution, three changes led to segmentations in the labour market (Cf. Figure 1.1): the Taylorist Revolution and the rise of mass production, the tertiarization and expansion of service work, and the growth of the welfare state and public employment. Each of these processes had the potential for further cleavages: the craft-industry, white-blue collarline, and the public-private cleavages. These cleavages were differently transformed into organizations, some were encompassed in inclusive unions, in others cases sectionalist unions emerged in competition to existing ones. Moreover, labour organizations were not only shaped by the functional cleavages, they further reinforced through their interest politics the social divisions upon which they were based. Hence, segmentational cleavages originate from closed social mobility and ingroup social association within the *Weltanschauung* community, while functional cleavages derive from closed mobility patterns in the labour market. Segmentational cleavages arise primarily from divisions in society, functional cleavages from the social divisions of labour. The former tends to arise in general from conflicts with the State, the later from conflicts with the employers.

AN OUTLINE OF THE THESIS

Let me provide a short overview of what will be presented in the following chapters. First, I shall lay out the methodological and theoretical bases of the study and the main argument (Chapter 2). I propose a sociological approach to the study of unions as intermediary organizations. *How are interests formed, organized, mobilized and represented?* The chapter exposes the argument on institutionalization of major lines of conflict of interests (or cleavage structures) into union diversity. It also sketches an evolutionary model of the organization of labour, the differentiation between unions and party, and between unions and union centre.

The main empirical sections of the study will be dealing with *political cleavages* (Part II) and *functional* cleavages (Part III) that gave rise to important differences in the organization of labour across Western Europe. Part II discusses the three *political* cleavages that gave rise to the Socialist labour movement (Chapter 3), the Christian labour movement (Chapter 4) and the Communist labour movement (Chapter 5). In each of these three chapters, the formation of the cleavage, the creation of political parties and the emergence of allied union centres will be sketched. Thereafter, follows a dynamic analysis of the tension of party-union relations as unions and party move on diverging paths caused by incongruous logics of membership and of representation, that is between extending their social base and representing the more heterogeneous interests. By analyzing each line of cleavage the part on political cleavages reveals how each line of conflict became differently transformed, leading to variations in political union diversity across Europe.

The second part on cleavages discusses cross-cutting *functional* cleavages that found expression in different forms of union organizations: the craft vs. industry union principles (Chapter 6), the white-collar vs. blue-collar cleavage (Chapter 7), and the private vs. public sector cleavage (Chapter 8). In each of these three chapters, the formation of the cleavage,

the emergence of national unions and the creation of (or integration into) a union centre are discussed. Again, a dynamic analysis of the logic of membership and representation follows, highlighting the tensions between unity and strength of particular forms of interest organization. In the part on functional cleavages, each line of conflict is analyzed as to its impact on functional diversity across Europe.

Adopting Rokkan's perspective my aim is to draw as a conclusion a *Conceptual Map* of union diversity in Western Europe (Chapter 9) that encompasses the major factors that have led to diversity in the organization of labour interests. The major challenge to European labour is to overcome union diversity. The conceptual map of union diversity developed before should provide us with a framework for the discussion of possible future points of adaptation. The last, concluding chapter (Chapter 10) takes a again the issue raised at the beginning: *can we detect a convergence towards labour unity, or is union diversity persisting in Europe?*

Finally I would like to stress that given the scope of the comparison the attempt to develop a general scheme for one hundred years and twelve European labour movements is a rather "risky" venture. Any single case may be challenged by more detailed national or historical studies. New evidence may bring about new interpretations of facts requiring revisions of the model which can only be welcomed. This study should be seen as part of a collective enterprise initiated by studies like STURMTHAL'S *Unity and Diversity in European Labor* (1953). As ROKKAN (1980) pointed out the conceptual maps should be used as a "machine to produce hypotheses" that are certainly tentative but try to encompass the diversity across Western Europe in our explanation and naturally provoke further elaboration. It is for the reader to judge at the end whether "the dwarf who stands on the shoulder of giants sees further than the giants themselves" (MERTON 1965).

2
CLEAVAGE TRANSFORMATION

> *'I called for a detailed analysis of the parallels and the interactions between two sets of organization-building efforts: the structuring of alternatives in what I called the 'numerical democracy' channel and the building of effective units of action in the corporate bargaining channel. (...) A full-fledged model would have to generate hypotheses not only about the emergence of alternatives in the electoral channel but also about the structuring of mass organizations in the corporate channels and about types of interlinkages between the units in the two arenas. (...) None of this can be sorted out systematically without detailed analyses of the actual cleavage bases of the movements: we have to look at the sequences of cleavage crystallization and we must find how far the first mobilizing agencies were able to exploit the electoral and the membership markets before the next set of agencies emerged (Rokkan 1977: 563, 568, italics removed).*

Union diversity originates from the fragmentation of labour interests. However, from labour interests to union organization we cannot draw a direct, linear line. The social organization of interests is a transformation process. Not all potential conflicts of interests will find their expression. Moreover, not all collective interests are organizable, some pose formidable problems of getting people together to act in their interests, others are difficult to be represented. Ironically, where such a transformation from interests to organization is successful, the very success makes later further change difficult. Organizations tend to inertia and thus cleavages become frozen. The more successful an organization consolidates, bolsters group solidarity, and orchestrates its external relations, the more it becomes lured into organizational languor. My assumption is that organizations reflect the conflict of interest of the time of their emergence, that these cleavages become institutionalized in organizations. Moreover, social cleavages become frozen in the organizational structure and the organization is relative resistant against immediate adaptation to social change.

In this chapter I shall provide the general concepts and models of the transformation of cleavages into organizations. *First*, I shall follow each phase of the process of formation, organization, mobilization and intermediation of interests. From political sociology I will borrow the concept of cleavages to delineate important lines of conflict that gave rise to the formation of interests *vis-à-vis* contenders. Cleavages provide the base on which collective organizations are formed, they delineate the boundaries of an interest community internally and externally. Cleavages help creating and maintaining unity. However, even an organization based on group solidarity and common interests faces two problems: the problem of mobilization and intermediation. Potential members have to be mobilized for collective action and interests have to be represented effectively. Moreover, there is a ten-

sion between the two logics in the face of ongoing social and political change, a challenge that requires adaptation of the organization. If an organization fails to adapt it will be endangered to dissolve or disintegrate.

Second, I shall develop the thesis that organizations once established tend to structural inertia, that cleavages become frozen in the organizational structure. The process of *institutionalization* operates at all level and phases of the transformation of cleavages into organizations. The process of institutionalization consolidates the organizational structure, deepens the embedding of the organization in the social structure, and strengthens its links to other organizations. My contention is that there is an institutional path: organizational decisions at an earlier time structure and delimit the alternatives for future adaptation.

Finally, I shall introduce an evolutionary model of the differentiation of labour organizations. Political party and trade unions emerged and differentiated as separate institutions, one in the political "electoral channel", the other in the economic "bargaining channel". Within the action set of unions, two levels of organizations became differentiated at the level of the individual unions and at the level of peak associations (or alliances of these unions). This will be followed by a listing of possible explanatory factors for political and functional cleavages that contributed to union diversity. A discussion of the processes of social closure and pillarization provides two concepts for understanding the rise and decline of cleavage organizations, that will be discussed in the following chapters on each political and functional cleavage.

I
THE TRANSFORMATION OF CLEAVAGES INTO ORGANIZATIONS

Cleavages are at the root of union diversity. For a better understanding of the differences in the organization of labour interests across Europe we must examine how interests become organized. However, there is no linear relationship from interests to organization. Not all potential conflicts of labour interest find their expression in union organization. For building a strong interest organization a formal organization structure has to be build, resources must be mobilized and its relations to the outside should be structured. Hence, it will be argued that cleavages become transformed into collective organizations by an intricated process of formation, organizational foundation, mobilization, representation and possible future adaptation. Before I shall discuss each of these processes, let me first clarify the concept of cleavage since the concept takes here a central position, though it is relatively vaguely defined in political sociology (cf. ZUCKERMAN 1975).

First of all, *cleavages* should be distinguished from social conflict as such: "A cleavage is a division on the basis of some criteria of individuals, groups or organizations among whom conflict may arise. The concept of cleavage is thus not identical with the concept of conflict; cleavages may lead to conflict, but a cleavage need not always be attended by conflict. A division of individuals, groups or organizations constitutes a cleavage if there is some

probability of a conflict. (...) Cleavages operate in the social structure dividing it into various collectivities; sometimes such structural cleavages become the target of conscious orientation and a variety of interests are defined " (LANE & ERSSON 1991: 53). *Cleavages* are thus potential lines of conflict that result from differences in the social structure. Yet they are also partly shaped by the mobilization of these conflicts through collective actors. Not all cleavages are necessarily politicised and find their organizational representation. Following the sociologist MERTON (1948), one could distinguish between *latent* and *manifest* conflicts of interests (cf. also DAHRENDORF 1959: 178). Nevertheless, in order to compare the "bewildering variety" (ABRAMS 1982: 163-177) in cleavage structures I will use an *a posteriori* classification of cleavages based on the evolution of social conflict and the organizational responses to general social processes (e.g. Industrial Revolution). The question of whether, when and how these potential lines of cleavages became crystallized and mobilized by organizations remains the subject of empirical analysis in the subsequent chapters.

One should be careful not to fall into the trap SARTORI (1969) once called *sociological determinism* by extrapolating political cleavages from social stratification. In sociology and political sciences, "the concept of cleavage is often either reduced '*down*' to that of 'social cleavage' or raised '*up*' to that of 'political cleavage' (BARTOLINI & MAIR 1990: 215)". Instead, cleavage structuration should be analyzed as a two-step transformation process of latent conflicts in the social structure and their crystallization into manifest political conflicts. Social cleavages are transformed into organizations but are also shaped by collective actors.

In the following I shall discuss five aspects of the *transformation of cleavages into organization*. Following a similar scheme by ROKKAN (1977)[1], I distinguish five processes: (1) formation, (2) organization, (3) mobilization, (4) representation, and (5) adaptation. *First*, in the *formation* phase new social groupings emerge and new lines of conflict crystallize. *Second*, the *organization* phase the social cleavages of the time of foundation become institutionalized within the organization. *Third*, the organization faces a *mobilization* problem once it cannot control its boundaries but has to organize beyond the small bases of group solidarity. *Fourth*, at the same time, if faces a *representation* problem of how to intermediate the common interests. It will often seek broader alliances with other organizations. *Finally*, as social and political change continues, the organization faces the problem of *adaptation*. However, there is a trade-off between opening up for new groups and alienating the old followers, between seeking new alliances and rebuffing the old allies. Let us discuss now each aspect in its own right.

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1 Rokkan distinguished six steps in the translation process: (1) the generation of cleavage lines, (2) the crystallization of cleavage lines, (3) alliances of political entrepreneurs, (4) choices of mobilization strategies made by such entrepreneurs, (5) the choice of arenas for the confrontation of mobilized resources, and (6) actual pay-offs of such concerted efforts (cf. ROKKAN 1977: 564). My scheme collapses the first two into one category (formation), and stresses more the adaptation considerations than the post ante pay-offs of adopted strategies.

THE FORMATION OF INTERESTS

Collective interests are often taken for granted or projected from overt group acting (cf. TILLY 1978: 59). Instead, the *formation* of group interests should be conceptually separated from the problem of collective action and formal organization. From an individualist perspective, one often assumes that interests represent the wants of individuals and that group behaviour imply congruent wants of a group of individuals. For WEBER (1922: 15) collective action was then "interest based" when individuals assumed the same rational aims for their action, when their behaviour was based on the same *Interessenlage* (interest base). Yet interest formation implies more than a common interest base. Before engaging into collective action, a quasi-group evaluates the expected gains and losses of the potential course of action. Hence, "to be aware of one's interests, therefore, is more than to be aware of a want or wants; it is to know how one can set about trying to realise them" (cf. GIDDENS 1979: 189).

Social or political change can lead to the generation of cleavage lines. Economic and political development can lead to the formation of a new quasi-group with potentially common interest. In the course of the Industrial Revolution, for instance, a dependent industrial workforce emerged with similar life chances. Other processes lead to further social divisions on the basis of which people tend to group. However, the existence of social cleavages as such leads not necessarily to the crystallization of a cleavage.

Indeed, not so much the fact that a quasi-group has objectively the same common interests is crucial for an understanding of cleavage structuration but that actual conflicts of interests arise herefrom. Given a quasi-group that has a common identity and that forms a close social network, it is likely to form an interest group when in the interaction with other groups it comes into conflict of interests (cf. TILLY 1978, 1985). Cleavages have their "origin in the authority structure of associations" (DAHRENDORF 1959: 181), they are an outflow of the distribution of power in a society. For Marx class interests arose in opposition, a class was forming as the result of the common struggle against another class. In analogy, we can see cleavages as conflict of interests between two groups in society, one contending the other in the polity (cf. also TILLY 1978). In this case one can speak of the formation of a political cleavage that derives from politicised social cleavages.

THE ORGANIZATION OF INTERESTS

A quasi-group that conceives its interests as in conflict with other groups is not yet an interest *group*. In addition to the formation of interests a degree of collective *organization* is necessary for an interest group proper to emanate. This is the fundamental problem of cleavage transformation: collective interests have not only to be formed through the process of cleavage crystallization, but an enduring organization has to be built. The transition from interest formation to collective organization is a process. "It is a matter of no small interests to determine at what point these looser configurations crystallize into associations" (GINSBERG 1953: 41). In fact, it is not always easy to decide when collective action has

achieved a degree of collectiveness and continuity that one can speak of a formal organization as "a set of stable social relations deliberately created, with the explicit intention of continuously accomplishing some specific goals or purpose" (STINCHCOMBE 1965: 142). The transition from a quasi-group to an organization entails a deliberate choice for more stable social relations in order to achieve a particular goal. Once established, the organization takes on its own life, its own mechanism for reproduction. I will consider trade unions as *formal* organizations "that have been deliberately established for a certain purpose" (cf. BLAU & SCOTT 1962: 5), as opposed to social and informal organizations (e.g. a strike movement). Certainly, unions include also informal social organizations and are the descendant of a social movement. Nevertheless, I consider the act of setting up a formal organization as the starting point, although informal collective action has often preceded and the building of a consolidated organization may require a longer time period thereafter (cf. HANNAN & FREEMAN 1989: 147-9). When a group of workers goes on strike one can speak of some form of social organization, though this will be *ad hoc* and informal unless they attempt to build a continuing formal organization.[2]

Historically, unions were "deviant" organizations (NEDELMANN 1975, DAHRENDORF 1959: 190) that had to gain legitimation. Initially, "political inventors" or "entrepreneurs" (cf. STINCHCOMBE 1965, ROKKAN 1977) play a crucial role in founding organizations and defining their scope. People will form an organization when they perceive that the organization is a more effective and successful alternative in providing some previously unobtained benefits (cf. STINCHCOMBE 1965: 146). This implies that the political entrepreneurs has access to the necessary social organizational technology and the political opportunity structure is favourable to organization, though at an early stage the formation of "deviant" organizations was highly taxed. But still today, the costs to found a new organization tend to be considerable, particularly since already existing organizations can "price out" new ones or raise high "tolls on entry" through institutional arrangements.[3]

The formation of new interests may not lead necessarily to new formal organizations when already existing organizations attempt to include them. When there is no appropriate representation and other groups seem to gain from organization, new social groups are compelled to organize themselves. This drive to organize collectivelly in a society leads to the consecutive organizations of various social groups (cf. KORPI 1978 for Sweden). Crucial for the cleavage transformation is the question whether interests will be organized within or outside existing organizations. The question of integration or separation of interests will be of central importance in the following empirical cleavage chapters. Individuals that perceive a lack of interest representation have three alternatives to respond: exit, voice or

2 For instance, the Italian autonomous movement (COBAS) developed from an ad hoc strike movement to an infant organization requiring public recognition as a bargaining partner like the three "big" established union confederations.

3 For instance, representativeness conditions for the recognition as collective bargaining partner (e.g. the NLRB majority certification procedure in the USA), or a threshold for representation into parliament (like the 5% mark in Germany) rise "tolls on entry" for a union and a political party respectively.

loyalty (HIRSCHMAN 1970). Accordingly, individuals may *voice* their interests within existing organizations demanding them to represent their interests. Secondly, they may *exit* from existing forms of interest representation and found a new, more appropriate interest organization. Or thirdly, they may find that their voice and exit options are precluded and consequentially their *loyalty* towards the system will abate. The alternatives are relatively constrained: an individual's alternatives for collective action are contingent on the decisions of others to join in and promote the same interests.

THE MOBILIZATION OF INTERESTS

Trade unions are *mutual-benefit associations* "in which the membership is expected to be the prime beneficiary" (BLAU & SCOTT 1962: 45), different from other types of organizations were prime beneficiary are owners, clients, or the public-at-large. Mutuality with its give-and-take can only provide collective benefits when the burdens are jointly shared. Membership is the prime resource both in terms of the contribution members pay (financial dues, participation, strike proneness, recruiting others, honorary functions) and as the source for legitimation or representativeness *vis-à-vis* its contenders. Moreover, membership *via* internal democracy plays an important role in the aggregation of collective interests. Particularly in the absence of surveys union leaders have to rely on membership expression to know more about the interests of those that they claim to represent.

There are two principal problems for unions as membership organizations once a group of founders has set up such an organization. The two problems derive from the question of mutuality: *what is the principle of group solidarity* (HECHTER 1987)? The first problem is the selection of the potential membership base, or social base, that is, the definition of the organizational domain. Organizations may choose to specialize for a particular niche in the membership market, they may tend to stress *social closure* (cf. WEBER 1922, MURPHY 1988), while others pertain a more generalist, open strategy. The second problem is the mobilization of potential members, the *collective action* problem (OLSON 1965), that applies particularly to large scale organizations that provide mainly public goods. It is interesting to note that the latter problem has gained more interest in the literature than the first, while the important link between the two has been largely ignored.[4]

A "closed" union, for instance, a local miners' union in a mining community with an exclusive membership principle (closed shop) can more easily mobilize on the base of stronger social bonds, group homogeneity and exclusive mutual benefits. However, given its exclusiveness, a closed union limits deliberately its potential membership base. Occupational communities, particularly when an "isolated mass" separated from the outside world (KERR & SIEGEL 1954), have often been considered to be prime examples of group solidarity

[4] OLSON (1965) discusses "inclusive" and "exclusive" groups briefly and it is implicit in the discussion of large vs. small groups in his seminal *The Logic of Collective Action*, that set the tune for later debate on the collective action problem. His more recent work, however, focuses more on the production of inclusive or exclusive goods of encompassing vs. selective interest organizations (cf. also OLSON 1982).

and collective action. Yet, as the rise and fall of local miners' unions indicate, solidarity based on exclusiveness may be an initially successful but - on a long-term base - a self-defeating principle due to changes in the environment that endanger communities with closed boundaries. With increasing market integration even previously closed local communities will face the competitive forces of world markets and increasing interdependence.

The external contingency of closed unions, their long-term inability to control the influx of workers and changes in the work organizations that are detrimental to its own group solidarity, forces many closed unions to adopt an *open* strategy (cf. OLSON 1965: 66-8). In order to prevent competition between organized and non-organized groups an *open* union (or inclusive union) attempts to organize all potential members in an economic sector. However, an *open union* cannot so easily rely on strong social bonds but has to convince its potential followers that membership is worthwhile. The possibility to use informal group pressures are limited and formal arrangements (e.g. closed shop) are more visible and thus may provoke repression by employers or the state. Large, open unions face the *free-rider* problem of collective action, they have in the absence of coercion to use *selective incentives* to motivate an individual to contribute to the production of a collective good (OLSON 1965). Yet despite these problems large "open" unions exist nearly everywhere with more or less success. Certainly, inclusive unions provide in some instances selective benefits (e.g. insurance benefits) and use some form of coercion (e.g. closed shop), however, these measures are rarely enough to mobilize on a large scale. In order to tackle the collective action problem we need to change the perspective: from a short-term individual choice to a long-term view of institutional path dependence.

Large, open unions have hardly ever been build *de novo*. They were in most instances the result of long-term organization building efforts. Sometimes these endeavours were boosted by sudden radical social mobilizations after wars or in general strikes when the non-unionized faced insecurity over their future (a situation adverse to rational choice assumptions). Advocates of open unionism made appeals to broad social groups to combine, but the actual consolidation of inclusive unions was a long-term process. Unorganized workplaces, occupations, social groups, regions had to be mobilized one-by-one. Historically, unionists were aware of the problem of collective action and therefore tended to start organizing where group solidarity was strongest. Moreover, the building of a union entailed long-term investments, thus requiring a shifting of expectations from short to medium-term returns (CROUCH 1982: 45). Hence, it was less the most deprived but the better paid workers that were the first to organize (BLAU 1964: 214-5).

THE REPRESENTATION OF INTERESTS

Mutual-benefit organizations perform a dual function of intermediation: they aggregate interests internally and represent them externally. Trade unions as *intermediary structures* (cf. MÜLLER-JENTSCH 1983) are one of the most important social institutions in contemporary society. Unions perform the two dual functions of internal *social integration* and

external *system integration* (cf. LOCKWOOD 1964, STREECK 1987). Not only have unions to face the mobilization problem with its logic of membership, unions have also to decide collectively over the content, target and channel for collective action. This intermediation problem has its own rules: the *logic of intermediation* (cf. SCHMITTER & STREECK 1981). An important insight from neo-corporatist theory on interest intermediation is that "organisation is both constrained by and shapes the nature of interests concerned (CAWSON 1986: 11)". Collective interests do not speak for themselves but have to be filtered and forwarded through an organization. Moreover, interest organizations do not just derive goals from an aggregation of interests but shape the very base of the goal formation, the collective identity and value-system (cf. STREECK & SCHMITTER 1985: 19).

Internally, intermediary organizations perform the important function to link the social structure to the social system, that is, to aggregate and shape interest formation. In order to press for the interests of its members an interest organization needs internally a degree of *hierarchical ordering* (cf. SCHMITTER 1974). Interests are aggregated through processes of internal democracy. Moreover, in order to bargain with other organizations a union has to rely on a degree of compliance by its members. If necessary is must be able to discipline its members for non-compliance (CROUCH 1979: 39-40). This may be particularly the case when the organization's leadership stresses the primacy of medium-term procedural goals (to achieve power for future negotiations), while members prefer short-term returns.

As for the logic of membership, the *logic of representation* (or intermediation) varies as a function of the size (or degree of differentiation) of the membership. Small unions that cater only a particular craft or occupation can form special interest organizations with a high degree of internal cohesion. Special interest organizations have the advantage of amplified solidarity but also tend to group homogeneity and social closure. Large inclusive unions, on the other hand, organize a larger segment of the population with larger interest heterogeneity. Moreover, small special interest groups are less likely to be affected by the externalities of their pressure group politics than large encompassing interest organizations (OLSON 1982). Thus encompassing organizations have also to take into account the external effects of their action. They have to explain to their members the constricting logic of *Sachzwänge* (factual requirements).

Externally, interest groups represent the mediated interests towards the outside. In order to enhance representation possibilities and overcome unnecessary competition with like-minded organizations, unions seek alliances within the union movement and with the outside. Cooptation and coalition are two "bridging strategies" (SCOTT 1987) for organizations to build alliances in order to increase the representational strength and overcome resource dependency (cf. PFEFFER & SALANCIK 1978). These strategies are substitutes if not a functional equivalence for encompassiveness under conditions where this cannot be achieved by one single organization (cf. STREECK 1987), that is by "one big union".

ADAPTATION OF INTEREST ORGANIZATIONS

Finally, the question arises to what degree are organizations able to adapt their institutional set-up, their mobilization strategy and alliances to changing external conditions. In the strategic considerations of organizations different prospective pay-offs of alternative strategies are considered. However, there is an inbuilt tension between the two integrative functions of intermediary organizations, the logic of membership and the logic of representation. Depending on the forms of intermediation, its interorganizational links, the organization - according to the logic of representation - becomes dependent in its decisions from the environment. On the other hand, the link between the organization and its social base makes the organization also dependent from the social structure. Social change can affect the social support structure of an organization, while changes in the inter-organizational network and power relations also require adaptation. Strategic adaptation of an organization may pose a dilemma when the logic of representation requires an opposite adjustment to that imposed by the logic of mobilization.

Each of the two logics creates different trade-offs once an organization attempts to alter its membership base or its organizational interdependencies. One of these interaction effects can be illustrated by the example of a working-class party transforming itself into a catch-all *Volkspartei* (KIRCHHEIMER 1966). By changing its social appeal it may come into conflict with its traditional close union relations. Trade-off considerations (PRZEWORSKI & SPRAGUE 1986) operate at two levels for the party (or for a union). First, the party (or union) by moving away from its traditional base may loose old supporters (or members), while partly gaining through appeal to new ones. Second, the party (or union) risks to strain its relations with the traditional ally (union and party respectively), while it may gain some more room for manoeuvre to cooperate with other organizations.

The ability to adaptation, however, varies as to the degree of the institutionalization of the organization into the social structure and organizational network. My argument will be that the initially successful transformation of interests into organizations becomes a somewhat self-defeating cause, it increases organizational inertia. Organizations that are well institutionalized face formidable problems of change: flexible adaptation is difficult when the organization is relative strongly locked into the social structure and tied into an interorganizational network.

II
INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF CLEAVAGES IN ORGANIZATIONS

We have followed the transformation process of cleavages into organizations, the process by which interests become formed, organized, mobilized and represented. Cleavages are not only an impetus for the initial formation of an organization, but they are the very base of the two main functions: the mobilization and representation of interests. The enduring impact of cleavages on collective organizations derives from the particular way in which

cleavage-organizations are embedded into the social structure and are linked with the social system. As pointed out in the introduction, unions have a dual function as collective and corporate organizations (see Chapter 1). As collective organizations they have to rely on the mobilization of the social base (membership or supporters). As corporate actors they have to rely on alliance building with other organizations in order to achieve effective representation.

I shall now develop the thesis that cleavages become through the process of *institutionalization* enshrined into the organization. First, in the formation and consolidating phase, the cleavages that gave rise to the organization as well as the way in which the organization is set-up have a long-term impact on the "infusion with value". Thereafter, I will develop along the two logics of membership and representation, the strategies by which cleavage-organizations institutionalize themselves. I will develop two crucial concepts for the study of the institutionalization of mobilization and representation processes: social closure and pillarization. In each case, I shall state the mechanism and the limits of these processes. In fact, some cleavage-organizations are compelled to adapt a more open mobilization strategy and broader alliance building. Indeed, the two concepts allow us not only to analyze the social and organizational closure but also the reverse processes of desegmentation and depillarization on cleavage-organizations. Yet, my contention is again that there is an institutional path: organizational decisions at an earlier time structure and delimit the alternatives for future adaptation.

ORGANIZATIONAL INSTITUTIONALIZATION

Once an organization has been founded, the problem of the "maintenance of the system" (SELZNICK 1948) arises. In order that an organization lasts longer than an *ad hoc* collective action movement it must structure its internal and external relations. The founders must build and consolidate an organizational structure that differentiates leadership, administrative and membership roles. The leaders, staff and members will have to be committed to the aims of the organization, that is, "infuse with value" (SELZNICK 1957: 17). The assumption taken here is that the initial phase of foundation and consolidation has an impact on the long-term organization development. Organizations will carry with them "traces of their time of origin" (STINCHCOMBE 1965: 159) over their subsequent development. Whether the organization was externally or internally founded and whether all parts of the organization become committed to one set or a diffuse set of values will have an impact on the organizations resistance to change.

In his seminal study of parties DUVERGER (1951) distinguishes two genuine structural organization models: the leadership party (*parti de cadre*) and the mass party (*parti de masse*), or between internal and external founding. While the leadership party was initially formed by an electoral alliance or parliamentary grouping, the mass party has been formed by support or intervention from existing external organizations (DUVERGER 1951: 2-13). The difference between internal and external support has important consequences to the internal structure - what is summed up by the images of leadership vs. mass party. Externally

founded organizations tend to be more centralized, they are formed from the top-down, with more hierarchical discipline, and the centre assumes primary authority. In contrast, the loose electoral alliances and parliamentary groupings tend to be more decentralized, they have been formed from the bottom-up, and the local structures maintain largely their autonomy (DUVERGER 1951: 13). The more the organization is externally legitimated, the more it is interdependent and innerorganizational change is difficult to be undertaken unilaterally.

One should also separate the process of organizational consolidation from the dimension of support. There are two ideal-type forms of territorial expansion: a strong, centre-led strategy of *penetration*, and a weak, periphery-led form of *diffusion* (cf. PANEBIANCO 1988; ELIASSEN & SVAASAND 1975). Yet one can apply the same principle also to non-territorial aspects of organizational consolidation. Does an organization grow through differentiation of functional units or through combining relative independent units? Institutionalization is a more uniform process in the case of centre-led penetration, when local organizational structures but also functional sub-structures become modelled after the centre, while in the case of periphery-led growth by bringing together diverse units and will ne only incompletely integrated.

Organizational institutionalization leads to the consolidating of an organization, however, it "is a two-edged sword" (HANNAN & FREEMAN 1989: 75), the other edge of the sword is *structural inertia* (see also HANNAN & FREEMAN 1984). For a number of reasons structural inertia persists in well institutionalized organizations (HANNAN & FREEMAN 1977: 957). *Internally*, it is rational to continue existing routines given the past investments that become sunk costs, limited information over alternatives, vested interests opposed to change, high risks and costs of reorganization, and shared organizational norms (cf. STINCHCOMBE 1965, 1968). *Externally*, structural inertia is fostered by external barriers to entry or exit from organizational fields, constraints on access to informations, and isomorphic legitimation. Thus for an organization it is less costly to continue existing routines than indulge in unknown areas, thus organizations follow a learning curve (NELSON & WINTER 1982: 99-107). Institutionalization is not merely limited to the consolidation of the organizational structure but also derives from the mobilization of interests through social embedding and the representation of interests through interlocking with other organizations. I shall examine now the process of institutionalization through social embedding (*social closure*) and interlocking (*pillarization*), that contribute to the "freezing" of cleavage structures in union systems.

SOCIAL CLOSURE

In order to create group solidarity and mobilize resources for the representation of interests, a cleavage-organization can use an exclusive strategy. *Social closure* is a monopolization strategy which maintains internal solidarity and external closure (WEBER

1922: 23-24).[5] Through social closure an organization locks into the social structure. Social closure binds members of a social group or community to an organization.

Historically, social closure was often a partly deliberate, partly affective reaction to the destablization of traditional social networks through modernization, in particular, through spatial and social mobility (cf. ROKKAN 1977, ELLEMERS 1984). A social group that is endangered through the 'ills of modernization' builds a web of social relations that replaces traditional community by associational belonging. Important is the creation of an ideological community, whether *Weltanschauung* or professional status, that creates solidarity and group identity *vis-à-vis* other groups. Social ghettos, like Socialist, Catholic or Communist working class communities in the interwar period are an example for political cleavage organizations based on social closure. But also status groups with *Standesdünkel* (particular social esteem), labour aristocracy, white-collar salariat, *Beamtenstand* (civil servants) mobilized in defense of their privileges.

Cleavage organizations play an important role in the process of social closure through creating a network of associational life. Social closure is based on a deliberate attempt to create inclusive concentric circles. The inner circle is the political or spiritual life sphere, enclosed by the socialization sphere, further encircled by the professional life and finally by the private, social life. Multiple membership in organizations of these spheres is the mechanism that creates internal cohesion, paralleled by the process of interlocking at the level of organizations. For Socialist workers in interwar Germany, for instance, their life turned around concentric circles: the political party, working class family and neighbourhood community, trade union and workplace organization, sports or cultural associations, or holiday camps. For Catholic workers, only the inner circle was replaced by the Church and Catholic Action groups, the other life spheres were matching those in the Socialist "camp".

However, as will be shown in examining cleavage- organizations, social closure is a precarious, even self-defeating mechanism. Social integration, the increased national integration of the previous subcultures into society, led to a loosing of the grip of group identity. Desegmentation increased after the Second World War with increasing social mobility, deepened political and economic integration, enhanced individualization, spreading leisure culture, general secularisation, and the diffusion of modern values through mass media. Modernization eventually cut the base of social closure processes, it finally succeeded over the counter-reactive process, albeit not completely. The concentric social circles that had been artificially created (different to the mechanical solidarity of the Middle Ages), through continued social integration became increasingly cross-cut (cf. SIMMEL 1890/1908), leading to multiple contradicting group memberships. Pressures toward opening cleavage organizations at the level of interest intermediation have reinforced the breaking down of the formerly tied social network.

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5 Following WEBER (1922), social closure theory became further developed by conflict therorists and neo-marxists (COLLINS 1975, MURPHY 1988). I use social closure here in a more narrow sense as the process of segmentation of a social network in order to foster solidarity and to shut off a group from external influences.

EXCLUSIVE AND INCLUSIVE MOBILIZATION STRATEGIES

Hence, unions have in principle two basic strategies for mobilization: an exclusive strategy that is based on social closure and an inclusive strategy based on associational advantages. As pointed out before, small, closed unions profit from exclusive mobilization strategies, while large, open unions face collective action problems (cf. OLSON 1965). In general, there are six means to mobilize members: (1) group solidarity, (2) group monopoly, (3) group coercion, (4) individual selective incentives, (5) individual risk avoidance, (6) individual costs of non-membership. The first three mechanism remain mainly strategies of small, exclusive *closed* unions, the latter three of large, inclusive *open* unions.

(1) *Group solidarity*. Individuals may be strongly committed to the group in which they work or live and thus join for reasons of group solidarity. Moreover, a motivation to join a union can be social needs of individuals for group identity and solidarity. The social club character was prevalent among the many small union locals in the early days of union history. Until after the war, the organizational life was a major pillar of working class formation and the crystallization of group identity. Although the growth of unions to large scale organizations was largely detrimental to the social function, union movements with a well-developed workplace oriented "club system" have been more successful than others (KJELLBERG 1983).

(2) *Group monopoly*. According to PERLMAN (1928) American workers were afraid of job scarcity and therefore American unions attempted to achieve 'job control' in order to monopolize job opportunities for their members. Membership may be rational when a closed communal union can monopolize control over entry into a profession or craft, and thus reduce competition through outsiders by exclusion (WEBER 1922: 23-25, 201-203). Based on historical accounts, however, Olson suggests "that unions have sought 'job control', not so much to protect a stagnant or dwindling supply of job opportunities, as to strength, expand, and stabilize unions as organizations (OLSON 1965: 82)". In any case, job control and monopolization are limited to small groups (work places) or professions with particular skills and control over the labour process.

(3) *Group pressure*. The already organized have an interest to maintain group solidarity - quite in contrast to the principle of *voluntary* association. "A group's survival depends upon the adoption of effective techniques to control its members" (HECHTER 1987: 51). Monitoring compliance is seen as legitimate in a mutual-benefits society, the organization can enforce compliance and may even hire professionals as agents to maintain membership. Furthermore, external support may be achieved through political exchange, alliance building or bargaining with other allied organizations (labour party, other labour associations), the employers or the state. These institutionalized arrangements are a form of coercion,

though often covered, leaving *de jure* freedom, while *de facto* forcing individuals to become member.[6]

(4) *Individual benefits.* In the absence of coercion, unions may provide selective incentives or club goods to overcome the collective action problem. Originally, a number of unions had been formed as mutual benefit associations with the main aim to provide welfare benefits, though these benefits have later been provided on a larger scale by the welfare state. Moreover, "outside inducements" (OLSON 1965) that are not related to the prime aims of the organization, such as family insurance, holiday camps, social activities, provide "club goods" that are additional, but hardly sufficient enough incentives to combine. In fact, these selective benefits have often fallen short of the costs of membership. Moreover, they became less important over time as they were often dysfunctional to the unions' main goals of economic interest representation (cf. STREECK 1981: Chap. 10).

(5) *Individual risk avoidance.* Membership may be rational under circumstances of uncertainty when the organization provides a mutual insurance. In fact, unemployment insurance, strike benefits, grievance handling, legal advise are all mutual insurance benefits of unions against uncertainty deriving from the structural weakness of individual employees *vis-à-vis* their employers. Risk avoidance through mutual-benefit thus seems to be a rational strategy, particularly for those that would be most affected by external risks (strike, work dispute, arbitrary dismissal, firm closure) due to a weak position in the labour market. Cost-benefit calculations on membership costs compared to the future need and value of these insurance benefits can be positive. Moreover, risks are difficult to determine for an individual under uncertainty, incomplete information and external contingency when (the risks cannot be individually controlled).

(6) *Individual costs of non-membership.* On the other hand, one can also turn the free-rider problem up- side down (cf. BRIEFS 1980: 706). A union claims to be the representative of a particular section in the workforce, expecting each one that profits from it also to contribute to its costs, although non-members ("free-riders" as seen for the union) have no say over the goals. This leads to the paradoxical situation that the costs of being a non-member may exceed the costs of membership (MARSH 1976, WILLIAMSON 1989: 78). In fact, some under-represented, non-unionized groups may be disadvantaged compared to others and therefore driven to combine (within or outside the existing unions). Wage contracting in so far is not always a public good, but can be a targeted, exclusive collective good (cf. OLSON 1965). Those not represented may not receive their "fair shares" (SWENSON 1989), non-membership becomes thus a costly option, the non-organized groups are facing solitarily the collective solidarity of the organized.

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6 Thus membership in an union-led unemployment insurance scheme in Sweden does not require *de jure* being a member of the union as well, but *de facto* this discretion is not as obvious to the potential member.

PILLARIZATION

Cleavage-organizations not only monopolize through social closure but also use organizational closure to enhance their power. Organizations enter alliances with others to maintain unity and augment their power resources *vis-à-vis* contenders. Cleavage based organizations form interlinkages and become organizationally segmented, they become integrated into an organizational pillar. *Pillarization* is the macro-process by which an interorganizational network is created with the aid of interlocking and other bridging devices on the base of a social cleavage.[7] The process of pillarization is the tandem to the process of social closure, both processes are mutually reinforcing each other. Social closure enhances group cohesion, collective solidarity and resource mobilization, while pillarization fosters social closure through the organizatational segmentation of social life spheres.

Similarly to the process of social closure, the process of pillarization was a counter-reaction of political elites and dissidents to modernization. In order to mobilize against the threats of modernization, a strong organization was needed. Internal cohesion and external pressures were to provide the base of organizational power to these elites (ROKKAN 1977). An interorganizational network was created or became differentiated from the cleavage fostering centres (the party or Church). Interlocking of leadership and alliance building became the most important bridging strategy that maintained the coherence of an organizational pillar.

Again the idea of *concentric* circles is the organizing principle not only of the social life spheres but also of the organizational life. The party or Church is the inner circle the *Weltanschauung* disseminating institution, encircled by the media for that dissemination (propaganda press, own schools), and followed by the professional organizations, and finally the social and cultural organizations (cf. POST 1989). Interlocking is the functional equivalent to the process of mutual membership in the case of social closure, organizations form alliances or co-opt leadership positions. Moreover, overlapping social bases, mutual membership, and multiple leadership increases interdependence between these organizations.

However, as in the case of desegmentation, *depillarization* eventually sets in, mainly as a result of a pillar's own organizational success. Increased interdependence with cross-cleavage organizations through accommodation, concertation and corporation decreases the impact of intra-cleavage interlocking. Moreover, each organization will eventually have to face the externalities of its sectional politics. Thus with the advancement of *system integration* the initially formation of a system opposing interest coalition becomes

[7] The concept of pillarization (*verzuiling*) was first introduced by Dutch sociologists (cf. KRUIJT & GODIJN 1962). Besides the Netherlands, the concept has been applied to segmemented countries, like Belgium, Switzerland, and Austria. In political science, the impact of pillarization on the accommodation of interests in consociational societies has triggered off an extensive debate (LIJPHART 1968). However, I use the concept of pillarization here in a more limited organizational usage.

decomposed as its parts become drawn into political exchange with institutions outside the own pillar. Furthermore, the problem of desegmentation destabilizes the social base and forces adaptation in the social boundaries. The organization will be forced to open up to new social groups by demphasizing the traditional cleavage base. However, by becoming more encompassing these organizations move into different directions, reducing their interorganizational overlap in the social base, thus at least gradually the pillars start crumbling.

ALLIANCE BUILDING

Following THOMPSON & MCEWEN (1958) we can distinguish four forms of interorganizational relations (besides competition): (1) bargaining, (2) co-optation, (3) coalition, and (4) merger. The constraints of the environment and the degree of inter-organizational control over organizational goal-setting decisions increases in the above order since the "potential power of an outsider increases the earlier he enters into the decision process (THOMPSON & MCEWEN 1958: 25)". Coalition and bargaining are strategies of alliance building where organizations remain completely autonomous, while cooptation and merger are alliance building in which organizations give up a part (or all) of their control.

(1) *Bargaining*. Bargaining is a structured exchange relationship between potentially competing organizations that agree to recognize each other as contract agents. As a recurrent exchange relationship both parties have an interest in creating trust by implementing and enforcing compliance to the terms of the agreement. "The need for periodic adjustment of relationships is demonstrated most dramatically in collective bargaining between labor and industrial management, in which the bases for continued support by organization members are reviewed (THOMPSON & MCEWEN 1958: 27)". Bargaining increases environmental control over decision making through the direct interaction with the other bargaining party. An organization becomes bound in the choice of alternatives by the degree to which the other party precludes alternatives from negotiation. Although inter-class bargaining between unions and employers or the state are the common, recurring form, inter-union bargaining is important where unions are split but have to come to terms in order to represent their interests effectively *vis-à-vis* the employers or the state (multi-union bargaining).

(2) *Co-optation*. "*Cooptation* is the process of *absorbing* new elements into the leadership or policy-determing structure of an organization as a means of averting threats to its *stability* or existence (SELZNICK 1948: 34)". Co-optation or interlocking of organizations is a strategy between complementary, non-rival organizations in order to better coordinate common action and increase external support and legitimacy. Cooptation may be formal or informal, through interlocking directorates or through overlapping multiple membership. It brings external considerations into the decision making process thus further limiting the choice of alternatives and the possibility for unilateral decisions (externalities of action to secondary parties become organizationally recognized). Complicated interdependencies develop between formal authority and power relations, commitment and responsibility become

shared between organizations. In the case of trade unions, co-optation is an important device in the relationship between party and union centre (see section 2.3 below), both organizations are not competitors but gain from the legitimation, resource and support of the allied organization operating in the other channel of representation.

(3) *Coalition.* Coalition is the most far reaching continuing form of interorganizational cooperation. The most primitive form of coalition is an *action-set* (ALDRICH & WHETTEN 1981: 387), a group of organizations "that have formed a temporary alliance for a limited purpose", the early trade union congress, the Triple Alliance in Britain, or *Aktionsgemeinschaften* (action committees) come to mind as examples of action-sets. On the other hand, a *peak association* is a long-term, general purpose, integrated association of organizations that are similarly affected by external forces and have thus a common purpose to gain strength from collective action. Peak associations involve a degree of transfer of resources and decision making power to a higher level that serves the common interests. Organizations that build an alliance attempt to reduce the competitive pressures at the level of single organizations by shifting it up to a higher level (HANNAN 1988: 104-5). The most integrated coalition is the neo-corporatists model of a monopolistic, state-licensed peak association constituted by a limited number of non-competitive, singular, compulsory membership organizations (cf. SCHMITTER 1974). Not only theoretically do forms of coalition building vary in their intensity, union centres vary between loose, volatile action-sets and strong, enduring peak associations.[8] Across Western Europe, union centres vary over time and between union movements as to the degree of *vertical* integration (cf. VISSER 1990: Chap. 8), in how far power (e.g. organizational reform, bargaining rights) and resources (e.g. strike funds, own staff) have been transferred to the higher (peak) level.

(4) *Merger.* Merger is the ultimate, discontinuing form of bridging strategies. An organization joins with an other organization to foster their common interests and will thereby give up most of its autonomy. After a merger it is no longer subject to inter-organizational constraints (THOMPSON & MCEWEN 1958: 28, fn. 14), though internally former divisions may continue. Merger can be a rational strategy for an organization in order to overcome resource dependency (PFEFFER 1972, PFEFFER & SALANCIK 1978), to reduce domain competition (FREEMAN & BRITTAIN 1977: 176), to decrease transaction costs (WILLIAMSON 1981), or to gain from economies of scale (CHITAYAT 1979: 5). From an ecological view point, there are two forms of combining organizations in order to rise their power of action: the "symbiotic (on the basis of their complementary differences) and the commensal (on the basis of their supplementary similarities). (HAWLEY 1968: 331)". There are furthermore two different forms of merger: (i) *amalgamation* of organizations that agree to dissolve in order to build a new combined organization and (ii) *absorption* of an organization by an other organization that will continue in its existence, while the other submerges its structure. Note that whatever its rationality a merger may face resistance by members that fear to loose the

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8 I use the term "union centre" as a generic term for all forms of coalition building among unions, thus including confederation, union congress, coordination committee. Note that American usage is federation instead of confederation (cf. KASSALOW 1969).

base of group solidarity. Moreover, "the president of a small union which is considering a merger with a larger union or with other smaller unions, is very conscious that leadership control as well as economic resources must be relinquished (CHITAYAT 1979: 7)". The merger strategy is furthermore constrained through legal and institutional requirements (e.g. merger laws)[9], while external pressures (e.g. from union centre) and ideology (e.g. solidarity principle, cf. FULCHER 1988) foster concentration.

INSTITUTIONAL PATH

The assumption of this study on cleavage structuration is that institutionalization enhances path dependence (NORTH 1990). Past decisions become institutionalized and limit the set of alternatives for the future course of action (ROKKAN 1977). At a crucial juncture of an organization's development, when crisis symptoms signal to leaders the need for substantial reform, the alternatives are largely bound by past institutionalization processes. Different to the assumptions of rational choice theory, these strategic decisions are not taking place in a void, there is no *tabula rasa*. Although organizations may adapt to changing environments by strategic decisions at critical junctures, "developments at one step set conditions or constraints for the next" (ROKKAN 1977: 564).

Institutional change is normally gradual and incremental, the most important possibilities for sudden, substantive change are given at critical junctures in the life span of an organization. Critical junctures are important potential turning points in the development of an organization. These conjunctures are points in time when symptoms of organizational crisis are signaled to the leadership, when disfunctional routines of the organizational behaviour have accumulated to a threshold of intervention, when problems of resource mobilization and internal disintegration have gained a critical mass, when changes in the network of organizations jeopardize established exchange patterns. Thus external social change and system restructuration, combined with mounting internal organizational tension, pose a formidable pressure to change. This coincides often with a situation when resources become freed (like after a war) and uncertainty over the future course is paramount.

Any decision taken, including no decision, can be considered to be a *strategic decision* in a situation of a critical juncture. We can speak of a strategic decision when the actors have some discretion and there are several alternatives to choose from, and when the taken decision has long-term consequences and will be crucial for the future position within the organizational network. The most important characteristic of strategic choice at critical junctures is that there are multiple solutions and only imperfect information (cf. NORTH 1990). There is no golden way to achieve the most efficient solution, at least for the actors involved at the time. Therefore, institutionalized structures can play an important role in

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9 For instance the British Trade Union (Amalgamation) Act of 1917 required 20 percent of consenting votes from at least half of each organizations membership, while the reform of 1964 required only a simple majority vote (cf. SIMPSON 1972: 387-9).

limiting the range of alternatives. At least there are three alternatives to an organization under pressure to change: selection, adaptation, or disintegration. An organization may either fail to adapt, while other organizations that were better adapted succeed over it (selection), or adapt successfully to the new situation, or the organization sees part of its leadership, membership or structure dissect.

When there are multiple solutions without a rational optimal strategy, the decision will be more determined by power relations than by rational choice. Institutions, in particular ideology, will shape the definition of the situation as well as the perception of possible alternatives. The decision making is likely to become a power game of vested interests within the organization. Furthermore, when the organization is linked with others, the organization may be further dependent and limited in its choice. Instead of a one shot rational choice game, it becomes an iterated *nested game* (TSEBELIS 1989, cf. KOELBLE 1992), where the outcome of one game, redistributes the power of groups within and between organizations, limiting the future choice or *Spielraum* (room for manoeuvre) in the next game.

The sequence of incremental and strategic choices thus follows a ramified process, where early small decisions and chance events have long-term consequences. Through the process of institutionalization the range of alternatives is limited and prestructured. An organization can change its course, but it cannot completely change its internal structure, external relations, or social base without risking complete upheaval. Any change is thus bound by past institutionalization. In order to adapt a radical change an organization has not only to design and implement a new structure but dismantle the old one without loosing its force. This is not to say that the development is deterministic or teleological, one cannot foresee the future choice but only analyze the conditions that limit the process of adaptation. There remains enough liberty for individuals to choose rationally or affectively from the set of alternatives and enough space for chance. But the subject of this study is to examine the conditions and configurations under which interests became organized, and how the once taken organizational decisions have been structuring the alternatives thereafter.

III
THE DIFFERENTIATION OF LABOUR INTEREST ORGANIZATIONS

Finally, we will now turn to the evolution of cleavage-organizations of labour interests. I shall develop two models that systematize the differentiation of the organization of labour interests into political and economic oriented organizations. The first model accounts for differentiation of party and unions, and the other for the division of labour between union centre and national unions. They are not meant to describe any particular national union development but an *ideal-type* model. Yet they can serve as yardsticks to compare the ideal paths of evolution with the national development. They allow us to point at divergence in

the development of these organizations and reflect on the impact on union diversity. The model is both an interpretative view and an explanatory device that will be the baseline model for the following chapters and detailed analysis of each labour cleavage. Furthermore, I shall provide some indications as to the clusters of factors that may account for the salience of political and functional cleavages in labour organization. Again these are only sketches of general universal processes and are not compared with the historical development in this chapter.

DIFFERENTIATION OF PARTY AND UNIONS

Working-class party and unions comprise two different forms of labour interest representation. Historically, party and unions emerged as the two main "wings" of the same social movement that became differentiated into two types of institutions sited in the political arena and the economic arena respectively. Party and unions, emerged in response to, and were shaped by, the gradual opening up of the "electoral channel" and the "corporate channel" (ROKKAN 1977). Yet, as LIPSET (1983) observes, differences across Europe were substantial as to the path by which "the working classes were accepted into the fabric of societies as political and economic citizens. The first involves their right to vote and to organize a political party that could play a constructive role in the polity; the second refers to the way working-class economic combinations, in the form of labour unions, were accepted as formally legitimate by the state and substantively legitimate by employers (LIPSET 1983: 6)". In the model forwarded here, it is assumed that deviations from an ideal-type *integration* process moulded the differentiation of the two organizations. The proposition is that the timing and structuring of these two channels had important consequences for the integration of labour into the political and economic systems (cf. ROKKAN 1977, LAFFERTY 1971, ELIASSEN 1974, LIPSET 1983).

Following ROKKAN (1970: 79) one can postulate four institutional thresholds that structured the political integration of the working class into the polity. (1) The threshold of *legitimation*: When were formerly excluded social groups granted the rights to assemble, to become organized and to express themselves in public? (2) The threshold of *incorporation*: When were these groups allowed to participate in political representative bodies? (3) The threshold of *representation*: When was a proportionality between electoral power and decision making power established? (4) The threshold of *executive power*: When did these groups get the chance to participate in the execution of government? These intervening constraints on the political opportunity structure moulded the "political alternatives" for collective action available to the labour movement in the political arena.

Similarly, in the economic arena, the corporate opportunity structure moulded the opportunities for collective action of labour movements. The structuring of the "bargaining channel" shaped the development of union as an institution, and its differentiation form the party. In analogy to Rokkan's model, a set of four thresholds can be proposed with respect to the transition towards a modern system of industrial relations (Cf. EBBINGHAUS & VISSER 1990): (1) The threshold of *association*: When was the right to form a coalition of labour

Figure 2.1
Model of Party-Union Differentiation in the Electoral and Corporate Channel

Electoral Channel	interest intermediation	Corporate Channel
"NATIONAL REVOLUTION"	WORKING CLASS FORMATION	"INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION"
Transition to		*Transition to*
Political Democracy:	Labour Movement	*Economic Democracy:*
1) Legitimation		1) Coalition right
2) Incorporation	<--- *differentiation*: --->	2) Action right
3) Representation	Political Economic	3) Bargaining
4) Executive power	functions functions	4) Participation
	PARTY <---> *interdependence* <---> UNIONS	
Political integration		*Economic integration*
STATE	LABOUR	EMPLOYERS

granted and no longer impeded? (2) The threshold of *collective action*: When was the right to strike granted to all workers? (3) The threshold of *bargaining*: When were unions recognized as collective bargaining partners by the State and by employers? (4) The threshold of *participation*: When did unions become intermediary organizations involved in the formation and execution of social policy and economic management? These thresholds constrain the "alternatives" of union organization and the form and degree to which unions become integrated within the capitalist economic system.[10]

Both threshold models are *ideal-type* representations of major steps in the transition toward political and economic integration of the working class - comparable to T.H. Marshall's sequence of the extension of citizenship rights (MARSHALL 1950). The evolutionary ideal-type model as proposed here (see Figure 2.1) is to be taken as encompassing the main course of European development towards political and industrial democracy. Its main purpose is to compare variations and deviations from the ideal-type path, not to assume its universality. We can study variations along two dimensions: (i) the degree of *differentiation* of the two channels and (ii) the *sequencing* in the opening of the two channels. The more equally, and the earlier, the two paths were separated the more we would expect party and unions to be differentiated and being less interdependent. However, if the processes are not synchronized we can expect a spill-over effect: when the political channel remains longer closed, one can expect a politicization of the organizations in the "bargaining" channel, while in the reverse case, unions will seek political alliance and support.

The structuring of the two channels will be taken as given, since an examination of the reasons, timing and character of the integration process would require a study in its own right (cf. BENDIX 1964, DAALDER 1966, ROKKAN 1968, MANN 1987). Certainly, this integration process was not merely an elite decision, but more an interaction between power holders and contenders. Nevertheless, for pragmatic reasons I take it as exogenous, for the

[10] Few studies have systematically analyzed the variations in institutional arrangements, see as an exception SORGE 1976 for an account of the transition to industrial democracy.

interest here is to analyze the impact of variations in the context of interest organizations on the way in which interests become formed.

EXPLAINING POLITICAL CLEAVAGE-ORGANIZATIONS

The party-union model allows us to account for the differentiation of political and economic interest representation. The model holds best for the Socialist labour movement (see Chapter 3), which is indeed the paradigmatic case of the ideal-type model. However, as will be shown, the cross-cutting class cleavage organizations, the Christian and Communist labour movement, were also reactions to the party-union interdependence of the Socialist labour movement.

For an explanation of the transformation of political cleavages, I would like to suggest four clusters of intervening contextual factors: (1) the social structure, (2) state intervention, (3) employers' intervention, and (4) cultural agencies and ideology. All four factors have been put forward in explanations for the character of labour movements, their radical or reformist orientation (cf. ELJASSEN 1974, LIPSET 1983). However, our interest here is to account for the different impact of cleavage structures on labour movements, not primarily their orientation. Nevertheless, one would expect the same independent variables to have also an impact on the transformation of political cleavages into organization.

(1) *Social structure.* The salience of the labour-capital cleavage depends partly on the degree to which the pre-industrial social fabric was eradicated by industrialization. Particularly on the continent, pre-industrial, semi-feudal social relations persisted and reinforced the status system (cf. STURMTHAL 1953: 17-32). It was there that the social integration of the rising proletariat was less successful and the process of social closure could erect social ghettos based on existing social ties and traditional status differentiation. Although secularization affected the growing urban working-class first, it did not lead in all working-class communities to a decline in religious affiliation. Migration form rural areas and regional periphery with a different ethnic, linguistic or religious population further added to the fragmentation of the working-class. The social status divisions, moreover, led to further working-class fragmentation and political heterogeneity.

(2) *State intervention.* The timing and scope of the integration of the working-class into the polity had also a direct impact on the institutionalization of cleavages. The state assumed in several countries a role in codification of union structures (e.g. legal union recognition, criteria for representativeness as bargaining partner). In respect to the State-Church cleavage, the conflict between a national-liberal Nation-State and the Church, particularly the Catholic church intensified segmentation. An important role played the school conflict over whether the state or the Church was to obtain authority over mass education, particularly, for the middle and lower classes (LIPSET & ROKKAN 1967). At a more general level, the political environment, for example, the degree of centralization and strength of the Nation-State affected the formation of labour organizations. For instance, the stronger French central state hampered trade union development more effectively, while the weaker German federal state had eventually to rely on incorporation of intermediary organizations,

such as unions for the execution of social policy (cf. CAROLL, DELACROIX & GOODSTEIN 1988: 386-9).

(3) *Employers strategy.* Recognition of unions by employers at the workplace or by employer associations at the national level played an important role in the institutionalization of union structure. In some cases, this was used as deliberate employer strategy to fragment the labour movement. On the other hand, in some countries, employers themselves were organized into religiously segmented employers' associations that preferred to deal with unions of their own creed (if at all), thus religiously divided labour movements had the possibility of cross-class accommodation within their own religious pillar (cf. LIJPHART 1968). On the other hand, employers intransigence and lacking willingness to centrally bargain perpetuated existing fragmentation of the labour movement into a radical political and reformist economist movement.

(4) *Ideology.* Both Left working-class party and Church claimed primary authority over ideology, the national or international party in the case of Socialist and Communist labour movements, the Church in the case of the Christian labour movements. The strategy of these political and cultural agencies were crucial, particularly, in the formation phase of labour movements. Since these actors pursued strategies not primarily aimed at economic interest representation, they often imposed on the union movement their own political and cultural goals. Tutelage and intransigence of the party or Church hindered for long the development of a fully differentiated, independent union structure, often blocking across cleavages labour unity *vis-à-vis* capital and the state.

Hence, for a better understanding of cross-cutting cleavage organizations we have to add further "players" to the figuration shaping the organization of labour interests. *Figuration* is a useful image to depict the interdependence of major collective actors in a social field, it takes a prominent place in Elias' figuration sociology (ELIAS 1970, cf. SWAAN 1988 for an application). Besides the employers and the state, there are two further collective actors that intervened in the formation of labour movements - both claiming a particular ideological primacy over *Weltanschauung*. The Church had an important role in the emergence of Christian trade union movements, though the Rome-led Catholic church was more trans-national and centralized than Protestant denominations. The Moscow–led Communist International assumed a particular role in the Communist trade union movement, while in the Socialist movement there remained only a diverse international *community of discourse* (cf. WUTHNOW 1989), after the shortlived First International.

DIVISION OF LABOUR BETWEEN UNION CENTRE AND UNIONS

A second differentiation in the organization of labour interests took place within the 'action set' of unions: the division of labour between a union centre and its constituting affiliated unions. Like party and unions, the differentiation between union centre and national unions followed a general differentiation into a more political function and a more economic function of interest representation. Historically, union centres were build in most countries through the initiative of already existing national unions, and often with the help

Figure 2.2
Model of Building Union Centre and National Unions in Concertation and Bargaining Channel

Concertation Channel	interest intermediation	Bargaining Channel
Building of peak association:	Union Movement	*Building of union alliance:*
1) National integration		1) National unions
2) Associational monopoly	<-- *differentiation*: -->	2) Noncompetitive structure
3) Peak authority	Political Economic	3) Leadership authority
4) Central administration	functions functions	4) Union administration
	CENTRE <---> *interdependence* <---> UNION	
Macro-level concertation (political exchange)		*Meso-level Bargaining (contract negotiations)*
STATE - EMPLOYERS PEAK	LABOUR	EMPLOYERS ASSOCIATIONS

of the party or other actors in the figuration. The need to combine in a peak organization became pressing as the want rose for independence from party tutelage, effective national pressure politics *vis-à-vis* the state, and solidaristic cooperation against increasing employers centralization. However, it still remains disputed which of these forces was the driving one, if actually only one was dominant (cf. FULCHER 1988). The functions of the union centre are threefold: (1) coordination of the affiliated national unions (also *vis-à-vis* the party), (2) the representation of the general interests *vis-à-vis* the state (pressure group politics), and (3) the concertation with the national employers associations (bargaining function).

The union centre is commonly a peak association, that is, an organization of organizations, quite in contrast to the political party. With few significant exceptions, labour organizations in the economic sphere are less centralized than in the political arena. The more diverse composition of union movement (cf. MARKS 1989) is often overlooked by studies that concentrate on peak level organization only. For single unions, to build an alliance with others is a rational strategy to overcome uncertainty and pool resources to increase the power potential *vis-à-vis* contenders. The degree of integration in such an alliance, however, varies substantially over time and across countries. Union centres often started as a statistical information office, a periodical congress of union delegates, or an alliance of union leaders became in some cases differentiated well-staffed confederations with considerable power over their affiliates.

An ideal-type model (see Figure 2.2) can summarize the transition from an undifferentiated union movement to a well-organized national union movement. Such a union movement is signified by the following internal organizational characteristics: (1) nationally integrated, (2) functionally differentiated, (3) hierarchically ordered, and (4) centralized. Note that this ideal-type union movement is close to the model of neo-corparist interest organizations (cf. SCHMITTER 1974). However, as has been pointed out in neo-corporatist studies, trade union movements vary substantially across space and time in matching the model (cf. CROUCH 1986, 1991, VISSER 1990).

Like the previous model, we would expect variations in the sequence of these processes to affect the degree of differentiation of union centre and national unions. Different to the party-union model before, these processes are internal organizational consolidation processes, not the structuring of thresholds in political opportunity structure. Nevertheless, these processes have been triggered of by structural changes such as national integration of politics and economy, as well as the degree of centralization of state and capital.

(1) *National integration.* National integration of labour interests became crucial in the face of the national integration of labour markets, concentration of national economy, and increasing regulatory power of the central state (cf. ULMAN 1955). The formation of national unions, the integration of independent locals and the territorial expansion of a network of locals became one of the major achievements of prewar labour movements. Independent local unions and other regional representative structures - often strongholds of politicized syndicalist localism - became increasingly barred from direct representation within the national union centres. Dual structures of representation with *territorial* and *functional* units having a say within decision making in a union confederation were mostly settled in favour of the latter. This in turn lead to further depoliticization of the union centre and enhanced the differentiation from the political party which is commonly based on territorial representation. National integration of regional and local labour organizations was also a response to the "nationalization" of the electoral and bargaining channels. After the First International. the labour movements developed into more solid national union centres (e.g. the Swedish "*Landsorganisation*") that brought together the centralized national unions (e.g. the German "*Zentralverband*").

(2) *Functional differentiation.* A second crucial development was functional differentiation (cf. SCHMITTER 1974). Rationalization of the trade union structure became an imperative in the face of increased economic interdependence and concentration. At the level of national unions, the drive towards a reorganization and concentration of trade unions through mergers was crucial for a rationalization of the representative structure. Through mergers, unions with overlapping or adjacent domains can reduce direct competition, profit from economies of scale, and amplify political power. Union centres, in order to enhance internal coherence, fostered the drive towards a more rational, concentrated union structure through merger inducements and affiliation policies. Moreover, union centres often fostered the set-up of unions in weakly non-organized domains, thus enhancing overall representation. Concentration is a prerequisite for better, less time consuming and costly, decision making coordination. Yet, imbalances in the power structure of affiliates, the existence of a few "big" unions *vis-à-vis* many smaller unions, are usually an obstacles towards a shift of authority to the supra-functional peak level.

(3) *Hierarchical ordering.* "Hierarchical ordering" (cf. SCHMITTER 1974) involved the shift of decision making competences and resources to a higher level: from local to national, from single union to peak level. However, internal power distribution of union movements vary considerable over time and space, they follow diverging historical paths. Three functions seem to be crucial indicators for the degree of integration: power over resources, bar-

gaining competence and organizational disciplinary capacity. Power over resources at a higher level allows higher order, "organic" solidarity, it maintains overall strength through balancing resources between weaker and stronger units. Bargaining competence at a higher order balances again differences in power to the advantage of the weaker units. Organizational disciplinary capacity at a higher order maintains the unity of actions and limits jurisdictional competition. In practice, these three capacities are normally diminishing from the first to the last, not to speak of the differences between union centres as to the overall degree of integration (see VISSER 1990).

(4) *Centralization*. The building of an administrative structure is further an outcome of the forces that lead to centre building. In order to promote the afore mentioned processes, union movements enlarged, centralized and professionalized their administrative structures. With the growth of unions, unions could no more rely on voluntary activity only. Moreover, bureaucratic rationalization is partly an isomorphic process (DIMAGGIO & POWELL 1983), adapting to the bureaucratic environment for reasons of efficiency and legitimation. As the state, employers associations, and large corporations increase their administrative systems, the organization of labour is forced to follow suite.

EXPLAINING FUNCTIONAL CLEAVAGE-ORGANIZATIONS

The division of labour between union centre and unions raises the important problem of functional interest representation. What are the organization principles of the union movement, the distribution of power and task between national unions and the union centre. As was pointed out before, functional cleavages gave rise to different forms of organization strategies. Functional cleavages can lead to splits in a union movement: interorganizational conflicts over jurisdiction or external conflicts with other rival union centres. To explain the differences in the way in which interests of various sections of the dependent labour force became organized, a number of macro-social factors can be associated: (1) the economic development, (2) state intervention, (3) employer strategies, and (4) labour ideology. Both structure and agency are important variables for each of these factors, be it the structure of the economy, the state, the employers, the labour movement, or the action of these actors.

(1) *Economic development*. The economic development is the underlying force for the potential labour market segmentation and the formation of different sectional interests. The character and development of the economic structure has an impact on the labour process, for instance, on the level of skill requirements, industrial concentration and bureaucratization. These factors in turn influence the way in which labour interests are segmented, how different groups can combine and act collectively, and what resources they have. At the level of the workplace, technological development can restrain or facilitate the power of workers, as much as, at a industry level, it can hamper or serve the power of union organization. The timing and pace of the industrialization process not only affected the formation of the working class (cf. GALENSON 1952a, LORWIN 1958) but also the organizational development. Late-comers could apply new organization "technologies", while facing less rigidi-

ties of established, traditional structures. Moreover, slow and gradual development normally lead to peacemeal adaptation without large restructurations, whereas periods of sudden, rapid growth freed resources and allowed radical organizational changes (cf. STINCHCOMBE 1965). Yet, contingency theories have long claimed a technology-structure linkage, the interdependence of organizations and their technological environments (cf. SCOTT 1990), which cannot be maintained. Deterministic 'logic of industrialism' explanations fail to account why countries with similar economic level of development have so varying organizational structures.

(2) *State intervention.* The state may intervene at least at two levels by shaping interest formation or by licensing organizations. The state has been active in reshaping social divisions, particularly by intensifying the segmentation of the working class. Social and labour policy may well turn into class dividing politics (ESPING-ANDERSEN & KORPI 1984) when state regulation privileges some social groups, for instance, by granting special provisions for senior workers, white-collar employees, or civil servants. Moreover, the state regulated the organizational structure by erecting entry barriers or codifying its structure, for instance, by banning public sector strikes. The differential granting of coalition and strike rights (see above) to particular groups is one way of state regulations of collective organization. Of more subtle impact have been other regulations, such as association or merger laws, or statutory registration of unions. Moreover, the state can institutionalize unions through incorporation of unions into welfare state functions, for instance, participation in social security administration, labour courts, or employment exchanges. Finally, it should be noted that the state has been crucial in union recognition (BAIN 1970), either as employer in the public sector or by public licensing unions as social partners (cf. OFFE 1981), in both respects an existing union structure becomes codified and institutionalized at the discretion of the state.

(3) *Employers strategies.* The third actor in industrial relations, the employers, have a similar crucial role in shaping the context in which union organizations emerge. The level to which employers are collectively organized, the degree of centralization of employer associations, and the extent of their resources poses a challenge to the organization of labour interests, being pressed to follow suit. Moreover, in order to conduct collective bargaining unions are under pressure to adapt their structure accordingly, they may be inclined to coordinate their action (in a bargaining cartel), or even merge with each other to form a encompassing union as to limit the centrifugal effects of multi-union bargaining. Moreover, resistance of employers to union activities at any level poses a formidable challenge to unions to adapt. Historically, massive lock-outs by employers have made more coordinate and centralized action (national federation) and resources (strike funds) a prime necessity (cf. FULCHER 1991). On the other hand, recognition of unions will have an impact on the consolidation of unions (see BAIN 1970) and on institutionalization of the existing union structure. Beyond these structural aspects, employers strategies at the workplace level often fostered labour segmentation in their own interests.

(4) *Labour ideology*. Finally, the structure of the labour movement and its ideological orientation have an impact on the functional differentiation of union movements. Moreover, cross-cutting class cleavages multiply the number of rival unions, thus the average union would be smaller than otherwise, leading to diseconomies of scale, fiercer competition and pressures to concentrate within one movement. The strategies of union centres, whether following ideological or pragmatic considerations, for instance, conceptions of class solidarity (cf. FULCHER 1991), are also a catalyst. However, as was already noted, the authority of union centres over their affiliates vary across Europe, in countries where the need for a rationalization of the union structure would be greatest, fragmentation prevails within the union centre blocking the transfer of power to reorganize. On the other hand, success in bringing about a more rational structure at one time, may well lead to problems of integrating new sections of the labour force at a later time. These unorganized groups may in turn organize separately in response to the lack of representation and the success of the existing unions, following a general drive to organize (cf. for Sweden: KORPI 1978). Having developed a framework for analysis, we will now turn to each line of conflict, first political cleavages and later functional cleavages, and investigate in the following chapters the historical transformation of these cleavages in organizations.

3
THE LABOUR-CAPITAL CLEAVAGE

> *'The working class movement with purely trade union organization cannot reach its goal. A working class movement with purely political organization cannot reach its goal. The two forms of organization are indispensable to each other ...* (WILHELM LIEBKNECHT, *1893, cit. in* KASSALOW *1969: 29)*

Labour unity, was and is the primary goal and means of the labour movement. With the Industrial Revolution, the conflict between labour and capital gave universally rise to the formation of political and economic interest organizations that claimed to represent the interest of the working-class (cf. LIPSET & ROKKAN 1967). Socialist mass party and allied unions as modern forms of interest representation originated from the labour-capital cleavage.[1] Labour unity was crucial in labour's struggle for civil, political and social citizenship rights. In its century old history, the socialist labour movement has had a profound impact on the development of labour organization in Europe. No other labour movement has made a larger historical claim and commitment to *labour unity*, while struggling to overcome union diversity. Union diversity along the labour-capital cleavage derived from the different political and economic integration of the working-class, in addition to the persistence of pre-capitalist and new social cleavages that divided labour.

This chapter deals with the transformation of the universal *labour-capital* cleavage into socialist party and unions, revealing the variations in the transformation of the cleavage into labour organization. The claim is that these variations are largely the result of the dissimilar formation and diverse differentiation of party and unions following the opening up of the two channels of interest representation: the *electoral* channel and *corporate* channel (see Chapter 2). This chapter analyzes the transformation of the cleavage into party and unions, the parallel mobilization, the representation, and party-union linkages.

First, the *transformation* of the labour-capital cleavage into working-class party and unions will be compared. Following the model developed in the preceding chapter, the differentiation of party and unions, the relations between the two, will be related to the timing and sequence in their formation. Although we expect the cleavage organizations to emerge universally, the variations in the integration into polity and economy led to differences in the consolidation and interdependence of the two organizations.

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[1] In the following the term Socialist party and Socialist union movement is used as a general term for non-Communist working-class parties and union movements, though in some cases the terms Social-Democratic party, Labour party or Free union movement is more appropriate. It is not to claim that all these working-class parties (or unions) are ideologically or sociologically the same: quite in contrast.

Second, the logic of *mobilization* for party and unions will be discussed looking at the electoral and unionization records. During the initial phase of mobilization, party and unions gained from a parallel organization. However, working-class party and unions meet limits to their growth, they are faced with a strategic decisions to open to new social groups or to fall short of the majority or encompassing all dependent employed. We expect that these pressures will lead to tensions in the initial party-union relations.

Third, the *representation* of labour interests adds further tension between party and unions and the initial linkage. Whereas during the early phase both organizations gained from mutual struggle for political and social rights, with the integration into polity and economy, there will be more potential for differences. In order to make broader political alliances or strike settlements with employers, party and unions will have to alter their traditional policies. In particular, conflicts between a party in government and allied unions can increase the tension. Again we expect given the differences in the institutionalization of party and unions and their relations, strongly institutionalized labour movements to be slower in adaptation.

I
FORMATION AND INTERDEPENDENCE OF THE "SIAMESE TWINS"

In the course of the Industrial Revolution, the conflict between workers and employers - the *labour-capital* cleavage - led more or less uniformly to the formation of a working-class party and unions in the decades before the introduction of universal (or male) suffrage around the First World War (LIPSET & ROKKAN 1967: 35). One finds in all Western European countries the emergence of a party and unions that claim to represent the political and economic interests of the working-class. Even though still a *class-in-its-making*, the working class represented a substantial minority, one-fourth to one-third of the adult prewar population, with the "Great Expectation" that it would become the dominant, ruling majority in the near future (PRZEWORSKI & SPRAGUE 1986: 25-8). Moreover, socialist ideas that proclaimed the ultimate goal of a class-less society were disseminating internationally, thanks to the exile of dissidents, the improved communication patterns and trans-national party and union contacts. Yet, the Industrial Revolution spread unequally and with varying pace from its berth in Britain across the European continent. The *Arbeiterfrage*, the social problems connected with the rise of industrial capitalism, became a pressing question on the political agenda. While mending the most dangerous social wounds, the ruling elites utilised varying manoeuvres to exclude the working-class from gaining full political participation and to hamper its collective organization (cf. MANN 1987). The differences in political and economic development, however, had a divergent impact on the transformation of the labour-capital cleavage into labour organization.

Certainly, working-class party and unions, like *Siamese twins* (V. ADLER), were born together out of the same nascent social movement and are inextricably linked. The labour-

capital cleavage led universally to a differentiation of political and economic organizations into the two channels of interest representation, while the relations between party and unions remained interdependent (see Chapter 2). Even though a working-class party and unions emerged everywhere in Europe as a consequences of the universal labour-capital cleavage, there are important variations that have somewhat been neglected in cleavage analysis. Party and unions emerged partly synchronically, partly diachronically, thereby leading to different forms of party-union relations with important consequences for union diversity. The timing and sequence of the development towards mass democracy and pluralist industrial relations has shaped the cleavage transformation process into labour organization. Moreover, it will be argued in this Chapter that the initial party-union relations became entrenched in the organizational structures with long-term consequences. Socialist party and unions are later challenged by old and new social cleavages that cross-cut the labour-capital cleavage. However, following the theoretical propositions developed earlier (see Chapter 2), we expect the decisions taken at the time of founding to limit the set of 'alternatives' for change. Moreover, the institutionalization during the consolidation leads to structural inertia that reduces the capacity for swift adaptation.

THE FORMATION OF SOCIALIST PARTIES

The thesis of the universal *labour-capital* cleavage is supported by the ubiquitous emergence of socialist parties between 1863, when the first German socialist party emerged, and 1893 when the British Independent Labour Party was formed (for abbreviations, names and year of foundation, see Appendix). Nevertheless, the timing of the working-class party, its form of organization and electoral success, varied considerably across Europe with important consequences for the labour movement. Although there are several 'environmental' factors that set the conditions under which party formation occurred such as the class or status structure (cf. LIPSET 1983) and the pace and character of industrialization (cf. LORWIN 1958), the emphasise will be here on consequences of differences in the political opportunity structure, in particular, the structuring of the electoral channel (see Chapter 2). European states varied in the politics of integration or exclusion of dissident, lower-class interests (cf. DAALDER 1966, LIPSET 1983, MANN 1987). The contention is that the differentiation between economic and political interest representation that emerged in response to the degree of integration into the political system moulded to a considerable degree the character of the labour movement (cf. ROKKAN 1968, LAFFERTY 1971, ELIASSEN 1974, LIPSET 1983). Yet, the analysis here will be taking the structuring of the "electoral channel" as exogenous and examine solely the distinct consequences in the transformation of the *labour-capital* cleavage.

The leading questions to be posed are: *When, by whom, and how successful were working-class political parties founded?* An analysis of timing and sequence of the organizational formation and consolidation - though largely synoptical - reveals how the labour-capital cleavage became differently transformed into political organizations across Western Europe. The contention is that - given organizational inertia the structuring of the political

Table 3.1
Founding and Political Entry of Socialist Parties, Western Europe

Country:	AU	BE	DE	FR	GE	IR	IT	NE	NO	SW	SZ	UK
Party:	SPÖ	POB	SD	SFIO	SPD	IrLP	PSI	SDAP	DNA	SAP	SPS	Lab.
Predecessor	1874	1877	1871	1880	1863	1912		1882			1880	1893
Year of founding	1889	1885	1878	1905	1875	1922	1892	1894	1887	1889	1888	1906
Entry in parliament	1897	1894	1884	1893	1871	1922	1895	1897	1903	1896	1893	1900
Entry in government	1919	1916	1915	1924	1918	1948	1944	1939	1927	1917	1943	1915
Association right	1870	1830	1857	1884	1869	1824	1890	1855	1839	1864	1848	1824
Suffrage (>50% male)	1907	1893	1849	1848	1871		1912	1896	1898	1909	1848	1885
Prop. Representation	1919	1899	1918	(1919)	1919	1921	1919	1918	1921	1909	1919	-
Parliamentarism	1919	1830	1901	1917	1919	1922	1919	1868	1884	1917	1872	1909

SOURCE: compiled from ALBER 1982; ELVANDER 1980; FLORA 1983; JACOBS 1989; LANE & ERRSON 1991; MACKIE & ROSE 1990; ROKKAN 1970; WENDE 1981. NOTE: for names see Appendix

alternatives at an early period became institutionalized in the organizational structure with long-term ramifications, even after universal suffrage was later granted.

The first socialist party emerged not in the most liberal or open political environment, quite the contrary (see Table 3.1). "Political *entrepreneurs*" initiated socialist political parties first in Germany (1863/75)[2], Denmark (1871/78) and Belgium (1877/85), not without meeting state repression. From there the impetus spread to the neighbouring countries, that were still not completely industrialized: France (1880), Switzerland (1880/88), the Netherlands (1881). Late industrial development or weak inter-regional integration delayed the forming of a national socialist party in Norway (1887) and Sweden (1889), but also in Austria (1889) and Italy (1892). On the British Isles (including Ireland), formal rights of association were granted early, yet only after the suffrage reform of 1885 did socialist parties emerge (ILP, 1895), though these sectarian clubs remained largely detached from the working class.

The importance of institutional sequencing and timing of party foundation should not be misunderstood. The former does not determine the latter, but it provides the context within which the party emerges.[3] In many countries, suffrage reform became the main mobilizing issue on the way to Electoral Socialism. In this struggle, the socialist party had

2 In the following the year of foundation (or other events) is given in brackets after the organizations abbreviation or the country name.

3 The French and Swiss Socialist parties took a long time to become consolidated, not because of the lack of a substantial suffrage but paradoxically due to its long existence. The foundation of the German socialist party coincided with the granting of universal male suffrage for the newly unified Germany.

often to rely on parliamentary alliances (with reformist, Liberal parties) and extra-parliamentarian support from the labour movement (unions, labour press, cooperatives). The reformist character of the socialist parties of Belgium or Scandinavia can be partly explained by their successful mobilization for suffrage reform and broader alliance building. These parties were also early in accepting the logic of electoral socialism and even the participation in government (Denmark 1914, Belgium 1916, Sweden 1917). Ever since the 1880s, the question of *Millerandism*, that is, government participation in a coalition with bourgeois forces, divided the pro-participation reformists and the "revolutionary" left wing. Most prominently, the German SPD's entry into the last war government (1918) furthered the split with the party left (USPD), and the British National Labour Party broke away over the participation in government during the 1930s.

Using the organization concepts developed earlier (see Chapter 2) there are four ideal-type forms (cf. PANEBIANCO 1988) in the founding and consolidation process of socialist parties. One dimension is whether the organization was founded by *internal* or *external* forces, that is, on the initiative of "political *entrepreneurs*" or by other organizations, in particular, trade unions. The second dimension is the process by which the organization became consolidated, whether by *centre-led institutionalization* (penetration), or whether it remained *weakly institutionalized* (diffusion) with ample space for local autonomy. The classification is based on a comprehensive reading - though necessarily compressed interpretation of - party histories that brings some order to historical diversity of party formation across time and space (Table 3.2).[4]

First, the German SPD, formed by a merger in 1875, is a prime example of the *internally* legitimated and strongly *institutionalized* party. The party survived the Anti-socialist laws (1879-1890), and continued on the parliamentary road to socialism. The prewar SPD was "a powerful bureaucracy, self-financed, centralized, with a bureaucratic structure extending from the centre to the periphery and ensuring the dominant coalition's tight control over the party (according to those well described by Michels and by many others after him)" (PANEBIANCO 1988: 75-6). Similarly, the Danish SDF (1878) reemerged from an early volatile phase under the moderate Copenhagen leadership (supporting government in 1913, entering in 1916) that maintained interlocking relations with the strong craft union movement. A less successful example is the Dutch SDAP (1894), a late reformist break-away from the anti-parliamentarian SDB (1881), that imposed the German party model, but had less electoral success in a segmented late-industrializing society.

Second, a good example of an *externally* legitimated, yet *centralizing* party is the Swedish SAP (1889). Popular movements had already mobilized a part of the lower-classes (THERBORN 1989), when the party was founded on the initiative of local unions. Four-fifth of party membership were collectively affiliated (ELVANDER 1980: 44), binding resources and fate of party and unions together. SAP mobilized for suffrage reform, even calling for a

[4] On Socialist party history see: besides national country studies: the following comparative studies: ELVANDER 1980; GEARY 1989; KENDALL 1975; PANEBIANCO 1988; LINDEN & ROJAHN 1990; PADGET & PATERSON 1991; PATTERSON & THOMAS 1977, 1986

Table 3.2
Founding Origins and Organization Strategy of Socialist Party

	Penetration	*Diffusion*
Internal legitimation (founding)	German SPD Danish SDF Dutch SDAP	French SFIO Italian PSI Irish Labour Party
External legitimation (founding)	Belgian POB Swedish SAP Austrian SPÖ	British Labour Party Norwegian DNA Swiss SP

general strike (1902) that provoked employer centralization and state intervention. Committed to the electoral road, SAP entered the Liberal government (1917), even taking the risk of a left-wing break-away. Similarly, the Belgian POB (1879), was set-up as a externally legitimate party of local unions, workers' associations, co-operatives and socialist groups. The party became the centre from which the organizational network was turned into a well-organized *zuil* (pillar) that could rally for suffrage reform (LORWIN 1971). In late-industrializing Austria, the SPÖ (1889) was formed belatedly by a *plethora* of various workers' associations, political clubs and co-operatives. Only after years of struggle for franchise reform did the party enter parliament though the nationality question blocked prewar politics. SPÖ grew slowly into a mass party, relying on collective union affiliation and a cooperative movement, all three were to form the interwar socialist *Lager* (camp) centred around "Red" Vienna.

Third, the British Labour Party (1900/06) is the well-known example of the third type - an *incompletely* integrated, *externally* legitimated party. Early industrialized Britain was the country in which there was no socialist mass party, instead, some union leaders were elected to parliament on a Lib-Lab ticket. Socialist parties and trade unions, though mutually suspicious, were forced to accordance. "The formation of the Labour Representation Committee (LRC) in 1900 with its limited aim of sponsoring labour members of Parliament was a reflection of this tentative alliance. The LRC was a federation of independent organizations in which trade union money and muscle combined with socialist intellectual leadership. The forlorn hope was the socialist tail could wag the trade union dog (PRICE 1990: 19)." The LRC, later the Labour Party (1906), was weakly institutionalized, depending on external support (see PANEBIANCO 1988: 90-2). Individual membership was not introduced before 1918, but union block vote (over 80%) dominates - until today - the party's decision making. In Norway, the DNA (1887) emerged belatedly. It was a federation of local unions and socialist groups, that spread slowly from Oslo into the periphery, the strongholds of popular liberalism, entering parliament relatively late (1903). Similarly, the Swiss SPS (1888) was a weak federation of local parties, trade unions and welfare societies, that adopted a socialist programme belatedly (1904). Although part of the state-sponsored *Arbeiterbund* and given the possibility of national referenda (since 1871) socialist reform proposals were soon frustrated by labour's weakness in a Liberalist society.

Fourth, internally legitimated, *weakly* institutionalized socialist parties developed somewhat in an organizational void. Belatedly, SFIO (1905) grouped in an uneasy coalition the fragmented, sectionalist French socialist parties[5]. The Guesdists (POF, 1880), put their stamp on SFIO and the 1906-Charter that remained unaltered until Mitterand's party reform (PS, 1969/70). SFIO inherited a decentralized organization with incompletely integrated regional and intermediary structures (PANEBIANCO 1988: 95-6). Moreover, SFIO was less a working-class than a "voters party", with strongholds in regions of rural militantism. "The party was predisposed to such a development by its birth though the federation of groups with autonomous organizational power resources (which thus impeded the growth of a central bureaucratic apparatus), but *also* by the workers' unions' political independence. This independence prevented the SFIO from controlling a resource which was (...) essential to the construction of a solid party sub-culture" (PANEBIANCO 1988: 98). The Italian PSI (1892) emerged belatedly due to state hostility and incomplete national integration. It was a weak federation of regional associations, trade federations and mutual aid societies from which it remained dependent since it remained long excluded from parliament until 1913. Extra-parliamentary opposition and centrifugal "municipal socialism", undercut furthermore the authority of the party leadership (PANEBIANCO 1988: 104). Given the late national independence, the Irish Labour Party (1912/22) emerged also belatedly and abstained in the first decisive Irish elections on the national question, reflecting its contradicting support from British-based and Irish-based unions.

THE FORMATION OF SOCIALIST ALLIED UNIONS

While the socialist party had to integrate both the parliamentary grouping and territorial party structures, the union movement faced a double integration problem. National unions had to achieve authority over local unions in order to face the national integration of labour and producer markets. And national union centres had to integrate both functional and territorial forms of interest representation in order to press - with one voice - *vis-à-vis* the state and employers. In both struggles, the socialist party played a crucial role - in a practical as well as an ideological sense by stressing class solidarity over sectionalism (cf. FULCHER 1988). In this chapter we will concentrate on the latter integration problem the formation of union centres[6] (see Appendix), while the integration of locals into national unions will be described later (Chapter 6). Certainly, some national unions and many local unions existed before the formation of socialist parties, yet the formation of a union centre is a crucial step in *labour unity*, creating a national coordination amongst diverse, sometimes parochial, interests. Only thereafter was the union movement on a par with the national party in claiming labour representation *vis-à-vis* the state and employers.

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5 SFIO was a "broad church, holding together an uneasy alliance of reformists (A. Thomas), Republican-Marxists (Jaurès), Marxist-Republicans (Vaillant), Guesdists, quasi-syndicalists (Lagardelle), and anti-militarists (Hervé)" (MAGRAW 1989: 73).

6 In the following I will use the term union centre (instead of peak associations) to denote any form of cooperation between mainly national unions, such as annual congresses or confederations.

Table 3.3
Foundation of Socialist Union Centres

	AU	BE	DE	FR	GE	IR	IT	NE	NO	SW	SZ	UK
Union Centre	BFG	CGSB	DSF	CGT	ADGB	ITUC	CGL	NVV	NAFL	LO	SGB	TUC
predecessor			1886	1885	1875			1893				1863
founded	1893	1898	1898	1903	1891	1894	1906	1905	1899	1898	1880	1895
delay after party	4	13	20	15	16	(-28)	12	11	12	9	-8	-5
coalition right	1870	1898	1857	1864	1869	1824	1890	1855	1839	1864	1848	1824

SOURCE: see Appendix A.

Like in the case of political parties, the labour-capital cleavage lead not everywhere immediately to the formation of Socialist unions. Before the setting-up of national Socialist union centres, preexisting unions, particularly the early 'labour aristocracy' - like printers' craft unions (cf. MARKS 1989) - were largely particularistic and moderately oriented. Like the early *Lib-Lab* workers' candidates, these unions held liberal-reformist ideas before entering a socialist movement. Moreover, the earliest union centres, the British TUC (1867), the German Hirsch-Duncker *Gewerkvereine* (1868), and the Swiss SGB (1880) were mainly liberal-reformist union movements that shunned Marxist socialist orientations. Yet in Germany, the repression of political and social emancipation by the state, as the Bismarckian Federal and Prussian state during the Anti-Socialist laws (1878-1890) unintentionally further politicized and united the labour movement against the regime. Where political and economic integration of the working-class, at least more skilled sections, was initiated earlier, *Lib-Lab* craft reformist unions led to a tradition of a moderate labour movement, whereas repression fostered a politicisation of the labour movement.

Hence, the formation of national Socialist union centres and their relative timing compared to the socialist party are important in understanding the forces that shaped the labour movement (see Table 3.3). The crucial question is: *which came first, the party or the unions?* Was the party sufficiently able and strong to shape the development of the union movement, or was the reverse or neither of the two the case? Thus, four different ideal-type patterns of sequencing, representing different combinations of legitimation and institutionalization (see Table 3.4), can be derived from a bird's-eye view of labour history.[7]

First, the *party* preceded the union centre, giving the union movement support in fostering national coordination and ideological equipment (*German* type). In these countries, a well-organized socialist party (German SPD, Swedish SAP and Belgian POB) coordinated initially the local and national activities of the unions. The party later initiated the founding of an allied union "secretariat", from which a fully fledged centralized union confederation emerged over time. Thus, a centralized, preceding party moulded the centralization of the union movement and the integration into national unions. The German Free union centre

[7] On Socialist union confederations see GALENSON 1952a; GEARY 1989; KENDALL 1975; LAUNAY 1990; LINDEN & ROJAHN 1990; VISSER 1990.

Table 3.4
Formation and Organization Strategy of Socialist Union Centre

	Penetration	*Diffusion*
External legitimation (Party-led)	German ADGB Swedish LO Belgian CS	Norwegian NALF Austrian BFG Dutch NVV
Internal legitimation (Union-led)	British TUC Swiss SGB Danish DSF	French CGT Italian CGL Irish ITUC

was set up with the help of the party (1891), it grew gradually in strength and self-assurance *vis-à-vis* the party. Yet the party still claimed its primacy over such contentious matters as the general strike until the 1906 settlement. In Sweden, the party coordinated union activities until a union centre was set-up (LO, 1898), and collective party affiliation remained in practice for most local unions. In Belgium, the party coordinated union activities *via* a union committee (CS, 1898) within its structure, only in 1937 became the union centre independent of the party (CGTB).

Second, the process was reversed: the *union* movement became entrenched before a socialist party could exert a centralizing influence (*British* type). Thus the organization of economic interest had been already advanced by the time socialist ideas spread, in fact, moderate unions set up a union-led political party. This was the case in countries with strong apolitical, localist, and sectionalist craft unionism that achieved in some trades collective bargaining (Britain, Switzerland, and Denmark). In Britain, the Trades Union Congress (TUC, 1863) met long before the socialist parties of the 1890s, but remained a weak forum of autonomous unions and local councils (at least not before the 1895-reform). In Switzerland, local craft unions founded a union centre (SGB, 1880) that remained marginal until its 1905-reform when it came close to the socialist party. In Denmark, a union centre was formed first in Copenhagen (DSF, 1886), later nationally (1898), but remained long dominated by fragmented craft unions. In these countries, the prewar votes for the socialists did not match the size of the unionized workforce despite - or paradoxically because of - a relatively large enfranchised population, thus indicating the continuation of liberal worker alignments.

Third, the party preceded the unions, but was not sufficiently centralized to push the union movement towards centralization (*late-comer* type). This third pattern represents somewhat incomplete forms of party-led union centralization due to organization problems under late-industrialization and incomplete national integration (Norway, Austria, Netherlands). In Norway, the party coordinated local union activities before a union centre was formed (NAFL, 1899) that became only slowly a national organization, yet local cooptation and collective party-affiliation remained. In Austria, a union centre was formed, when the party was still in its infancy (1893), and centralization succeeded, as in Norway, only in the interwar period. The Dutch union centre (NVV, 1905) was set-up by the re-

formist socialist party as a rival to the syndicalist unions after a disastrous railway strike (1903). Only shortly before the First World War did party and unions start to centralize and integrate the local structures, facing localist, syndicalist (Norway and Netherlands) or national-ethical (Austria) counter-movements.

Fourth, both party and unions developed *independently*, therefore often overlapping in activities and competing over working class alliances (*French* type). These countries failed in a double sense: neither was the union movement strong enough to built up a political force, nor was there a political force that induced a strong union centre (France, Italy, Ireland). The French union centre (CGT, 1895) maintained a double structure of territorial and functional representation (*Bourses* and *fédérations*), thus both politicized locals and moderate unions had equal voice. CGT enshrined its syndicalist strategy, disapproving party-union relations in 1906, just when a united socialist party finally emerged (SFIO, 1905). In Italy, national unions and the Chambers of Labour coexisted, preceding the union centre (CGL, 1906). Moreover, CGL's close links with the socialists led to internal political feuds and a syndicalist split-away (USI, 1912). In Ireland, late industrialization, the national problem, and incomplete disengagement from the British TUC were major obstacles to party-union links and radical syndicalism soared in the 1910s. We will later see how union movements with a dual structure and strong local autonomy became affected by, or turned into, revolutionary syndicalism (see Chapter 5).

THE LINKAGES BETWEEN THE TWO SIAMESE TWINS

The figurations under which party and unions emerged had a profound impact on the character of the labour movement: the radical-politicisation of the union through the party, or the reformist-moderation of the party through the unions. But the party-union figuration shaped also the linkages between the two *Siamese twins*. The remnant of party-union linkages today reflect with the due adaptations the initial figuration of party-union formation, though in Germany and Austria a major change occurred after the Second World War. Although the historic linkage between the *Siamese twins* are redrawn all over Europe as a result of general political, social and economic development and global pressures (e.g. MARKOVITS 1992), such changes took different forms. As will be pointed out later, both the logic of membership and representation, pressed party and unions to reevaluate their linkages, yet again this happened under different configurations and with a different capacity to change.

Party-union linkages can operate at various level of an organization: at the leadership (or administrative) level or at the level of basis organizations, between party and national union centres (or national unions and even locals). In principle, there are two linkages: organizational interlocking and membership overlap. With organizational interlocking party and unions attempt to manage their interdependency through mutual coordinatation in decision making. Interlocking is part of the *pillarization* (see Chapter 2), by which party and unions build an inter-organizational network in order to maintain labour unity *versus* contenders. When the supporters and membership of party and unions overlap, they can profit

Table 3.5
Socialist Party-Union Linkages

	FORMAL LINKS	COORDINATION	INFORMAL LINKS
COLLECTIVE AFFILIATION OF UNIONS	British Lab. Irish IrLP (Belgian POB) (Austrian SDAP)	Swedish SAP Norwegian DNA	
MEMBERSHIP OVERLAP	Danish DSF	Belgian PS/SP Swiss SP	German SPD Dutch PvdA
"VOTER" PARTY (SPURIOUS)			French PS Italian PSI

NOTE: historical cases in brackets.

from mutual parallel mobilization. Party and unions fostered the creation of working-class cultures (social ghettos) through organizational and social closure. *Social closure* (see Chapter 2) helped party and unions to maintain collective class identity, cohesion and solidarity, but necessarily limited its growth to the sections of the workforce that could be reached by such a strategy. Yet, both forms of party-union linkage show a bewildering variety across European labour movements[8] , though a general trend toward distancing can be observed (see Table 3.5).

First, inter-organizational linkages have been initially maintained in most socialist parties, however, they vary in the degree of formalization and importance. In Belgium, the union centre was initially a part of the party structure, but with the 1902-reform interlocking directorates were established until the union centre became finally an independent organization (1937). Conversely, the Irish trade unions controlled the Irish labour party activities until the separation of the party from the union (1931) but two union leaders are still formally represented on the party board. *Ex-officio* interlocking directorates existed also in Denmark, where two party and two union leaders where represented on allied organization's executive committee (although since the 1960s there is also the rival, leftist VS with some union support). In Scandinavia, Britain and postwar Belgium, formal coordination committees or customs of informal meetings provide further coordination functions without direct interference. In postwar Britain and Belgium, these forms of coordination were mainly targeted around political elections, for instance the Liaison committee (1972), or the Belgian *action commune*. In Austria, after the move towards *Einheitsgewerkschaft*, there exists partisan factions within the union, in fact, the socialist faction FSG functions as the *Scharnierstelle* (PELINKA 1980) (hinge) between party and union. In the German, Dutch and Swiss parties the links are relative informal, the socialist party leadership includes unionists

8 On party-union linkeage see BEYME 1977: 215-243, KENDALL 1975, LINDEN & ROJAHN 1990, TAYLOR 1989: Ch. 3, GREBING & MEYER 1992.

among its ranks but the union remains officially "non-partisan" despite the fact that most of its leaders are socialist party members.

Secondly, collective affiliation of unions to the party have been the most explicit form of support but also means of influence. Collective affiliation in the British and Irish labour parties were a consequence of the union-led foundation. Britain is unique as TUC affiliated *unions* (not the TUC or individual locals) decide to affiliate collectively (see TAYLOR 1989: 53), in fact, some larger unions (in particular the miners) joined in only some years later. By the eve of the First World War, 83% of all TUC members were collectively affiliated to the party, albeit paying only a small political levy (only after 1918 was individual membership introduced). Collective affiliation has declined over time, partly as a result of legal changes, the introduction of *opting-in* rules from 1927 until 1946, and the expansion of non-partisan white-collar or public sector unions. However, TUC unions with their 'bloc-vote' at party congresses could still claim 94% the 1980s, yet this represented only 55% of all TUC members.

Outside Britain, collective affiliation was common before the First World War by local unions in Sweden (80% of party members, 45% of union members) and Norway (66% of party members), and Austria (40% of party members), while it was outlawed in prewar Germany, or voted down by the unions in Switzerland (1902) and France (1905). The local affiliation of the two Scandinavian union movements, not to speak of the relatively higher political levy, is compared to Britain a greater indication of membership alignment due to the larger discretion left to the membership base. Collective membership within the party declined with worker dealignment, more rapidly in Norway (1989: 24% of DNA members, ca. 4% of LO members) than in Sweden (1980s: 75% of SAP members, ca. 40% of LO members). While it has become *de facto* unimportant in Norway, the Swedish SAP decided in 1990 to discontinue *de jure* collective membership in order to rejuvenate the party. Given the affiliation of the largest general union (ITGWU) to the Irish Labour Party, collective membership dominates the party (ca. 95%) but remains more a financial political levy.

II
THE TWIN LOGIC OF ELECTORAL AND CORPORATE SOCIALISM

Socialist party and allied unions mutually mobilized for the extension of the civil, political and social citizenship rights to the lower classes. In mobilizing for change, party and unions became drawn into the two channels of interest representation as they climbed up the thresholds in the electoral and corporate channels (see Chapter 2). Party and unions, sometimes grudgingly, sometimes enthusiastically, in mobilizing for political or corporate power had to face the logic of membership. Initially the roads to Electoral and Corporate Socialism run parallel: party and union gained from party-union linkages and coordinated mobilization in the political and economic arena. Both as "outsiders" became increasingly integrated into the polity and economy, however, tensions between the two emerged. In fact, party-

union relations had been challenged ever since the First World War, the period marking the decisive moment for labour's national integration. The more the party and unions gained responsibility in political or economic participation, the more their relations faced potential conflicts of interests. Moreover, with the suffrage reforms around the First World War, in a number of countries Socialist labour movement faced competition, and limits to growth, by other cleavage-organizations. For analyzing the twin logic of Electoral and Corporate Socialism, we will now be looking into the long-term electoral and membership records of party and unions respectively.

THE TWIN PROCESS OF SOCIALIST MOBILIZATION

The *logic of membership* underlying the twin processes of socialist mobilization sets the pace but also the limits of Electoral and Corporate Socialism. When the *Siamese twins* fought side-by-side against exclusion - labour unity was labour's strength. As long as party and unions had limited resources and faced exclusion, both had to rely on the other for support in mobilization. Formal party-union links provided coordination of action, corporate union membership or party levies added to political funding, party clubs and union meetings knitted group solidarity, party journals and union press disseminated common ideology, ancillary organizations maintained further class identity. Socialist party and allied unions through *pillarization* created a net of political, economic and social organizations (see Chapter 2) in response to the hostile political and social environment. Building on preexisting group solidarity in working-class communities, socialist pillarization maintained *social closure* creating Socialist sub-cultures within modernizing societies. Particularly where regional and urban working-class communities existed but national political integration remained retarded, Socialist labour movements build *social ghettos* on the bases of pillarization and social closure, like Red Vienna or Red Berlin.

Looking at the record of socialist voting and unionization over one century, there is a secular trend in most countries from rise to stagnation, though notwithstanding cases with weakly institutionalized party-union relations (France, Italy and Ireland). With the exception of short fluctuations after the two wars, socialist voter turnout and unionization trends are strikingly parallel. Mobilization by party and unions rose in tandem and both reached their saturation ceiling, albeit with different zeniths of electoral and corporate mobilization depending on the salience of cross-cutting class cleavages. Initially, socialist party and union activities were deviant political causes (NEDELMANN 1975), promoted by few political *entrepreneurs* (STINCHCOMBE 1965). Only with increasing, legal, political and social acceptance (and receding resistance), did the new forms of interest representation become legitimated. In fact, we can observe a diffusion like curve with an initially slow but then

increasing growth rate until the momentum slows down up to a saturation point (the carrying capacity).[9]

The extension of the suffrage and the recognition of unions by employers and the state changed stepwise the opportunity structure of party and unions respectively (see Chapter 2). Yet, both party and unions needed time to build up national representative structures and mobilize constituency by constituency, company by company, the potential voters and union members. This was the phase when voting and union alignment became ingrained into the working class, reinforced by social ties and community solidarity. However, with increasing legitimation, competition with other forms of representation became more pronounced (HANNAN & FREEMAN 1989), particularly over groups that are outside the initial core support group. Moreover, with ongoing modernization, the core support group stopped growing, the social community ties degenerated, and inter-generational mobility cut working-class alignments. The "trade-off" between keeping the core support group and opening-up for other groups was a ambiguous choice for party and union leaders (cf. PRZEWORSKI 1985). On the one hand, political parties are forced to seek extension of their electoral support beyond the limits of a too narrow working-class base but cannot be certain about how much their core support will defect once the party changed course. Similarly, socialist union movements faced the problem of whether and how to integrate the rising politically heterogeneous white-collar workforce that challenged traditional organizing principles based on working-class solidarity (see Chapter 7).

Party and union strategists had to take into account that there was a trade-off between holding on to the old constituency, while opening up to new social groups (PRZEWORSKI & SPRAGUE 1986) - especially where workers could defect to other parties or unions. Yet a move away from the traditional social base could meet internal resistance by vested interests that were able to bloc any party or union reform. In fact, party and union strategists had only limited discretion to choose and implement organizational reforms. They faced a "nested game" (TSEBELIS 1990) in which internal power relations reflect past organizational decisions (cf. KOELBLE 1992), the old traditional groups have to decide whether to include the new social groups. The postwar move towards a *catch-all* party (KIRCHHEIMER 1966) or unity labour movements of the Austrian and German union movement, implied a deemphasization of party-union relations in order to attract middle class voters or white-collar union members respectively.

Cross-cutting political cleavages (reform-revolution, Church-State) could also further limit the growth of Socialist labour movements. In France and Germany, the relative successful interwar Communist parties limited the electoral success of the Socialist party and strained party-union relations, this applies even more for postwar France and Italy (see Chapter 5). In countries with religiously mixed or Catholic population, Christian-Democratic parties profited also from suffrage reform and from proportional representa-

9 The parallel S-shaped curves of political and corporate mobilization are similar to typical diffusion curves (cf. ROGERS 1983), suggesting mutual mobilization processess, instead of just unilateral influences from unions to party or from party to unions.

tion. With the help of a network of Christian unions and associations, these parties competed over workers alignment with the Socialist party (see Chapter 4). Yet, whatever the level of mobilization, the march towards Electoral or Corporate Socialism came with few significant exceptions to a standstill after the Second World War.

THE "NUMERICAL" STRENGTH OF ELECTORAL AND CORPORATE SOCIALISM

Before the First World War, socialist parties mobilized earlier or faster than their allied unions in Belgium, Austria (since 1907), Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. This was partly due to the relative extensive suffrage, and employer resistance and legal obstacles to unionization. In Scandinavia and Great Britain, votes for labour parties gained momentum only after *Lib-Lab* electoral alliances had been largely replaced. In France and Italy, the share of national votes for socialist parties exceeded by far the degree of unionization, the latter lagging behind due to employers intransigence and in some regions retarded industrialization. At the eve of the First World War, three labour movements were the best organized: the Danish DSF (17.5% union density), the German *Generalkommission* (13.7%), and the British TUC (12.2%, 80% affiliated to Labour), underlying their importance *vis-à-vis* the party. The German Free unions, became increasingly self-assured and achieved a historic compromise of party-union relations (1906), that enshrined mutual party-union autonomy and cooperation. All other socialist labour movements clustered below 10% in unionization and 10% to 20% in electoral turnout. The high share of agricultural labour force in these countries lowered the chances for both party and unions. If we take into account only the extractive, productive and transport sectors before 1914 Italian, French, Belgian and Dutch union centres organized not even every tenth "proletarian". Austria and Switzerland organized only few more, while the Swedish and Norwegian are at pars with the British and German union centre that organized about one-quarter, not to speak of the Danish movement where about every second "industrial" worker is a DSF member. Yet, depending on the landholding structures, and the strategies of labour toward small holding peasants, some Socialist parties (like the Swedish SAP) attempted to mobilize also the rural population, or attempted to organize agricultural labourers (as Italian unions).

With the news of the termination of the War and the Russian revolution, a wave of social mobilization boosted membership records of trade unions and working class parties. Where Communist parties remained weak (see Chapter 5), the extension of suffrage boosted socialist parties, though none of them came close to a majority position. Union membership in 1919-22 surged between 2 and 5 times compared with the prewar period. While the initial sudden political mobilization and radicalization made many unionists hold believed in a great universal break-through, the following period became a turmoil of European labour, when dispersion into various trajectories set in again. The sudden upsurge in support had overrun both party and unions, their leaders faced now the expectations and demands of a mass constituency and membership base. The sudden growth showed the limits of integration of new members through party and union structures. Party and unions differed across Europe as to their capacity to hold on to the new members or

Table 3.6
Votes and Seats of Socialist Parties (%), Western Europe 1890-1989

Country:	AU	BE	DE	FR	GE	IR	IT		NE	NO	SW	SZ	UK
Party:	SPÖ	PS/SP	SD	PS	SPD	IrLP	PSI	PSDI	PvdA	DNA	SAP	SPS	Lab.
Average votes (%)													
1890-1917	23.7	13.1	19.3	12.2	28.1	-	15.6	-	10.0	13.2	18.8	13.2	5.2
1918-1944	38.8	33.6	38.8	21.1	22.9	9.8	24.4	-	21.9	32.0	41.3	26.6	31.7
1945-1967	42.9	34.2	40.1	15.6	29.6	10.8	13.0	5.6	28.6	45.4	46.5	26.7	46.2
1968-1989	48.1	27.1	33.4	25.3	42.2	11.9	11.5	4.0	29.3	40.5	44.8	23.2	37.3
Average seats (%)													
1890-1917	19.2	16.6	14.7	11.3	16.1	-	6.6	-	6.4	6.6	13.1	4.5	4.0
1918-1944	39.9	36.3	38.5	19.8	23.2	7.8	21.0	-	22.4	30.3	45.0	23.8	21.4
1945-1967	44.9	36.9	40.5	15.5	31.5	10.2	13.1	4.4	29.7	51.3	48.5	26.2	48.8
1968-1989	49.0	29.1	34.3	29.8	42.4	11.1	11.5	3.5	30.6	45.0	46.1	24.5	43.7

NOTE: incl. predecessors; SOURCE: own calculations, updated series based on MACKIE & ROSE 1990, see Appendix B.

supporters, the union movements lost most of the new union members within five to ten years.[10] In Austria, Germany and Britain, the initial mutual recognition of employers and unions eroded correspondingly. In Scandinavia, Britain and Switzerland, the socialist unions recovered and later gradually gained in unionization during the years of increasing unemployment.

In the postwar period, socialist parties and allied unions reached their saturation when the core social support base was reached. In the first postwar elections, Communist parties had successfully mobilized in some national elections, yet voters returned back to socialist parties thereafter with the exception of France and Italy (see Chapter 5). The peak in socialist turnout was already achieved by the 1950s in Belgium, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, thereafter the party never exceed by more than 5% points its previous best result, with the exception of Sweden. Only in Austria and Germany, but also in France and Ireland, did the party achieve its saturation later, during the 1970s (in France in the 1980s). In both Austria and Germany, the two socialist parties pursued a catch-all strategy and turned to broader electoral support once the early elections in the 1950s deprived the hope of party leaders to eventually achieve the majority mark as a working-class party. In some countries, leftist parties and since the 1980s ecologist parties emerged in addition, competing with the long established socialist parties for the votes of wage earners and salaried employees.

A somewhat different pattern can be derived from the allied union movements. Saturation in unionization was also achieved in the 1950s in Austria and Germany, besides Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland and - if we consider party affiliated TUC unions only -

[10] Decline in percent, comparing membership low to peak in 1920's: Austrian BFG (-46%), German ADGB (-50%), and British TUC (-49%), but also to a lesser degree: Belgian CGTB (-27%), Danish DSF (-24% excl. SiD), French CGT (-35%) and Swiss SGB (-33%)

Table 3.7
Socialist Union Membership and Density (%)

Country:	AU	BE	DE	FR	GE	IR	IT	NE	NO	SW	SZ	UK
Union Centre:	ÖGB-FSG	FGTB	LO	FO	DGB	ICTU	UIL	FNV	LO	LO	SGB	TUC
Membership share (%)												
1913	91.8	55.4	75.4	94.8	64.9		60.4	32.1	100.0	66.8	73.0	54.0
1918-1944	85.0	71.2	82.3	54.9	70.6	80.0	54.2	37.7	100.0	77.9	63.6	77.0
1945-1967	[45.5]	30.0	79.9	14.0	85.1	57.3	10.9	36.1	78.0	74.2	58.1	86.0
1968-1989	[41.6]	41.7	71.8	19.6	82.0	92.4	14.3	53.0	69.8	62.1	51.5	87.7
Gross density (%)												
1913	5.9	5.2	17.5	2.2	13.7	.	3.2	3.9	9.4	3.1	6.4	12.2
1918-1944	36.3	22.6	33.1		25.9	.	6.9	11.3	20.4	30.4	15.2	24.0
1945-1967	62.7	19.3	48.4	0.8	31.8	26.3		14.6	46.3	51.2	21.8	37.1
1968-1989	58.8	26.2	52.6	3.0	31.9	49.5	7.1	16.3	44.4	51.7	16.9	42.8

SOURCE: own calculations, DUES database, see Appendix C.

United Kingdom.[11] However, in Belgium, Denmark, and Sweden, all countries with considerable increase in overall unionization, the allied union membership grew again above the previous peak in the 1970s. This was mainly due to the positive effects of union-led (Ghent system) unemployment insurance schemes (cf. NEUMANN et al. 1991, ROTHSTEIN 1990) in years of increasing unemployment - a unique incentive to join a union (although legally the two institutions are separated).

This empirical stability, if not deadlock, for most countries may be an astonishing finding, supporting the freezing hypothesis of the postwar party and union systems (see Chapter 10). The chances for the labour movement to break-out of the limits set by social mobilization were qualified. Only three out of twelve socialist parties and three out of nine allied union movements had success in broadening their support. Yet, even to achieve stability parties and unions had to alter incrementally. As the social structure changed, party and unions faced the rise and challenge of new social groups. In a number of countries, the socialist-oriented union movements faced decline in the unionization rate, in Norway and Switzerland already in the 1950s, but most pronounced in the United Kingdom in the 1980s. The question of political alignment between party and unions and its consequences for a break-out of the limited working-class support base became crucial for the electoral and corporate trade-off.

STABILITY AND CHANGE IN UNIONS AND WORKERS PARTY ALIGNMENT

Party and unions had traditionally gained their strength from the broad support in the working-class, but were they able to hold on to their base? Worker alignment to socialist parties varied across countries - with important consequences to the political distinctive-

11 France and Italy due to the weak party-union ties cannot be considered here.

ness (cf. ESPING-ANDERSEN 1985: 122-6). Although the party alignment of blue-collar workers declined somewhat over time, the relative differences between socialist parties can best be compared at the end of the mobilization drive (the early 1970s). Parties with high blue-collar workers' alignment (70-90%) can be presumed in Austria and Sweden, followed by medium-high (50-70%) alignment in Denmark and Norway, in Germany and Great Britain, medium-low alignment (30-50%) in consociational Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland, and low alignment (10-30%) in Catholic semi-agrarian France, Italy and Ireland.[12] As a result of the cleavage structures workers alignment are divided due to leftist parties in Scandinavia, particularly in Denmark, and as a result of religious cross-cutting cleavages in Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland (see Chapter 4). In France and Italy, the low alignment is due to the stronger working-class appeal of the Communist party (around 40% of blue-collar workers voted Communist in both countries in the 1960/70s). In Ireland, the Labour party failed to have an important support base within the small industrial working-class, it lost much of its small support (28% in 1969), particularly among the skilled working class in the 1970s.[13] In Germany and Great Britain, more than one-third of blue-collar workers voted for a conservative party (in Germany, the Christian-Democratic party attracts also Catholic workers), while one-sixth in Austria only.

A decline in worker alignment to union-linked socialist parties can be identified for the Danish DS and Norwegian DNA, while the Swedish SAP held its support (cf. ESPING-ANDERSEN 1985). In Britain, alignment of the manual working class plunged from over 65% in the 1960s and short below 60% in the early 1970s to around 43% in the 1980s (CREWE, DAY & FOX 1992: 19), albeit an increasing share of the non-labour vote went to the Liberals (SDP/Alliance). Working-class voting behaviour reflects the intensity of "class alignment", the importance of working-class community cultures for political mobilization. In this respect, party-union relations in combination with the strength of the union movement as such can have an impact on maintaining worker alignment.[14] Moreover, workers' party alignment seems to be proportional to the intensity and formality of party-union ties, since party and unions cannot completely overrule diverging party preferences of their core support group.

Historically, however, these ties have been crucial in maintaining socialist working-class milieus through the process of social closure. Austria, Sweden and Norway have close party-union ties, whereas in Denmark and Germany party and union have progressed more independently. In Great Britain, while the TUC unions have a strong impact on the party, not all unions are affiliated to the Labour party, nor is collective affiliation a guaran-

12 Information on voting behaviour of blue-collar workers or union members based on surveys are very scattered. The data used here is derived from cf. RASCHKE 1977: 257, NE: LIJPHART 1968: Tab. 4, IR: MAIR 1987: 70. See also PRZEWORSKI & SPRAGUE 1986, ESPING-ANDERSEN 1985, DÖRING 1990.

13 Less than 12% of skilled workers, less than 16% of unskilled vote Labour in 1970/80s (cf. MAIR 1987: 70, Tab. 3-4)

14 Worker alignment to left parties amongst self-indentifier correlates with the level of overall unionization (DÖRING 1990: 78)

tee for worker alignment in elections. The Belgian and Dutch socialist parties and unions, in an effort to construct broader movements beyond the historical pillars deemphasized the historical party-union ties (and swapped names) - though without much hope of a breakthrough. In France and Italy, party-union ties were already weak due to syndicalist heritage and as a result of the stronger working-class alignment with the working-class Communist party. In Ireland, worker alignment remains limited since populist, nationalist parties receive also a large share of working-class votes despite the collective union affiliation to the Labour party, which has only become substantial when the dominant IGTWU joined in 1968.[15] In fact, the Irish and British collective union affiliation decided upon by union leaders (or delegates), despite the larger share in party membership or union membership, is a weaker form of party-union ties than it appears *prima facie*. In countries, where the affiliation decisions and other party matters were taken locally - by a majority of members - local party and union structures are more closely interwoven, thus reinforcing the communal social milieus and worker alignment.

III
THE CHANCE FOR CHANGE AND THE UNITY OF LABOUR REPRESENTATION

Socialist party and allied unions both formed parts of a social movement for change in polity and economy in favour of the excluded lower classes. Since only in few cases socialist parties could achieve a parliamentary majority on their own, they had to subjugate to the *logic of representation* and look for possible allies to form a coalition government. On the other hand, the allied unions in order to represent the interest of their members had to achieve organizational power through extended unionization, centralization and unity. Both party and unions, while being still "outsiders", gained more form mutual mobilization by combining each others demands without much clash of interests. However, once they assumed responsibility and participated in government or in collective bargaining, conflicts of interests occurred and tensions in party-union relations mounted. According to the logic of representation the party had to make concessions to allies for the sake of coalition government. But also union centres that wanted to bargain had to make settlements with employers or the state that were not in the short-term or immediate interests of their members. As will be shown the chances for government, the stability and the internal compositions varied across Europe with consequences for the unions' impact on the incumbent union-allied party. Moreover union centres varied in unity, strength and representation monopoly, making them a more or less forceful and united voice of labour *vis-à-vis* the government and party.

15 Each union decides on its own contribution to the Irish Labour Party (or other political financing, cf. KATZ & MAIR 1992: 401-2, fn. b).

Table 3.8
Government Participation of Socialist Parties, Western Europe 1918-1989

Country:	AU	BE	DE	FR	GE	IR	IT		NE	NO	SW	SZ	UK
Party:	SPÖ	PS/SP	SD	PS	SPD	IrLP	PSI	PSDI	PvdA	DNA	SAP	SPS	Lab.
Government years													
1918-1944	2.3	8.5	15.7	5.0	7.0	0.9	0.0	-	0.0	5.2	18.0	1.2	3.0
1945-1967	21.3	14.3	17.7	9.0	1.1	6.1	6.7	14.8	15.1	20.3	23.0	19.0	9.5
1968-1989	19.7	10.3	9.9	6.4	14.8	9.2	18.6	18.5	5.6	13.0	16.0	22.0	7.6
Cabinet share (%)													
1918-1944	4.0	13.8	40.9	.	11.5	0.3	0.0	-	0.1	15.0	48.7	1.4	8.4
1945-1967	42.6	38.7	66.7	9.9	2.1	6.0	6.6	4.8	24.6	85.6	91.6	24.8	41.1
1968-1989	80.7	20.0	38.8	25.3	53.7	9.2	16.1	4.2	10.5	60.1	67.0	29.6	34.7

SOURCE: own calculations, updated series based on MACKIE & ROSE 1990 and FLORA 1983, see Appendix B. NOTES: incl. predecessors; cabinet share: relative share of seats in coalition, weighted by years

SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATION AND ALLIANCES

Once universal suffrage and parliamentary control had been introduced, socialist parties were commonly the largest party, due to the large share of working-class votes and the fragmentation of "bourgeois" parties. However, only in few historical moments, or thanks to preferential majority systems, socialist parties gained a parliamentary majority. Otherwise, the socialist parties had to rely on alliance building to maintain a durable coalition government. Before the First World War, most socialist parties were not even in theory prepared to enter into government, fearing the turbulence caused by *Millerandism*. Although Scandinavian parties considered participation somewhat earlier, the changes around the First World War brought the first important opportunity for socialist participation in government. Moreover, the frequency, duration and importance of socialist government incumbency took very different forms over the last 70 years across Western Europe (see Table 3.8).

Of those socialist parties that formed a government in the 1920s, none was able to maintain its position for long. The few socialist governments were either *interim* minority or unstable majority governments that lasted only a few months, in no case longer than two years. Although at the first wave of mobilization, incumbent socialist parties enacted favourable labour laws and some nominated unionists as heads of Labour Ministries, the power relations soon swung back to the bourgeois parties and employers' side during the 1920s. Given the general downswing in unionization, increased electoral volatility and government instability, party-union relations were strained by uncertainty. A way out of the tide of labour unrest, high unemployment and World economic crises, was open only to few labour movements. The Scandinavian socialist parties were able to come and stay (with a few months interruption) in power in Denmark (1929), Sweden (1932), and Norway (1935), with the help of agrarian parties bound in the Red-Green compromises of 1933/35

(see KARVONEN 1991). The Belgian socialists shared again power in a Grand Coalition (1935) until the eve of the Second World War. It is in these countries that unionization increases despite unemployment in the 1930s - with positive long term consequences. The 'historic compromise' of these years based on consolidating power, government incumbency, and consensus arrangements in industrial relations formed the base for the particular Scandinavian *Social-Democratic model* (see KORPI 1978, 1983), while at the same time the Fascist (or authoritarian) regimes came into power, forbidding socialist parties and unions in Italy (1924), Germany (1933), Austria (1934), and after the German occupation in France (1940).

This interwar experience underlines how important for the party-unions relations is the "stability of socialist control over the government" (KORPI 1983: 41). With hindsight, we can compare the duration of socialist government participation (see Table 3.8) over the postwar period. During the 45 years of democratic postwar governments from 1945 until 1989 (41 years in Germany from 1949), socialist parties were in power for over 40 years in Austria and Switzerland, over 30 years in Norway and Sweden, for more than 20 years in Belgium, Denmark, and Italy (the small PSDI participated even over 30 years). In France, Germany, Great Britain, Ireland and the Netherlands socialist ruled only less than half of the postwar period. One would expect unions to develop positive party relations where union leaders can expect socialist government support to last more than a few years. The earlier such a pattern becomes the rule the more important for the re-consolidation of party-union relations and a positive impact on labour's power in industrial relations. Scandinavia, but also Austria and Belgium, developed reinforcing party-union relations. Interruptions in socialist government in the later, second postwar period do not immediately alter long established party-union relations, although the rise of competitive left parties as in Denmark may force party-union relations to eventually cool-off. The 1970s Left-Liberal coalition governments in Germany and the single socialist party rule in Austria had brought party and unions closer, despite the unitary union credo of the 1970s. However, in the context of the continuing post-OPEC economic crisis in the 1980s, socialist governments failed, or if they came to power as in France (and Spain), over long did not deliver, what unions expected (SCHARPF 1987). Moreover, as the British experience shows, unions could not count on long periods of socialist rule, in fact, their overburdening expectations on Labour in government contributed to its instability. An electoral swing to the Right brought the risk of invalidating the pro-Labour achievements, the pendulum swings contributed to Britain's back-and-forth partisan industrial relations legislation.

In Scandinavia, socialist parties were not only able to govern for more than half of the period since the end of the First World War, but also have governed as the largest party within government coalitions, particularly in the early postwar period (see Table 3.9). In these countries, the allied trade union movement (the Scandinavian LOs) have profited since the 1930s from favourable Labour governments and the relative weakness of a bourgeois opposition. Yet even there, party-union relations became eventually more strained as the socialists lost in electoral support and socialist-dominated governments became less the

rule. In a number of other countries with strong union movements, socialist parties have ruled for a limited period as the senior coalition partner (Austria and Germany in the 1970s). In countries with strong segmented pluralism - and split workers alignment - socialists had to rely on forming coalitions with Christian-Democratic or Liberal parties (Austria until 1970s, Belgium, Netherlands, Italy, Switzerland). Given the majority voting system in the French Fifth Republic and in Britain, the socialist party had a much greater hurdle to overcome and ruled though even with no majority of votes for a limited number of years only.

Unions interest in maintaining party-union relations are not only a function of the timing, duration, and stability of socialist government participation, but also the composition or power relations within the government supporting parliamentary group. In majority electoral systems, as in Britain and France, socialist parties have the chance to win a parliamentary majority, even when it lacks a majority of votes at the national level. In Britain, this increases the pendulum tendency of sweeping parliamentary successes and thorough government changes, while in France, since the Fifth Republic, the right bloc was able to exclude the socialist party from power until 1981. In other countries coalitions were most of the time necessary (LAVER & SCHOFIELD 1990: 114-117): in *unipolar* systems (Norway, Sweden, -1971: Denmark), the socialist party had a hegemonic position; in *multipolar* systems (Belgium, Netherlands, Italy, Switzerland, 1971-: Denmark), either a parity party coalition or several smaller centre parties. Germany and Austria, both had been largely bipolar two-and-a-half party systems, in which governments were either a Grand Coalition or a dominant coalition with a junior partner. In a number of other countries and instances, particularly in Scandinavia, socialist parties ruled as minority governments, as the largest but not majoritarian party. If socialists were forced to look for coalition partners, the choice of potential allies was largely given by the party system as it reflected the cleavage structuration (ROKKAN 1968, LIPSET & ROKKAN 1967). Thus largely beyond the reach of Socialist party leaders was the prevalence of potential and willing coalition partner.

As in most countries the rural population was still considerable, at least in the interwar period, it was potentially an important strategic section between working-class and urban middle-class. Socialist working-class parties looking for alliances could not neglect the "agrarian question" (cf. ESPING-ANDERSEN 1985). The feasibility of a "Red-Green" alliance between urban working-class and the rural classes dependent on the landholding structures and whether other, mainly agrarian, parties had already mobilized the rural vote (LUEBBERT 1991, STEPHENS 1989). Scandinavian socialist parties, if they were not in a position to rule safely alone, found in the "old green" parties an ally (cf. ESPING-ANDERSEN 1985), though the Danish SD had to rely mainly on the Radical Liberals (RV). Although the Scandinavian parties did not form long standing coalitions, they profited from the splits in the bourgeois bloc and lacking a majority in parliament, ruled several times as a minority government or with the support of Communist or Leftist parties (see Table 3.9). The Austrian SPÖ was able to govern alone in the 1970s for over 13 years but was nearly twice as long forming a coalition government mainly a Grand Coalition with the Christian-

Table 3.9
Coalition Patterns of Socialist Parties (years), Western Europe 1945-89

Country/Party	Coalition	No partner	Communist	(New)Left	Agrarian	Ch.-Dem.	Liberals/Cons.
AU SPÖ	41.0	13.1	(KPÖ 0.6)	--	--	ÖVP 24.4	FPÖ 3.5
SZ SPS	41.0		-	-	SVP 41.0	CVP 41.0	FDP 41.0
SW SAP	38.0	7.7	-	(VPK 25.2)	CP 6.1	-	-
NO DNA	33.6	29.6	-	(SV 4.0)	-	-	-
DE SD	27.3	9.8	-	(SF 5.1)	V 2.1	-	RV 14.0)
IT PSI	24.8		(PCI 4.9)	PSDI 20.7	--	DC 24.8	PRI, PLI 20.4
BE PS/SP	24.6		PCB 1.0	--	--	PSC/CVP 17.0	PL/LP 15.4
NE PvdA	20.7		-	-	--	CDA 20.7	D'66 5.3
GB Lab.	17.1	17.1	-	-	-	-	-
GE SPD	15.9		-	--	--	CDU/CSU 2.9	FDP 13.0
IR ILP	15.3		-	NLP 3.3	-	FG 15.3	CnT 6.1
FR SFIO	8.9		PCF 2.5)		--	MRP 8.9	var. 8.9
PS	6.4		PCF 4.7	MRG 4.8	--	--	--

SOURCE: own calcualtions. NOTE: ranked by length of government (years); NE: CDA (incl. ARP, KVP, CHU), 1973-77: also PPR; IT: PSI only; FR: IVth and Vth Republic separately.

Democratic party (ÖVP). The other, less powerful, socialist parties in the consociational countries (Belgium, Switzerland, Netherlands), had hardly any alternative but to accept a coalition with the Christian Democrats and sometimes also with the Liberals. The smaller its strategic position within the coalition (dependent on its weight and the alternative coalition possibilities), the socialist party as it had to bargain with bourgeois parties was not able to promote union matters the same way as in Scandinavia or Austria (during the 1970s). Moreover, in the case where the Liberals were a strong partner, opposing socialist state-interventionist and Liberal market-economic principles narrowed the room for manoeuvre even further. Given the workers' or union wing of Christian parties pro-union strategies (see Chapter 4) had a better chance for compromise, particularly in Austria and Belgium, while less so in the Netherlands and in Switzerland. The same holds to some degree for the German SPD coalitions, that were with the exception of the late 1960s, a coalition with a Liberal, though at the time social-reform oriented and middle-class promoting party. The weaker French SFIO, Italian socialist parties (PSI, PDSI) and Irish Labour party were co-opted into coalition by the Christian parties (Italian DC, French MRG, Irish FG), often with other progressive parties. The reformed French socialist party under Mitterand was able to break the government monopoly of the bourgeois bloc in the Fifth Republic, though only with the help of the Communist and the support by left independents.

LABOUR UNITY IN SOCIALIST UNION MONOPOLY

If the unity of the political left adds to the power relations of labour (cf. KORPI 1978), labour unity is an important factor for unionism, too. Besides a high degree of unionization, SCHMITTER (1974) has pointed at *associational monopoly* as an important variable of labour unity and union power (cf. KORPI 1983, VISSER 1990, CROUCH 1990a: 74), measured as

Table 3.10
Associational Monopoly in Socialist Union Centres (%), Western Europe 1918-1989

Country:	AU	BE	DE	FR	GE	IR	IT	NE	NO	SW	SZ	UK	
Union Centre:	ÖGB-FSG	FGTB		LOCGT-FO	DGB	ICTU	UIL	FNV	LO	LO	SGB	TUC	Lab.
1913	91.8	55.4	75.4	*40.0	64.9		18.8	32.1		66.8	73.0	54.0	(44.9)
1920	89.7	81.4	77.3	54.2	73.8	*80.0	21.8	33.3		63.9	72.3	76.9	(51.8)
1930	80.2	70.6	75.5	58.6	67.4			40.0		82.1	60.7	76.8	(41.5)
1950	(64.4)	49.0	84.5	9.1	91.8	38.8	2.6	33.4		80.2	60.2	84.3	(53.5)
1970	(68.0)	43.9	75.0	17.4	81.5	95.3	14.1	38.8	76.0	66.3	54.9	89.4	(56.0)
1889	(59.8)	38.6	69.5	21.6	82.4	90.9	14.0	59.1	65.0	58.9	47.9	84.0	(*46.0)

NOTE: incl. predecessors see Table 3.(?); AU 1950-89: 100%, Chamber of Labour votes of FSG faction in brackets; FR: -1920: syndicalist CGT, 1950-: socialist FEN and secularized CFDT not included (see Text); NE: FNV 1980 non-Catholics only; 1989: incl. Catholics; UK: (Lab.) Labour party affiliated TUC unions only. SOURCE: 1913: own data collection; 1920-1980: VISSER 1989, 1990 (tab. 19); BE - 1940: NEUVILLE 1959, AU, BE, IR, 1950-, others 1989: DUES database, see Appendix C.

membership share of a given union centre in overall unionization. It indicates to what degree a union centres is able to claim in realiter universal representation, or faces competition by other organizations. The associational monopoly provides us with an indication of the salience of cross-cutting class cleavages as they are transformed into rival union movements (see Table 3.10), without entering here into the origins of these (see the following chapters).

While by 1920, most socialist union centres were able to absorb most of the independent manual labour unions, they faced some competition from political rival unionism or incipient white-collar federations. The Scandinavian and Anglo-Irish movements, particularly the Norwegian and Swedish LO had a near monopoly among the dominantly blue-collar workers, while the Danish, British and Irish movements faced more independent local and autonomous unionism until the unemployment and economic crisis forced many of them to join or risk to perish. In countries were Christian or white-collar union movements competed as in Austria, Belgium, Germany, and Switzerland, socialist union centres gained from the sudden membership mobilization in the early 1920s but faced increased membership losses and competition by rival movements. The Dutch NVV after losing members during the 1920s gained from the decline of the splinter movements. In France and Italy, where socialist were organized within syndicalist movements (CGT and CGL), these movements faced strong competition from communist union currents (see Chapter 5).

After the Second World War, again political cleavage structures accounted for variations in associational monopoly since efforts to labour unity had failed in most European countries with the exception of Austria and partly Germany. The French and Italian, the Belgian and Dutch socialist, communist and (in some countries also) Christian unionists had proposed plans to overcome the dooming interwar labour fragmentation and founded a unitary non-partisan union movement. However, these efforts failed in all four countries within few years, as the Marshall plan, the Cold-War and fierce internal political battles

mounted. Thus only in Austria and Germany where the tragedy of fragmented labour had been most a calamitously newly reformed *Einheitsgewerkschaft* (unitary union) gained near monopoly in representation: Austrian ÖGB (100%) and the German DGB (above 80%). Moreover, with the shifts in employment structure the differences in union strategies towards the functional cleavages gained in salience. Besides the Austrian and German union centres the Anglo-Irish movements were able to integrate a large degree of non-manual unionism - the British TUC (85-90%) and Irish ICTU (95-90%), in the latter case after the national quarrels that led to a split into two rival movements (ITUC, CIU) was settled with the merger of ICTU in 1959. All four union movements were open to white-collar and public service employees, and allowed via depoliticisation, factionalism or opting out non-socialist party supporters to be a member of a dominantly socialist labour movement without too much self-denial.

The Scandinavian union centres rank *second* in associational monopoly. They acquired a high degree of representation amongst manual workers but were only partly successful in organizing non-manual workers (cf. VISSER 1990: 114-119). The Danish LO has been more successful (85-70%) than the Norwegian LO (80-65%) which in turn ranks before the Swedish LO (80-60%). The ranking of the Scandinavian union movements reflects the inverse strength of rival white-collar unionism. This in turn reflects the strategy of inclusion: the purity or flexibility of the adopted industrial union principles within the LO's (see Chapter 6). The Danish LO with a mixed structure is more open to white-collar or public sector sectionalism, while the Norwegian and particularly the Swedish LO enforced a mainly manual industrial unionism principle.

In the *third* group we find again consociational countries, Belgium (50-40%), the Netherlands (35-40%, later 60% incl. Catholics) and Switzerland (60-50%). The ranking of these countries reflects to some degree the mixture of political and functional cleavage structures: in Switzerland and partly the Netherlands, it is the loss due to the functional cleavage, in Belgium and partly the Netherlands, it is due to the competition by the Christian (and other political) movements. The Dutch merger of the socialist and Catholic unions, although it led to the split-away of some white-collar unions, consolidated its position (around 60%)[16]. It should be noted that in Austria, there are quasi-pillars within the union centre, the political factions. The socialist faction FSG has also lost in strength from 70% of the votes at Chamber of Labour elections to 60% today, while the Christian and Nationalist party factions increased accordingly.

Finally, in polarized pluralist countries (see Chapter 5), in France and Italy, the two split-away anti-Communist union centres CGT-FO (ca. 10-20%) and UIL (ca. 5-15%) have a clear minority position amongst the five or three union centres. This is partly due to the fact that socialist supporters are also organized by other union centres, as a minority in the Communist-led union centres (CGT and CGIL), and by the secularized, former Christian

16 The three Socialist, Catholic, and Protestant pillars together, lost in overall share - and considerably in unionization - from a peak 83% in mid-1950s to 77% in 1989, though not if Catholic/white-collar split-away MHP is included with 8%.

union movements (CFDT and CISL) or the French teachers union FEN. In fact, CFDT is today the union centres with the closest party-union links to the PS and a majority of its leadership and members are pro-socialist. Whereas the PS pursued a strategy of searching informal contacts with the unions, the PSI has failed to do so, although the party aimed at copying Mitterand's success under Craxi (JUNGAR 1991: 259-260).

However, associational monopoly is only one, albeit important, aspect of labour unity as a prerequisite of effective union representation (see VISSER 1990). The aggregation, differentiation, and hierarchical ordering of interests, as well as the distribution of power and autonomy within the union centre vary considerable over time and across countries. An important aspect of unity within a union centre was internal coordination and aggregation of interests via the concentration into few large union organizations. A trend toward concentration in all union movements (see Table 3.11), reflecting the integration of local or small sectionalist unions into national broad unions, the merging of smaller unions into new ones, the absorption of smaller by larger unions, and the faster growth of larger, multi-sector unions. The countries with traditional mixed, if not territorially and functionally fragmented, structures have made considerable progress in the interwar and postwar period (in particular Denmark, Ireland, Great Britain), while the Swedish and Norwegian LO's started to rationalize their structure earlier (see Chapter 6). On the continent, the postwar socialist union centres had rationalized their union structure already by the 1950s thanks to interwar concentration movements and postwar organization reforms (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, and Switzerland). However, the French and Italian minority union centres were less successful to integrate local and sectional unions which further dispersed resources and led to further fragmentation.

Not only the number of affiliates but the division of power within union centres is an important factor in union representation. Looking, for instance, at the membership share of the three largest affiliates (see Table 3.11) provides an indication of the concentration of power within few dominant national unions, that can play a key role within the union centres policy making and can perform leadership role in collective bargaining and pressure group politics (cf. CROUCH 1990a, VISSER 1990). Here again concentration is higher within the Continental European union centres, while the Anglo-saxon, and less the Scandinavian, but definitively the French and Italian lack a degree of leadership. However, predominant general unions (Danish SiD or Irish IGTWU) can also play an important role within a more fragmented union system, they commonly challenge the transfer of power to the confederation level and bloc further organizational reforms. Large multi-sector unions (e.g. German IG Metall) have also provided a *primus inter pares* leadership role often to the detriment of the union centres authority (see Chapter 6). The power of the confederation may in fact be a function of both the concentration of unions and the possibly equal distribution of power amongst them, with a minimum of overlap and jurisdictional conflicts.

Table 3.11
Concentration in Socialist Union Centres (%), Western Europe 1918-1989

Country:	AU	BE	DE	FR	GE	IR	IT	NE	NO	SW	SZ	UK
Union Centre:	ÖGB	FGTB	LOCGT-FO		DGB	ICTU	UIL	FNV	LO	LO	SGB	TUC
Number of Affiliates												
1900	298	.	52	.	58	.	.	.	.	21	30	191
1920	65	31	55	.	52	.	.	.	.	31	19	213
1950	16	16	70	.	16	44+24	37	28	41	44	15	186
1970	16	14	52	42	16	75	36	20	40	29	15	142
1989	15	12	30	.	16	58	28	17	29	23	15	78
Three Largest Affiliates (%)												
1950	40.8	59.0	52.5		49.3	a35.5		42.5	31.1	32.8	59.4	.
1970	48.8	65.0	55.1		56.6	55.2		55.2	36.6	46.4	64.9	37.6
1985	49.3	64.0	54.6		56.8	48.6	29.2	66.1	42.3	57.5	65.7	36.2

NOTE: for predecessors see Table 3.(?); IR 1950: ITUC+CIU; IR: 1987; UK: 1988; (a) 1955: ITUC only.
SOURCE: 1900-20: own collection; 1950-89: DUES database 1992; see also Visser 1990: 143-4, Tab. 18

UNIONS AND SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION

Although party and unions may have a common objective in achieving government rule, "union-linked parties in government, while receptive to certain union demands, have numerous other administrative and economic pressures to respond to. Tensions between union-linked parties and unions has regularly coincided with the party's assumption of government responsibilities (JOSEPH 1979: 75)". Socialist governments, like any other government, are object to various multidirectional pressures from coalition partners, internal party factions, the semi-autonomous parliamentary group, forceful employers and business interests, augmenting financial constraints, long-term international obligations, and - alas - an impatient public opinion.

Unions commonly expect from supporting governments state favourable regulation and intervention in two policy areas of immediate relevance to unions: first, industrial relations regulation, and second, economic and income policy. In the first policy area, unions hope that Socialist governments intervene in favour of the role of unions and its power relations (cf. KORPI 1983). However, unions not always aim first at direct socialist government intervention, but were able to profit from a general increase in political power (cf. KORPI & SHALEV 1980, KORPI 1983). The Basic Agreements struck between unions and employers in Norway (1935), Denmark (1936) and Sweden (1938), attempted to achieve "industrial peace" in order to preempt unilateral state intervention. Moreover, the Scandinavian voluntary agreements between capital and labour gained quasi-official character, often complemented by legislation (ELVANDER 1974: 373). Similarly the German employers singed the November Agreement (1918) in anticipation of probable Socialist government intervention and the threat of revolutionary upheaval. However, when the power relations changed during the

Weimar Republic, even several codified agreements could not prevent the deterioration of industrial relations institutions and practices (cf. FELDMAN & STEINISCH 1985, ABRAHAM 1986). Similarly, the Matignon Agreement pressed for by the new Popular Front government (1936) remained volatile. A similar agreement in Belgium (1936) initiated by a grand coalition enshrined the first step towards corporatist partnership. With the exception of the Danish Basic Agreement (1899) and Swiss "peace" agreement (1937), the major agreements had been struck when socialists came new into government or in national crisis situations that demanded inter-class consensus (cf. ARMINGEON 1992: 139-140).

Although early coalition rights were granted at the time when socialist parties were only incipient, later extensions of coalition and strike rights were introduced by socialist coalition governments[17]. In Britain, new Labour governments abolished instantly conservative trade union acts that curtailed party-union relations and union securities (1927 Trade Dispute and Trade Union Act, abolished in 1945; 1971 Industrial Relations Act, abolished in 1974, cf. HEPPLE 1986) and were expected to abolish Conservative Trades Union Acts 1982-6 after regaining power. The impact of socialist incumbency has been particularly important in the introduction of worker participation. The first works' councils in Germany (1920), and works' council and chamber of labour in Austria (1919, 1920), the *délégues du personnel* in France (1936) were legislated by Left coalition governments in particular reform situations in which also employers gave their consent in fear of otherwise even more radical demands. The adoption and scope of reforms in workers' participation in the early 1970s were found to be related to socialist incumbency at the time and less generally to postwar power relations of labour (STEPHENS & STEPHENS 1982), albeit the institutional forms varied considerable, reflecting important long-term differences between countries (SORGE 1976). Legislation on workers' participation and representation has been attributed to be crucial to the power relations in industrial relations as it regulates union access to - and control of - workplace activities (cf. KJELLBERG 1981, STREECK 1981).

Secondly, in respect to economic and income policy, unions expected during the postwar years Keynesian demand management measures to maintain full employment, thereby strengthening the base for unions labour market power. However, the interest perspective and preference structure of unions differ from that of Social-Democratic governments, as unions aim at maintaining full employment (or reduction of unemployment) *and* the rise in real income (SCHARPF 1987: 212-218). Social-Democratic governments that maintain a full employment policy cannot be secure of cooperation by unions, as they can *"free-ride"* with expansive wage demands (SCHARPF 1987: 215). Party-union relations are crucial to socialist governments for maintaining cooperation and wage discipline by unions. Especially unions in Scandinavia and consociational countries, in which Social-Democratic parties were ruling or formed coalitions, unions profited from lower postwar records of unemployment and inflation with somewhat more gradual growth pattern, although much of it is at-

[17] In reform of coalition rights in Austria: 1918-20; Belgium: 1921, 1936; France: 1936, 1982; Germany 1920; for white-collar workers: Denmark 1938, Sweden 1936, cf. ARMINGEON 1992: 348-353 (Tab. A-4.1)

tributable to the particular consensual style of these small states in world markets (KATZENSTEIN 1985). In larger economies, Keynesianism adopted by socialist government in Great Britain and Germany in the late 1960s and early 1970s, or belatedly by French socialist in 1981, proved since the OPEC crisis in 1973 and the collapse of the U.S.-led international economic system "impotent, even serving counter-productively to exacerbate the conditions they were designed to cure (PADGETT & PATERSON 1991: 155). Consequently, relations cooled-off between socialist-led governments changing their course to monetary and fiscal measures and unions facing loosing power through high unemployment. In Britain and Germany, conservative governments came into power and ended socialist rule, while the austerity measures of the new French socialist government or Craxi's dismantlements of the Italian wage-price indexation strained even further party-unions relations and provoked rising popular unrest (PADGETT & PATERSON 1991: 154-167).

CONCLUSION

The thesis according to which the labour-capital cleavage is universal (LIPSET & ROKKAN 1967), holds for the formation of Socialist party and union centres in each country before the First World War, but fails to account for the large variations in the actual cleavage transformation. Applying the hypothesis developed by ROKKAN (1968) and LIPSET (1983) about the political and economic integration of the working-class into polity and economy, the variations in the formation of party and unions, as well as the consequences for party-union relations can be accounted. The labour movement emerged under varying conditions of political and economic integration, leading to differences in the differentiation between party and unions, division of functions and party-union linkages. It was found the more gradual and early the economic and political integration, the more an entrenched Liberalist union movement preceded and shaped the party formation. In the reverse case were party and unions faced state and employers resistance, the party normally preceded and coordinated the unions, reinforcing mass mobilization for suffrage reform and a class strategy for unions.

With the exceptions of polarized movements, the socialist party and unions, like *Siamese* twins, had a symbiotic *mobilization* relationship - they both gained from the advances of the other, yet they also faced similar limits. As long as the constituency largely overlapped and was recruited from the mainly manual working-class social background, party and unions jointly mobilized and maintained collective identity and solidarity through *social closure*. However, socialist party and unions, particularly where they had build a *social ghetto*, met two social limits to growth. First, in societies with cross-cutting class cleavages, socialist party and unions faced competition from Christian and Communist labour movements. Second, the traditional manual working-class support base never became a majority as in the Great Expectation, moreover, it stagnated after the Second World War. Both party and unions faced a strategic choice of opening up or remaining locked into a ghetto, but there was also a trade-off involved. The trade-off varied according to the party-union relation-

Table 3.12
Labour-Capital Cleavage and Union Movements

	Early/Gradual Integration	Late/Sudden Integration
LABOUR UNITY labour-capital cleavage dominant	UNION-LED *Labourist* UK, IR, (DE)	PARTY-LED *Solidaristic* SW, NO, GE, AU
PLURALISM cross-cutting class cleavages	PILLARIZED *Segmented* NE, BE, SZ	WEAK LINKAGE *Polarized* FR, IT

ship and the possible exit options and organizational costs for dissident movements. Moreover, party and unions were slow in adapting to social change, as was shown, they suffer from *structural inertia*, particularly where they had become locked into the social structure and where the party-union linkage remained inflexible.

The sequence in formation of party and unions, had important consequences for the external or internal legitimation and organizational consolidation of union movements. Four clusters of transformation of the capital-labour cleavage, as laid out in detail in this chapter, can be summarized (see Table 3.12): (1) *labourist* unionism, where an early union movement emerged and had decisive role in bringing about the Labour party, (2) a *solidaristic* union movement that was shaped by party leadership and joint struggle for Electoral Socialism, (3) a *segmented* reformist labour movement that remained partly confined to a non-religious segment due to cross-cutting cleavage, (4) a *polarized* and fragmented Left movement with initially weak party-union ties and later partisan splits. This summary table provides a typology of the main configurations, the major differences in the transformation of the labour-capital cleavage into organizations. The typology takes the contextual factors, the degree of integration and the existence of cross-cutting class cleavages, as external, societal and political environment that in turn could be further elaborated.

When socialist party and unions were still "outsiders", both fought for the same general aim, yet once they became integrated into polity and economy, both were forced to accept the logic of *representation*. However, the opportunities to alliance building and government participation varied with the cleavage structures across Europe. Similarly, the main union centres varied considerably in unity, centralization and authority, but also the degree of competition and rival unionism, as a consequence of the cleavage structure, and state and employers strategies. Moreover, the chances for Socialist government participation, its strength and stability, varied, providing different political environments for Socialist union movements, the possibility to count on neo-corporatist policies and universal welfare state policies, as for instance in Scandinavia. But Socialist union movements could also find their niche within segmented societies, profit from corporatist arrangements and hope for an eventual coming-together with secularisation of Christian and Socialist union movements. Yet, the Church-State cleavage remained more persistent as a cross-cutting class cleavage than many had expected hundred years ago, as will be described in the following chapter.

4
THE CHURCH-STATE CLEAVAGE

> *The decisive battle came to stand between the aspirants of the mobilizing nation-state and the corporate claims of the churches. (...) The parties of religious defense generated through this process grew into broad mass movements after the introduction of manhood suffrage and were able to claim the loyalties of remarkably high proportions of the church-goers in the working class. These proportions increased even more, of course, as the franchise was extended to women on a par with men. Through a process very similar to the one to be described for the Socialist parties, these church movements tended to isolate their supporters form outside influence through the development of a wide variety of parallel organizations and agencies: they not only built up schools and youth movements of their own, but also developed confessionally distinct trade unions, sports clubs, leisure associations, publishing houses, magazines, newspapers, in one or two cases even radio and television stations* (LIPSET & ROKKAN *1967: 15; italics removed).*

Religion matters for labour unity, too. In some European countries, religious conflicts cut across the *labour-capital* cleavage, thereby splitting worker alignments (LIPSET & ROKKAN 1967). In terms of social cohesion of political parties, it has been claimed that "religious divisions, not class, are the main social basis of parties in the Western world" (ROSE & URWIN 1969: 12). Religion, leads not only to particular forms of group association but has the potential for inter-religious conflict, its function of "providing an *alternative set of values* creates a potential for conflict between religion and secular society" (COLEMAN 1956: 56). In some countries, the political Church-State conflict split not only the polity and gave rise to a religious party, it also provoked a split in working class political alignment and labour unity. Historically, Christian unions were built as a reaction to the threat of secular modernization and socialist mobilization. The Church-State cleavage, although less universal than the labour-capital cleavage, cross-cut labour unity and led to union diversity in continental Europe. Moreover, it is an instructive, prime example of the processes of pillarization and segmentation, the formation of a network of linked organizations and the promotion of social closure based on *Weltanschauung*.[1]

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1 The concept of "verzuiling" (pillarization) was first introduced into analysis of Dutch organizational life by KRUIJT & GODDIJN 1962; it was extended as a mode of political accomodation by LIJPHART 1968 and LORWIN 1971, see also POST 1989 on a review of the extensive Belgian and Dutch literature. I use pillarization as a more "generalized" concept (cf. ROKKAN 1977) to describe the process and state of organizational interlocking, and segmentation as the process and state of social closure (see Chapter 2).

This chapter analyzes the conditions, development and limits of religiously based cross-cutting class cleavages. As in the previous chapter, the transformation of the cleavage into party and unions, the parallel mobilization, the representation aspect and party-union linkages will be examined.

Firstly, the formation of the Church-State cleavage and its transformation into Christian party and unions will be analyzed and compared to the Socialist labour movement. The Church-State cleavage has given rise only in some countries to the formation of Christian party and unions, that compete with Socialist party and unions for worker alignment. The historical overview explores the role of the Church and the religious parties in the formation of the Christian union movement. In the early phases, it was the position of the Church, her intransigence or tutelage that shaped the formation pattern of Christian party and unions. Later, however, the Christian-Democratic party had a more important role in the figuration that promoted separate Christian union organization or integration.

Secondly, mobilization of working-class aligance was an important factor for both Christian party and unions in securing its position. Although the Christian-Democratic party appealed beyond the working-class, the mobilization potential and path of party and unions were connected. Both contributed and gained from the process of segmentation, the promotion of social closure through pillarization. However, once desegmentation and depillarization started, Christian-Democratic movements varied in their responses and capacity to adapt across Europe.

Thirdly, the substantial impact of Christian-Democracy and the institutionalization of democratic pluralism in industrial relations for the presence of Christian unionism will be discussed. Christian unionism has to operate under the pressures of plural unionism, that is fragmented union diversity, the leaders have to balance internal cohesion with cooperation with other movements. Christian unionists based on their Christian-social conception - Catholic 'subsidarity' or Calvinist 'sovereignty in its own sphere' - opt for pluralist union diversity but strive for labour unity within their own circle. Christian unionists have accepted union diversity even when they are only a minority with a fragmented labour movement. However, in order to limit destabilizing effects and ineffectivity, and given their preference for consensus, Christian union leaders wished to come to terms within its contenders within the labour movement as well as outside.

I
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE CHURCH-STATE CLEAVAGE INTO THE CHRISTIAN PILLAR

The religious map of Europe has been relatively stable since the end of the Religious Wars (1648), even though the process of Nation-State building was not yet completed (cf. LIPSET & ROKKAN 1967). Therefore, not only denominations and states do not neatly overlap, the religious factor - the impact of *Church-State* relations, religious heterogeneity, and the degree of toleration of dissident religious groups - is spread unevenly across Western Europe

(MADELEY 1986, 1991).[2] In Catholic countries, the Church remained an independent (trans-national) structure of authority in conflict with the secular Nation-State. In Protestant Europe, the Church was part of the Nation-building process, though in Scandinavia dissidents mobilized in short-lived religious revival movements, whereas in Britain new denominations (Chapels) were tolerated early.[3] In religiously heterogeneous countries, the coexistence of two denominations remained a problem for national integration - requiring *amicable* accommodation in society and polity (LIJPHART 1968; LEHMBRUCH 1967). Hence, the religious map of Europe clusters around three (and a half) groups: countries with Catholic monopoly, countries with Protestant dominance (either Northern Lutheran monopoly or Anglo-Saxon pluralism), and a "mixed pattern" (cf. MARTIN 1978: Ch. 2, MADELEY 1986, 1991). What remains of importance for labour unity is less the religious composition or fragmentation as such but the different reactions to ongoing modernization that broke up religious bonds in working-class communities, often leaving Socialism as the sole *Ersatz* religion. However, where secularizing modernization and religious defence collided, Christian party and unions emerged, splitting worker alignment and labour unity.

The Church, in particular the Catholic Church (but also orthodox Calvinists), remained one of the major contenders to the centralizing Nation-State and the liberal-materialist market economy in both Catholic countries and religiously "mixed" Nation-States. Since the French Revolution, the Nation-State has attempted to limit the power of the Church, to cut its trans-national ties (with the Vatican), to intervene in internal Church hierarchy, to curb her income and privileges, to regulate civil marriage and to take over welfare provisions. However, the dominant mass-mobilizing conflict has been over secular control or ecclesiastical domination on elementary education (cf. LIPSET & ROKKAN 1967: 15, SWAAN 1989: 83-7). The *schoolstrijd* (school dispute) mobilized religious communities against the secular Nation-State and gave rise to the formation of parties of religious defense, out of which Christian-Democratic parties grew (LIPSET & ROKKAN 1967: 15). However, only in the Low Countries the Church(es) secured an important role in education, the historical Church-State school-pacts (Belgium: 1895, 1958; the Netherlands: 1917) entrenched the system of *verzuiling* (pillarization) with its segmented party and union systems (LORWIN 1971). In the other countries, private denominational schools remained the exception (cf. NEAVE 1985), though Church influence on religious teaching existed particularly where control remained at the sub-national level.[4]

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2 Besides the overview in the tradition of LIPSET & ROKKAN 1967 by MADELEY 1986, 1991, on Protestant Europe: see MADELEY 1977, 1982, on Catholic Europe see: MARTIN 1978, WHYTE 1981; for country profiles see MOL 1972.

3 The Church has served on the British Isles as carrier of territorial identities (or even nationhood), for instance, the Church of Scotland for the Scots, the Catholic Church for the Irish (cf. MARTIN 1978: 102.)

4 In 1900, the share of private (denominational) schools in primary education figured at 40% in Belgium, 31% in the Netherlands, 27% in France (though mainly female middle-class, cut by the State in 1907), 7% in Italy, 4% in Austria, and less than 1% in Germany and Switzerland; cf. FLORA 1983: Ch. 10.

Table 4.1
Founding and Political Participation of Christian Parties

	AU	BE	DE	FR	GE	IR	IT	NE		NO	SW	SZ		UK
Religion:	Cath.	Cath.	Prot.	Cath.	Cath.	Cath.	Cath.	Cath.	Prot.	Prot.	Prot.	Prot.	Cath.	Prot.	Prot.
Party	CVP	PSC	KRF	PDP	Z.		PPI	KVP	ARP	CHU	KrF	KDS	CVP	EVP	
Founded	1895	1884	1970	1924	1870		1919	1904	1879	1897	1933	1964	1912	1917	
delay to Left *	6	-1	72	19	1		27	10	-15	3	45	66	24	11	
Entry															
in Parliament	1890	1847	1973	1924	1870		1919	1888	1888	1897	1933	1985	1848	1919	
in Government	1907	1884	1982	1944	1919		1920	1901	1901	1908	1945	-	1891	-	

SOURCE: founding and entry years: LANE & ERSSON 1991; JACOBS 1989; MACKIE & ROSE 1990. NOTES: Cath.: Catholic, Prot.: Protestant; (*) in years to Left party. BE: CVP/PSC regional split 1936-45, 1968-; reformed: GE: 1945: CDU/CSU (both); IT: 1943 CD; NE: 1976/80: CDA (3 party merger).

THE FORMATION OF CHRISTIAN-DEMOCRATIC PARTIES

For an understanding of the Christian trade union movement, it is worthwhile to analyze first the formation of religious parties and the conditions under which Christian-Democracy emerged.[5] In contrast to the Socialist labour movement (see Chapter 3) Christian party and unions emerged less as result of the differentiation of political and economic functions of one social movement. Instead, nascent Christian unions had to seek political support in their struggle for the right of existence - within their own *zuil* (pillar) - against Church interference and - outside - against the larger, more contentious Socialist labour movement. Hence, Christian unionism profited from (but also shaped the character of) the Christian-Democratic party. Both party and unions were based on similar Christian, anti-Socialist *Weltanschauung* and appealed to all social classes, in particular, after the extension of suffrage and collective bargaining, they made an appeal on Church-going workers. It was the Christian unionists that tried to turn the religious parties into a "Christian-Democratic" party, while the religious (inter-class) party was not directly involved in building a Christian union movement.

However, was Christian-Democracy a counter-reaction to the "Socialist threat"? In three countries, important Christian-Democratic parties emerged around the time of Socialist party founding: in Germany, Belgium and Austria (see Table 4.1). However, the parallelism may be no more than coincidental: following changes in the political system and given the infancy of the labour movement the Socialist actual "threat effect" was still small. Instead, the formation of religious parties should be seen more as a "tandem" response to both the penetrating modernization process (cf. ELLEMERS 1984) and the rise of anti-clerical Socialist movements (cf. STUURMAN 1983), thus to both social and political mobilization.

[5] On religious or Christian-Democratic parties in Europe see FOGARTY 1957, IRVING 1979, MADELEY 1977, 1986, 1991, also WENDE 1981 and JACOBS 1989.

In early democratic parliamentary systems such as Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, loose parliamentary groupings existed long before well-organized national party structures were built up. As long as decentralized federalism prevailed, or national centralization lagged behind, there was not much need for Catholic mass organization, thus the more centralized Netherlands or Austria became more pillarized than the more federalist, "sectionalist" Switzerland (cf. KRIESI 1990, LEHMBRUCH 1967). Hence, it was first in the more secularized or "mixed religious" *diaspora* that the Catholic Church and lay leaders turned the extensive network of parishes, welfare institutions, and Christian Action groups to political use and built a well-organized pillar (cf. RIGHART 1986). It was also there that the Catholic party overcame its conservatism and opened itself to the Christian-Social labour wing.

The *schoolstrijd* provoked the early foundation of the first well-organized religious party in Europe - the Dutch Calvinist party (ARP, 1879), though it later suffered from a split-away of the moderates (CHU, 1897). In contrast, Protestant parties in Germany and Switzerland emerged with much more difficulty and remained temporary and minuscule parties (Germany 1890s, mid-1920s) or a minor and regional phenomena (Swiss Zurich-based EVP 1919). Although there existed a prewar Scandinavian tradition of "popular movements" (*folkrörelser*), the religious movements remained split, scattered and transitory (THERBORN 1989: 197-201). Only belatedly did religious rival parties emerge: most importantly, the earliest Norwegian KrF (regionally: 1933, nationally: 1945), the small - from parliament excluded - Swedish KDS (1964) and the late minority Danish KRF (1970) - all based on moral-ethical sectarian defense against increasingly "permissive" Nation-States (cf. MADELEY 1977). The "Anglo-Saxon type" of Christian-Democracy (FOGARTY 1957) was party-less since political alignment of dissident Protestants remained an individual choice - "each acting for himself" (FOGARTY 1957: 10). For Irish Catholics after the emancipation of the 1820s the National question became overriding; they voted on both British Isles either for the Irish National party or (even with the consent of bishops) the Labour party where the majority system did not guarantee the success of an Irish MP candidate.[6]

Compared to the paradigmatic *Michelsian* German SPD (see Chapter 3), the Catholic party was initially a weakly centralized party, mainly serving as an electoral machinery in mobilizing mass support in those constituencies were Church-goers could tip the majority. However, with universal suffrage and proportional representation, working-class voters and their organizations gained in importance for Christian-Democratic parties (cf. LIPSET & ROKKAN 1967: 15, 32-3). In France and Italy, due to the intransigent, *ultramontane* Catholic Church, small Christian-Democratic parties emerged relatively late, only after the First World War, after the union movement had already emerged. The Christian-Democratic parties in Italy (PPI, 1919) and France (PDP, 1926) relied more on support form the

6 Political parties in the Catholic-dominated Irish Free State and later Irish Republic could not claim Christian tradition as a means of social cohesion. Fine Gael, today affiliated with the European People's Party, cannot be seen as a Christian-Democratic party proper (as in LANE & ERSSON 1991), it lacks in fact the particular association with the religious cleavage (cf. MAIR 1987).

Table 4.2
Founding Origins and Organization Strategy of Christian Parties

	Penetration	*Diffusion*
Internal legitmation (lay-led)	German Zentrum Dutch ARP Dutch CHU	French PDP Italian PPI Norwegian KrF
External legitmation (Church-led)	Austrian CP Belgian PC	Swiss KK Dutch RKSP

Christian unions than on the Church hierarchy or Catholic action. The Italian Church hierarchy was long opposed to a mass political party, since as PPI's founder Sturzo observed "the Church unites, politics divide", but changed its position after the disastrous alliance with the Fascist state.

The process of Christian-Democratic party formation is more complicated and unsteady than in the case of Socialist parties, partly due to the lack of a coherent trans-national ideology and party model. Nevertheless, one can distinguish four forms of political formation (see Table 4.2): *first*, internally legitimated political parties with individual membership and centralized structures (German Catholics, Dutch Calvinists); *second*, internally legitimated parliamentary groupings that relied on a diffuse network of local alliances (French and Italian Catholics, Norwegian Protestants); *third*, political alliances with external, corporate social organizations (Austrian and Belgian Catholics); *fourth*, electoral alliances of a diffuse network of regional federations and social organizations (Swiss and Dutch Catholics). The first two forms developed more independently from the Church hierarchy, the latter tended to be led by the clergy. This classification reflects the early phase of party consolidation, though a number of parties have gone through several phases in the transition from loose, decentralized, volatile political alliances to centralized mass parties.

With the shift from political elite alliances to national mass mobilization, the Church lost its monopoly, and Christian lay organizations gained in importance. On the Continent, a plethora of functional organizations within the Christian pillar were formed, in particular, for worker associations and unions, associations of business (or middle class) interests, and farmer leagues. Together with the Church hierarchy, these three socio-economic groups are the four major actors in the figuration that supported Christian-Democratic parties, though the institutionalization of the relations between party and supporting groups and the degree of interdependence varied over time and between countries.

THE FORMATION OF CHRISTIAN UNION MOVEMENTS

The formation of Christian unions remained a tardy and equivocal process compared to the Socialist labour movement. While the Socialist party and unions differentiated from each other, the Christian labour movement emerged more in a process of differentiation of the

economic from the social-cultural function and as an emancipation from Church tutelage.[7] The figuration that gave rise to the Christian workers movement was - in contrast to the Socialists - the more intricate interaction between Church hierarchy, emancipated lay workers and Christian-Democratic party leaders. The early religious organization of workers had been initiated by benevolent priests or bourgeois honoraries to safeguard the spiritual community, and the teaching of the gospel, and to provide social welfare to the needy, first the "poor", and later with the recognition of the *Arbeiterfrage*: the workers. These clergy-led organizations remained mainly of local scope, non-political and less directed to economic problems. These 'intermediary structures' of local self-help and benevolence followed the principle of *subsidarité* summoned in Christian-social theology.

After the encyclica *Rerum Novarum* (1891), the Pope gradually recognized the economic base to social misery and also allowed functional interest representation. Until then the Catholic Church had long been opposed to union organization, but continued to foster *Fachvereine* (craft associations) linked to clergy-led cultural workers leagues, while looking with sucpicion at separate lay-controlled unions that accepted the strike weapon. In all countries clergy-led Christian workers leagues preceded the formation of Christian union centres (see Table 4. 3): national leagues of the spreading network of parish and diocese workers' associations preceded on average about fifteen years the formation of incipient national union centres. In some countries the two principles clashed, further weakening overall labour unity. Most notably, the *Gewerkschaftsfrage* (union question) provoked Church-intervention in Germany (Berlin vs. Cologne movement) and the Netherlands (Limbourg vs. Leiden school), while in others the conflict was less manifest but nevertheless inherent. However, Christian unionists had to seek help to guarantee their cultural and political independence *vis-à-vis* the rival Socialist union movements. Lacking in force and being reluctant to use the strike weapon, at least in its early days, Christian unions had to rely on Church support, State intervention, and employers good-will to secure their right to collective representation.

The German local and national unions that had emerged since the encyclica *Rerum Novarum* (1891) formed the first Christian union centre in Europe (GCGD, 1899), that was against the will of the Church hierarchy *interdenominational*, though only few Protestants actually joined these unions. Similar attempts toward interdenominational unionism were curtailed by the Dutch Bishops' ban (1906) leading to a Protestant (CNV, 1905) and a Christian union centre (NKV, 1909) that lasted seventy years. In Austria, Belgium, Netherlands and Switzerland, the pro-union Christian-Social movement came in opposition to the Church-led conservative leaders of the Christian workers' leagues. In these three countries, trade union centres were established in the decade before the war, though scattered national and local unions had emerged since *Rerum Novarum* (see Table 4.3). Where the Church had been most intransigent towards Christian political and union activities, a union centre that coordinated the scattered local and national unions was achieved only

7 On Christian union movement see FOGARTY 1957, LAUBIER 1985: Ch. 2, LAUNAY 1990, RIGHART 1986, SCHOLSL 1961, VISSER 1990.

Table 4.3
Founding of Christian Workers' Leagues and Union Centres

	AU	BE	FR	GE	IT	NE	SZ		
Religion:	Cath.	Cath.	Cath.	both	Cath.	Cath.	Prot.	Cath.	Prot.
Workers' League:	RV	ACW	Sillon	VKD	Unione	RKV	CAS	SKVV	VESA
Founded	1902	a1891	1900	1880	1906	1888	1900	b1904	1900
delay to Labour	+1	-7	-3	-10	0	-17	-1	-1	20
delay to party *	-6	1	-5	10	-13	-16	25	-8	-23
Union Centre:	ZCG	CSC	CFTC	GCGD	CIL	NKV	CNV	CNG	SVEA
Founded	1909	1912	1919	1899	1918	1909	1905	1907	1920
delay to Labour	+8	6	14	9	12	4	4	2	40
delay to party *	1	20	-5	29	-1	5	30	-5	3
delay to League	7	21	19	19	12	21	5	3	20

NOTE: (+) delay to Socialist trade union confederation (SZ: 1905 change to socialist orientation); (*) delay in years to founding of Christian Democratic party; (a) predecessor (1867, 1870; 1920s: reform); (b) merger of SKV (1857/99) and VMAV (1888).

after the First World War. The Italian CIL (1918) and French CFTC (1919) were hardly representative, the first was concentrated mainly in Lombardia, Veneto and agricultural areas, the latter was founded by a pious association of clerks and Catholic unions from the newly incorporated Alsace.

Christian unionism, however, was not limited to Catholic workers only, though Protestant and inter-confessional unionism remained a more exceptional case within Europe. The Dutch Calvinist union movement dates back to an ARP-led split-away from the Liberal union federation over the *schoolstrijd*, but it long remained a paternalistic organization (*Patrimonium*) until after the Socialist unions refounded a union centre (1905). Only in Switzerland, another Protestant union centre emerged, though only after the First World War (SVEA, 1920). In Protestant Europe, in Scandinavia and the British Isles, Church-going workers remained integrated within the same union movement as the other workers. In Britain some dissident denominations participated actively within the labour movement, while the Scandinavian Socialist union movements were, like on the continent, largely atheist. Attempts to organize unions along religious lines, like the minuscule Danish Christian workers' union (1899) remained minor exceptions in countries where dissident religious movements were confined to rural, peripheral areas.

A recapitulation of the founding origins and organization strategies should map the major differences among Christian union centres (see Table 4.4). The degree of internal or external legitimation in the case of Christian unions is classified as to the degree of Church tutelage and influence of the clergy *vis-à-vis* the lay leaders at the phase of early consolidation. This influence may have two forms depending on the second axes of the organization strategy, whether the organization was centralized and thus mainly open to top-down in-

Table 4.4
Founding Origins and Organization Strategy of Christian Unions

	Penetration	*Diffusion*
Internal legitimation (lay-led)	German GCGD Belgian CSC	Swiss CSG Dutch CNV
External legitimation (Church-led)	Austrian ZCG Dutch KAB	French CFTC Italian CIL

tervention of the Church hierarchy (or union leaders), or whether it was a more loosely knit network of union activities relying on the local initiative of priests (or union leaders). In the Dutch and German Catholic union movement the Catholic bishops intervened in attempting to limit its "unionateness" and interdenominational character, though the Dutch intransigence was more successful. Quite in contrast to the more dogmatic, intransigent position of the *diaspora* Catholic hierarchy in the two "mixed" countries, the Austrian and Belgian Church showed more pragmatism (on Belgium cf. PASTURE 1991). While the French and Italian movement suffered from the general intransigence of the Church hierarchy, local priests had an impact on the disconnected local activities. The Swiss Catholic and Protestant unionization efforts, lacking a strong centralized Church hierarchy, remained a loose coordination of multifarious activities in regional pockets.

Certainly, Christian union movements were building in response to Socialist labour movements (about four to ten years afterwards), except where an intransigent Church hampered national union organization as in France and Italy (see Table 4.3). However, this process was less a national than a more regional process of competition in response to modernization. More lay-oriented unions emerged where diaspora Catholics (and Protestants) faced the double "dangers" of Socialist agitation and secularizing modernization, while in more homogeneous or backward rural areas activities were mainly clergy-led counter-mobilization efforts against the "ills of modernization". Although the roots of the Church-State cleavage predate the labour-capital cleavage (cf. LIPSET & ROKKAN 1967), it is only in response to the latter that the Church-State cleavage became crystalized and mobilized into a cross-cutting class cleavage splitting worker alignment and labour unity.

Besides Church intervention, there is also a relationship between Christian party and union formation, reflecting the joint contribution of both organizations to cleavage crystallization. There exists a parallelism in party and union development: in countries where no Christian-Democratic party emerged, there was also no schism of the labour movement along religious lines - or *vice versa*. Christian-Democratic parties did not emerge in all of the twelve countries considered here: there is no Christian-Democratic party on the British Isles, there are only small Christian parties in Protestant Scandinavia, while in the "mixed" and continental Catholic countries Christian-Democratic parties though of different scope and strength emerged. Only in the group of countries with Catholic or mixed religious

composition did there occur a split in the labour movement, too. Yet the claim "that it was not pillarization that created the political parties, but the political parties gave rise to the process of pillarization" (STEINIGER 1977: 252) seems only partly confirmed. It was less the party that created the unions, but the party became the crystallizing point and alliance partner against Church tutelage and Socialist rivalry: Christian unions sought legitimation and support from the party. The more distant relationship between religious party and unions, in comparison to the Socialist party-union relations, had also its impact on the mobilization pattern of Christian labour movments to which we turn now.

II
FROM MOBILIZING SEGMENTATION TO DEMOBILIZING SECULARIZATION

Christian party and unions mobilized much more independently than the Socialist labour movement, yet the party leader' appreciation of Christian unionism changed once the suffrage was extended to the working-class. Both party and unions had an interest in maintaining social closure against hostile environments, in particular the secularizing Nation-State and the desecrating industrialization. Yet the political and social mobilization found its limits through party and union competition in the political and industrial relations system. Both party and union leaders had to contend against two challengers - inside and outside its own pillar. Christian unionists faced not only competition by other rival union movements but also by employers, even those that were close to their allied Christian-Democratic party or were linked *via* a Christian employers organization within their own pillar. Moreover, the ongoing social change, the secularization of life spheres and the increased cross-milieu interactions, the outcomes of the very success of national integration, eroded the very base of Christian party and union mobilization: it qualified the possibilities for social closure through pillarization. However, Christian party and unions adapted differently to the new challenge and consequently followed different paths of electoral and corporate mobilization.

MOBILIZATION THROUGH PILLARIZED SEGMENTATION

Christian labour, in party and unions, had to mobilize against the dominance of rival labour movements but also against opposed forces within its own pillar. Only through strength could it claim a right towards representation of labour interests within the inter-class party and *vis-à-vis* the state and employers in the sphere of industrial relations. Party leaders in mainly Catholic countries, like the Austrian K. Lueger, quite similar to the Socialists, expected to gain the majority of votes once suffrage would be extended (cf. STEINIGER 1975). In fact, already before the First World War, the Christian parties mobilized about one-half of the enfranchised population in Austria (1907 after the suffrage reform), Belgium, and the Netherlands (all three major Christian parties combined). In Germany and Switzerland - under male universal suffrage - the Catholic minority (ca. 35% and 40%

Table 4.5
Election Results of Christian-Democratic and Religious Parties, Western Europe 1890-1989

	AU	BE	DE	FR	GE		IT	NE				NO	SW	SZ	
Party:	ÖVP	CVP	KRF	MRP	Z.	CDU	DC	CDA	KVP	ARP	CHU	KrF	KDS	CVP	EVP
Religion (*):	Cath.	Cath.	Prot.	Cath.	Cath.	both	Cath.	both	Cath.	Prot.	Prot.	Prot.	Prot.	Cath.	Prot.
Votes (%)															
1890-1917	48.1	50.3	-	-	18.5	-	3.5	-	17.6	22.8	9.5	-	-	21.4	-
1918-1944	40.9	36.6	-	3.2	10.6	-	20.4	-	28.9	13.3	9.1	1.1		20.0	0.8
1945-1967	45.5	42.6	-	14.7	-	36.0	41.4	-	30.7	10.8	8.6	9.1	1.8	22.5	1.1
1968-1989	43.3	31.0	3.0	7.4	-	45.4	37.1	31.9	21.4	9.9	6.2	9.2	1.7	21.0	2.0
Seats (%)															
1890-1917	48.9	59.1	-	.	25.0	-	3.1	-	24.5	17.8	7.7	-	-	21.0	-
1918-1944	44.5	40.0	-	.	11.3	-	19.9	-	29.9	13.9	9.7	1.0	-	22.5	0.4
1945-1967	48.6	45.9	-	16.2	-	38.8	45.5	-	31.9	10.9	8.6	7.8	0	23.6	0.7
1968-1989	44.3	32.9	2.8	5.1	-	47.4	40.3	32.9	22.4	9.4	6.2	11.0	0	21.9	1.5

SOURCE: own calculations, updated from MACKIE & ROSE 1990, see Appendix B. NOTES: (*) Religion: Catholic, Protestant, both denominations; (%) Cabinet share: relative share of seats in coalition, weighted by years. BE: incl. PSC; GE: -1933: incl. Zentrum, BVP; 1948-: incl. CSU; NE: 1980 CDA merger (KVP, ARP, CHU).

respectively) voted faithfully for its party (probably more than 60% of enfranchised Catholics), mobilizing about one-fifth of the votes. However, no prewar Christian-Democratic party emerged in Catholic France and Italy due to the intransigence of the Catholic Church to the republican or liberal Nation-State. In France, Christian workers faced the choice between conservative and anti-clerical (republican) left parties, whereas Italian workers were hardly enfranchised and thus were less committed to other parties and were easier mobilizable by the interwar Christian-Democratic party after the suffrage reform.

After the First World War, Christian party leaders expected to profit from an extension of the suffrage (and proportional representation) to include the more religious agrarian propertyless, small middle-classes and some sections of the working-class. However, Christian parties actually mobilized somewhat less votes (particularly: Belgian KP, German *Zentrum*, and Dutch ARP) and lost much of the favourable prewar seat allocations, with the exception of the Dutch Catholic party. The Italian Catholic party (PPI, 1919) mobilized a turnout of about one-fifth of the voters, certainly less than in other Catholic countries but an achievement nonetheless for a new party. This was largely due to the symbiotic relationship with the Christian union and cooperative movement (cf. SCHOL 1966). Indeed, the Christian labour movement with its cooperative movement and Chambers of Labour assumed an important role for the party leadership, not only to reach the Christian workers but the agrarian population as well. Although the Christian unions represented a minority and had less members than the Socialist unions, they had an important role within their own pillar. Comparing union membership to party votes, Belgian, German, Dutch and Swiss Catholic unions organized around 20% of party turnout, while merely 6% in Austria

but around 90% in Italy.[8] Of course, as within the Socialist camp, not every union member was a "faithful" (or loyal) voter to the party (or for that matter eligible to vote), yet union leaders had an important mobilizing role as communication channels for the party.

THE DILEMMA OF SECULARIZING MOBILIZATION OR DEMOBILIZING SECULARIZATION

After the Second World War, Christian unionists faced the question of whether Christian unionism was still a feasible option in an increasingly materialist and secularized postwar world. The dilemma for a Christian union (and similarly for the Christian-Democratic party) was how to adapt to the secular challenge and yet maintain its cohesion. How to retain the Church-goers and yet also appeal to those that hold more instrumental orientations? With hindsight, we found that Christian union movements diverged in their adaptation strategy and mobilization path in every possible manner. Notwithstanding the integration of Christian unionists within the Austrian and German unitary union movements, we find since the mid 1950s all possible mobilization patterns: from long-term growth-to-limits to growth-and-decline and relative stagnation or recent downward trends.

Firstly, the most outstanding development is certainly the Belgian Christian union centre (CSC/ACV). It is the strongest "truly" Christian union movement in Europe (cf. PASTURE 1992), outnumbering the rival Socialist union centre (FGTB/ABVV) since the late 1950s. This exception to the rule is an important case for understanding the impact of pillarization. In the early 1950s, the Belgian Socialist and Christian union movements had nearly the same strength; both were willing to acknowledge each other as equals. Both were part of extensively well-formed organizational pillars centred around the party (or the Church), a network of mutualities, cooperatives, media, sport and social clubs and other organizations (cf. LORWIN 1975). What was true for the Christian union movement, particularly in Flanders, holds also - across the border - for the Dutch Catholic union movement, and yet the latter movement declined after its peak in the late 1950s. Three factors have contributed to the success of the Belgian as opposed to the Dutch Catholic unions: a pragmatic ideological adaptation, a favourable territorial shift in economic and political power, and institutional arrangements that maintained pillarization.

In Belgium, the postwar Catholic unions had shaken loose the Church tutelage and adopted a more pragmatic orientation, this was even easier after the Church retreated from politics after the School pact (1958). Contrary to the Dutch Catholic bishops who found themselves in a *diaspora* within a Protestant-secular society, the Belgian bishops abstained from direct intervention in union matters. Union leaders in turn could be more pragmatic, attracting even those that were neither pious, nor Church-goers (cf. PASTURE 1991).[9] The

[8] The membership-votes ratio was calculated as union membership divided by party turnout. Since non-enfranchised women (in France, Belgium, Italy) or young members are included among union members the ratio is overestimated.

[9] The CSC, in fact, was more able to attract younger members and activists, and provided more services in a more modern organization than the Socialists (LORWIN 1975: 252-3).

Table 4.6
Christian Union Membership Share and Union Density (%), Western Europe 1890-1989

	AU	BE	FR		GE	IT	NE		SZ	
Union Centre:	ZCG	ACV	CFTC	CFDT	CGB	CISL	NKV	CNV	CNG	SVEA
Religion:	Cath.	Cath.	Cath.	Secul.	both	Secul.	Cath.	(both)	(both)	Prot.
Membership Share (%)										
1890-1917	7.3	40.5	3.8	-	11.6	27.4	11.2	3.6	3.4	-
1918-1944	9.1	25.7	7.9	-	17.1	(45.0)	21.1	12.1	8.5	2.2
1945-1967	[17.6]	47.7	2.4	13.0	1.2	34.9	27.9	15.2	9.6	2.1
1968-1989	[29.8]	51.4	3.1	19.6	2.7	35.2	22.1	17.0	11.2	1.5
Gross density (%)										
1890-1917	0.5	2.0	0.0	-	1.4	1.0	2.0	0.5	0.2	.
1918-1944	3.9	8.7	0.9	-	5.9	8.6	6.4	3.7	2.2	0.6
1945-1967	[11.0]	20.6	0.5	3.0	0.5	10.8	11.4	6.2	3.7	0.8
1968-1989	[17.6]	32.5	0.5	3.5	1.0	16.9	8.6	5.9	3.8	0.5
Net density (%)										
1945-1967	.	20.1	0.5	3.0	0.4	9.7	10.9	6.0	.	.
1968-1989	.	26.6	0.5	3.5	0.9	14.0	7.6	5.1	3.3	.

SOURCE: own calculations, DUES database, see Appendix C.
NOTE: NE CNV: until 1977 Prot., SZ: until SVEA merger: Cath.; AU [.]: ÖAAB Share in votes in Chamber of Labour Elections 1949-89

Christian union centre maintained close ties with the party that became more distant as union membership increased while party support declined over the 1960s. In fact, the CSC did not suffer from the radical plunge in electoral turnout and was less affected from centrifugal tendencies in the Christian-Democratic party over language and regional conflicts. Traditionally, Catholic unions had their strongholds in the more rural Flemish-speaking areas, thus the shift of population and employment to the North had given it a further boost.[10] Compared to the Dutch unions, the Belgian unions maintained the Ghent-system of union-led unemployment insurances after the war (cf. VANTHEMSCHE 1990), with the consent of both pillars. The local unions paid out the subsidized benefits to the recipients thus providing a highly attractive incentive.

Secondly, more common pattern of growth and decline can best be exemplified by the case of Dutch Catholic pillarization and de-pillarization. Catholic unionization increased in the early 1950s but came then to a standstill as was the case with overall unionization. The strength of the Catholic pillar proved to be its weakness: the tightly knit network of organizations, largely under the control of the Catholic Church. This had sustained its *social ghetto* cohesion but led in the long-run to intransigent inflexibility. The Church that had been known as "being more Roman-Catholic than Rome", forced the unions in a Catholic

10 Although CSC gained more rapidly outside their traditional area, 74.5% of CSC (47.4% of Socialist FGTB) membership was concentrated in Flanders (1964/5), that is about 70% more than FGTB in that region. In 1985, 68.3% of CSC members resided in Flanders, compared to 42.9% in the Socialist FGTB. (cf. CSC reports, SPITAELS 1967).

workers' league (KAB) and intervened into union affairs, most notably in 1956 when the bishops condemned membership of Catholics in Socialist unions. Only at the peak was a new, truely unionate confederation established (NKV, 1964) that shed Church tutelage and deemphasized its religious character (by no longer discriminating against non-Catholics). At its peak around 1960, the Catholic union centre organized nearly as many blue-collar industrial workers as the Socialist centre, yet far fewer in the private tertiary (two-thirds) and in the public sector (one-half, calculated from VISSER 1989: 157). While the Socialists gained in the latter sector even further, the Catholic union centre stagnated, and became the weakest of the three pillarized organizations in the white-collar, private tertiary and public sector, not to speak of its weak support amongst the belatedly growing female labour force. That NKV was locked into a past social structure was a remnant of the Dutch Catholic episcopacy's interpretation of Christian social doctrine (cf. PASTURE 1991), that opposed the organization of blue-collar workers *and* white-collar employees within the same movement. Compared to the slow de-pillarization in the union sector, the Catholic party lost dramatically in the 1967 and 1971/72 elections from over 30% to below 20% of votes when it joined the two other religious parties to found a Christian-Democratic party (CDA). Similarly, running into a membership and financial crisis, the Catholic unions were forced to accept the merger proposals, while the Protestants withdrew in the last moment. The Protestant unions were also stagnating, though they were less regionally concentrated and more cable of shifting to new sectors, particular after some independent Catholic white-collar unions joined. By joining the Socialist unions, the Catholic unionists did not escape the threat of decline; the newly merged FNV lost considerably in active membership in the 1980s.

Thirdly, most other Christian union movements have faced similar problems, yet on a much lower level and were able to maintain their membership, albeit losing - like unions overall - in recent years. An interesting comparison of the French and Italian Christian union movements may further reveal the problematic dilemma of religiously pillarized organizations. Both the French and Italian union centres changed from a religious to a secular orientation during the first two postwar decades. The change of name and constitution in the case of the CFDT in 1964 is only the final success of the secular *minorité* that turned from minority to a majority within the CFTC. The change found large support amongst the members, only one-fifth joined the traditionalist CFTC-*maintenu* split-away. Differences in the character of Christian labour movements and in its subsequent adaptation, resulted not only from different mobilization paths but also from variations in the impact of Christian-Democracy on politics and on industrial relation institutions.

III
FROM PILLARIZATION TO DEMOCRATIC PLURALISM

Christian-Democratic party and Christian unions were both part of the same *Weltanschauung* pillar as a result of the Church-State cleavage. Yet the party was a cross-class *Volkspartei* even *avant la lettre*, while the union movement was a class organization that

cautiously developed into a deconfessionalized, secular movement. For the party, according to the *logic of representation*, the unions were an important ally within their own pillar to mobilize larger sections of the working population, while the latter voiced its interests against other factions within the party. Through the party, the Christian unions were able to meet Christian employers or Christian-Democratic business leaders. The inter-class party played a crucial role in mediating class conflicts within its own pillar and thus fasciliating political accomodation in society (cf. LIJPHART 1968). Moreover, Christian-Democratic parties had an important role in institutionalizing democratic pluralism within industrial relations. Although Christian unionism added to union diversity, its strength in labour unity within its pillar and its cross-class relations gave it more importance than mere numbers showed. However, much of overall labour unity was dependent on the willingness of union leaders to cooperate across pillars and to adapt their movement to the changing world.

THE IMPRINT OF CHRISTIAN-DEMOCRACY

The Christian party had already made its imprint in many consociational countries, before Christian-Democracy proper emerged with the suffrage reforms around the First World War. In countries with early parliamentarism, in Belgium (1830), Switzerland (1872) and the Netherlands (1878), Catholic parties entered government early. After its landslide victory in 1884, the Belgian Catholic party ruled for 28 year until the end of war.[11] The Dutch Catholic party entered the Calvinist-Catholic coalition in 1901 (individual Catholic politicians had been included before) which alternated with Liberal governments until the suffrage reform of 1920. The Swiss Catholics were asked to join the Radical-Liberal party in 1891, and have remained in office ever since, albeit with a second Federal Council seat since proportional representation (1919). In Austria since the 1907 suffrage reform and in the German Reich, parliamentary majority (though not the cabinet) depended on the consent of the Christian-Social party and *Zentrum* respectively.

After the suffrage reform and proportional representation, Christian-Democratic parties continued to rule for nearly the entire *interbellum* in the above mentioned countries, though in varying coalitions (see Table 4.7). They profited from their pivotal position and the failure of the left to achieve a majority or strike a compromise with the Liberals or the Right. The Belgian Christian-Democracts and particularly the German *Zentrum* ruled particularly during the critical years in a Grand Coaltion with the Socialists, while in Austria and the Netherlands such centre-left coalitions broke apart after a short time. On the other hand, the Swiss war cabinet asked the Socialists to join only in 1943.

After the Second World War, Christian-Democratic parties ruled in all countries for more than half of the postwar period, though varying in strength, regularity and coalition partners - mirroring the Social-Democratic party position (see Chapter 3), though none -

11 The "Christian-Democrats", the progressive party splinter, obtained 3 out of 10 Minister posts from 1907 onwards, cf. KOSSMANN 1978: Apendix.

Table 4.7
Government Participation of Christian Parties, Western Europe 1890-1989

	AU	BE	DE	FR	GE	IR	IT	NE			NO	SW	SZ	
Party:	ÖVP	CVP	KRF	MRP	CDU	FG	DC	CDA	KVP	ARP	CHU	KrF	KDS	CVP	EVP
Religion (*):	Cath.	Cath.	Prot.	Cath.	both	Cath.	Cath.	both	Cath.	Prot.	Prot.	Prot.	Prot.	Cath.	Prot.
Government years															
1918-1944	14.0	20.1	-	.	12.7	-	.	-	20.9	21.7	21.7	-	-	27.0	-
1945-1967	22.0	14.2	-	21.4	18.3	6.1	21.4	-	22.5	15.3	17.4	2.3	-	23.0	-
1968-1989	5.4	22.0	5.7	10.2	9.0	9.2	22.0	12.4	9.9	9.9	5.4	7.3	-	22.0	-
Coalition with Socialists (years)															
1918-1944	2.3	8.5	-	-	7.0	-	-	-	-	0.0	0.0	-	-	1.2	-
1945-1967	21.3	5.7	-	8.9	1.1	6.1	6.7	15.1	15.1	13.0	10.4	-	-	24.8	-
1968-1989	3.1	11.3	-	-	1.8	9.2	18.6	1.0	4.6	4.6	-	-	-	29.6	-
Cabinet share (%)															
1918-1944	42.0	44.8	-	.	15.1	-	.	-	41.8	20.8	14.2	-	-	37.1	-
1945-1967	53.2	46.9	-	21.7	61.2	26.4	74.8	-	47.9	10.7	10.3	1.6	-	29.3	-
1968-1989	17.4	53.9	1.6	4.3	32.6	41.8	69.1	34.0	20.5	8.5	4.2	6.2	-	26.5	-

SOURCE: own calculations, updated series based on FLORA 1981, MACKIE & ROSE 1990, see Appendix B. NOTES: (*) Religion: Catholic, Protestant, both denominations; Cabinet share: relative share of seats in coalition, weighted by years. BE: incl. PSC; GE: -1933: incl. Zentrum, BVP; 1948-: incl. CSU; NE: 1980 CDA merger (KVP, ARP, CHU).

maybe with the exception of the Austrian ÖVP (1966-70) - ever obtained hegemony. Neither was Christian-Democracy to become important were Socialists achieved sustained or sporadic hegemony (Scandinavia, Britain, France). The Italian Christian-Democrats though divided by fractions had until the strongest and longest government role (see Table 4.7) as it successfully kept the Communists out of government and restricted their alliance alternatives. Similarly during the two postwar decades the German, Austrian, Belgian and Dutch Christian-Democratic parties played an important role as major coalition partner, though sometimes joined by the Socialists. These governments were more inclined to all inclusive corporatist concertation making. Indeed, these arrangements were a vital element to "stable, consociationalist democracies" (SCHOLTEN 1987). The impact of Christian unions seemed to have been largest where coalition governments included the Socialist parties, since any pro-union policy had to be done on a par with the other union movement, while in centre-right coalitions union interests remained underrepresented.

In the second half of the postwar era, however, centre-left coalitions became less the rule, though they remained in power in Italy, Belgium and Switzerland. Following the depillarization, regional disparities, and increasing tensions between factions or party wings, Christian-Democratic parties face a critical situation in Belgium and Italy, with some warning signs in other countries. Although trade unions have not come as much under attack or suffered severe austerity measures in these countries as in Britain or France, yet the social wing within Christian-Democratic parties has become a even more discounted voice.

INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF DEMOCRATIC PLURALISM

As Fogarty observed, the history of Christian Democracy is the growth of the seeds sawn by the early twenties (cf. FOGARTY 1957: 298). In the consociational countries, where Christian-Democratic parties participated in interwar governments, *democratic pluralism* became institutionalized in industrial relations. Union recognition entailed not only the legitimate representation of labour interests in collective bargaining, but guranteed also representation rights to the minoritarian Christian unions. Moreover, in Belgium, Austria, Germany and the Netherlands, corporatist institutions were introduced such as works' councils, Chamber (or Council) of Labour during the interwar period. These statutory institutions - partly unintended - were soon a forum for democratic pluralism in industrial relations. Representation on these institutionalized channels of labour representation necessarily became a political issue: how were seats to be allocated between the partisan union movements (by social elections, mutual agreement, or government decision)? Even of earlier origin were social welfare institutions that promoted union pluralism, through applying subsidarity and corporatist principles. After the Second World War, the Christian and Socialist pillars agreed to continue and reform these industrial relations institutions of interclass and intraclass consensus in order to stabilize postwar industrial relations (but also to limit the impact of Communists).

In Belgium, where the Ghent-system originated, union-led unemployment insurances received early on support (1907) and were subsequentially subsidized by the central government (1920). Christian-Democrats and Socialists together struck early on a compromise on free choice of welfare funds but with state regulation and financial support (*Verzekeringswet*, 1903, SCHOLL 1964). The continuation of the Ghent-system in unemployment insurance had the unintended consequence that the Belgian labour movement grew during high unemployment, from which also the Christian unions benefited (VANTHEMSCHE 1990). Besides the increasing number of sectoral bipartite committees, there existed a long tradition of a national bipartite forum, the National Council of Labour.[12] For the representation on these committees, the major confederations agreed on principles of division of seats with the employers and state. Mutual recognition was further underlined by the wartime secrete "Social pact" (1940) and the status of *représentativité* granted by the state (1948). The three established union centres were able to keep individual exit costs and organization costs high, thus, for instance, the independent unions of *cadres* were not officially recognized as representative until 1985.

In the Netherlands, at the time of the historic comprise (1917) it was also decided by the Christian parties that state and communes should subsidize voluntary unemployment insurance schemes, which was controlled later by a social security council that became the forum for pluralist union representation (cf. KUIPER 1925). Similarly, pluralist unionism derived its legitimation from, but also reinforced, high-level corporatist representation and

12 It was first a tripartite (1892), then reformed bipartite (1935) institution, it continued informally since 1945, and was restructured to its current form in 1952 (cf. "Belgium" in BLANPAIN 1977).

cross-class (and interdenominational) consensus seeking between and within the pillars.[13] *System* integration (see Chapter 2), not social integration, became the overriding concern of Christian union leaders, in particular Catholic unionists. While clinging on top-level elite corporatist arrangements, social disintegration at the pillars bottom remained largely unnoticed and unaltered.

Austria has also a long tradition of integrating unions into legislative consultation, in particular via the Chamber of Labour.[14] While representation on the Chamber was a matter of rivalry between the *Lager* in the interwar period, the postwar unitary ÖGB allowed its partisan factions to campaign in the Chamber elections, thus allowing the minority representation to the Christian-Democratic wing. The ÖGB was successful in monopolizing its representative status and being accepted as the sole social partner on the side of labour, notably in the parity price and wage commission (statutory since 1957, predecessor since 1947 price agreement).

In Germany, some corporatist arrangements have existed that are similar to those in Austria but did not survive as much into the postwar period. Although the Christian unionists had been proponents of corporatist relations, the legacy of Bismarckian social and labour policy (union representation in self-administration) fuelled more status divisions (due to the collarline divisions) than pluralist unionism, to the advantage of the anti-semitic Protestant clerical union DHV (cf. EBBINGHAUS 1988). The November agreement (1918) signed by the employers and all major union confederations, including the Christian unions, recognized unions and thereby institutionalized indirectly union pluralism. After the Second World War, the unitary DGB claimed a monopoly of representation and was able to *de facto* exclude the minuscule Christian unions (for instance, in the 1970s "Konzertierte Aktion", although much less the status-oriented federations of white-collar and civil servants (DAG and DBB)).

In Switzerland, although Christian unions together with Socialists unions had early consultative functions *vis-à-vis* the national parliament, social and labour policy remained largely a matter of cantonal regulation. This was more to the advantage of Catholic unions within the Catholic cantons, but hardly to the *diaspora* organizations. Moreover, they suffered from employers intransigence as much as the Socialist unions until the more cooperative years (1937 peace agreement in metal industry). In France, the regionally dispersed Catholic unions of the interwar period met similarly employers resistance, while favourable State intervention was lacking until the Popular Front government forced employers to the Matignon agreement (1936), from which the Left unions were more to profit. After the Liberation, Christian unions were able to claim the same moral right for *représentativité* as

13 The High Council of Labour (1919) provided social policy proposals, after a short phase of corporatist experiments during the German occupation, the Social Economic Council (SER) was established in 1950.

14 The first consultative council was formed in 1898, the Chamber of Labour was codified in 1920, later abolished (1938) after the German Anschluß, but refounded in 1945, and finally reformed in 1954 (cf. ARMINGEON 1992: Appendix).

the Left-wing unions (the State granted this right to the four partisan unions and one cadre organization). In Italy, after interwar Fascist corporatist regime, democratic, voluntary unionism was reestablished, though since 1950s the state assumed a role in recognizing "representative" unions, distribute positions in the large state sector by partisan principles, and intervene into collective bargaining matters. In reaction to the strike wave, the state strengthened the position of the representative unions at the work place (1972) and on arbitration boards (1973) (cf. ARMINGEON 1992: 290).

CHRISTIAN LABOUR UNITY IN UNION PLURALISM

If Socialist unionists strove for labour unity through overcoming union diversity, Christian unionists sustained the view that labour unity rests on pluralism. Within each *famille spirituelle*, unity amongst the "faithful" was more easily to maintain and defend against external disturbances. Christian workers were to be organized within their own organizations, or they would either abstain or loose their faith. Inscribed into the very existence of Christian unionism and Christian-Social teaching was a conception of *democratic pluralism* (cf. IRVING 1979: 40-56) that operated at two levels: horizontal pluralism (or political pluralism - the coexistence of different political union movements) and vertical pluralism (or *subsidarité* - the devolution to the lowest possible level). Yet two practical consequences for labour unity followed. *First*, Christian union movements were only a minority movement, at least outside the confines of its stronghold regions. This was particularly problematic as labour market became increasingly nationally integrated and an industrial relations were centralized. *Second*, the Christian labour movement, though being commonly with fewer resources, was spread into a net of local, regional, occupational, status group organizations, often with mixed economical, cultural and social functions. Hence, while the strength of Christian unionism was its cohesion through relying on the small faithful community, this strategy caused major obstacles for an effective interest representation. Although a possitive effect of democratic pluralism was the freedom to vote by feet, to choose the most attractive union within the same sector, this "strength of rival unionism" (cf. GALENSON 1961: 17-41) was only limited as long as alignments remained based on non-materialist ideology, however, once instrumental orientation became more important, there were less reasons to continue rival unionism.

Table 4.8
Associational Monopoly of Christian Unions (%), Western Europe 1913-1989

	AU	BE	FR		GE	IT	NE		SZ	
Union Centre:	ZCG	ACV	CFTC	CFDT	CGB	CISL	NKV	CNV	CNG	SVEA
Religion:	Cath.	Cath.	Cath.	Secul.	both	Secul.	Cath.	(both)	(both)	Prot.
Associational Monopoly (%)										
1913	8.6	48.8	3.7	-	6.8	3.5	10.7	12.8	4.5	1.5
1920*	6.4	17.9	5.1	-	14.7	40.0	21.6	10.9	4.7	1.1
1935**	15.0	35.3	11.7	-	19.6	--	23.7	14.8	10.3	3.4
1950	[14.2]	50.3	8.7	-	0.1	22.8	25.6	13.7	7.7	2.6
1970	[23.5]	51.8	2.3	17.2	2.3	34.6	25.3	15.0	11.1	1.6
1989	[29.1]	54.0	5.1	23.3	3.2	35.3	-	18.3	11.7	-

NOTE: (*) IT: est. 1919-21, (**) 1932: AU, 1931: GE,
SOURCE: Monopoly: own calculatations, Appendix C.

Before the First World War, when the belated efforts to organize Christian unions began to become coordinated, Christian unions attracted only a small minority of all unionized workers (see Table 4.8). However, the two Dutch Christian unions organized already one-fourth and the Belgian unions came close to 80% of the Socialist membership (though figures for the independent unions are unknown). In some strongly Catholic regions such as Flanders, Southern Netherlands, and Rhineland, the Catholic unions competed successfully against the Socialists. The mobilization wave in the early 1920s boosted more the Left labour movements than the Christian unions, but they profited from unionization of white-collar employees and civil servants who tended to organize in non-Left unions. Although all unions, including the Christian union movements, suffered from a membership crisis during the 1920s, the Christian unions were less affected than the Socialists. In fact, their associational monopoly increased (see Table 4.8), giving them a larger claim for representation. However, in Germany the Christian unions (particularly among Protestants) became increasingly pervaded by the German-National and later *Nazi* movement, while in Austria the German-Nationals formed a separate movement to the Christian unionists.

Postwar development of Christian unionism diverged. In some countries, Christian unionists were integrated within a unitary movement, while in others the movement became secularized, and in some cases they adapted the chracter of the movement. Most notably, the Belgian Christian union movement was able to outnumber the Socialist and Liberal union movement. In the Netherlands, the Catholic union centre extend its share up to 30% until the mid-1950s (short above 30% of the population was then Catholic) but lost compared to the Socialist and independent unions thereafter, finally joining the Socialists in 1977/81, while the Protestants stagnated until they could also claim representation of some previously non-integrated Catholic unions. The two Christian unions until the 1970s not only represented at its peak nearly half of all organized but had besides the Socialist an undisputed place (until the formation of the white-collar federation MHP). With less

numerical and more regional importance, the Swiss Catholic union centre stagnated around its prewar high and partly escaped further decline by integrating the small Protestant union SVEA in the 1980s.

The two secularized Christian union centres (CFDT and CISL) that competed with mainly Communist-led unions (CGT and CISL) were able to advance their share of representation. In both countries in the first two decades the two secularizing Christian union movements gained moderately from the weakening of Communist unionism (see Chapter 5), while unionization rates lessened somewhat until the mobilization wave of the late 1960s. The three Italian union movements gained considerable in unionization in the 1970s, but lost again in the last years. At the time of the short-lived CGIL-CISL-UIL federation the Christian unionists organized one-third of all members, compared to one-half by the Communist-led CGIL. The recent decline in Italian unionization, however, is less attributable to secularization as in the case of the Dutch movement. In France, a general decline - affected all three politically divided labour pillars, in particular the Communist-led unions (see Chapter 5).

An important differences between countries in term of their growth prospect but also their representational claim was the class character. Motor of the secularization of the French and Italian movement were the public sector unions, that would grow in employment and have particular interest in representation *vis-à-vis* the government over the growth of the welfare-state. Similarly, the Belgian CSC (and to a lesser degree the Dutch CNV) were open to public sector unionism, while the Dutch Catholic KNV, the Swiss CNG, and the German CGB remained bastions of blue-collar industrial unionism. In Austria, the Christian-Democratic faction was particularly strong in the central government and private white-collar sector, as a result of the larger political heterogeneity in these sectors. This allowed Christian union leaders access to the government if not even a post as Labour minister. Thorough the party, contacts could be established with Catholic or Protestant employers organizations or party-members. Christian-Democratic social policy built on principles of subsidarity had a long-term influence in reinforcing the class-dividing, religious cleavage (ESPING-ANDERSEN & KORPI 1984). Moreover, it was in these countries with Centre-Left governments that major industrial relations reforms reinforced and institutionalized a pluralist union system with a right (and means of existence) for the Christian union movement (see below).

THE CHANGING PARTY-UNION LINKAGE

Compared to Socialist unions, Christian unions have less close ties to (and a less important voice within) their political ally. While Socialist party and allied unions are primarily class organizations, Christian party and allied unions result from cross-cutting class cleavages. Certainly, the Christian unions had an important impact *via* the workers' wing in transforming the pre-suffrage party of religious defense into a Christian-Democratic *Volkspartei* (peoples party) but it was only one of several forces. Christian union leaders had long difficulties to win party support, though after the introduction of universal suffrage (and pro-

Table 4.9
Christian Party-Union Linkages

	Church-led	Party-led	Secular
corporate (standen)	Belgium -1944 Austria -1934		
social wing	Belgian CSC German GCGD Dutch KAB/NKV	German CGB Austrian ÖAAB	German DGB
personal links	French CFTC	(Italian ACLI)	French CFDT Italian CISL 1960s-

portional representation) Catholic working-class votes in Flanders, Southern Netherlands, Rhineland, or small-town Austria counted in party headquarters. The Christian-Democratic parties, that as catch-all *Volkspartei* claimed to represent the working class as well, had to maintain friendly relations with Christian unionists.[15]

The Christian party and unions have a different positions and role within the Christian pillar, that is composed of a plethora of social, cultural and economic organizations that stretch from the sacred to the profane life spheres. In countries with strong pillarization, particularly in Belgium and the Netherlands, intermediary structures are organized in concentric circles (cf. POST 1989: 188) around the religious core, the Church, one finds a circle of religion disseminating institutions (e.g. Church lay organizations and media), then the party, and thereafter a circle of professional organizations (Christian unions, employers' associations, farmer leagues, cooperatives), and finally a circle of social and cultural organizations (e.g. Christian leisure and sports clubs). In the Dutch-speaking parts of the Low Countries, there exist besides unions also Christian employers associations.[16]

The Belgian and Austrian parties formalized external support by corporatist integration (*standen* or *Stände*) of organizations for farmers, employers and workers besides other social groups, though the Belgians discontinued the corporatist membership first in Wallonia in the 1930s and nationally after 1945. In the Dutch and German interdenominational Christian-Democratic parties (CDU/CSU and CDA), no formal links exist but party wings (*Sozialausschüße*) represents the minority labour interests against the well organized interests of employers and farmers. In Italy, the links to corporate organizations have

15 The support for the Dutch Catholic party at its peak, for instance, nearly mirrored the overall electorate (survey of 1964), while the Calivinist parties (ARP, CHU) had more support amongst white-collar employees and the Socialist labour party was overrepresented amongst blue-collar workers (cf. LIJPHART 1968: Table 4, p. 29).

16 In Flanders: VKW (1935/1966), in the Netherlands: NCW, 1967), previously split in Protestant and Catholic associations, while small-and-medium business associations (middestands) had been formed even earlier.

declined in importance, while political factions ('*correnti*') around party leaders and based on patronage systems prevailed to the advantage of business interests (Confindustria). Again, one can detect the impact of sequential founding: where corporate organizations (unions) came first and were crucial in setting up party structures, as in Austria and Belgium, a corporatist structure was constituted. In other countries, where the party preceded functional organizations, relations were based more on cooptation or even left to be informal. However, there are pressures over time that differentiate, if not distance, party and unions, particularly after the Second World War. In countries, Christian-Democracy emerged belately and remained marginal, as in Scandinavia (cf. MADELEY 1977), a Christian workers' (or union) wing never realy developed.

After the Second World War it was more the Christian-Democratic party that determined the fate of Christian unionism than the Church that eventually retreated from politics and unionism altogether (albeit the Dutch bishops only in the 1960s). Party leaders decided in 1944 in Italy or in 1945 in Austria to build a unitary union movement - though with political factions, and were the leading forces behind the split of the Italian CGIL in 1947 and the concessional solution in Austria. But as the Italian case indicates, the party-led unions distanced themselves from the party in the course of the 1960s (cf. FARNETI 1978). In Austria and Germany it was attempted to overcome previous fragmentation by the postwar integration of Christian trade unionists within a unitary labour movement. This was achieved by either allowing overt but highly institutionalized political factionalism as in Austria, or through symbolic balanced leadership and more informal political ties as in Germany. In Austria, Christian faction (FCG) within the ÖGB and the workers league (ÖAAB) within the Christian-Democratic party (ÖVP) have gained in importance within the unions and the Chamber of Labour respectively.[17] On the other hand, the German unitary DGB (1949) explicitly rules out the possibility of organized factions. However, it does allocate informal representation rights in union and federal executive councils to Christian unionists who are organized in a labour league within the CDU. Nevertheless, the DGB remained - though informally - associated with the SPD, and some of its union leaders have a seat in party councils or in parliament. In the late 1950s a rival Christian union centre (CGB) but remained small (see Table 4.6), since it received not much support from the CDU, the German employers or the government (it remains excluded from tripartite consultation).

In the two main examples of segmented pluralism, Belgium and the Netherlands, attempts in 1945 to create a unitary movement failed due to the refusal of the Christian labour movements which were reconstituted. Between 1945 and 1972 Christian unions attracted more members than Socialist and all other unions together. The Belgian Christian union centre ACV, with its strong basis in the now economically prospering Flanders area and thanks to its growing white-collar sections, outnumbers the Socialist FGTB. Differences

[17] In the Chamber of Labour elections, Christian ÖAAB increased its votes from 14.9% (1949) to 36.5% (1984), but lost recently some 5-8% to the National-Liberal wing. Support among white-collar employees grew from 28.5% (1949) to 48.7% (1984), but fell to 38.5% (1989) (cf. SOMMER 1989)

Table 4.10
Church-State Cleavage and Religious Split in Union Movement, Western Europe 1918-1989

Union movement	Catholic monopoly	Mixed pattern	Protestant
No/marginal split (<10%)	Ireland postwar Austria France 1964-	Northern Ireland (*) postwar Germany	Sweden, Norway Great Britain (*) Denmark
Medium split (10-30%)	France -1964 Italy (**) interwar Austria	Switzerland interwar Germany Netherlands 1977-	
Dominant split (>30)	Belgium	Netherlands -1977	

SOURCE: revised from EBBINGHAUS & VISSER 1990: Table 5. NOTE: (*) quasi-religious split through affiliation to Irish vs. British based unions; (**) CISL became secularized in 1970s although it reached more than 30% (excl. autonomous unions).

decreased as the two become more independent from party and Church tutelage. In the Netherlands this has led to a merger (FNV, 1980/1976) between Socialist NVV and Catholic NKV, while Protestant CNV remained separate, thereby attracting some Catholic unions, now becoming, as initially, interdenominational.

The French Catholic union centre (CFTC) with the 1964-reform (CFDT) became a secular movement that seeks alignment with the Socialist party (Christian-Democrats had become politically squeezed between the right and left bloc). This secularization provoked, however, a split of a minority who continued the old organization and tradition (CFTC). In Italy, the Catholic confederation (CISL, 1950) that had emerged from the failed unitary union centre (CGIL) distanced itself from the Church and Catholic Action from the mid-1960s.

CONCLUSION

The *Church-State cleavage* was found to lead to segmented pluralism and rival unionism in countries where Catholic or Calvinist communities came in opposition to the secularizing Nation-State, liberal-materialist capitalism and anti-clerical Socialist movement. The Church with her opposition towards political and union activities and control over cultural identity was an important actor in the *figuration* that gave rise to Christian-Democratic parties and Christian unionism. The major State-Church conflict over mass education not only gave rise to parties of religious defense, but its outcome determined her influence on local working class communities, as in Beligum and the Netherlands. In these countries, and to a lesser degree in parts of Switzerland, Austria, and Germany, a pillarized network of Christian organizations led to *segmented pluralism*. The Church intransigence in Catholic France and Italy led to a belated (and in France later aborted) formation of a Christian-Democratic movement. Although Christian-Democratic party and Christian unions devel-

Table 4.11
The Church-State Cleavage and Christian Union Movements

	Christian unions SEPERATION	Unified movement INTEGRATION
Church-led segmentation	*pillarized* Dutch CNV (NKV) Belgian CSC Swiss CNG (SVEA)	*merger* Dutch FNV (1977-)
Party-led segmentation (polarization)	*secularizing* French CFDT (CFTC) Italian CISL	*internal* Austrian ÖGB [FSG] German DGB

oped more independently than in the Socialist movement, they later became interdependent allies for mutual mobilization, representational legitimation, and distance from Church tuelage.

In this chapter, we have discussed the configurations under which the State-Church cleavage gave rise to Christian union organizations. Yet, the leading question was how could a union movement that was based on a pre-industrial cleavage emerge and persist, while industrialization would increase secularization. In fact, there have been major changes and adaptations to Christian union movements in the postwar period. Of particular postwar importance have been the following four clusters in adaptation of postwar Christian unionism (see Table 4.11): (1) the traditional *pillarized* Christian union movement in segmented pluralist societies that became more distant to Church intervention, (2) *secularizing* Christian union movements that reemerged with party-led split from Communist-led union movements, (3) the *merger* of the crisis-struck Christian and Socialist unions, and (4) the postwar *integration* into an all-partisan unified union movement (with leadership or faction representation). Following the theoretical propositions (see Chapter 2), those movements that established worker alignment at an early time and became institutionalized showed the most resistance to change, yet if it remained *inert* it risked to steer into a cushoned deadlock.

Christian-Democracy and Christian unionism initially organized and mobilized on the basis of religious alignments, they used a strategy of social closure. With the help of a network of organizations the movement could maintain the segmentation into a *Weltanschauung* community that was to isolate its followers from external influences. Although the ideological difference between Socialists and Christians, the actual competition between these movements is limited as long as politico-religious alignments are stable. However, the religious cleavage organization came under pressure through continuing secularization and social integration. If it continued a closed mobilization pattern it would risk to decline, while it could lose its identity and cohesion when it adapted to secularization. Some Christian union movements have sucessfully become more pragmatic (Belgian CSC) or secularized (French CFDT and Italian CISL), while the Dutch NKV shows the dangers of closure strategy.

As secularization and desegmentation thinned out the social base for the cleavage organizations, competition between labour organizations increased while the web of organizational linkages entangled some pillarized organizations and made adaptation difficult. Initially, *pillarization* had helped to make up for the weakness of rival unionism by providing political linkages and cross-class contacts for Christian unionists within their own pillar. However, pillarization, democratic pluralism, and elite accommodation brought also two dangers. *First*, the leadership became disconnected from the social base and concentrated on compromise seeking with those forces from which the members were supposed to be shield. *Second*, the more Christian unions became institutionalized and the welfare state expanded, social integration advanced and consequently, the insistence on separate organizations became increasingly paradoxical. The Church-State cleavage has lost much of its mobilizing salience, although it remains entrenched in organizational structures and institutional arrangements that tends to persist. We will turn now to the last political cleavage: the reform-revolution cleavage.

5
THE REVOLUTION-REFORM CLEAVAGE

"(...) the Industrial Revolution produced lower-class parties of one sort or another throughout the West but these differed conspicuously in strength, in organizational unity, in ideological orientation and in the extent of their integration into, or alienation from, each historically given polity. (...) To aid in the mapping of these variations in the character of working-class politics our model posits a fourth 'critical juncture', an International Revolution. The conflict between proletarian internationalism and 'nation-accepting' socialism emerged early in the history of the working-class movement. The dramatic events of the First World War and the Russian Revolution deepened the split in the movement and produced not only militant factions but distinct and competing working-class parties (ROKKAN 1968: 207, *italics removed)".*

Quarrels over revolutionary or reformist strategy divided labour further. Since the first days, labour was split whether to follow the path toward Electoral and Corporate Socialism or await the final *'Kladderatasch'* (crash-bang-wallop), the breakdown of capitalism. The prewar Socialist intellectuals, like Kautsky and Bernstein, debated fiercely over revolutionary ideology or revisionist pragmatism, and the International union movement over syndicalist *"action directe"* or reformist trade unionism. Yet the Russian Revolution in 1917 became the signal to the revolting workers hoping for a radical change in society and economy. Dissatisfaction with the national, reformist path of the Socialists led many to become committed to the International Revolution under the leadership of the Soviets. At this critical juncture the *revolution-reform cleavage* produced a *schism* in working-class parties and union movements, though varying in salience (LIPSET & ROKKAN 1967, ROKKAN 1968).[1] The Moscow-led Communist labour movement, like the Rome-led Catholic workers movement, added to labour disunity and amplified union diversity.

The revolution-reform schism was largely a response to the preceding cleavages, the labour-capital cleavage and the Church-State conflict. It will be argued in this chapter, that the salience of the revolution-reform cleavage was contingent on the degree of incomplete national and cultural integration of the working-class. The labour schism was most intense where social integration and system integration were incomplete, where radical, syndicalist counter-cultures existed due to incomplete national or cultural integration, and where labour remained excluded from society, polity and economy by the intransigence of

[1] My terminology departs from Rokkan's "International-National" cleavage that alludes too closely to the Russian Revolution. The revolution-reform cleavage, in my own reading, includes also pre-1917 syndicalist union movements and non-Moscow-led leftist party splits (e.g. the Danish VS).

Church, State and employers. The revolution-reform cleavage has been initially important in several of the twelve countries, but after a short postwar *intermezzo* in Communist popularity, it remained largely a phenomenon of *polarized pluralism* (SARTORI 1976), that is, limited to France and Italy.[2] The development of a Communist movement in France and Italy contrasts with the labour movement in the other Western European countries. The analysis in this chapter will thus map the cross-national differences first, but later focuses mainly on the comparison of the French and Italian development. The diverging paths taken by these two Communist movements highlights again the issues of cleavage persistence and organizational change, the degree to which social integration and system integration de-emphasize the salience of the revolution-reform cleavage. As in the previous two chapters, the formation, mobilization and representation aspects will be analyzed sequentially.

First, the *formation* of the revolution-reform cleavage and its transformation into Communist party and union movement will be examined. It will be shown, how the relatively universal split became differently ingrained into the party and union systems, depending on the forces that gave rise to the party and the strategic considerations toward the unions. Of long-term consequences for the party-union linkage and adaptation to change was the specific *figuration*: the Moscow-led Communist International, the national leftist party leaders and the syndicalist unions.

Second, the parallel *mobilization* of Communist party and unions, both appealing to and maintaining the same social base (the militant working-class) will be analyzed. Communist party and unions had chances to implant themselves where national and cultural integration was incomplete, that is, in regions of radical syndicalism and areas of dechristianization, that is, where Socialist and Christian organizations remained weak. Both Communist party and unions, favouring militancy and "pure" class appeals, utilised organizational control and social closure to maintain worker alignment and community radicalism. At critical junctures, workers militancy led to waves of radical mobilization, yet Communists remained unable to sustain mobilization in the interwar and postwar period with few but significant exceptions. In particular, the postwar diverging path of the two outstanding Communist labour movements, the French and Italian, will be compared. The two movements chose between two opposing strategies: identity-maintaining social closure and ideology-adapting social opening.

Third, the political and economic interest *representation* posed a challenge to the division of labour and party-union relations. Since the revolutionary doctrine had been the initial impetus to the schism, the acceptance of the logic of representation in the electoral and corporate channel was a more retarded and ambiguous change in Communist movements. Given the party primacy and the importance of political over economic aims, the Communist unions were forced to wait for a political change that remained largely foreclosed. The possibility for political alliances were reduced by the given political and union

2 Beyond the scope of this study, however, Communist movements and "polarized pluralism" has also continued into the postwar period in Finland, but also in Spain and Portugal (after democracy was reinstalled).

systems as well as the internal capacity for adaptation. However, the Italian and French cases provide diverging strategies in alliance building and in representational flexibility. Over the postwar decades, the two movements chose differently between pure but less effective 'class' unionism in France and attenuating class alliance in Italy. While the former chose to maintain labour unity within its own *Weltanschauung*, the latter movement opted for reducing union diversity and enhance national labour unity.

I
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE REVOLUTION-REFORM CLEAVAGE

Communist party formation was universal and radical unionism was widespread across Western Europe in the early 1920s - in a phase of increased political and social mobilization, if not radicalization. For many workers, instigated by the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia and the economic and political crisis at home, revolutionary action became the new expression in political strikes and within the works' council movement. For them, the reformist, parliamentarian road to Socialism was obsolete and the Socialist party seemed discredited by its war-cooperation. The major collective actors in the revolution-reform schism were the Moscow-led International Communist movement, the leftist party splinter (or dissidents) and the syndicalist unions.

Communist party and unions have been - through *"proletarian internationalism"* - to a large degree dominated by decisions coming from Moscow, probably more than Catholic unionists by an encyclica send from Rome. With the establishment of the Communist International in Moscow (Comintern, 1920) the Soviet Communist movement enshrined its leadership role in Lenin's 21 conditions for affiliation, though this was not of immediate impact. For Communist unions, an international movement was founded (RILU, 1921), that remained under tight control of the Comintern and was later dissolved by the party. Comintern's strategy shifted back-and-forth in its early years, following the Soviet domestic changes as well as its "foreign" policy in a rapid changing World situation. Moreover, it took several years until it had moulded the national parties along its model of *"democratic centralism"* (cf. WALLER 1988).

Although a Communist party emerged universally across Europe, the way in which this transformation came about as well as its later strength and impact varied considerably. This was of importance for Communist unionism, too. Given the primacy of the party, the strategy of Communists towards unionism was contingent, as will be shown, on the strategic considerations of the party. Depending on the party's strength and strategy, Communists attempted to organize within or outside the already existing union movement. That party-dependence proved to be a successful strategy particularly in countries which had hailed syndicalist union autonomy from party tutelage until then, seems to be one of history's paradoxes. However, as will be examined later, there is more than coincidence between prewar syndicalist traditions and later implanting of Communist unionism.

Table 5.1
Foundation and Political Participation of Communist Parties, Western Europe

	AU	BE	DE	FR	GE	IR	IT	NE	NO	SW	SZ	UK
Party:	KPÖ	PCB	DKP	PCF	KPD	CPI	PCI	CPN	NKP	VPK	KPS	CP
Predecessor	1918	.	1919	1905	1917		1919	1909	1918	1917		.
Year of founding	1920	1921	1920	1920	1918	1921	1921	1918	1923	1921	1921	1920
First election	1920	1921	1920	1924	1920	1927	1921	1918	1924	1917	1922	1922
Entry in parliament	1945	1925	1929	1924	1920	-	1921	1918	1924	1921	1922	1922
Entry in coalition	1945	1945	-	1936	-	-	1945	-	-	-	-	-

SOURCE: LANE & ERSSON 1991; JACOBS 1989; MACKIE & ROSE 1991.

THE FORMATION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY

A Communist party emerged in all of the twelve countries, adapting a Communist programme and affiliating to the *Comintern* between 1918 and 1923. Compared to the two other political cleavages, the party formation of Communist parties was universal and relatively synchron (see Table 5.1). However, the break with Socialist Reformism took different organizational forms depending on the structure of the Socialist party. The existence of left-wing splinters groups, the possibility for radical currents to capture the Socialist party structure, and the power position of the existent Socialist party were crucial factors in shaping the conditions under which the schism took shape. The break with the Socialist national and reformist road was a reaction to, and therefore varied in salience to, the Socialist party's position towards the war, its acceptance of mass democracy, and its willingness to enter into government. From a synoptical reading of Communist party history[3] one can derive four forms of founding (see Table 5.2): *first*, the capturing of Socialist parties, thus turning an already existing organizational structure at Communist use; *second*, the radicalization of an early, left-wing minority break-away that turned Communist but remained split; *third*, Comintern-led party foundations that imposed Moscow-led strategies, thus being relative unadapted to national circumstances; *fourth*, the merger of left-wing splinter groups partly induced by Comintern but remaining an unstable minority.

First, the most prominent development took place in countries in which Communists adapted a strategy of *'capturing'* and transforming existing Socialist party structures. A majority of French Socialist delegates opted to join Comintern, forcing the "reformists" to refound SFIO in 1920. The Italian Socialist party joined the Comintern in 1920, causing internal party strife at which end not only the Social-Democrats but also the Communists broke away. This three-fold division still holds today. The Norwegian syndicalists captured the Labour party (DNA) in 1918 and joined - as the first Western party - the Comintern, also

3 On Communist parties see BUTON 1990, JACOBS 1989, MCINNES 1975, TANNAHILL 1978, WALLER & FENNEMA 1988, WENDE 1981.

Table 5.2
Founding Origins and Organization Strategy of Communist Parties

	Penetration	*Diffusion*
Internal legitmation (internal split)	French PCF Italian PCI Norwegian DNA	Dutch CPN Swedish SVK German USPD/KPD
External legitmation (Moscow-led)	Austrian KPÖ Belgian PCB Swiss KPS	Danish DKP Irish CPI British CP

here first Social-Democrats split off and finally - after DNA turned around once more - the Communist wing broke-away. In all three countries, syndicalist tendencies and federalist party structures co-existed, allowing a capturing and consequential transformation of substantial parts of the existing (local) party structures into communist ones.

Second, in three further countries, Communist parties emerged from early *leftist* parties that opposed the "reformist" Social-Democratic party (German USPD, Swedish VS, Dutch SDP). In these countries, Communist were unable to gain a majority or sizeable minority within the Social-Democratic party but had to organize outside and instead turned towards the anti-militarist, syndicalist left-wing parties. In the other countries, the left-wing "revolutionary" movement was even further fragmented and weak. In the *third* formation pattern, the party formation was *imposed* by Comintern (Austrian KPÖ, Belgian PCB, Swiss KPS) that had only occasional small success. In the *fourth* pattern a *merger* was the result of a coming together of splinter groups (British CP, Danish DKP, Irish CPI) but remained a weak party.

COMMUNIST UNION ORGANIZING STRATEGY

Not in all countries did the political party schism lead to a rift in the union movement - the revolution-reform cleavage proved to be less universal in the case of unions.[4] The formation of Communist unionism, given the ideological primacy of the party, depended largely on the strategy of the Communist party. The party strategy, in turn, depended on the electoral strength of the party, its dependence from Moscow's directives, and its strategic considerations of 'unions' as a political mean. Three union organizing strategies can be detected, they are partly contingent on the strength and strategy of the Communist party at the time and the existence of syndicalist traditions (see Table 5.3): *first*, the *'capturing'* of a union confederation where it finds a near majority for a radical turn, yet taking the risk of a split in the labour movement; *second*, the organization of a more or less formal *trade union opposition* within the existing dominant union movement where it finds enough supporters and weak resistance, yet thereby increasing internal factionalism; *third*, the Communist *in-*

4 On Communist and syndicalist union movements see besides national accounts LINDEN & THORPE 1990, WALLER 1990.

filtration and organization of Communist-led rank and file action (Communist cells, ad-hoc direct action).

The *first* pattern, the strategy of *'capturing'*, can only be successful where Communist party have enduring mass support, as in postwar France and Italy. In the interwar period, French and Italian Communists were in 1920 in a majority (or strong) position at the Socialist party congress, thus provoking an immediate split of the party and union movement, though the Fascist rise prevented the latter to materialize in Italy. Yet it provoked non-Communist unionists to leave the captured union movements within the first postwar years and found rival organizations.[5]

The second, "Trade Union Opposition" had been a relatively predominant strategy, though only for a short time, at the peak of the radicalization wave in the early 1920s in Norway and Germany. In Norway, the syndicalist trade union opposition (NFO) within the Norwegian LO under the leadership of the General Workers Union captured first the Labour Party (DNA) in its congress in 1918 and thereafter the union centre (NALF, the Norwegian LO), and for a short time affiliated with respective Communist International. In Germany, Communist union opposition was strong within the metalworkers union (DMV) and coexisted with Communist movement (Gelsenkirchener FAU) in the Ruhr area. Yet as precipitously as syndicalists and Communists had joined forces, they parted over the question of affiliation with the Moscow Internationals.[6] On the British Isles, syndicalist union leaders of mainly the general (unskilled) workers' unions at the peak of the interwar radicalization embraced the Russian revolution instantaneously - only to turn disenchanted its back after visits to (or reports from) the land of 'proletarian dictatorship'.

Third, the existence of institutionalized *factions* within the union movement that provides a formal channel for party representation. This pattern was only established as a postwar compromise between various factions, the Communist faction, however, lost in importance over time (in Belgian FGTB in the 1950s and Austrian ÖGB since the 1970s).

A HISTORICAL CHANCE FOR LABOUR UNITY

The end of the Second World War brought a historical chance for labour unity. Having fought Fascism and occupation in joint resistance movement and acknowledging the interwar tragedy of labour disunity, many union leaders saw the need and chances for forming a unified all-partisan labour movement. At the time of liberation, Communists could rely on local activities and cells in many countries, particularly in France, Italy, and the Low Countries, though they were more restrained in occupied West Germany and Austria. Clandestine contacts or exile encounters of Communist leaders with union leaders from other parties, led to a number of historical settlements to overcome past divisions and build a unified union movement. In France, Belgium and the Netherlands, Communist and

5 In France: CGT-FO and FEN, in Italy: CISL and UIL in 1947/8 (see below).

6 The French syndicalist broke-away to found their own CGT-SR in 1926, the break-away of Norwegian Communist Party in 1923, the break-away of German Communists in the Ruhr area from the syndicalist FAUD.

Socialist unionists joined forces, while in Italy, Austria and West Germany, Left party and Christian unionists combined in forming a unitary union movement. However, the Communists' strength and position varied considerable: were they were majoritarian, moderate unionists broke away in France and Italy, while in other union movements the influence of Communists were severely reduced (and sometimes outed) within few years. Similarly, at the international level, the Socialist-moderate national union movements left the postwar unified International (WFTU) and founded a new Socialist International (ICFTU) in 1949.

In Italy, during the German occupation, leaders of the three major parties, the Communist, Socialist and Christian-Democrats signed the Rome agreement (June 1944) to form a unified union movement (CGIL) that would replace the Fascist corporatist labour organization (cf. ADAMS 1952). At the time when Socialist and Communists were excluded from government in 1947, the Communists were in the majority, followed by the split Socialists, while the Christian-Democrats were a small minority.[7] A year later when Christian-Democrats and other moderates were more and more estranged by CGIL's more radical government opposition, they left CGIL to form a new union centre (LCGIL, later CISL) in 1948. The anti-clerical Radicals and moderate Socialist left CGIL a year later and founded another union centre (FIL, later UIL) in 1949, while the majoritarian Socialist (PSI, also PSU) stayed in CGIL, remaining an important minority that (differently to France increasingly) checked the Communist majority.

The French CGT was re-established in the continuation of the resistance union movement, but the Christian unionists had immediately refounded their own movement (CFTC). Socialists participated within CGT but the Communists had profited most from its resistance participation and soon controlled the majority of unions and locals.[8] With the rising Cold War and Communist opposition to the Socialist-Centre coalition government, the more moderate Socialist union faction (FO) broke away in 1947. The teachers' unions (FEN) followed two years later but decided to be on its own and non-partisan *vis-à-vis* the government.

In the two Low Countries, Communists attempted to form a unity union movement with the Socialists, while the Christians abstained from the start. However, in both countries the Socialist were able to outdo, if not suppress, the Communist movement. In the Netherlands, based on its strength in the resistance movement, the Dutch Communist party (CPN) promoted the formation of a unitary union movement (EVC) under its leadership in 1945. However, the Socialist NVV reappeared and soon outnumbered EVC with help of

7 Votes at the CGIL 1947 congress: the Communists (59.4%), majoritarian Socialists (22.8%), Christian-Democrats (13.8%) and Republicans and Social-Democrats (4.2%) (LAUNAY 1990: 386).

8 By 1946 the Communists controlled 21 out of 30 national federations and 4/5 of the departmental unions, a considerable increase compared to the PCF's strength before the war that showed the comparative advantage of the Communist cell structure to manage the post-liberation mobilization (ROSS 1976: 507-8, n. 5).

Table 5.3
Founding Origins and Organization Strategy of Communist (Syndicalist) Union Movements

	Penetration	*Diffusion*
Internal legitmation (union-led)	*syndicalist-communist:* Dutch NAS / EVC Swedish SAC	*localist-syndicalist:* Norwegian LO 1920s interwar German FAUD/BRI
External legitmation (party-led)	*communist-led:* French CGT Italian CGIL	*communist faction:* Belgian FGTB 1940s Austrian ÖGB

anti-Communist drives, while EVC stagnated and later split into syndicalists (1958) and Communists, who ended EVC in 1960.[9]

In Belgium, the liberation brought a surge in Communist party support and the appearance of unitary union movements, too. The Socialist union leaders (CGTB with 248.000 members) agreed to merge - on a par - with three resistance union movements that mixed Communist and syndicalist tendencies.[10] But the newly founded union centre (FGTB) soon expelled the Communist faction (30% of FGTB) from congress and executive committee in 1948 (BEYME 1977: 26-7), thereafter Communist unionism never really recovered.

In Austria, the Communists were - according to the pre-liberation agreement - integrated within the Austrian union confederation (ÖGB) with the status of a formal, political faction that was allowed to affiliate to the Communist International (WFTU). The Communist faction soon suffered set-backs, like the Communist party, in the Chamber of Labour elections where it fell after the *Staatsvertrag* (State Treaty, 1955) from 10% to 7% and dwindled since 1969 to 1% in 1989 (cf. SOMMER 1989). In Germany, the unified union confederation (DGB, 1949) maintained an anti-Communist policy once the immediate chance of reunification with the Communist-led Eastern unions had become nil. Communists were a minority in some DGB unions, but kept a low profile, particularly after the party suppression in 1956. Moreover, a rival union centre was not only ideologically difficult to legitimate, it was also destined to fail in the anti-Communist West-Germany.

Although with the end of World War II, there existed a historical chance for labour unity, in the six countries where this had been attempted, in four cases Communism was curbed or out-competed by regaining Socialist unionists. Where it remained dominant, however, its partisan character estranged more moderate, minority groups that eventually left, adding to further union diversity. The fate of Communist unionism seems to be tied to

9 In 1945, NVV had 150.000 members compared to EVC with 170.000. CPN and EVC membership was prohibited for civil servants in 1951 and expelled by NVV (excluded CPN members from its ranks in 1956) until 1971 when "non-political" Communists were reaccepted (cf. VOERMAN 1990)

10 At the merger, CGTB had 248.000 members, Communist CBSU: 165.000, Syndicalist MSU: 60.000, public sector SGSP: 52.000 (cf. HEMMERYCKX 1990).

the fate of the Communist party, its strength and strategy. Only where the Communist party maintained strong worker alignment, Communist unionism had a chance to claim its role. Communist unionism faced the problem of how to continue mobilizing when tied to the party, while other currents remained more flexible as economic interest organizations, as we will now examine.

II
FROM MOBILIZATION FOR REVOLUTION TO DIVERGING MOBILIZATION PATHS

When Communist labour movements emerged, the Socialist (partly also the Christian) labour movements had already long established claims on worker alignment. For the Communist labour movement, political and industrial mobilization was not only important *vis-à-vis* the State and employers, but also for its maintaining its own influcence within the labour movement. Communist union organizing strategy, as already shown, depended on strategic considerations of the party, the possibility to mobilize most effectively within or outside the existing union movement. However, the conditions under which Communists were able to successfully establish themselves within the union movement varied according to the success of the party and unions representing the previous cleavages (labour-capital and State-Church). It will be now shown that the reform-revolution schism was limited in time and space to a number of mobilization waves (post-1917, mid-1930s, post-1944, late 1960s) and to countries with incomplete social integration and system integration. A comparison of the varying implantation of Communism reveals some of the historical and configurational factors that gave salience to the revolution-reform cleavage.

A second aspect to be considered is the diverging postwar mobilization paths of the French and Italian Communist labour movement. For the Communist party, according to its doctrine, the unions are an important but subservient agent for political mobilization. As a "*transmission belt*" the union serves the party to appeal to a larger section of the workforce, including workers that are not members or militants of the party. However, this doctrine limits the role of unions to auxiliary political mobilization agents and sees little use in non-political economic action. As long as the union is subordinate and the party remains locked into working-class social ghetto, party and unions gain from parallel mobilization but their long-term growth prospective is limited due to the social closure strategy. However, if party and unions tend to overcome their limited appeal by opening to other groups, the linkage between the two organizations becomes more problematic and the synergist effect of joint mobilization drain. The comparison of French and Italan Communism, will show how the two movements made opposite strategic choices that led to diverse mobilization paths.

FROM SYNDICALISM TO COMMUNISM

For an observer in the early 1920s, the signs for a revolutionary change seemed to be gaining critical mass: the general social and political mobilization after the First World War, the rise in labour disputes, the emergence of works' councils, and attempts at political insurrection. Yet, once parliamentarism was established, the Communist party had to face more or less severe electoral competition from other working-class parties. In fact, Communist unionists were able to attract large support in few instances after the First World War. *What were the conditions under which Communist unionism had the best chances to implant itself in interwar societies?*

First, as was pointed out, Communist unionism was contingent on the strategic considerations of the Communist party, that reflected its own strength within a society. During the interwar period, the Communist party was only a minority splinter party that never exceeded 5% of the votes in Austria, Denmark, Switzerland, United Kingdom and Ireland (see Table 5.5). Communism showed temporary success in Norway (1921: 4.6% of the votes) and Sweden (1928: 6.4%), particularly in areas of syndicalist-localist traditions in the 1920s but subsided thereafter. In Italy, when Communists contended their first election (1921) they mobilized only a small share of the votes (4.6% and even fewer seats), three years before the Fascists suppressed all parties. In Belgium, Communist extended their vote above 5% in 1936 and 1939 following the Popular Front trend across the Southern border. However, the most remarkable electoral success was achieved by the German and French Communist parties, they mobilized at their peak a larger section of the working-class. Nevertheless this did not exceed more than one-sixth of the total electorate (1932: KPD 16.9% of votes, 1936: PCF 15.3%), since both parties opted for a pure 'working-class' mobilization strategy, instead of using a broader social appeal.

Second, even where the party had gained some support, interwar Communist unionism depended largely on the existence of prewar sydndicalist and localist traditions of system opposition upon which Communist could mobilize. After the Communist split-away of the CGT, the Communist-led CGTU had about 80% of the membership of the moderate-syndicalist CGT, yet only around 3% in density before the 1936 reunification. In all other countries, Communist unions remained a more marginal and volatile movement, notwithstanding some "red" regions, radical industries and political strike movements. The pro-Moscow trade union opposition that captured the Norwegian LO in the early 1920s was concentrated in syndicalist unions that had a small majority (55%) at LO congress. Communism and syndicalism coexisted and remained fragmented in a number of countries: in Ireland and Britain, some syndicalist union leaders flirted briefly with the Bolshevik revolution, in Germany syndicalist and Communist splinters coexisted, and the traditional Swedish and Dutch syndicalist unions remained a minority.[11] Like the Socialist

[11] The British and Irish syndicalist unions organized about 15% in TUC or ITUC membership (according to RILU reports, cf. "RILU" in HEYDE 1931). About 10% of German unionized workers were at the best affiliated to the Communist International in the 1920s, the separately organized syndicalist (FAUD) and Communist unions (BRI) had a much smaller membership at the end of the

Table 5.4
Ideological Split in Labour Movements (Interwar Period)

Ideological split	CATHOLIC	MIXED	PROTESTANT
Unified labour movement	*Church-State alliance:* Austria, Belgium Ireland	*Consociationalism:* Netherlands Switzerland	*Early consolidation:* United Kingdom Denmark, Sweden
Deep splits in left movement	*State-Church cleavage:* France Italy	*Late unification:* German Reich	*Late independence:* Norway (1920s)

SOURCE: adapted (tranposed) from ROKKAN 1968: 208; countries outside this study ommitted.

movement, Communist unions suffered from demobilization (or even deradicalization) during the mid-1920s and with the exception of the French popular front mobilization wave shrank to small local or industrial enclaves. Only in France after the re-unification of the CGT with CGTU in 1936 an unknown tripling in membership occurred.

Is it more than a *coincidence* that Communist unionists found the most fertile base for organization in *syndicalist* union movements?[12] Communism found in fact its stronghold during the interwar period in countries (and areas) in which revolutionary syndicalism had found much support among the swelling unskilled workforce and isolated workers communities. Revolutionary syndicalism was less based on a coherent ideology than a workers' movement that stressed direct economic action and opposed party-union links, Socialist Electoralism and parlamentarism. *First*, syndicalist union structures provided a fertile ground for Communist propaganda that radicalized and transformed the fragmented, localist union structures for its own purposes. In France and Italy, the dual representative structure of functional and territorial interest intermediation (sectoral vs. regional unions) allowed ephemeral radical currents in small unions or local communities, thanks to the one-local-one-vote rule, to impose a more radical stance - even against a long-standing "moderate" leadership at the centre. This holds also for the Dutch syndicalists and German localist union movement, and to some degree even to the incompletely centralized Norwegian LO of the 1920s.

Second, the missing or weak party-union link in syndicalist movements provided, gave the Socialist a small possibility to moderate the unions, in fact, Communists and syndicalist allied in their radical opposition to Socialist reformism. Yet "syndicalist organizations nearly everywhere fervently supported communist internationalism in its infancy, until it became clear that the Comintern insisted upon parliamentarism and the subordination of

Weimar Republic (cf. "Germany" in: Linden & Thorpe 1990). The traditional syndicalist movements in the Netherlands and Sweden organized not more than 3% and 7% respectively over the interwar period (cf. VISSER 1989).

12 On syndicalist union movement see LINDEN & THORPE 1990.

Table 5.5
Election Results of Communist Parties, Western Europe 1918-1989

	AU	BE	DE	FR	GE	IR	IT	NE	NO	SW	SZ	UK
Party:	KPÖ	PCB	DKP	PCF	KPD	CPI	PCI	CPN	NKP	VPK	PST	CP
Average votes (%)												
1918-1944	0.6	2.5	0.8	11.2	12.8	0.9	4.6	2.3	8.7	6.7	1.8	0.2
1945-1967	4.1	5.2	4.2	24.5	7.0	0.1	22.8	5.3	5.4	5.7	3.0	0.2
1968-1989	0.9	2.6	1.8	18.0	0.3	0.0	28.9	2.6	0.5	5.1	2.0	0.1
Average seats (%)												
1918-1944	0.0	1.6	0.5	5.2	12.7	0.7	2.8	2.3	6.7	3.5	1.3	0.1
1945-1967	1.5	3.8	3.8	17.5	5.7	0.7	23.7	5.1	1.8	3.3	2.3	0.1
1968-1989	0.0	1.4	1.0	10.9	0.0	0.0	30.3	2.4	0.0	5.0	1.6	0.0

SOURCE: own calculations, updated series from MACKIE & ROSE 1990, see Appendix B. NOTES: (%) Average share in votes/seats - weighted by months of term; GE: 1918-30: USPD (partly merged with KPD); NO: 1921-4: DNA; SW: 1918-21: VS; -1944: incl. also (rival) Kilbom communists.

revolutionary unions to communist parties, whereupon most of them broke with Moscow" (LINDEN 1990: 4).

Third, Communism gained from the decline of syndicalist appeal, providing instead a more coherent mobilization strategy. Since the early 1920s syndicalism had lost much of its *raison d'être* - with the maturing of industrial capitalism, pluralist industrial relations, growing welfare state, and parliamentary democracy, while revolutionary movements "took place in preindustrial or industrializing countries, and never in fully developed capitalist societies (LINDEN 1990: 18)."

Fourth, beyond these immediate organizational factors, the importance of the revolution-reform schism can further be explained by the persistence of social cleavages and the degree of political integration. LIPSET has argued that "the more rigid the status demarcation lines in a country, the more likely the emergence of radical working-class-based parties" (LIPSET 1983: 1-2). Although the rigidity of the status system fermented class consciousness, of crucial impact on revolutionary unionism was the sequencing, timing and character of political and economic citizenship, that is the way in which the dominant classes reacted to the rise of the working-class (LIPSET 1983: 2). In Latin Countries, union movements were long suppressed by the State and employers, leading to soaring class conflict, while foreclosing effective reforms via the parliamentary route. Weak fragmented Left parties faced in these countries increasingly radical unions.

Fifth, in addition to partial system integration, the reform-revolution schism can also be related to incomplete *social integration*. The experience of the First World War and the example of the Russian Revolution deepened the split within the working-class movement under two constellations (ROKKAN 1968: 207-8). On the one hand, a radical (partly Communist) labour movement emerged in Protestant and mixed countries with a recent nation-building process with late national independence or unification. In these countries, conflicts over cultural standardization and national identity persisted and the working-

class remained incompletely integrated, as interwar Norway and Germany.[13] On the other hand, a schism occured in Catholic countries where the *Church-State* conflict had been deep and persistent. This had deepened the fragmentation of the working class, as in France and Italy (but also in Spain).

ROKKAN's thesis holds for the fragmentation of left parties, in France and Germany, and to a lesser degree in Italy and Norway. However, Communist unionism in the four countries took very different forms: from internal and regional radical opposition in Germany to an oscillation in orientation within the movement in Norway to a split-up in France and Italy. Moreover, it should be stressed that the thesis is time-dependent: the Norwegian and German working-class split abated after the interwar period as in the other non-Latin countries. In France and Italy, however, the fragmentation of working-class parties and unions persisted, this postwar divergence needs further analysis.

THE POSTWAR DIVERGENCE: FROM SOCIAL CLOSURE TO OPENESS

After the Second World War, Communist parties experienced a new surge in public support, thanks to their involvement in the resistance movement, partly due to hope for a radical change. Even in countries with small Communist inclination during the interwar period, a sudden upsurge was visible - in the Scandinavian and Benelux countries in the first elections Communist parties received 10-13% of the votes. Yet after the Western capitalism with the help of the Marshal plan was installed, Communists received electoral set-backs, cutting votes by nearly a half in the next elections (6-8%). In West Germany, Austria, and Switzerland, anti-communism had already been entrenched by the time the first postwar elections (1947-9) were held in which the Communist Parties remained below 6% (in Austria already in 1945). On the British Isles, nationalist anti-Communism persisted since the war - there was no fruitful ground for "proletarian internationalism". With the exception of Austria (partly under Soviet occupation), no Communist party in these countries was able to hold on to its party membership.[14]

The French and Italian Communist Parties are thus outstanding, they were able to mobilize one-fourth and one-fifth of the electorate respectively, though compared to the PCF, the Italian PCI had more than twice as many members and remained a growing mass organization.[15] With hindsight, it is not surprising that Communist unionism was only in these two countries able to become thoroughly entrenched, while any attempts to secure influence in a unity alliance of all, or left partisan unionists had failed there by the late 1940s.

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13 But also outside our comparison, Finland and Iceland, both countries with late independence from Russia and Denmark respectively (cf. ROKKAN 1968).

14 Less than 2% of the electorate were Communist party members, or about one-third of votes in the late 1940s, (own calculations, cf. TUNNAHILL 1978).

15 In each country about 5 million votes in the late 1940s (cf. to 1.4 million in West Germany). While the PCF was able to mobilize around 800.000 members (15% of its voters, 3% of the electorate, including the newly enfranchised women), the PCI organized more than 2 million members (one-third of its voters, 7% of the electorate) (own calulations, cf. TUNNAHILL 1978).

Table 5.6
Communist Union Membership (estimates) and Union Density

	AU	BE	DE	FR	GE	IR	IT	NE	NO	SW	SZ	UK
Union Centre:	(f)	(f)	(o)CGT(U)		(s/o)	(s)	CGIL	EVC	(o)	SAC		(s)
Union membership (%)												
1920s	*	*	*	36%	*10%	15%	.	3%	<55%	7%	*	15%
1940s	10%	15%	.	55%	.	.	65%	15%	.	2%	.	.
1960s	5%	.	.	40%	.	.	45%	<3%	.	1%	.	.
1980s	2%	.	.	25%	.	.	40%	.	.	<1%	.	.
Gross (net) density (%)												
1890-1917	.	.	.	1.6	-	.	-	0.6	.	0.5	.	.
1918-1944	.	.	-	8.4	0.4	.	4.9	0.9	-	1.5	.	-
1945-1967	.	-	-	+17.1	-	-	+25.1	5.3	-	0.7	.	-
1968-1989	.	-	-	+7.2	-	-	+19.4	-	-	0.5	.	-

SOURCES: own calcualations, DUES database, see Appendix C. NOTES: (f) factions (1940s-), (o) union opposition (-1930s), (s) syndicalist; (*) estimates (1920s: partly affiliation to Profintern); 1940s-: AU: ÖGB-GE Fraction; FR: 80% of CGT; IT: 80% of CGIL; NE: EVC; SW: SAC. (+) net density (excl. pensioners).

This strategy to unite within such a unified labour movement as often envisaged in the exile or clandestine wartime resistance movements, was promoted by Communist parties. In France and Italy, the Communists were asured of a pro-unity majority at the labour congresses, yet once they used their control the more moderate minority wings risked to break away, what they finally did in 1947 and 1948. However, the Italians were more flexible towards the Socialist and Christian unionists, retaining a majority section of the former group (this was moreover possible since the Socialists had left government with the Communists).

In the other countries, the process was reversed such that Communists became more and more excluded as they quit postwar governments, lost votes, supported spontaneous strikes against the interest of the Socialist union leaders. The Swedish syndicalist-communist union (SAC), given the success of LO, had to accept the industrial relations system. It began also to provide unemployment benefits and to sign collective agreements. Nevertheless, it remained only of marginal importance. In the other countries, in Norway and Denmark, the British Isles and Switzerland, no Communist union centre emerged after the Second World War, and internal Communist union opposition loomed only occasionally in regional or sectoral pockets.

Hence, the French and Italian Communist parties and union movements are outstanding in their persistence and level of mobilization. Nevertheless, the two movements chose different strategies and consequentially followed separate mobilization paths in their postwar development (cf. TARROW 1976, LANGE & ROSS 1982). In both countries, the Communist party and unions suffered from stalemate, if not demobilization: during the 1950s the PCF and PCI stagnated or even lost in electoral votes, while the CGT and CGIL lost dramatically in unionization during the 1950s (see Charts ??). The PCF recovered from its loss during the

late-1950s political crisis and the constitutional changes and was able to stabilize its support around 20% of the electorate. The PCI was able to gradually extend its strength beyond the North-West working-class and rural workers in the "red belt" from around 20% to 25% in the 1960s. The PCF, that remained an orthodox Communist working-class party, suffered during the 1980s from the rise of the Socialist party and retreated to its traditional working-class bastions in the North and opposition regions in the Centre and South. The PCI, on the other hand, that adapted a more independent Euro-Communist line with a historic chance of sharing government responsibility, booming in 1976 to over 36%. In recent years, becoming increasingly moderate and flexible (dropping its Communist name in favour of PDS in 1990), it suffered from a similar depillarization trend as other movements, losing its majority in the "red belt" in recent years.

However, the most striking divergence was the turn-round of the CGIL after 1969 and the continuing decline of CGT. The new wave of mobilization in the 1970s was not limited to the CGIL only, but a general trend of all three confederations. The renewed strength can be attributed to reforms in the industrial relations system and CGIL's change in union politics toward workplace representation and collective bargaining. The CGT, on the other hand, remained largely unwilling to drop its system opposition. While the Italian Communist movement moved from revolutionary working-class mobilization based on a strategy of social closure to a more open, flexible strategy, French Communists were unable to overcome polarization and their isolation.

III
FROM POLARIZED PLURALISM TO POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION

Dedicated to the international revolution, Communist parties and unionists expected a break-down of the democratic and capitalist system and showed contempt for political reformism and economic gradualism. Moreover, as part of an international movement, the Communist party was forced to follow and defend the international and domestic policy recommendations from Moscow, even if such policies showed limited national success. However, once the parliamentary system and economic system became institutionalized, and competing labour movements gained in influence, Communist party and unions came under pressure to shift attention to the political and corporate roads. Although Communist party and unions faced the contradictions between representation and opposition already during the interwar period, the following analysis will mainly look at the divergent post-war patterns, in particular, compare France and Italy.

While the French interwar Popular Front (1936-38) was the first but incomplete attempt to Left-Centre alliance building, the participation of Communists in reconstruction cabinets after the Second World War was a break with past system opposition. However, the later exclusion from government (1947), the fragmentation of the left and the withering of the radical tide, led the Communist party to seek new but different alliances in France and

Table 5.7
Government Participation of Communist Parties, Western Europe 1918-1989

	AU	BE	DE	FR	GE	IR	IT	NE	NO	SW	SZ	UK
Party:	KPÖ	PCB	DKP	PCF	USPD	CPI	PCI	CPN	NKP	VPK	-	CP
Years in Government												
1918-1944	-	-	-	1.9	(1.5)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1945-1967	*	*1.0	-	(2.5)	-	-	*0.8	-	-	(10.2)	-	-
1968-1989	-	-	-	4.7	-	-	(3.0)	-	-	(15.0)	-	-
Cabinet share (%)												
1918-1944	-	-	-	1.5	(1.7)	-	-	-	-	.	-	-
1945-1967	*	*0.9	-	(3.3)	-	-	*0.8	-	-	(2.2)	-	-
1968-1989	-	-	-	2.8	-	-	(5.6)	-	-	(31.2)	-	-

SOURCE: own calculations, updated series based on FLORA 1981, MACKIE & ROSE 1990, see Appendix C. NOTES: (%) Cabinet share - weighted by month in government; (): direct or indirect support of government; (*) immediate postwar all-parties coalition government; GE: USPD partly merged with KPD.

Italy. However, once political alliances showed success, the crucial question of system integration reappeared: are Communist unions willing to take government and economic responsibility and pursue incremental political and econonomic reform? According to the "transmission belt" doctrine, political aims had the prerogative and unions served mainly as political mobilization agency at the discretion of the party. However, Communist unions faced limited possibilities for economic action under rival unionism. The question was whether the Communist party would give the unions the freedom to cooperate together with other union movements and press for non directly political aims, such as economic improvements and industrial relations reforms. Finally, the different choices in respect to political and industrial participation taken by the French and Italian labour movements have also partly reshaped the party-union linkages.

COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION

Soon after its foundation the Communist party accepted the rules of the 'democratic game' as it stood for elections in all countries though it could hardly expect to achieve a majority and acceed to government by its own. With few exceptions, Communist parties abstained from entering democratic governments, even in the few instances that Communist votes in parliament supported centre-left or left governments (see Table 5.7). However, even in the political mobilizing Popular Front in France, the Communist members of parliament supported the Blum government but did not enter. Communist leaders carefully abstained from taking responsibility and became consequently drawn into governmental politics, as later under Mitterand's first government in 1981. The strategic considerations were also partly imposed by Moscow's leadership and its often abrupt changes in strategy.

The Communists role in the resistance movement gave them popularity, while some of the right and Socialist left had been discredited through collaboration. Thus to increase the legitimation of immediate postwar reconstruction governments, Communists were invited

to join in Austria, Belgium, France and Italy.[16] However, in all other countries Communist remained excluded from national governments due to the success of Socialist labour parties (Britain, Norway), or left-agrarian (or centre) coalitions (Sweden, Denmark), or centre-left coalitions (the Netherlands, and since 1946 Austria), or even more conservative coalitions (Germany, Switzerland). With the millitary alliances of the Cold War and Western economic integration (Marshall plan), all opposed by Moscow-oriented Communist parties, Communists ended their government participation in Belgium, Italy and France in 1947. However, in Belgium and France, the Socialists remained within the government and became increasingly moderate, while the more radical Italian socialist party (PSI) left with the Communists, though the reformist Social-Democratic break-away (PSDI) soon joined again the coalition. Other non-communist leftist parties with a more distant relationship to Moscow emerged in other countries, particularly in Scandinavia they gained importance as a Left alliance partner. The bipolar political system in Scandinavia with small non-orthodox leftist splinter parties put these parties in the position but also under pressure to support a minority Socialist government in order to prevent a right bourgeois coalition.[17]

However, the pro-Moscow Italian and French Communist parties remained the most important and longest excluded opposition parties that claimed also to mobilize the majority of the organized workers. The exit of the Communists from the government in 1947 intensified in both countries the left-right confrontation. While in Italy the right was a relative cohesive bloc based on the Church-supported Christian-Democratic network within a fragmented party system under proportional representation, the French right was more fragmented until De Gaulle's Fifth Republic established a presidential system, that favoured the right *bloc* and limited the role of the parliament (with a new majority voting system). Since 1959, the Socialist party excluded from the government had to achieve a majority before it could re-enter government. Thus the Socialists had either to win enough dissatisfied Communist voters or to enter an alliance with the Communists to win a majority. The Italian non-Communist Left on the other hand had been split and had been asked one by one earlier to join as junior partners into government already in the 1960s, thereby being drawn into responsibility and lured into the Italian patronage system. The Italian Communists gained from the political regionalization during the 1970s some influence in its regional strongholds, particularly the "red belt" (Emilia-Romagna, Toscany). The more-centralized French system, on the other hand, trapped the PCF to concentrate on Paris-centred national politics only. While the PCF was willing to enter some tactical electoral alliances (Programme Commun) with the Socialists to overcome the majority hurdle, the PCI envisaged during the late 1970s broader strategic alliances (even with the left DC wing) in

16 The Communist party participated in government in Austria (April-December 1945), Belgium (March 1946-March 1947), France (November 1945-November 1947), and Italy (June 1945-May 1947).

17 The Danish leftist party (SF) supported occasionally Social-Democratic minority governments (1967-68, 1971-73, 1975-77) but did not enter. The Swedish Communist party (VPK) had a even more crucial role in supporting the Social-Democratic governments (1957-69, 1970-76, 1982-) since the end of the old red-green alliance in 1957. The small Leftist party in Norway (SV) has occasionally supported the DNA minority governments.

order to participate in governmental politics in a *compromesso storico*. Ironically, the inclusion of Communists in the first Socialist Fifth Republic government in 1981, however, was a short but stifling embracement. The PCF withdrew from the government before becoming completely entrapped into political compromise building in 1984. The Italian Communist, however, played an important role as the major opposition party, and at some occasions were a necessary supporting partner, without committing itself to a government role. Moreover, PCI's flexibility derived from the need for labour unity and labour-capital compromise in order to reform the economic system and overcome the regional disparities.

THE WEAKNESS OF RIVAL UNIONISM AND STRENGTH OF LABOUR UNITY

Syndicalism traditionally repudiated alliance building, political horse-trading and compromise seeking, but hailed the obstructive force of direct action. During the interwar period, as was shown earlier, revolutionary syndicalism remained a minority phenomenon amongst the unionized population, not to speak of the un-organized. The further split or oscillation between syndicalist and Communist-led union movements added to the interwar fragmentation in those countries.

It was not before the end of the Second World War that Communist-led unions achieved a majority position in Italy and France. For the observer in the 1950s, Italy and France were prime examples of the "weakness of rival unionism" (GALENSON 1961: 1-16), not only in terms of unionization but particularly in respect to their impotence in industrial relations. French and Italian unions, while lacking power in the economic sphere, would retreat to political struggles. Political motivated strike action that would primarily take issue with the state has a long tradition in France and Italy (cf. SHORTER & TILLY 1974, TILLY, TILLY, & TILLY 1975, SNYDER 1975), it was also encroached in anarcho-syndicalist union strategy of '*action directe*'. During the Cold War years, the state and employers were intransigent against the Communist-dominated labour movement in both France and Italy. Paternalism and "immobilism" of French and Italian employers had persisted over the Second World War, well into the 1960s. Although Communism and rival unionism provided the *patronat* (employers) further possibilities to rule-and-divide, they were not much more willing to bargain with non-Communist movements that grew in importance. In fact, it should be noted that only initially Communist-led CGT and CGIL represented the majority of union members as consequence of the ebb in mobilization, both organized around three-quarter of all organized in 1950 but saw their share deminish further to ca. 55% ten years later (incl. UIL in Italy, cf. VISSER 1989). Moreover, not all union members were supporters of the Communist party, particularly in CGIL an estimated one-fifth of the membership supported the minority Socialist (PSI) wing.

Not only the employers intransigence fed back on rival or polarized unionism, state intervention into industrial relations was even more important given the increasing and pace-setting public and nationalized sector employment. *First*, as a consequence of the suppres-

sion and the resistance pact, all major union movements could claim a right of existence. The status of representativity was granted to a the Communist-led unions (CGT, CGIL) as well as its break-aways (FO in France, CISL and UIL in Italy) and independent forces (CFTC, CGC in France). Given the weakness of rival unionism, the French minister of labour had the right to extend collective agreements (since 1950) that had been signed by the "most representative" union centres (dropped in 1978) and following further clauses (abolished in 1971), albeit CGT refused to sign most agreements (cf. STURMTHAL 1983: 75). Not until the late 1960s was collective bargaining at national level expanding and covering other than merely provisions on social security and employment conditions. *Second*, given the weakness of labour, the state intervened in setting the main labour market conditions through legal regulation, in particular, the minimum wage in France, the dismissal rules in Italy. This only reinforced the tendency to concentrate on political power struggles instead of the economic arena.

Since the 1960s French and Italian unions became increasingly involved in more de-politicised 'bread-and-butter' union action, at sector and workplace level. Moreover, there were several attempts to form unity-of-action and cooperation between CGT and CFDT or CGIL and CISL (and UIL), a prerequisite for successful multi-union bargaining. Once the hopes for electoral success became a somewhat deadlocked case, the Communist party allowed some form of autonomy to the union movement in economic action. "Organized by competing political parties as well as by competing labor confederations, as labor unity increased but agreement between the competing parties did not, the labor confederations sought to increase their independence from the political parties in order to reinforce the tendencies toward unity (WEITZ 1976: 569)". The French and Italian Communist union movement, however, differ in the degree of autonomy from the party, economic integration into collective bargaining, and overcoming rival unionism through labour unity of action.

The CGIL had more *Spielraum* (room for manoeuvre) than CGT, since CGIL included a increasingly critical Socialist faction and thus had to de-emphasize its party links, and its "rivals" were more willing to join, while CGT's unity-of-action was largely opposed by FO and CGC. Even more important were differences in the union system. The Italian regional and national unions gained in importance during the 1960s and were willing to take up multi-union collective bargaining for mainly economic reasons, while CGIL central leadership still concentrated on political action. But even in political strategy, CGIL cooperated with the other movements in order to promote social and political reforms (pension reform and regional policies for the South) since the late 1960s. Following the strike wave of 1968/69, the Italian government intervened into industrial relations, in particular workplace representation (1970) and arbitration (1973) in favour of the representation of three main confederations. These measures channelled the protest and strengthened the access of the three union centres at the workplace, leading to increase and stabilization of unionization in the 1970s. In France, besides less important changes in works councils (1968) and collective bargaining law (1971), major reforms of industrial relations (*Auroux* laws) were only implemented by the new Socialist government (1982-86) that required employers to

bargain but did not halt the further decline of French unionism. Moreover, CGT favoured political means over narrow collective bargaining.

OVERCOMING THE "TRANSMISSION-BELT" LINKAGE

The Communist party had the role of leadership in the revolutionary movement. In this conception, the party was not a mass party but a cadre party, organizing only faithful militants that would follow party orders. The trade unions would have the role of "transmission belts" in mobilizing the broader sections of the working-class. The primacy of the political party was also a consequence of the preference of political over industrial action. As long as both channels remained closed, only a radical political change would be able to bring capitalism down. Following this doctrine, Communist unionism was largely a political instrument to use direct action to destabilize capitalism and radicalize the working-class. Industrial action for the betterment of working-conditions were secondary. To seek union recognition as a collective bargaining partner against the revolutionary orthodoxy.

However, Communist party dominance was difficult to establish where Communist unionism had been formed by internal forces or where Communist unionism remained scattered and diffused. The Norwegian syndicalist trade union opposition that had first captured the union movement and then the party, was not willing to become subdued to Communist control (the Communist party finally split away). In the Dutch and Swedish syndicalist unions that had become more under Communist control, some syndicalist locals left in protest founding even smaller unions. In France, it was foremost the PCF after its bolshevization that maintained tight control of the Communist union movement (CGT-U) that had separated from the syndicalists (CGT). Communist unionism during the later 1920s was mainly infiltration of party members operating in small cells, a strategy that became crucial during the later suppression. It was the Comintern and PCF that shifted policy from the disastrous 'class against class' strategy to the popular front tactics. As a consequence the CGT-U joined again the CGT. At the international level, the Communist union centre was dissolved in order to prepare a merger with the Socialist International that did not materialize before the war.

A comparison of the party-union linkages of the two most important postwar Communist labour movement, reveals the difficult transformation from "transmission belt" subordination to autonomy in its own sphere.[18] In the immediate postwar period, at least after the break-away of the moderate minority, the Communist party controlled the dominant union movement, where it obtained a majority position at the level of the central organizations, the national unions and regional divisions. Yet the strength was not only at the central and intermediate level but also at the local level since it was the party cell (and not the union) that operated at the workplace (cf. ROSS 1976, WEITZ 1976). During the first

[18] For literature on PCF-CGT: see ROSS 1976, ROSS 1982; on PCI-CGIL: see WEITZ 1976, FARNETTI 1978, LANGE & VANICELLI 1982.

postwar decade, the unions (CGT and CGIL) were subordinated to the party (PCF and PCI) political goals, including the unions industrial action served primarily political goals, quite in contrast to their members wishes. It was in the mid-1950s that the "transmission belt" relationship was replaced by greater autonomy, although the PCF-CGT relationship proved less flexible than the PCI-CGIL one. This happened in the context of increased competition from other union centres and political changes (the end of the French Fourth Republic and the breakdown of Communist-Socialist cooperation in Italy) that required more independence from the union centres.

One major difference between the French and Italian union movements was the fact that CGIL included Socialist party members and wished to maintain the unity of the Left. Since the later 1950s, the Socialist fraction(s) gained in importance, advancing a critique of the "incompatiblity" between PCI and CGIL leadership (finally limited in 1969). Moreover, following trends to CGIL-CISL cooperation of the manufacturing unions and joint political action in the 1960s, the three union confederations agreed to build a common tripartite "federation" in 1972. The federation was not to last but CGIL had started a process of independence from party tutelage that was difficult to reverse, if it had not already entered a 'way of no return' (FARNETTI 1978: 435). CGIL retreated gradually from the Communist International and its close cross-border links with CGT; it was - on the recommendation of CISL and UIL - accepted in the non-Communist ETUC in 1978.

The French party-union relationship also changed towards more autonomy, albeit less fundamentally. The CGT, increasingly concentrating on depolitized matters, occasionally joined forces for common economic action with the secularized, Socialist-oriented CFDT (first with the 1966 CGT-CFDT pact), while the party became more concerned with building Left political alliances than relying on CGT as a class mobilization force. This "two-sphere" division of labour, however, "has not led to any change in the PCF's organizational control over the CGT (..) it has made considerable difference in the relationships between political leaders and trade unionists within the PCF. Recognizing the functional specificity of the CGT has led to a greater recognition of the functional specificity of its leaders in the party (ROSS 1976: 540)". The difference between the PCF-CGT and PCI-CGIL development is even more evident since the breakdown of the Communist regimes in the East since 1989, PCI changed its name (PDS) and deemphasized its Communist ideology, though risking the split-away of traditionalist Communist wing.

CONCLUSION

Following the theoretical propositions (see Chapter 2), we found that the *revolution-reform schism* occurred in countries were the working class was incompletely integrated, both in respect to system integration and social integration. The break with a reformist road to Electoral and Corporate Socialism was a reaction to closed or limited opportunities for political and economic participation. Although intellectual debate over revolutionary or reformist strategies predated the final schism, it occurred at the critical juncture of the na-

tional integration of the Socialist labour movement (see Chapter 3). The Moscow-led Communist movement implanted itself particularly where prewar syndicalist traditions and left wing splinter parties had previously emerged. We found that workers broke with the reformist Socialist or Christian-Social movements where the working class had been incompletely integrated, either nationally or culturally, that is, where local, syndicalist traditions persisted or where dechristianization advanced rapidly. Thus the labour schism came forth in reaction to the previous two labour cleavages, the labour-capital and State-Church cleavage. Where these cleavages had left uprooted communities without establishing enduring alignment to the Socialist (and Christian) labour movements, Communist party and unions were able to implant themselves.

The main instances where the revolution-reform cleavage led to labour disunity, as described in this chapter, can be summarized in four clusters (see Table 5.8): (1) most importantly *polarized pluralism* in France and Italy, (2) the temporary *interwar currents* in nationally late integrated Germany and Norway, (3) the rapidly suppressed or subsiding *postwar factions*, and (4) the small traditional *local-syndicalist* movements that came partly under Communist control. The manifest form of cleavage transformation was an *organizational schism* that led to a split in the union movement between Communist or Syndicalist unions and non-Commmunist union movement, while the other form was *internal opposition*, that was pursued where Communists were not in a majority. The strength of Communist party was the most important factor for the enduring splits, in postwar France and Italy, systems of polarized pluralism.

While the early syndicalist tendencies denied links to political parties, the later Communist labour movement accepted the primacy of the Communist party and Moscow's leadership. After the Second World War, an initial Communist surge in support soon abided with the onset of the Cold War with the exception of France and Italy. The historical chance for reunited labour movement failed in these two countries, as revolution-reform conflict over integration into the *Western* political and economic system soon reemerged. System opposition was the bases of the schism, and the party claimed its primacy. In both country, the schism led to polarized pluralism, a political and union system in which the working-class is fragmented and incompletely integrated into society and polity.

Communist party and unions, given their opposition to other movements, maintained their own cohesion through "social closure". Under the leadership of the militant cadre party, the union movement became a strategic agent for mobilizing party support and militancy. However, as was shown, the French and Italian Communist movement adapted opposing strategies, that led to different paths of mobilization and representation. The more mobilization was based on strategies of "social closure", long-term social change limited the mobilization potential, but an "open" strategy would dilute the ideological coherence and core ideological schism. The development of the PCF-CGT and PCI-CGIL development have been described as the two diverging strategies of *closure*, or ideology maintenance in France, and *opening*, or pragmatic adaptation in Italy.

Table 5.8
Revolution-Reform Schism and Internal Opposition

	Communist Union Centre ORGANIZATIONAL SCHISM	Socialist Union Centre INTERNAL OPPOSITION
Strong Communist party (10%-)	*polarized pluralism* French CGT Italian CGIL	*interwar currents* Germany 1920/30s Norway 1920s
Medium Communist party (5-9%)	*local-syndicalist* Dutch EVC (-1960) Swedish SAC	*postwar factions* Austria, Belgium, 1940s (Germany, Norway) -1950s

The diverging mobilization patterns are closely linked to differences in representational strategies. Although the French and Italian movements are strongly pillarized under the leadership of the party, they became differently integrated into the political and industrial relations systems. While PCF and CGT sought political alliances and deemphasized their links for tactical reasons, PCI and CGIL became increasingly independent and promoted broader social alliances. In fact, CGIL became more drawn into building a "northern" type corporatist industrial relations system and thus assumes a more economic functions than merely a political role. This evolution shows how polarized pluralism (or rival) unionism can develop into segmented pluralism and co-operative unionism that opens chances for more labour unity. Yet, today's challenge to political unionism in France and Italy with their recent sectionalist strike movement, but also elsewhere, are conflicts based on non-political, *functional* cleavages to which we will turn now. As will be suggested in the following chapters, these functional cleavages have gained in importance and sometimes supersede the three political cleavages.

6
THE CRAFT-INDUSTRY CLEAVAGE

> *'Trade unionism is peculiar to modern industrial society; its rise is attributable to forces activated by industrialization. The growth, structure and ideology of the labor movement of any country are conditioned by the nature of the industrialization process; that is, by the character of the society in which industry first took root and by the tempo and reaction of industrial development. This is not to say that political and cultural factors are not important. On the contrary, they may be decisive in determining the precise lines of trade union growth at a given time. But the dynamic element, in terms of which one may obtain the deepest insight into trade unionism, appears to be the complex of events subsumed under the concept of industrialization.* (GALENSON *1952b: 105.)'*

Divisions in the labour process amplify union diversity. The *Industrial Revolution* gave rise to the formation of working-class party and unions (see Chapter 3), but the timing and character of the economic development had also an impact on union diversity. During the first, early industrialization craft unionism emerged based on occupational community traditions. As modern capitalism advanced labour faced the challenge of organizing the army of proletarians, the less or unskilled workers that were increasingly employed in mass production. The *craft-industry cleavage* reflects the division of interests between those that could exceed "*craft monopoly*" (PERLMAN 1928) due to their indispensable skills and position, and those that had no chance to unilaterally control their labour market power. The major line of conflict is the question of solidarity and labour unity: are the privileged maintaining their position by *social closure* or are they willing to combine with the more feeble less skilled and struggle for a general improvement of their situation? The choices of different union strategies, not only had long-term consequences for labour unity, but it also reinforced differences in the political character of the labour movement.

This chapter delineates two different trajectories in the transformation of the craft-industry cleavage with long-term consequences on union diversity. Based on the theoretical propositions (see Chapter 2), we expect an early entrenched mobilization by one form of organization to limit the scope for subsequent organizational development. Indeed, we can detect one *sectionalist* union path that can be traced from craft to allied-craft to general unionism with the coexistence of earlier forms. The other *solidaristic* union path developed from craft to industrial to multi-sector unionism, the later forms tend to marginalize or replace the previous forms. The two chains of organizational adaptations were to a large degree the consequences of two opposing forces: the persistence of craft traditions, decentralized workplaces, and sheltered domestic market economies, and on the other hand, the

penetration of industrial mass production, concentrated industries, and export oriented market economies. Following the scheme in the previous chapters, the formation, mobilization and representation aspects of the craft-industry cleavage will be discussed.

First, the *formation* of the cleavage and the transformation into national unions and their coordination at the level of a union centre will be analyzed. Socialist union centres had in some countries assumed an additional role in reshaping the organizational structure, while in fragmented union systems they failed to do so due to their limited authority. Moreover, the union structure are under pressure to adapt to the national integration of labour markets, the increased centralization of employers, and the national regulation in industrial relations. The formation analysis will argue that the diverging paths had already parted at the end of the initial phase of formation and consolidation by the early 1920s, albeit they needed several decades to fully develop.

Second, the *mobilization* strategies of *closed unionism* in early sectionalist movements and *open unionism* in later solidaristic union movements vary considerably in their growth pattern over time and between sectors. Closed unionism adapts a strategy of mobilizing through *social closure*, while open unionism aims at labour unity through an *inclusive* strategy. Both strategies, however, are contingent on the environment, occupational changes and economic development that set the constraints for the growth perspective of the two strategies.

Third, the *representation* aspects of the closed and open strategies will be discussed, particularly in respect to the fragmentation of labour unity. Fragmentation of labour hampers union concentration and peak authority which reinforces fragmentation. The political character of the union centre and of its linkage to a political party - it will be argued - shaped the way in which workers' interest have been aggregated within the union system. Again, the timing and character of the institutionalization of industrial relations helped to freeze organizational forms. Hence, the craft-industry cleavage gave rise to differences in the union system but also in the organization of a union centre: the centralization, division of labour, the transfer of authority, or the concentration of power vary with the degree of fragmentation.

I
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE CRAFT-INDUSTRY CLEAVAGE

The differences in today's union structure in industry, the way in which interests of manual workers in the productive sectors are aggregated, date back to the formation before, and consolidation of national unions after, the First World War. At the turn of the century, a large working class had been formed, representing more than half of the labour force (see Table 6.1), especially industrial production and transport became important economic activities. The increasing economic integration, the spread of modern means of communication, the urbanization, and the growth of the nation-state, were all factors that promoted the

development of national collective organization. Yet the pattern of union development was far from being universal. Although there is a convergence of countries towards an industrial society, the timing and pace of industrialization varied considerably and so its impact on union diversity (cf. LORWIN 1958). The differences between forms of union organization stem partly from variations in industrialization but it is not merely an unmediated outflow of the economic development. Against a technical contingency interpretation, I will argue here that it were organizational choices and the interaction of political and economic development that moulded the diverging paths in union development.

With the early industrialization, skilled workers in the spreading craft-shops became collectively organized thanks to occupational community bonds, and sometimes renewed preindustrial "guild" traditions. This 'labour aristocracy' could exert some control over the labour process, limit access to the craft, and define job territory. However, with the changes toward mass factory production during the second industrialization and extension of transport, the unskilled and semi-skilled workforce increased more rapidly endangering the status of craft workers. Labour faced a strategic decision between *closed* unionism and *open* unionism (cf. TURNER 1962: 139-168, MARKS 1989), that is between sectionalist and solidaristic strategies. The choice was whether to integrate or separate the new non-craft workers within the same union movement. On the other hand, there was also the challenge to enhance labour unity across sectors in response to an increasingly interwoven economy. As the labour market became nationally integrated, local sectionalist strategies could not any more provide a solution to the interets of large sections of the workforce. There were two levels at which labour unity would have to be build in order to overcome labour's internal competition, solidarity had to be maintained through horizontal integration (across sectors) and vertical integration (across skill levels).

Table 6.1
The Formation of the Working Class and "Industrial" Workers, Western Europe (1890-1970)

	AU	BE	DE	FR	GE	IR	IT	NE	NO	SW	SZ	UK
Dependent employed (in % of total labour force)												
1890	45	68	58	53	65	.	.	.	58	44	49	83
1910	46	66	66	54	66	.	50	75	61	55	60	84
1930	65	69	65	59	67	45	54	79	60	65	70	89
1950	64	72	72	60	71	56	56	71	71	77	75	90
1970	78	81	81	82	84	66	51	85	83	88	80	79
Blue-collar "industrial" workers in mining, secondary and transport sector (in % of dependent employed)												
1890	38	45	27	34	44	.	.	.	30	16	.	<51>
1910	45	62	27	37	51	.	33	40	36	30	46	<56>
1930	40	63	32	45	45	<34>	.	44	36	45	47	<56>
1950	46	57	39	54	50	<43>	47	42	45	46	46	<60>
1970	40	42	37	53	43	<48>	.	32	*40	*40	39	40

SOURCE: own calculations and estimations based on FLORA, KRAUS & PFENNING 1987.
NOTE: closest census year; dependent employed (excluding family workers), Blue-collar "industrial" workers in mining, secondary (manufacturing, utilities, construction) and transport, <> incl. also white-collar employees.

THE FORMATION OF INDUSTRIAL UNIONS

The early efforts to organize local craft workers date further back than the industrial take-off and were partly collateral of guild traditions. However, modern national trade unions with organizational stability and durability emerged only in the later quarter of the nineteenth century with few exceptions. While the traditional craft-shop has been the setting in which craft unionism emerged, the spread of the factory system gave rise to new forms of unionism. At the time of the founding of Socialist union centres (see Chapter 3), much depended on the balance between the plethora of smaller craft and local unions and the scattered attempts to organize on a larger, national base.

The *first* crucial step toward modern union organization was the *national* integration of local unions within a central organization.[1] The need for coordination of the local activities and the organization of the non-unionists became more pressing with the national integration of the labour, producer and consumer markets (cf. ULMAN 1955: 27-8). "Market forces work against any organization that operates only in a part of a market. Employers often will not been able to survive if they pay higher wages than competing firms. Thus an existing union often has an interest in seeing that all firms in any given market are forced to pay union wage scales. (...) In addition, workers with a given skill who migrate from one community to another have an interest in belonging to a national union that gives them ac-

[1] This was often indicated by the name of such unions: *Zentralverband, Centralorganisation, National Union, Centrale,* or by using the National adjective, as Irish ...

cess to employment in each new community. Finally, the political strength of a large union is obviously greater than that of a small one. The incentive to federate local unions and organize unorganized firms increase considerably as improvements in transportation and communication enlarge the market (OLSON 1965: 67-8)". With few exceptions, the first *national* unions emerged by the late 1860s in Western Europe (see Table 6.2).[2] The national union integration, entailed the incorporation of pre-existing local structures within a national federation, or the building of a new network of local sections on the initiative and with the help of the central leadership. Where national unions grew out of combining already established local unions, centralization was more difficult to obtain than in the case of new centre-led organization building.

The earliest national organizations were commonly *craft* unions in printing due to their tightly knit occupational community (*Chapel*) and easier access to communication (cf. MARKS 1989: Ch. 4). These organizations remained often confined to a single trade or craft such as printers. Craft unions had many advantages at that time: they could rely on occupational solidarity, they could limit access to the trade by apprenticeship and other regulations and they provided travel costs and other self-help to prevent undercutting of wage levels. Although they were small organizations, they could rely on their labour market power (*craft monopoly*) to set working and employment conditions unilaterally (PERLMAN 1928). However, this sectionalist strategy was endangered by occupational changes and economic down-turns since it was not adaptive to change and to limited spread of risks.

The *second* step was the formation of *open unions* (cf. TURNER 1962, MARKS 1989), that would organize beyond the limited jurisdiction of a single trade or craft union. The process of concentration of the many small unions into few inclusive unions was a long-term process that lasted more than a century and still has not ended. However, the concentration process has taken different forms of organizational restructuring: *first*, the amalgamation of occupational unions of similar trade or crafts (ex-craft unionism); *second*, the creation of new unions that cater for an industry (partly by absorption and amalgamation of competing craft unions); *third*, the organization of a general union that catered for the non-craft not yet organized, partly by absorption of smaller unions. Two hypotheses have been forwarded to explain the diverging trajectories, a more economic contingency argument about the timing of *industrialization* (GALENSON 1952b, INGHAM 1974, STEPHENS 1979) and a institutionalization argument on the *entrenchment* of craft unionism (cf. GALENSON 1952b, CLEGG 1976, KORPI 1978).

Open unionism rose in the course of the second Industrial Revolution, the growth of Taylorist mass production and a less skilled workforce. *Industrial* unions came into being as a result of mergers in adjacent industries and largely dependent on the (small) size and the decline of separate industrial domains. *General* unionism, on the other hand, emerged in contest with both craft and industrial unionism, and once it had taken root it was difficult to dislodge in favour of industrially demarcated unions. As noted by CLEGG (1976), com-

2 The British AEU (1858), the "new model union" of engineers was the earliest, most prominent example of national ex-craft union.

Table 6.2
The Formation of Industrial Relations in Western Europe

	AU	BE	DE	FR	GE	IR	IT	NE	NO	SW	SZ	UK
Coalition right	1870	1898	1857	1884	1890	1824	1890	1855	1839	1864	1848	1824
Union confederation	BFG	CGTB	DSF	CGT	ADGB	ITUC	CGL	NVV	AFL	LO	SGB	TUC
Founding	1892	1898	1898	1895	1890	1894	1906	1905	1899	1898	1880	1863
(delay in years)	22	0	31	11	0	74	16	55	60	32	32	
Employer association		CCI	DA	CGPF	VDA		CGII	C.O.	NAF	SAF	ZOA	BEC
Founding	.	1914	1896	1919	1913	.	1910	1920	1900	1902	1908	1919
(delay in years)	.	16	-2	24	23	.	4	15	1	4	28	56
Union recognition	1919	1919	1899	1936	1918		(1923)	1919	(1915)	1906	1919	(1916)

SOURCE: compiled from various sources: ALBER 1981; GALENSON 1952; HEYDE 1931; MIELKE 1983; VISSER 1989, 1990; WINDMULLER/GLADSTONE 1984: passim.

menting on British unions: "It is, however, much easier to persuade unions to come together by amalgamation than to prevail upon them to split themselves up or to transfer groups or members to other unions. Consequently advocates of industrial unionism may succeed in persuading occupational unions within a given industry to amalgamate into an industrial union, but they must expect strong resistance from general unions and occupational union which straddle industrial boundaries (CLEGG 1976: 31)." In fact, general unions since the interwar period have continued to grow by absorption in Britain, becoming larger unions than many industrial unions in other countries. Nevertheless, they are differently structured than industrial unions as they straddle across sectors without integrating all skill levels within a firm or all firms within a sector.

In countries with early and successful trade union formation (Britain, Ireland and Denmark), craft traditions persisted and shaped their union structure until today (cf. GALENSON 1952b, FLANDERS 1952). The early *entrenchment* of craft unionism hampered a rationalization of union structure that could build labour unity by including labour of all skills and across all firms. In early industrialized and unionized Britain, the first phase of mass union growth began in the late 1880s, the period of "new unionism" (cf. HOBSBAWM 1985, POLLARD 1985), though craft unionism had already been entrenched. Similarly, Danish crafts unions emerged relative early as "descendants of guilds" (cf. GALENSON 1952b/c), they resorted to some degree of "craft monopoly", as the urban labour markets were "compartalized" by trade specific apprenticeship. Since Danish craft unions remained "closed" for the growing force of unskilled workers, general unions emerged (separated for male and female workers), thereby occupying the niche in which industrial unionism could have otherwise emerged.

A Scandinavian comparison provides further evidence for the impact of *industrialization* and labour market segmentation at the turn of the century on the union structure (GALENSON 1952b: 123 ff.). In fact, in contrast to Denmark, industrialization was later in Sweden and Norway, and more rapid (cf. GALENSON 1952b, LAFFERTY 1971) and craft

unionism had not been as entrenched by the time national unions emerged (cf. KORPI 1978: 74). Since "late, rapid industrialization tend to skip the workshop stage of production and proceed directly to industrial mass production (STEPHENS 1979: 45)", industrial unionism was more prone to emerge in these countries. Moreover, the more industry was concentrated, as in Sweden compared to England, the stronger the tendency toward industrial unionism (cf. INGHAM 1974, STEPHENS 1979).

However, *general unions* emerged also in other countries, despite their later industrialization, yet they became a "suppressed historical alternative" (MOORE 1978). For instance, besides Denmark, in the two other Scandinavian countries general unions emerged but became literally suppressed by early crisis and turned into industrial unions.[3] Also in other countries, general workers unions of semi- and unskilled factory workers existed, but they commonly developed into industrial unions of the chemical and allied productive industries (Austria, Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands), or mainly of construction and allied trades (Belgium). Hence, it is less the timing of *industrialization* that decided upon the form of union organization, but the degree to which early or late industrialization facilitated an entrenchment of craft-general unionism or exceeded pressures to combine across segmentational lines. There is empirical support for the *entrenchment* thesis: the two countries with the most prominent sectionalist fragmentation along craft-general lines, Denmark and Britain (plus Ireland), had the highest level of unionization before the turn of the century.[4] Thus craft and general unions had already been well established before Taylorist mass production and industrial concentration took off, thus occupying already the niche of industrial unionism, that became a phenomena for few new or marginal industries (e.g. railways). This finding links up to the thesis on the comparative advantage of first mobilizing agencies and the subsequent structuring of alternatives (ROKKAN 1977, see Chapter 2).

Before the First World War, only few unions had started to grow incorporating more than few confined trades. With the interwar mass mobilization, new groups of unorganized joined new or existing unions that grew rapidly. Yet not all union movements were able to enlarge, or only to stabilize their membership during the interwar economic and political turmoil. In fact a wave of mergers that were to reduce the growing economic interdependence of industries and occupations (see PFEFFER 1972), followed the wave of new foundations (for Britain see WADDINGTON 1988) in nearly all interwar countries, thereby further

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3 The general unions were founded in Sweden (1891) and Norway (1895) and Denmark (1896, though in Copenhagen already in 1890). However, it was the Danish Labours' Union that became the largest union within the union centre (1913: 34.4% of LO), while the Swedish general union was severely hit by the 1909 strike (1907: 20%, 1914: 9.5% of LO) and the Norwegian general union (1914: ca. 25% of LO) suffered from internal splits from its syndicalist episode in the mid-1920s.

4 Already in 1890, the Danish unions organized 6% of all dependent employed (cf. "Dänemark" in HEYDE 1931), the second leading union movement after the British unions that unionized 11% (1892), a decade later both movements were at par with 12% and 13% respectively (cf. BAIN & PRICE 1980).

concentrating the union structure, yet along the two different trajectories of sectionalist and solidaristic unionism.

THE FORMATION OF UNION CENTRES

In addition the role of the union centre was important in shaping the union structure and enhancing labour unity. But the weakness or strength of the union centre itself was a result of past fragmentation or concentration. Thus we expect the early formation of a union centre to consolidate the existing fragmented union structure, while the later formation of a Socialist-oriented union centre had an additional impetus in promoting national centralization and rational union structure. The success of the German and Swedish union centres in union concentration was attributed to the later development of a more Socialist union centre, in comparison to the early sectionalist British TUC (FULCHER 1991), though there have been also "suppressed historical alternatives" (MOORE 1978: Ch. 11). A comparison of the failure of *British-type* Liberal craft unionism in Germany, and the disaster of *German-type* Socialist-solidarity unionism in Britain reveals again how some contextual factors "suppressed" one alternative and favoured the other.

Given TUC's weak centralization, attempts were made to form a *German-type* industrial federation (GFTU, 1899), yet it found not the long-term commitment of the larger and smaller unions to share in resources and transfer authority (cf. PROCHASKA 1982, FULCHER 1988, 1991). The GFTU with its motto 'unity is strength' started with high hopes, soon to be frustrated by sectionalism and overlapping with the TUC. While the "TUC washed its hands of all responsibility for the new organisation (...) and so succeeded in riding itself finally of the problem of federation, with all the sectional quarrels that had bedevilled it", the GFTU was to experience, "that even its relatively modest demands upon its members were difficult to enforce and that its polities depended upon a very fitful sense of unity among an extremely individualistic membership" (PROCHASKA 1982: 22, 29).[5] Neither, was the TUC able to promote a rational restructuring via merger policies to limit union jurisdictional disputes effectively; nor did it promote the integration of local autonomy within national unions (it still accepts locals as equals within its ranks).

But reversely, in Germany there existed also a *British-type* liberal craft-oriented union movement (*Hirsch-Dunker*, 1869). It remained active during the Anti-socialist laws but thereafter stagnated and was successfully competed by the new Socialist union centre (*Generalkommission*, 1890) that became a driving force for centralized *inclusive* unionism. In fact, "unity is strength" had been the best strategy given the experience of political suppression and severe employer resistance. Labour unity was enforced in terms of national integration, the eradication of localism, and in terms of centralized bureaucratic structures that match party strength. In respect to the industrial union principle, a "*sowohl-als-auch*" (as well as) pragmatic policy was adapted at the 1892 congress (cf. SCHÖNHOVEN 1987: 73). The

[5] The GFTU did not find the support of the large unions and a number of its affiliates joined larger, general unions for protection (FULCHER 1988: 256).

metalworkers union (1891) remained one of the few prewar industrial unions, but even "occupational" unions gradually opened their ranks to the less skilled (cf. SCHÖNHOVEN 1985, 1987: 73).[6]

Like the British TUC (1868) and German *Hirsch-Duncker* unions (1869), early union centres that coordinated craft unions and local union activities and were (initially) rather Liberal than Socialist emerged also in the Netherlands (ANWV, 1874), Switzerland (SGB, 1880), Norway (DFNA, 1884) and Denmark (Copenhagen DSF, 1886). These Liberal-craft centres, however, either declined gradually in importance (Germany, Netherlands, Norway) or turned into Socialist-oriented union movements (Britain, Denmark, Switzerland).[7] Craft unionism survived at a local level or in some trades in a number of countries, before a new Liberal union centre reemerged as a small third, non-confessional anti-socialist "pillar" in the three consociational countries (the Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland).[8] This leads us to the recognition of the impact of political cleavage-organizations in fostering broader 'class' alliances and overcoming occupational sectionalism.

Most notably, the Swedish union movement (LO, 1898) followed the German centralization model after the 1909-strike disaster and in reaction to the challenge of centralized employers associations (cf. FULCHER 1991). Again the metalworkers set the model with their work-material union, yet by 1923 about two-third of all LO members were organized in industrial unions, compared to 46% in 1908 (cf. KORPI 1978: 64). Nevertheless, even though the industrial principle had been accepted by LO in 1922, trades such as building and printing remained opposed (GALENSON 1952b: 123) and it took several decades to integrate all occupational unions. Similarly, in Norway, the acceptance of the industrial principle in 1923 was difficult to enforce, particularly since a number of craft unions preferred disaffiliation over disbanding. Although forces against and for change coexisted as in Britain, Sweden, and Norway, the "Socialist influence tipped this balance towards organisation of an open, class-wide and unified character (...)" (FULCHER 1988: 265).

In France, Italy, Switzerland, Belgium and Imperial Austria, the issue of union restructuration towards sector-wide unionism instead of sectional craft unionism was cross-cut by other cleavages, the politico-religious and ethnic-regional cleavages. In all these countries, industrialization had taken place in confined regions, while in others traditional preindustrial production methods and agriculture prevailed. Moreover, ethnic and religious compo-

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6 There were two other prewar industrial unions (timber, construction). More than half of the original founding affiliates had merged or dissolved and seven multi-occupational mass unions (70% of all members) existed at the eve of the First World War (SCHÖNHOVEN 1985: 229). After the war, the industrial principle was accepted by the ADGB congress (1922) but it remained voluntary for already existing unions since they may have otherwise disaffiliated.

7 The SGB (1880) was initially more a liberal craft union, preceeding the Socialist party, and only in 1905 adapted Marxism. In Norway, a liberal artisan-agricultural union (DFNA, 1884) emerged in the periphery before the Socialists became a national centre (cf. "Norway" in LINDEN & ROJAHN 1990).

8 In the Netherlands (ANV, 1912, 1929: NVC), Belgium (CGSLB, 1920/1930), and Switzerland (LFSA, 1919).

sition varied, thus making a national integration of all union currents within one central movement difficult. In France and Italy, the coexisting regional organizations (*Bourse du Travail, Camera del lavoro*) led to a fragmentary *dual* structure within the movement, between local unions (*syndicats*) and national unions (*fédérations*), hampering a rational reorganization and construction of strong, national industrial unions (cf. ADAMS 1952, LORWIN 1952, KENDALL 1975). In Belgium, Switzerland and the Netherlands, the Socialist union movement and the Christian movement were based in different regions and trades, allowing the first to be more based on industrial lines than the latter. Yet competition between the two movement, and diseconomies of scales due to *rival unionism* (see Chapter 4), drove both movements to rationalize their structure gradually, hence, even the traditional, corporatist Christian union movements combined beyond their initial occupational outlook. Beside the impact of cleavage-organizations on union structure, the employers played also a role.

CENTRALIZATION OF EMPLOYERS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

Union diversity reflected also the pressures on labour to meet the level of centralization by employers and the necessities of collective bargaining.[9] INGHAM (1974) in a comparison between Britain and Sweden argued that the degree of centralization of the employers association accounts for the centralization in industrial relations. The character of the employers association, in turn, is largely dependent on the structure of the economy: small countries being more specialized and having a more concentrated economic infra-structure (INGHAM 1974). Yet, it has also been argued that employers centralized in response to initial organization of labour, and by doing so, forced unions to organize as well (FULCHER 1988, 1991). According to this view, "the dynamics of conflict were the driving force behind centralization, which was the unintended consequence of the escalating conflict set off by the rapid organization of labour (FULCHER 1991: 96)". Yet the INGHAM-thesis of industrial concentration and the labour movement thesis of employers response to union power, are not necessarily contradicting. The two factors could be mutually reinforcing processes, much like the intriguing parallel drawn by SWAAN (1988): "The process of amalgamation and federation of employers' and workers' organizations reveals many traits in the dynamics of state formation: it is an example of a figuration in which opponents compel one another to evolve to higher levels of integration" (SWAAN 1988: 175). The threat to concentrate resources and decision making by one, compelled the other, leading to an upward spiral.

Employer associations, like trade unions, were originally formed during the era of "local markets" at a local level and for specific industries. At least at this level there seems to be some indication for the *labour movement thesis* of employer response to union organization: "The establishment of associations along industry lines generally preceded the formation of

[9] Employers centralization and bargaining structure were in turn a result of the character of industrialization and the economomic structure, in particular the concentration, product heterogeneity and export dependency (see CLEGG 1976, INGHAM 1974).

central employer associations. At the central level the creation of overarching bodies for broad representational, political, and legislative purposes lagged behind the rise of national trade union centres by roughly ten to twenty years (WINDMULLER 1984: 3)." Looking at founding dates, there is even evidence for a lagging behind of the founding of peak employer associations in respect to the major trade union confederations (see Table 6.2), with the exception of Denmark.[10] In Scandinavia, national employers' peak associations emerged in short response to labour, while in Britain and Switzerland, where craft unionism had emerged relative early, such organizations lagged behind.

Most continental European countries experienced the formation of central employer associations only around the First World War. Yet, comparatively, the strength, scope and comprehensiveness of employer associations varied considerably across Europe.[11] The large, core industries, in particular associations in manufacturing and engineering, were for long dominant and remained more autonomous.[12] Moreover, there is no need for the assumption that actors do indeed replicate a 'parallel' organizational solution in all cases.[13]

Similarly one finds only a spurious effect between the character of collective bargaining and union structure. Collective bargaining structures provide no satisfying explanation of diversity in union structure *per se* (cf. CLEGG 1976). In some cases, intermediate forms of cooperation such as bargaining cartels served much the same function as centralized industrial unionism. Although unions may be able to negotiate in multi-union bargaining, fragmented union systems involve economic and political costs due to more sectionalist interests formation. Moreover, institutionalized bargaining served often to marginalize or exclude non-recognized forms of unionism and increase organizational costs for the non-represented to form their own unions. Also collective bargaining between centralized union and employer associations occurred in some cases before the First World War, it remained confined to some branches (printing, engineering) and nationally to few countries (Denmark, 1899). After the First World War, with union recognition and new institutions for the regulation of industrial conflict the existing union structure became institutionalized (see Table 6.2). In some countries, it was state intervention, in others "voluntary" agreements between employers and unions that led to union recognition. Legislation on association rights[14] but also the integration of unions into statutory welfare systems could have an

10 In Denmark, the Copenhagen DSF preceeded the national employer association. Of course, in an other respect, "capital" had already earlier started to coordinate its pressure group and self-government activities via business interests associations and Chamber of Commerce or Industry.

11 Most organizations covered only the secondary sector, while separate bodies existed for agriculture, commerce and finance, and the public sector (cf. SISSON 1987, LANZALACO 1990). Furthermore, the French and Italian had a dual, regional and industrial representation structure, much like the unions.

12 The Swedish metal employers, for instance, joined SAF only in 1917.

13 While in Sweden centralized employer association and national unions emerged parallel, this was not the case in Denmark, where employers were relative early centralized but the Danish labour federation remained decentralized (GALENSON 1952b: 68-73).

14 For instance, the British Trade Union Acts (1917, 1964) set constraints on democratic procedures for union mergers (cf. WADDINGTON 1988)

additional impact on the persistence of union structure. Hence, the path of orgnizational adaptation has been shaped by a set of mutually reinforcing and mediating processes, not just by the industrialization process as such.

II
FROM EXCLUSIVE TO INCLUSIVE MOBILIZATION STRATEGIES

The choice of an organization principle entails also a particular mobilization strategy. Closed unionism is an *exclusive* membership strategy, while open unionism adapts an *inclusive* strategy (cf. MARKS 1989). Historically, craft unions pursuing an exclusive mobilization strategy had initially an advantage over open, inclusive unionism, whether industrial or general unionism. Secular changes set external limits to the growth of craft unionism and its strategy of labour monopoly and occupational solidarity. Open unionism may spread horizontally across sectors in form of general unions, or across skill levels within a given sector in form of industrial unionism. Accordingly, there are differences as to how industrial unions are affected by changes in the employment structure, depending on whether they happen to be in growing or declining sectors. General unions have more possibility to be flexible in moving between growing or easy to organize sectors, while industrial unions are forced to spend resources on organizing also the difficult organizable groups and firms within their chosen sector. The second, important issue of membership mobilization is the growth pattern of industrial or blue-collar unionism. The question is which type of labour movement was able to achieve a high degree of organization among the manual industrial workforce? However, important differences in the growth potential can be attributed more to contextual factors than to the organizational principle as such.

EXCLUSIVE VS. INCLUSIVE MOBILIZATION STRATEGY

Craft unionism persisted not merely because of vested interests and inflexible leadership but a closed union strategy remained for a long time the more successful mobilization strategy. The strength of craft unions is their small size since this guarantees labour unity and solidarity within its group. Small, local unions that catered for the skilled workers had relative advantages in overcoming the collective action problem as "small groups can better provide themselves with collective goods than large groups. (OLSON 1965: 67)" Closed unionism can provide more easily collective goods to the workers and exclude non-members from sharing them. Craft unionism is still based on primordial occupational *Gemeinschaft* (community) that through *social closure* reinforced community boundaries (cf. WEBER 1922). Local craft unions provided also a social "club" function that maintained occupational ethos and group identity. Moreover, craft unions have been known to provide extensive social benefits to their members (cf. EICKHOF 1973). Mutual benefits and insurance provided an incentive and could be maintained thanks to the monitoring capacities and compliance pressures under group solidarity (cf. HECHTER 1987). However, market

and political forces compelled unions to adapt a more inclusive strategy, organizing not only on a local level but on a national one, to cater not only for the skilled but also for the semi-skilled and unskilled (cf. OLSON 1965). Moreover, "when only part of an industry or skilled group is organized, employers also have a ready source of strike-breakers (OLSON 1965: 68)", thus unions were forced to organize beyond their initial group boundaries to prevent undercutting competition by other groups.

However, the mobilization problems of large open unions were much larger than those of small sectionalist unions. Selective, collective goods were more difficult to be targeted at members and mutual benefits - given the lower average income - strained more union finances. Given the heterogeneity of membership inherent to open inter-occupational unions, group solidarity, membership compliance and individual monitoring are more difficult in large open unions (cf. HECHTER 1987). Moreover, since the action of large, open unions are more visible, and externalities more noticeable, unionism becomes a more political matter. Such an inclusive strategy therefore is more likely to attract counter-mobilization, if not repression, by its contenders, the employers and the state. On the other hand, open unions until they have become organizationally strong and recognized as bargaining partner by the employers will tend to use strike and political action as means of *pression ouvrière* for political representation and state intervention, as the prewar strike movements in Western Europe indicate (cf. SHORTER & TILLY 1974: Chap. 12). Open unions, given their more contentious strategy, concentrated their resources more on strike funds and less on welfare benefits than closed unions (cf. EICKHOF 1973).

Hence, closed and open unionism are based on different strategies of unity and strength. Closed unions opt for unity and strength through communal group solidarity; open unionism aims at strength through class unity of labour to prevent intra-class divisions. Not only that these two forms emerge at different stages, exclusive and inclusive strategies are also liable to demise under different circumstances (cf. FRIEDMAN 1990). In contrast to craft unions that were spreading horizontally across industries, industrial unions that encompassed vertical skill hierarchies in specific industries suffered from higher turnover rates and were more subject to economic cycles. The willingness of unions to combine and pool resources with others in order to overcome these limitations varies also with economic conditions. In times of a general membership growth, unions may seek to expand into new domains in order to cope with interdependence between domains, whereas in times of membership stagnation or decline competition and interdependence between unions within a domain becomes more severe (FREEMAN & BRITTAIN 1977: 176).

An instructive insight into the strategy and growth pattern of closed and open unionism can be derived from comparison of the early printers and metalworkers. Printing unions maintained organizational stability by an elaborate system of mutual benefits, that provided not only an incentive but also a means to prevent wage competition through laid off workers (cf. MARKS 1989: Ch. 4). "Instead of relying on brute force of the strike, these unions preferred to control the supply of labour at its source by encompassing as much of the work force as possible, monopolizing the task performed by labour, and unilaterally

denying employers a supply of cheap non-union labour (MARKS 1989: 126)". The British and German printers unions showed sustained, increasing growth pattern in the decades before the First World War thanks to their advantageous labour market position. "The low degree of substitutability of employers of their labour, intense competition among employers, the invulnerability of employers to foreign competition, and especially in the newspaper side of the industry, the extreme perishability of the product gave printers a favourable economic contest to exercise their organizational leverage (MARKS 1989: 152)". However, although the printers - thanks to their pre-entry closed shop - were highly organized, a number of separate unions for allied workers coexisted in printing. For instance, in Germany, semi-skilled workers, lithographs and bookbinders remained separately organized within the Free union movement until their suppression in 1933, they were reformed into one industrial union for printing and paper trades in 1949 but were recently merged to a "media" union. In Britain, not until the 1960s did the competing London and national craft unions merge, facing increased competition with industrial unions (SOGAT'82) after radical changes in printing technology eroded their craft base since the 1970s.[15]

In the case of metal workers labour monopoly based on craft skills was undermined by the introduction of mechanization and homogenization of the labour process and the increase in surplus labour in the Second Industrial Revolution (cf. GORDON, EDWARDS & REICH 1982: Ch. 4 on USA). Occupational unions were compelled to organize the unskilled and semi-skilled within its industry in order to counter employers strategies to undermine their strength and strike force through cheap labour and strike-breakers. Employers, on the other hand, were more under international competition and sought to limit labour costs, they were therefore interested to combine and set wage and working conditions for the whole industry. The centralization tendencies of the employers and the more fierce anti-union activities in Germany and Sweden as compared to Britain and Denmark, led the metal workers' unions in the former countries to seek centralization and federation of the various occupational groups, including semi-skilled and unskilled workers (cf. FULCHER 1991, SCHÖNHOVEN 1980, GALENSON 1952b). In both countries, the work-material union was the first step toward industrial unionism, organizing first all grades working with a given material (metal, wood), by organization drives beyond craft boundaries and attempts to absorb existing craft unions and allied trades. Solidaristic mobilization for collective action was their main weapon, yet growth in membership was less sustainable by mututal-benefits and more endangered by employer resistance. Open unionism was much more contingent on employer and state action but also on the business cycle, particularly on changes in labour supply and demand. Only after union recognition was achieved on a na-

15 In Germany, semi-skilled workers, lithographs, bookbinders remained separately organized within the Free union movement, they were regrouped in 1949 to one industrial union for printing and paper trades and recently merged to a "media" union (1988). In Britain, only in the 1960s merged the competing London and national craft unions, facing increasing competition by SOGAT and technological errosion of the craft since the 1970s.

Table 6.3
Level of Union Organization (Union Density), Western Europe (1900-1940)

	AU	BE	DE	FR	GE	IR	IT	NE	NO	SW	SZ	UK
Overall Union Density (%)												
1890	<1.0	<1.0	6.0	2.0	3.0	-	<1.0	<1.0	<1.0	<1.0	<1.0	11.0
1910	5.8	5.1	17.3	9.1	18.1	-	8.3	11.0	8.2	8.3	6.6	14.6
1920	51.0	38.6	33.4	10.6	52.5	32.6	34.9	31.1	20.3	27.7	26.3	45.2
1930	37.6	28.8	36.9	7.8	32.7	27.8	-	27.7	19.0	36.1	23.6	25.4
1950	56.8	33.2	48.9	31.6	33.7	37.1	40.3	42.0	47.9	66.7	39.7	40.6
1970	53.0	44.5	57.1	21.5	33.0	48.6	33.4	36.5	55.6	66.2	28.9	44.6
1989	43.6	53.4	76.0	9.7	31.5	41.7	34.0	23.6	53.8	81.3	27.6	38.9

Source: based on VISSER 1989, 1990, 1991, and DUES database.

tional level, metal workers could bargain improvements based on its potential strength without necessarily risking a defeat in an industrial dispute.

General unionism is also based on a open union strategy that is mainly integrating horizontally (across sectors) and less vertically (across skill levels). Given the lack of a craft base, its organization strategy has no particular industrial boundaries, since it organizes labourers that have historically been relative mobile between industries. Historically, general unions tend to be an amalgamation of various confined occupational and workplace pockets, such as lorry drivers and dock workers, that show strong community bonds and can exert social pressures to combine (and establish closed shops). General unions provide some form of stectional autonomy to absorb organizations (via trade sections or special representation rights), at least for an initial period.[16]

Quite in contrast to industrial unions that gain strength from encompassing organization, that is, mobilizing all workers in a given industry, general unions can base their strength on concentrating on the most mobilizable and strategically important work groups. Thus stagnation in employment and economic contraction hits confined industrial unions more than general unions that are more "industrially diversified" much like corporate conglomerates in comparison to industrial firms. General unions are in fact more flexible to sectoral and technological change than industrial unions with their fixed organizing domains. On the other hand, industrial unionism when it is the dominant principle produces less overlap and multi-union bargaining except for new emerging industrial branches, while general unions often come into jurisdictional disputes with craft, occupational and industrial unions in a given sector.

THE GROWTH OF INDUSTRIAL WORKERS' UNIONISM

Given the different organization forms and mobilization strategies one could expect important variations in overall union growth. Closed unionism certainly had a higher degree

16 For instance, the British TGWU errected under Bevin a dual structure of trade sections and regional federations that would prevent sectionalist autonomy undermining labour unity.

of unionization than other strategies, albeit within its more limited boundaries of its jurisdiction. In fact, while craft unionism may have contributed to overall strength when the skilled workforce was still dominant, with the growth of mass production workforce the early success of craft unionism has turned into a structural disadvantage.[17] Although craft unions showed higher unionization rates within their jurisdiction before the First World War, the new emerging industrial unions, such as the British miners federation contributed to a higher level of organization within their sector.[18] After the First World War, the two strategies of craft-general or industrial unionism have both shown to be as capable of mobilizing a large share of the workforce, though general unions seem to rely more on union shops to secure membership.

It is difficult to attribute differences in union density to the organization principle as such, at least we lack detailed comparison that could account for skill levels and control for other factors. Even more cautious are claims on differences at the overall level of unionization, such as the claim that the persistence of craft unionism shows an inverse relation to union density.[19] General unionism may be more effective and flexible in organizing unskilled workers and part-time workers who move between sectors or in and out of the labour market. As will be discussed in more detail later, the major differences between the two strategies are in respect to the degree of encompassing interests.

In order to compare the impact of manual industrial unionism on the overall strength of labour movements, some comparison over time and across countries give some indications, albeit comparability is conditional. The level of unionization varies considerable across Western Europe (see Table 6.3), even if we discount for concealed inactive membership and other problems in reporting membership between labour movements (cf. VISSER 1989, 1990, 1991). The Swedish labour movement, taking net union density as an indicator, is the best organized union movement today (81%), followed by the Danish (76%). These countries have increased their level of organizations continually since the Great Depression when they both organized about one-third of the dependent employed. This record in union growth has been attributed partly to the strength of the left labour movement (cf. KORPI 1978) but also to the favourable impact of union-led unemployment insurance schemes (cf.

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17 In a historical studies of spinner and weavers it was found that craft unions often frustrated efforts to organize others: "where less-skilled workers organize first, this has apparently provided a better basis for trade unionism in general then was an initial organization of skilled workers alone (TURNER 1962: 167)."

18 Lacking detailed statistics based on skill-levels, evidence from sectoral comparison of unionization can only provide some indications. In Britain, union denstiy rose in coal mining from 59.5% in 1892 to 74.1% in 1911, while in craft-dominated printing rose from 27.7% to 35.9% (cf. BAIN & PRICE 1980: 45). While the growth rates were similar, the difference in level shows thats craft-dominated sector was less successfull to mobilize beyond the skilled crafts.

19 The lower Danish union density as compared to Sweden was attributed by Stephens to the craft tradition (STEPHENS 1979: 45), yet density levels have become close in the 1980s. In fact, Danish union density was higher than Swedish unionization until the early 1930s, particularly in manufacturing it had already achieved a high level of union density (see Table 6.3).

ROHSTEIN 1990). In fact, the next two high unionization countries have such schemes (Belgium) or had them in the past (Norway).

However, part of today's unionization record of theses countries is also the success in the organization of white-collar employees and public sector workers.[20] A comparison of the impact of industrial unionism should compare the degree of unionization in the industrial sector and among blue-collar workers (see Table 6.(?)). Such an analysis can provide more insights into the causes of unionization, particularly where institutions, like unemployment insurance or union recognition can be expected to have different impact for specific sector and groups. For instance, unemployment insurance may be less an incentive in the sheltered public service sector, while union recognition depends on central state action in this sector (see Chapter 8). The question arises to what degree has industrial unionism provided the base for subsequent waves of organization in the later growing white-collar and tertiary sector.

Since union density for manual industrial workers are unavailable for all countries, a comparison of the manufacturing sector may give some indications.[21] In the Scandinavian countries, a high level of union density was attained already in the early postwar period and remained high. In Belgium, unionization overall and in industry in particular increased with the mounting of unemployment (since the 1970s) as workers stayed with their unions due to the union-led (state subsidized) unemployment insurance and because of union support in case of plant closures. Thus in all these countries, unionization levels were already above the national and even European average during the decade of full employment but increased further to near saturation during the years of mounting unemployment and economic crisis. The reasoning of British syndicalists that union-led unemployment insurance would privilege only the few unionized and gainfully employed and therefore enhance labour disunity, proofed to be turned up-side-down: labour unity is strengthened as everyone is induced to become a union member.

In Germany union density in manufacturing was relative higher than overall level with the exception of the 1960s. Access to the workplace made up for lack of other union securities in Germany.[22] Similarly in Italy, unionization increased considerably during the 1970s as a consequence of the more workplace oriented union politics and cooperation of the three Italian confederations (see Chapter 5), though density has declined gradually since the early 1980s. Given the institutionalized role of the Austrian union confederation, unionization in Austria was higher than in Germany or Italy, though union density has declined gradually since the 1970s, including manufacturing.

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20 In fact, in the Scandinavian countries the traditional industrial manual workers account only one-third of overall union membership.

21 Differences in unionization of white-collar workers will still account for some of the difference in union density in manufacturing, albeit probably not more than 10% since the level correlates fairly with overall differences.

22 There was an increase in unionization after the reform of the works' council law in 1972, density increased by one-third from 42% to 56% (1970-85).

Table 6.4
Number of Affiliates to Main Union Confederation
Western Europe (1900-85)

	AU	BE	DE	FR	GE	IR	IT	NE	NO	SW	SZ	UK
Union Centre:	ÖGB	FGTB	LO	CGT	DGB	ITUC	CGIL	FNV	LO	LO	SGB	TUC
Number of affiliates												
1900	*298		*52		58		-	-		21	30	*191
1913	*76		*59		49					26	21	*207
1920	*65	31	*55		52				32	31	19	*213
1930	45	28	*57		31					37	14	*210
1950	16	16	70	(30)	16	22	(40)	28	39	45	15	186
1970	16	13	60	29	16	53	38	20	35	27	15	142
1985	15	11	33	(30)	17	47	21	15	33	24	15	98

SOURCE: Affiliates: various reports of confederations, VISSER 1991; DUES database 1991.
NOTE: (*) includes also autonomous locals

In Britain the closed shop contributed considerably to the higher degree of unionization in the sector: 46% of manual workers in industry were member of a closed shop in 1977 and after the Conservative's legal changes around 20% in 1989.[23] The weakening and waning of this institution as well as the detriment in union recognition account for a substantial part of the decline in unionization from 56% to 46% overall (64% to 41% in manufacturing) in the last decade (1979-1989).

In Switzerland, France and the Netherlands, voluntary unemployment insurance had also a long tradition and became only belated compulsory state schemes (1981, 1967, 1949 respectively). However, different to the Belgian or Scandinavian countries, these *mutalités* were never as effective union-led schemes that provide an incentive for union membership. In Switzerland, unionization in the manufacturing sector remained on a relative low level partly due to the institutionalized union-employer relations since the 1937 "peace" agreement. Employer resistance and lack of bargaining strength of French unions hampered (and has nearly eroded) unionization in French industry, except for a number of large, often state-controlled enterprises. The most striking decline in the last decade, only comparable to the British one, occurred in the Netherlands, where unionization in industry fell from 50% to 41% (1980-85), following a general trend in Dutch blue- and white-collar unionism. This decline reflects the lack of workplace access of the highly institutionalized and centralized Dutch unions (cf. VISSER 1992) that face rising unemployment, deregulation and deindustrialization.

This broad overlook on unionization trends in manufacturing can only indicate some of the wide differences in union strength across countries, time and sectors. Many factors can

[23] 30% in partial closed shop in industry firms (above 50 employees) in 1977 (WIRS survey, cf. BROWN 1981: 56), that is an estimated 2.1 Mio industrial workers (of 5.3 Mio employees). By 1989, closed shops had fallen by half to 12% overall (or 2.6 Mio employees) and to ca. 20% in manufacturing and 30 in utilities (STEVENS, MILLWARD & SMART 1989: 619).

be included in a list accounting for the differences in unionization: employers resistance, workplace access for unions, union-led unemployment schemes, institutionalized union-employer relations, and the "closed shop" and other union securities. Here, we have considered mainly union-led unemployment insurance and forms of workplace access that seem to explain some of the cross-national differences in unionization. The recent British and Dutch decline in union membership need additional reasoning, they reflect general changes in industrial relations against the background of profound economic crisis and structural restructuration. In both cases, the traditional bases for the strength, whether 'closed shop' in Britain or the Dutch institutionalized representation, have become undermined by these changes. Too much reliance on the successful strategies of the 1960s turned in to a disadvantage in the 1980s.

III
FROM SECTIONALISM TO CLASS SOLIDARITY

Closed unionism and open unionism are not merely two different forms of mobilizing strategies. Closed unionism is based on the representation of sectionalist interests, while open unionism aims at overcoming sectionalist interests in favour of more encompassing interests. Class solidarity entails the accommodation of both intra-class and inter-sector differences of life chances. Hence, to the degree that unions encompass interests both vertically (from lower to higher skill levels) and horizontally (from core to peripheral sectors) one can speak of class solidarity, though disregarding other political and functional cleavages. The transformation of the craft-industry cleavage into union organization has important consequences for the way in which interests of labour are aggregated and represented. The degree of concentration or fragmentation and the number of actors within the labour movement vary considerably with consequences for the coordination of labour interests at the central level. Moreover, union fragmentation leads to multi-union bargaining that enhances costs of coordination and possibility of inter-union disputes. However, secular changes, in particular the changes that give rise to new sections of the workforce, set limits to the dominance of manual labour or industrial unionism within the labour movement. While this will be the discussion in later chapters, the traditional party and union relations, and the leadership of blue-collar unions become increasingly contested as other groups multiplyand fragmentation increases.

CONCENTRATION IN UNION STRUCTURE

National integration and the rationalization of union structures were important challenges to labour movements and a precondition for effective representation in major union centres. The national integration of functional interest organization remained an obstacle, particularly in countries with large regional disparities in economic development or an early development of unionism when labour market were still of local scope. An integration of the independent local unions within national unions and only an indirect representation

within the union centre were important steps toward encompassing aggregate functional (not politizised territorial) interests on a national level.[24]

After their foundation the new union centres had much larger numbers of affiliates than today (see Table 6.4). Although there were mergers following economic pressure or recommendations of the union centre, there were also new unions that joined or were founded in previously uncovered sectors. The major concentration wave happened during the interwar period less a result of the union recommendations but as a consequence of the interwar membership and financial crisis. The Austrian, Belgian, German and Swiss union centres reduced their number of affiliates, though rival political unions or unions of white-collar or civil servants multiplied outside their realm. The Scandinavian unions showed some slight increase, albeit there were a number of mergers to form industrial unions. Yet the British TUC remained on its high level of more than 200 affiliates with an increasingly skewed size distribution.

After the Second World War, in some countries a unique chance for reformation was given after the years of union suppression. Union leaders stepped ahead and realized the interwar plans of reform on the drawing board only in Austria and Germany, and partly in Belgium and the Netherlands. The number of unions was cut to 16 affiliates in Austria, Belgium, and Germany which came closest to a neat industrial union principle. Other union centres followed only gradually, such as the Dutch union centre and the Scandinavian union movements (first Sweden, then Denmark, and Norway in 1988 with the FF-merger of 5 unions). Although the number of unions was cut by half, the TUC still is the most fragmented union organization with nearly 100 affiliates, albeit an increasing tendency of the largest unions to swallow the smaller and become "super" unions.

Although there is a secular trend toward concentration within the major union centres, major differences in the degree of fragmentation and union structure persist. A comparison of the number of unions that organize blue-collar workers in the private sector (see Table 6.5) reveals the differences in union organization across countries. By the 1950s, the British, Danish and Irish union systems showed a considerable persistence of craft union fragmentation with more than 45% of all unions catering for blue-collar occupations, while in Norway, Sweden and Switzerland, a smaller number of craft unions co-existed with a membership share of more than 5%. The French and Italian union systems with weak national unions at the time was probably between the two former groups, albeit no data is available. In the other countries, craft or occupational unions were more rare or unimportant in strength. Supporting the historical account, craft unionism coexists were general unionism is important, while industrial unionism became dominant and replaced craft

[24] In Britain, locals (and "autonomous" sections of absorbed unions) preserved the representation rights on TUC, even though a similar national federation existed. Historically, the prewar Austrian union centre had over 200 independent affiliated locals, the became gradually integrated into national unions before 1918. The German union congress decided early (1892) to exclude independent locals and excluded those unwilling to join a national unions. While in the French and Italian case a dual structure remained in effect until today (see Chapter 5).

unions and prevented general unionism in the other countries. General unions accounted for a large share of overall membership and blue-collar workers in the private sector in the typical craft-general union systems of Britain, Ireland and Denmark. In Britain, the share of general unions was smaller due to the larger share of multi-craft unions that spread across industries much like general unions, albeit only for skilled workers. The Belgian general union of construction and allied trades (within FGTB) accounts for the - surprising - large share in membership but is a borderline case to industrial unionism.

A general trend toward concentration but also toward shrinkage in overall membership share can be seen from a comparison with 1985 (see Table 6.6). The Overall number of unions in this domain have been reduced, while in some cases the overall number increased due to the proliferation of public and white-collar unionism. While systems with establishment of a rationalized postwar structure showed not much change, like in Austria, Belgium, Germany, further concentration into fewer industrial unions occurred in the Netherlands (particularly after the FNV merger), and Sweden and Norway. In the craft-general union systems, a trend toward concentration can be detected but not to the advantage of industrial unionism but general unionism. Moreover, a reduction in the share of industrial and general unionism indicates the shifting emphasis from industrial to post-industrial unionism. Only in Germany did the industrial unions still represent the majority of union members by the 1980s (discounting the agricultural share in Italian unions), while in Norway and Sweden it came into a minority position with one-third of all union members within the overall labour movement.

Unionism has not only historically grown out of blue-collar unionism, it has been until the 1970s the dominant force in the union movement. Until the 1970s, the majority of all organized union members were blue-collar workers in the private sector (see Table 6.7). Due to the growth of white-collar and public sector unionism (see Chapter 7 and 8), first in the most advanced welfare societies, in Sweden and the Netherlands, then later also in the other industrialized countries, the traditional blue-collar labour movements became challenged, not only in terms of membership but also in respect to leadership in the union movement and collective bargaining. The major national union centres, however, vary in their degree of encompassing the other two cleavages. The Swedish and Swiss labour movement, in particular, remain concentrated on blue-collar workers, while white-collar workers joined mainly unions outside the major union centres (LO and SGB). In Belgium, Germany and Switzerland, Socialist labour movements remained still more dominated by blue-collar unionism in the private sector than in the labour movement in general.

MULTI-UNION OR SINGLE UNION BARGAINING

As long as closed unionism could rely on unilateral regulation, collective bargaining was not much more than a formalization of informal practices. Open unionism, whether industrial or general unionism, was dependent on collective bargaining to achieve any improvement, and it is consequently the expansion of collective bargaining that allowed open unions to spread beyond privileged occupations (cf. CLEGG 1976: 30). However, any form of

Table 6.5
Number of Craft, General and Industrial Unions (1950. 1985)

1950	AU	BE	DE	FR	GE	IR	IT	NE	NO	SW	SZ	UK
Overall	16	32	119	.	33	109	.	327	125	156	66	720
private sector	10	23	64	.	11	58	.	73	29	35	23	393
industrial	10	18	5	.	9	4	.	52	14	21	9	13
general	-	2	6	.	.	4	.	1	1	-	2	2
craft	-	3	53	.	2	50	.	20	14	14	12	378
1985												
Overall	15	40	129		82	80	65	236	148	75	72	286
private sector	9	22	24	.	18	30	33	21	27	23	23	70
industrial	9	17	3	.	14	3	26	12	13	17	11	10
general	.	2	5	.	1	3	-	1	1	-	3	2
craft	.	3	16	.	3	24	7	8	13	6	9	58

Note: Instead of 1950: DE: 1953, GE: 1951, NO: 1956; exluding locals (NE: 58 and UK: 286).
Source: own calculations based on DUES database.

union is compatible with collective bargaining as long as unions are recognized by employers. "Consequently collective bargaining supports and preserves union structure as it existed at the time of recognition; and, for each trade union movement, that structure was shaped by the state of industrial organization and technology during the period of its birth and development (CLEGG 1976: 30)." The impact of early institutionalization can account, the persistence of craft union structure, for instance, in the printing industry that was amongst the earliest to bargain.[25] Moreover, on the national level, countries with persistent craft unionism, union recognition was widespread already at an early time. The Danish unions signed their first national agreement as early as 1899. "The Development of collective bargaining in Britain was a more gradual process than elsewhere. Employers' resistance to unions was less intense than in many countries, and collective bargaining was therefore less dependent on legal support and regulation (WINCHESTER 1989: 496)". This gradual development of collective bargaining in Britain and Denmark promoted a more fragmented union structure to emerge.

Yet, such union fragmentation - in addition to rival union pluralism (see Chapter 4 and 5) - weakens labours' position *vis-à-vis* capital in general and in collective bargaining in particular. "Unions have always striven for, but have not always been able to achieve, unity within their ranks in the justified belief that unity enhances bargaining power, whereas splits and divisions weaken it. (WINDMULLER 1987: 19)". Multi-union bargaining entails problems of coordinating and aggregation of interests. Moreover, employers have an ample chance to use union rivalries or sectionalist interest to 'rule-and-divide' labour unity and steer intra-class conflicts. Even if jurisdictional disputes between craft unions and general

[25] The German printers union (1866) signed its first national collective agreement already in 1896 (cf. also MARKS 1989).

Table 6.6
Membership Share of Craft, General and Industrial unionism (1950, 1985)

1950	AU	BE	DE	FR	GE	IR	IT	NE	NO	SW	SZ	UK
Overall	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
private sector	58.5	74.9	70.6	.	65.8	75.2	.	65.5	61.7	62.5	55.7	68.6
industrial	58.5	58.5	7.7	.	64.3	4.7	.	63.9	49.4	55.8	45.0	16.1
general	.	15.5	43.3	.	.	54.1	.	0.2	4.6	.	5.0	23.0
craft	.	0.9	19.6	.	1.5	16.4	.	1.4	7.7	6.7	5.7	29.5
1985												
Overall	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
private sector	43.1	62.1	41.9		54.0	59.6	68.6	43.3	35.0	35.3	46.9	42.7
industrial	43.1	45.7	4.9	.	53.3	1.6	54.5	40.1	28.6	33.7	40.5	6.0
general	.	15.8	29.7	.	0.2	44.6	.	0.1	3.2	.	3.3	24.9
craft	.	0.6	7.3	.	0.5	13.4	14.1	3.1	3.2	1.6	3.1	11.8

Note: Instead of 1950: DE: 1953, GE: 1951, NO: 1956.
Source: own calculations based on DUES database.

unions in a given industry are limited, conflicts of interests between these unions over bargaining strategy and "just" redistribution are more likely to become explicit and can be exploited by employers to play off one side against the other. An important function of encompassing, centralized unions is to devise and maintain distributional norms for inter-occupational levelling, while a centralized union centre complements further inter-union consensus building (cf. SWENSON 1989). However, intermediary negotiating bodies are also a device to coordinate action prior or during negotiations with employers, like the federations in Britain or sector cartels in Scandinavia.

A further difference between craft-general and industrial unionism in collective bargaining is that between horizontal and vertical integration. Industrial unionism as it encompasses different skill levels and occupations along the vertical hierarchy has to build consensus on inter-wage level differentiation within a given sector. It is more limited by its strength in the sector, the resistance of employers in the sector, and faces more directly the externalitites of its action. A general union, on the other hand, would have an interest to maintain similar wage levels across sectors but an improvement in relation to other non-organized wage groups, whatever the resistance of employers in a given sector. While industrial unions tend to prefer industrial or territorial collective bargaining, general unions would tend to profit from either national bargaining or local bargaining.[26] Furthermore, recent trends seem to suggest that the advances of non-union firms in new growth sectors in Britain have been a result of union fragmentation and workplace strength (cf. WINCHESTER 1989), while in countries where industrial unions cooperate with central employer associations derecognition by individual firms is more limited.

26 However, it should be mentioned that their is a more recent trend of the two forms, industrial and general unions, to merge into multi-sector unions that spread over several loosely connected sectors.

On the other hand, coordination through a union centre could balance out the sectionalist tendency of fragmented union structure if (!) central leadership had enough authority to bargain in the general interest. Yet, fragmented union movements with an unequal distribution of membership across many small unions and few large unions have commonly hampered the transfer of authority to a higher level. Comparing the degree of centralization of resources at the peak level in respect to strike funds, finances and union staff, Jelle Visser has ranked in a comparative study the Austrian, Dutch, Norwegian and Swedish union centre (all with industrial unionism) as the most centralized, followed by Germany (with relative strong and unequal industrial unions), and finally the Danish, Italian, Swiss, French and British union centres (with craft or large local-regional autonomy) (cf. VISSER 1990: 176).[27] These crude indicators suggest that there seem to be two contrasting forms of interests organization: a centralized-industrial unionism with large "solidaristic" element and more decentralized-fragmented unionism with a tendency towards sectionalist interest conflicts.

LEGACY OF WORKING-CLASS UNIONISM

About a century ago, blue-collar craft and multi-occupational unions were the founding members of Socialist union centres and provided often important organizational support to the emerging Socialist parties. The legacy of working-class unionism is still having its impact on today's Socialist union centre and party. As was shown before (see Chapter 3), Socialist party and allied unions follow a similar mobilization logic since both initially appeal to the same social base, the manual industrial working-class. Class cohesion is the strength of labour: to mobilize a class on the base of their common interests and class solidarity. Open unionism, whether industrial or general unionism, propagated collective class ideology and reinforced the formation of working-class identity. The Socialist working-class mass party and the solidaristic, centralized industrial union movement became the model of Socialist party and unions. The model was unquestionable as long as both their support base overlapped, as much as class identity was maintained through both organizations and ancillary intermediary structures, and as party and union leaders were still inspired by the same ideology and aims.

Blue-collar unions are nearly everywhere affiliated with the major Socialist union centre (or in the case of rival unionism another major union centre). Liberal-neutral craft unionism or independent unions have been a phenomena of the past or have become marginal since the late 1950s.[28] During the interwar period, blue-collar membership outside the main union centres was at some time still considerable (up to one-quarter) due to independent craft unions or unions of foremen. Nevertheless, given the strong tendency of blue-collar

[27] With the slight upgrading of Denmark, the same rankorder holds for the degree of centralization in postwar collective bargaining structure (cf. VISSER 1990: 176) that is necessarily contingent on the transfer of authority and resources.

[28] The Belgian movements (CGSLB) being the exception with about 5-8% of overall postwar membership, though mainly in public transport.

Table 6.7
Blue-collar Private Sector Membership

	AU	BE	DE	FR	GE	IR	IT	NE	NO	SW	SZ	UK
Overall share (%)						b)	c)					
1920	60.1	.	86.0	62.4	67.6	.	.	60.8	86.7	72.6	61.0	a)79.0
1950	58.5	69.8	84.3		64.8	75.1	60.8	63.3	74.6	63.7	58.3	b)67.4
1970	52.3	63.2	58.7	a)47.4	53.8	73.6	64.1	48.8	50.9	44.8	52.9	b)59.4
1985	42.2	54.9	42.9		48.2	58.9	57.8	34.2	35.1	36.3	48.5	b)49.1
Union Centre	ÖGB	FGTB	LO	CGT	DGB	ICTU	CGIL	NVV	LO	LO	SGB	TUC
Membership share (%)							c)					
1920	63.2	.	94.3	72.5	90.2	.	.	76.4	86.7	78.0	75.4	.
1950	58.5	73.1	84.3	.	71.6	.	61.0	70.2	74.6	79.1	72.5	.
1970	52.3	63.9	74.9	a)57.4	64.9	.	70.3	56.0	65.3	73.0	73.1	.
1985	42.2	60.0	59.3	.	57.1	.	63.6	48.8	52.4	60.5	72.5	.

NOTE: (a) incl. white-collar workers; b) incl. public sector membership of mixed sextor unions, (c) incl. white-collar workers but excluding agriculture; SZ: 1985
SOURCE: calculated from tables in VISSER 1989 (membership: market - blue-collar), except BE, IR and UK calculated from DUES database.

unions and the much smaller support among non-manual employees, blue-collar unionism dominated for long the European labour movement.

Indeed, European Socialist parties and allied unions are descendants of working-class organizations and for the first part of the postwar time Socialist party and unions remained so.[29] Advocates of a change toward catch-all parties and encompassing all-grades unions underlined the need to open party and unions to the growing middle class or white-collar salariat (cf. PRZEWORSKI & SPRAGUE 1986). However, even where this was declared official policy the stagnating traditional working-class base of party and unions was only gradually superseded by middle class voters and the unionization of non-manual employees (see Chapter 7). Party and unions are still reflecting past social structure due to *structural inertia*, though the membership structure of party and unions tend to be more resistant to change than electoral support (including social and works council elections), or for that matter: leadership. The loss of the proletarian character of the Socialist party and union, in particular of the leadership, was already observed in 1911 as stated in Michels thesis on the "iron law of oligarchy" (MICHELS 1911). Nevertheless, blue-collar workers are still overrepresented amongst the Socialist party's electorate and the allied union membership, despite the claim of catch-all party and all-grade encompassing unionism.[30] The party and union cen-

29 In the 1950, more than two-thirds of the vote were cast manual workers and their famniles (cf. PRZEWORKSI & SPRAGUE 1986), similarly blue-collar workers represented 70%-90% of Socialist union membership (cf. VISSER 1989, 1990).

30 Overrepresentation of manual workers electoral support was still around 20% in the Scandinavian Social Democratic parties in the 1970s (see ESPING-ANDERSEN 1985: Tab. 4.9)

tres given the process of social imprinting and institutionalization became locked into the past social structure (STINCHCOMBE 1965). The established union centres overrepresent those groups that were important at the time of consolidation, while it underrepresents new groups.[31] The Austrian union centre had been the most adaptive in its membership structure due to the reorganization in 1945, the smaller dominance of a blue-collar industrial workforce at the time, the associational monopoly in representation, the successful, non-contentious integration of white-collar and public employees within the movement (see Chapter 7 and 8).

CONCLUSION

The craft-industry cleavage emerged with the growth of mass production, its transformation in union organization depended largely on the entrenchment of previous organizational decisions and the mutual reinforcing processes at work. There were two challenges to union movements in overcoming sectionalism: the national integration of local structures and the broadening of the organization base. Two trajectories of union organizations have been found. In some countries due to the persistence of craft traditions, open unionism organized those workers that had not been covered by closed unionism leading to a patchwork of union organizations, yet skewed by large general unions. In the other countries, employer resistance, weak craft traditions, and socialist ideology led the occupational unions to federate and finally merge in industrial unions that due to a more equal spread of forces were willing to transfer decisions to the level of central unions. Although there were "historical alternatives", these efforts at turning the path around became, however, suppressed through the described forces.

These findings underline the general theoretical claim that previous organizational decisions and contextual conditions in conjunction have structured the organizational alternatives for an adaptation of labour unionism to the changing structure of the economy. Where a craft-general union system became entrenched, the union centre that was to emerge was less centralized, was less dedicated to Socialist ideology, and had less authority to promote union restructuration and centralization. The paths diverged early on since they led to different mutually reinforcing processes, an upward spiral of inclusive industrial unionism, national integration and centralization, and the blockage of such a process due to local autonomy, craft sectionalism, and uncontrolled growth of "big" unionism.

In the historical account we have pointed at various differences between national union movements. However, if we attempt to summarize the findings (see Table 6.8), we can detect four main clusters of the transformation of the *craft-industry* cleavage into union orga-

[31] Comparing union membership of 1985 and labour force structure, the Swedish LO and Swiss SGB represent the social structure of the 1920s, the German DGB the 1950s, the Austrian, Danish, Dutch and Norwegian union centres the 1960s. There is a trend toward increasing overrepresentation in all union centres, particularly strong in Sweden and Switzerland that have locked into the interwar structure.

Table 6.8
Craft-Industry Cleavage and Union Centralization

	CRAFT TRADITIONS	SECOND INDUSTRIALIZATION
Local autonomy (decentralized)	*Craft-General* UK, IR, DE (early entrenched)	*Dual structure* FR, IT (late functional)
National integration (centralized)	*Mixed industrial* BE, SZ, (NO) (regional concentrations)	*Central industrial* AU, GE, SW, (NE) (early centralizing)

nization: (1) *craft-general* systems in which craft and local traditions were early entrenched and led to the formation of general unions for the non-organized; (2) *mixed* systems in which some broader unions spread unevenly across the country due to different regional development; (3) a *dual structure* of territorial and functional representation where the latter emerged belated and assumed less dominance; and (4) *central industrial* unionism with industrial unions within a centralized union movement. While in the craft-general and dual structure local unionism is only incompletely integrated within the national unions and union centre, in the two other cases, national union and union centres have been able to penetrate into and control the local structures. The centralization and strength of the union centres versus the sectional local or union autonomy increases "diagonally" as one moves from the craft-general to the central-industrial type, the two other cases of union centres under segmented and polarized pluralism were not capable to aggregate all interest via few inclusive functional organizations.

The *mobilization* pattern of closed and open unionism have been found to vary. *Closed* unionism has advantages due to its stress on social closure, yet it finds it limits by labour competition, changes in the employment structure, and employers resistance. *Open* unionism, by its very aim is forced to grow, yet it has a more difficult task given the lack of labour monopoly, weak occupational solidarity, and the collective action problem for large organizations. Differences between the two forms of open unionism, industrial unionism and general unionism are less important in respect to mobilization potential today. General unionism tends to be more flexible in mobilizing but in contrast to industrial unions may not have a large incentives to organize all employees within a sector. Yet, in terms of the aggregation of interests, in respect to the accommodation of intra-class (cross-skill) interests the differences between industrial and general unions are more important.

The *representation* of workers interest has been found to differ between the two types of union systems, disregarding other factors as rival unionism. Craft-general union systems multiply the number of actors in collective bargaining, while one-firm-one-union systems give way to more centralization in collective bargaining. While the former system has problems to accommodate vertical inter-class interests, the latter is more in need of further coordination (central negotiation or wage leadership) to adjust for differences between sectors. The strength of labour unionism, particularly industrial unionism, relied on class

solidarity and close alignment with a working-class party. The changes in the employment structure, however, have reduced the former dominance of industrial or manual workers unionism, while unions representing new functional cleavages increasingly compete and challenge the traditional ideological and wage leadership. It is to these cross-cutting class cleavages that derive from the social division of labour that we will turn now, the division of interests caused by the white-blue collar cleavage (see Chapter 7) and public-private cleavage (see Chapter 8). The historical irony seems to be that once labour unity had been nearly achieved after long battle against sectionalism within the manual class, unity became subsequently challenged by union diversity again, yet from interest organizations of non-manual employees and workers in the state sector.

7
THE WHITE-BLUE COLLAR CLEAVAGE

> *'Union structure has an important bearing upon the evolution of white-collar unions. In several countries this has been and continues to be a basic issue between white- and blue-collar workers and their organizations. The main issues are these: Are white-collar workers to be included in industrial unions together with their blue-collar colleagues? If so - what degree of autonomy are white-collar workers to have within the industrial union? If there are to be separate white-collar unions which may straddle industrial boundaries, are they to be affiliated with the same federation to which the unions of blue-collar workers belong? Is there to be a separate federation of white-collar unions and what ought to be its relationship with the blue-collar federation?'*
> (STURMTHAL 1966B: 381)

Status distinctions in society hamper labour unity further. In many Western European countries, *collarline* differences arising from the social, market and work situation of white-collar employees in contrast to blue-collar workers, split labour unity and amplify union diversity.[1] With the advancement of capitalism and modern industrial production, the demand for white-collar work increased even more rapidly than the industrial manual workforce. The new service class with its ambiguous class position was not only a problem to Marxist class theory as observed by the German Social-Democrat EDUARD BERNSTEIN and the Austrian Socialist KARL RENNER (cf. GOLDTHORPE 1982), it was also a challenge to Marxist-oriented blue-collar unionism (cf. LEDERER 1912). Most of all it was a question of labour unity: can one integrate white-collar employees within a unitary labour movement or even within one encompassing union? Some unionists wanted to leave on the side the new middle-class oriented white-collar group in order to maintain working-class purity. However, the *collarline* cleavage varies in salience and scope across countries and time due to differences in state policy, employers action and middle-class aspirations. The transformation of the *collarline* into union structure was partly a reaction to the existing blue-collar union structures, the importance of industrial unionism and party-union relations that provided an obstacle for white-collar unionization.

This chapter explores the conditions under which the *collarline* cleavage became transformed into union organization, at both the level of national unions and of peak associations. It will analyze the formation, mobilization and representation aspects of the *collarline* cleavage for white-collar organization.

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[1] The concept of "collarline" ("Kragenlinie") is a translation from the German literature on white-collar social history (cf. KOCKA 1977, 1981a, 1981b) that is even more intuitive in English due to the common usage of white-collar vs. blue-collar workers.

Table 7.1
The Rise of the White-Collar Salariat

	AU	BE	DE	FR	GE	IR	IT	NE	NO	SW	SZ	UK
White-collar employees (%)												
1920		16	23	21	23			20	18	16	22	22
1930	22	21	25	23	25			21	19	18	24	25
1950	31	27	30		28		16	31	26	35	30	31
1960	38	37	36		38		19	38	34	41	33	
1970	45	45	45	45	45	32	29	47	42	44	43	40
1985	51		58		52			59	57	56	54	50

NOTE: IR 1971, GB 1985 estimated;
SOURCE: own calculations based on FLORA, KRAUS & PFENNING 1987; VISSER 1989

First, it describes the *formation* of separate white-collar unions and union centres. To understand the interaction of collarline formation and union structure, the strategies of the state, employers and middle-class pressure groups have to be analyzed. On the other hand, the strategic decisions of the blue-collar unions to include and accommodate or to exclude and disregard white-collar interests were crucial for the salience of the organizational splits.

Second, the *mobilization* patterns of white-collar employees differ considerably from blue-collar workers. In general, white-collar employees have been less likely to join unions and were less prone to go on strike, though this difference has become less important over time and for many countries. Collarline differences in union density vary according to the different organization strategies and institutionalization of union securities.

Third, the *representation* of white-collar interests has amplified the fragmentation and heterogeneity of labour interests. White-collar interests are commonly less centralized and coordinated than blue-collar interests. Moreover, they have become increasingly self-conscious and strong opponents to blue-collar interest representation. Finally, the political heterogeneity of white-collar employees has mounted pressures to deemphasize union linkages with political parties.

I
THE FORMATION OF THE COLLARLINE CLEAVAGE

The *collarline* between white-collar employees and blue-collar workers emerged with the advancement of industrial capitalism and mass democracies. The rise of the white-collar salariat become a nearly universal feature in all Western European countries since the end of the First World War, when about one-fifth of all employees were in white-collar occupations, though some late industrializing countries lagged behind (see Table 7.1). With the second industrialization phase, the transition to Taylorist mass production, service functions and tertiarization expanded within and outside the factory (on see FOURASTIE 1949). Administrative, technical, supervising and commercial activities multiplied and became

differentiated from the production tasks and delegated to non-manual employees or service organizations (CRONER 1962: 112-3).

White-collar workers had a long history of maintaining middle-class orientations fostered by better education, social advancement prospects, and less working-class social background. Furthermore, the collarline cleavage was reinforced by more favourable social protection, fringe benefits and employment protection for white-collar employees, granted by employers or by the state. Thus the collarline reflects differences in three spheres: the market, work and social situation (cf. LOCKWOOD 1958). In each society, however, the collarline was drawn somewhat differently and with more or less vigour by state policy, employers action and middle-class aspirations (cf. KOCKA 1981a).

These social status differences were reinforced by blue-collar aversions toward integrating white-collar employees and status conscious pressure group politics of the middle-classes. Initially, blue-collar workers had often shunned the few patronized clerks holding the view that the black-coated employees were less unionate, willing or capable to join in the class struggle. Similar convictions led union leaders to doubt whether to trade-off working-class solidarity and cohesion against inclusion of the then still small and heterogeneous white-collar salariat. In most countries, "white-collar employees tend to see their interests as different from those of manual workers and to prefer their own separate occupational unions (CLEGG 1976: 39)." In the following, the formation of white-collar unions and the formation of separate union centres or the integration of white-collar employees within the existing labour movement will be sketched.[2] Moreover, the interaction between state social policy and employers action and the emerging white-collar organizations will be assessed.

THE FORMATION OF WHITE-COLLAR UNIONS

Although some white-collar associations were descendants of officer or commercial guilds, the first national organizations emerged in the more advanced industrialized countries in the last decades of the 19th century.[3] White-collar associations, with few exceptions, were initially "social clubs", welfare societies, or professional associations. The Austrian, German, Swiss and Dutch white-collar associations achieved some degree of organization already before the First World War, maintaining in most cases, however, harmonic relations with the employers. Only few developed into more contentious unions short before the First

2 On the history of white-collar unions there exist few comparative studies, see ADAMS 1974, CRONER 1962, EBBINGHAUS 1988, otherwise one has to rely on the readers by STURMTHAL 1966a, KOCKA 1981a beside numerous single country or union studies, for Germany: notably LEDERER 1912, SPEIER 1934, KOCKA 1981b, for Britain: LOCKWOOD 1958, BAIN 1970, for Sweden: SANDBERG 1969, NILSSON 1985, for Switzerland: KÖNIG, SIEGRIST & VETTERLI 1985, for the Netherlands: REINALDA 1981, 1985.

3 In Germany, with the earliest and best organized white-collar prewar movement, the oldest commercial clerks association was founded in 1858, but most larger white-collar unions (including technicians) date back to the 1880s and 1890s (cf. EBBINGHAUS 1988: 128-30), part of the activites were the occupational sickness insurance schemes.

World War, most others remained dedicated to middle-class aspirations of individual advancement, professionalism and respectability (cf. KOCKA 1981a). In addition, christian clerks associations that were to shelter the "respectable" young employees from the vices of industrial, modern societies were among the earliest Christian organizations.[4]

In societies with persistent status differences and promoted class divisions, the *collarline* cleavage led relative early to sectionalist interest organization. In Austria and Germany, white-collar associations cooperated in loose pressure group cartels to influence public policy making, in particular the drafting of favourable statutory social policy (see KOCKA 1981a). The social reference group for white-collar employees were largely the 'civil servants' and free professions that received high social esteem and state privileges, while the blue-collar labour movement was seen with much contempt.

However, in some countries, there were also white-collar employees in the public or semi-public sector that became relative early collectively organized, some of which in unions close to the blue-collar union movement (see next Chapter 8). Moreover, technicians, foremen, lower grade clerks and female employees, often with blue-collar social family background, tended to become organized by unions that were more willing to approach the Socialist labour movement. It should be stressed that the white-collar salariat was differentiated into many occupational and status groups spread across many sectors and placed within different ranks of authority lines. Therefore differences in organization patterns were large between white-collar groups, between office clerks and technical employees, between shop assistants and bank clerks, not to speak of the differences in the public sector (see Chapter 8).

White-collar unionization became a wide-spread phenomenon only after the First World War, in the context of high unemployment and inflation, as well as a general social mobilization that affected for the first time white-collar employees. In nearly all countries there was indeed a convergence to some degree of harmonious middle-class orientation and a more unionate labour movement. On the one hand, traditional associations became more "unionate", accepting the strike weapon. On the other, white-collar unions close to the blue-collar labour movement grew into mass organizations. Yet during the course of the inter-war period, with the onset of the World economic crisis, white-collar employees in most countries resorted to status defense (see KOCKA 1981a), but particularly in Germany and Austria nationalist organizations regained in importance (see EBBINGHAUS 1988).

In union systems with craft-general unionism, many white-collar technical occupations (technicians and foremen) became organized parallel to blue-collar craft unions in occupational unions, some of which amalgamated with blue-collar crafts or became later sections of general unions. However, the more academic credentials and state careers were important forn higher grade technicians the more he (sic!) opted for separate technical *cadres* organizations, particularly in Germany and France. Moreover, the more industrial unionism

[4] Notably the German anti-semitic protestant clerks association (DHV, 1893) and the French Catholic clerks association (SECI, 1887), while in Britain and elsehwere activities remained limmited to Christian youth clubs.

dominated, the more white-collar employees in industry tended to organize outside blue-collar unions. In the private service sector, particularly in distribution, blue-collar unions were less strongly organized, yet varied in their success to integrate sales girls and other lower grade clerks, at least outside the cooperative sector.[5] Most of the learned professions and occupational associations (e.g. pharmacists, bankers) were organizations that often included initially also self-employed and maintained harmonious labour relations.

Most strikingly, the *collarline* divisions of labour largely persisted after the Second World War. In the Austrian, German and Dutch case, where a rational postwar reconstruction was most deliberate and comprehensive, white-collar status cleavages proofed to be more persistent than the religious or ideological cleavages. In Austria, one white-collar general union (GPA) organizes employees in the private sector within the unified ÖGB that applies otherwise the industrial principle. Although the industrial unions in Germany and the Netherlands extended their scope to white-collar employees, they were challenged by reappearing white-collar occupational and staff associations.

In the United Kingdom and Ireland, but also elsewhere, white-collar employees had been organized by staff associations (sectionalist company unions of higher grades), particularly in manufacturing offices, chemical industry laboratories, banking and insurances head offices. A number of federations of staff associations were formed in order to provide some loose coordination and representation on a national level. In the United Kingdom, staff associations failed as much as white-collar unions to federate successfully, instead a number of staff associations were swallowed by the aggressive merger policy of general white-collar unions, in particular the ASTMS (now: MSF) in the 1970s.

In the postwar years another generation of white-collar unions emerged, that is, *professional* (and academics) associations, mainly in the (semi-)public sector, and *staff* associations representing supervisory, managerial and technical staffs. Where they emerged they remained usually outside the encompassing or white-collar union centres that had formed until then. In most countries that organized white-collar employees in encompassing or even industrial organizations, organization for technical, managerial and professional staff mushroomed in Western Europe. In Germany and France, these organizations of "Leitende Angestellte" or "cadres" date back to the interwar period (VELA 1919, CGCEF 1937), at the time when a surge in overall unionization and an extension of collective bargaining compelled managerial employees to organize collectively, too. Similarly to France, the Italian line of white-collar fragmentation had been cut at a higher *cadres* level ("quadri", "dirigenti"), with their own independent associations. In Scandinavia, in addition to white-collar occupational and industrial unions, associations of professional employees (academics mainly), sometimes also open to independent professionals, grew rapidly in Sweden (SACO, 1947) in the 1950s, in Denmark (AC, 1962/1972) in the 1960s and in Norway (AF, 1974) in the 1970s following the extension of the public and semi-public (welfare) sector.

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5 For instance the commercial unions in Scandinavia and Britain organized sales people, while German and Swiss commerce and transport unions failed to do so (cf. EBBINGHAUS 1988).

THE FORMATION OF WHITE-COLLAR UNION CENTRES

White-collar organizations even where they had gained some influence remained only loosely coordinated, if at all, at least until the First World War. In Germany and Austria, white-collar cartels emerged first as a pressure group for social policy of the prewar white-collar pension debate. Later these cartels that had been split on political lines formed standing committees that were the founding bloc for the Socialist white-collar union centre (Afa) in Germany and a Socialist white-collar section (within BFG) in Austria (see Table 7.(?)). In a number of countries, the critical economic situation of white-collar employees, the general mobilization, and the recognition of blue-collar unions demanded some reaction of the increasingly challenged white-collar organizations. The strategic choice for white-collar unions was to join an existing blue-collar movement or to go independent. However, this decision was very much contingent on the willingness of the Socialist (or other political) union movements to provide some autonomy to the white-collar minority within the union movement. Seen from the blue-collar union centre, four organization strategies emerged from the interwar period onwards: (1) a strategy of *benign neglect* towards white-collar union organization with the consequence of the emergence of a separate centre, (2) a *gradual inclusion* of unions for white-collar workers (particularly in lower grades), (3) a *separate pillar* within one movement, (4) a historic break for an encompassing labour movement with integration of white-collar employees within *all-grades* unions. With the exception of the last strategy, these adapted strategies rooted in the interwar years, when white-collar workers where still a small status-conscious minority.

First, in response to the *benign neglect* by manual labour separate white-collar organization, mostly non-political union centres were formed in Switzerland (VSA, 1919) and Sweden (DACO, 1931, 1944 merged with TCO). The blue-collar Swedish LO and Swiss SGB agreed to leave the organization of white-collar employees (outside the coop movement) to these other organizations. There was thus not much actual competition (they are on cooperative terms) and the blue-collar movement could maintain its working-class identity.

Second, the *gradual inclusion* and integration of white-collar unions into the Socialist (or other politico-relgious) confederations was attempted in Austria (1919 into BFG), Belgium, Britain, Ireland, and France, though with varying success in mobilizing white-collar employees. Moreover, in Denmark and Norway, white-collar employees, in particular lower grades, were organized in unions that eventually affiliated to the LO.[6] In both countries, development of independent white-collar unionism was retarded in respect to Sweden, though civil servants had founded early on representative associations (see Chapter 8).

Third, one finds an intermediate (*pillar*) solution, in interwar Germany, where the Socialist white-collar unions (federated since 1917) formed a peak federation (AfA) which was not affiliated to the blue-collar confederation (ADGB), but was linked by a cooperation

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[6] The Danish (HK) and Norwegian commercial unions (NHK) affiliated during the 1930s, whereas in Sweden there were two unions (Handels, in coop movement), one with LO and the other (HF) cofounded DACO (cf. EBBINGHAUS 1988).

Table 7.2
Socialist Party-Union Ties and White-Collar Union Strategy (1989)

PARTY-UNION TIES (*Party type*)	Union strategy towards white-collar (private sector) employees (in %) ALL-GRADE SECTORIAL	MIXED INCLUSION	BENIGN NEGLECT
INSTITUTIONAL TIES (modernized party)		Norwegian LO (11%) British TUC (<15%) Irish ICTU (<12%)	Swedish LO (9%)
HISTORICAL TIES (catch-all party)	German DGB (15%) Dutch NVV/FNV (14%)	Belgian FGTB (18%) * Austrian ÖGB (22%) * Danish LO (17%) *	Swiss SGB (2%)
WEAK TIES (middle-class party)	French FO (<15%) Italian UIL (<15%)		

NOTE: (<) upper limit (British, Irish, French and Italian figures estimated); (*) include large white-collar general unions.

agreement. In the Liberal and National-Christian camp separate white-collar federations emerged as well, with loosely coupled co-operation arrangements with their blue-collar sister federations.[7]

Fourth, some union centres change to encompassing *all-grades* unionism, though not without costs in terms of organizational competition and lower unionization rates. The German (and gradually the Dutch) union movement attempted to integrate white-collar unions not only within a non-unified union centre but within industrial all-grades unions, risking the split-away of white-collar peak associations (DAG from DGB in 1949, MHP from merging FNV in 1974).[8] This had an impact on the long-term cohesion and maintenance of solidaristic principles forwarded by (male) blue-collar unionism within theses union centres.

We can detect a relationship between the degree of integration of white-collar unions within the Socialist movement and the degree to which the industrial union principle has been enforced (see Table 7.2). Hence, the organization of white-collar employees, the transformation of the *white-blue collar* cleavage into union organization was partly contingent on the previous strategic decisions taken in respect to the *craft-industry* cleavage (see Chapter 6). In countries with a craft-based union structure and with separate occupational organizations for white-collar employees outside the confines of all-grades industrial unions, white-collar unions were more easily allied to the main union confederation, though perhaps difficult to integrate, like in Austria, Belgium, Britain, Denmark, Ireland, Norway. On

7 Within the Christian-German National movement the white-collar organization were dominantly Protestant, while the blue-collar unions were Catholic (see EBBINGHAUS 1988)

8 Similar plans within the ÖGB did not materialize, once the white-collar affiliate (GPA) had consolidated during the 1950s.

the other hand, in countries with already strong industrial union affiliates white-collar unions - if they had the means to do so - tended to organize separately, as in Germany, Sweden, Netherlands, and Switzerland.

STATE AND EMPLOYER COLLARLINE POLICIES

Historically, the collarline was particularly pronounced in countries where social policy was tailored to status groups, as in Germany and Austria (cf. SPEIER 1934, KOCKA 1981a, ESPING-ANDERSEN & KORPI 1985). In these countries social policy was initially a reaction to the *Arbeiterfrage* (the manual workers' question), the rising blue-collar workforce that increasingly was drawn into the Socialist labour movement and demanded extensive political and social rights. The *Angestelltenfrage* (the salaried employees' question) became immanent after the turn of the century, when white-collar employees were an increasing but crucial middle-class electorate (Austria 1907, Germany 1911 elections), that saw its former social status endangered. Moreover, the white-collar scheme was falling between the workers welfare schemes that were unable to guarantee a continuation of the 'respectable' middle-class life style, while they were excluded from the favourable state protection of civil servants. On the other hand, where social policy was based on universalistic citizenship principles, such as in Britain and Sweden, status divisions were mainly based on management policies. Before white-collar employment became a mass phenomena, employers used *rule-and-divide* strategies at the workplace by special treatment of white-collar employees in return for a special subdued service.

In Germany, the different corporative schemes promoted collarline divisions and mobilized white-collar organizations to press for their continuation, reinforcing the formation of the collarline cleavage (cf. EBBINGHAUS 1988).[9] Even in countries where universalistic social policy schemes were introduced, superannuation can become a dividing issue, as in Scandinavia. Moreover, favourable firm schemes for white-collar employees were also established, particularly in Britain and Switzerland, yet without much coordination.

The state intervened further in behalf of white-collar employees in regulating terms of employment and industrial relations (cf. EBBINGHAUS 1988: 15-7). In a number of countries, special dismissal notices for white-collar employees were legislated between the two wars and later extended as a consequence of increased unemployment.[10] While blue-collar unions were able to struggle for favourable conditions on their own, white-collar employees lacked collective strength and demanded therefore state protection since traditional rights were increasingly endangered by economic crisis and rapid expansion of service work into new fields. Moreover, as white-collar employees lacked collective strength in

[9] The issue of separate status-group or universalistic welfare scheme still divides the German DAG from the DGB, though both organizations are led by SPD members.

[10] Special dismissal notices of at least six weeks and often increasing to several month after stipulated years of service were introduced in the interwar period (Austria, 1921, Germany, 1926, Denmark, 1938) and are still statutory (similar rules apply also in Belgium, France, and Switzerland) (cf. BLANPAIN 1977, EBBINGHAUS 1988).

terms of unionization and strike proneness, the state intervened on their behalf and granted special provisions in collective bargaining and workplace representation.[11] With the partial exception of Sweden, the special social protection of white-collar employees has been particularly important in countries in which the *collarline* cleavage became important within the labour movement. This is a mutually reinforcing process. In societies where early social status division existed special interest organizations emerged propagating state (and employers) intervention on their behalf that once implemented reinforced the clientelistic pressure group politics along the *collarline* cleavage even further.

II
WHITE-COLLAR UNIONIZATION

Historically, white-collar employees, particularly in the private sector, were commonly known to be less inclined to join a collective organization, and if so to choose one of a less contentious character than blue-collar unions. White-collar organizations have become more contentious or "unionate" over time and in some countries white-collar employees are organized within industrial unions. However, white-collar unionization is still lagging behind blue-collar workers and public employees. Yet some forms of organization have proven to be more effective in mobilizing white-collar employees. Quite similar to blue-collar workers, there exist two strategies of occupational and class solidarity. Professional closure and collective promotion unions can be singled out as two different mobilization strategies for white-collar employees. Again, these strategies are only successful under some circumstances that favour professionalization or collective solidarity. Further factors in the work, employment and social situation of white-collar employees and other organizing conditions will be discussed as variables affecting white-collar unionization.

PROFESSIONAL CLOSURE OR COLLECTIVE PROMOTION UNIONISM

From the early days of white-collar unionization two strategies of mobilization emerged that correspond to two different modes of boundary setting. Like closed and open unionism that provides the different principles of craft unions and industrial unionism (see Chapter 6), a similar difference between *social closure* and *inclusive* mobilization emerged for white-collar employees, too. "Professional associations are nothing more than craft unions for educated labour. They pursue the same sort of limitation of supply which craft unions attempt, albeit more successfully. In particular professions have achieved legal closure to a degree undreamed of by skilled craft workers (STEPHENS 1979: 46)." On the other hand, white-collar employees that worked in jobs which became increasingly bureaucratized, standardized, and interchangeable, could only hope to gain from an encompassing strategy

[11] Special arbitration procedures were granted in Germany, Sweden, Denmark and special workplace representation rights in Austria, Belgium, Germany (cf. BLANPAIN 1977, EBBINGHAUS 1988).

of open unionism and collective promotion. Service workers, such as sales people, office clerks, draughtsmen, are forced to combine on a large scale, encompassing all employees within the same sector to prevent wage competition by the unorganized.

As in the case of craft unions, *professional* associations could base their strength on monopolization of control over the work and closure of entry to the profession. Like apprenticeship in the trades, white-collar employees had to have on-the-job training, if not academic credentials were required. In the latter case, professional associations sought to self-regulate professional standards or influence statutory regulation. In so far, these organizations provide a collective good to their members, regulating competition within the profession and from outside. Professional associations provide thus an important function in job certification and govern thereby mobility into the occupation (STINCHCOMBE 1990: 261-5). That these professional employees can indeed have some degree of job control and monopolize access is to some degree a result of the uncertainty problem that employers face (STINCHCOMBE 1990). Non-standardized service work, quite different to productive labour, cannot be accumulated and measured by efficiency standards but only by its long-term *effectiveness* (BERGER & OFFE 1981: 40), instead of output control only by input control (e.g. office hours in large administrations). Professional associations can provide collective goods for their members in form of access control and provide thus an incentive for membership. However, different to the blue-collar workers, professionals are not as much dependent on a collective strategy to advancement, they "are powerful enough within the labour market because of the scarcity of their skills, but who also gain considerable advantages from joining a professional association (CROUCH 1982: 69)". White-collar unions differ in respect to the importance of professional skills for a service job and the need for collective protection in lack of individual advancement possibilities (cf. SCHEUER 1986, CROUCH 1982: 67-8).

On the other hand, *open unionism* can only be a successful mobilization strategy when favourable social and organizational conditions are given. *Bureaucratization* at the workplace provides a favourable climate for collective organization, since lower grade employees have only channelled and reduced individual mobility chances and uniform, impersonally regulated working conditions (LOCKWOOD 1958: 141-2). LOCKWOOD has argued that "bureaucratization represents a set of conditions extremely favourable to the growth of collective action among clerical workers. It is not too much to argue that in fostering black-coated solidarity buraucratization has played a role analogous to that of the factory and labour market in the case of manual workers. (LOCKWOOD 1958: 142)". This is a mutual reinforcing process, "as bureaucratization provides fertile ground for unionization, so unionization, once established, leads to further bureaucratization by its demands for uniformity of working conditions (LOCKWOOD 1958: 142)." Historically, male clerical workers, for instance, organized in status defence against female employment[12], but had to realize in the

12 With the growth of clerical work, feminization increased constantly and provoked initially a status defense reaction of male clerks and latter recognition that only the organization of the lower

long run that only an inclusive strategy could prevent salary competition. Open unionization through collective advancement is a viable mobilization strategy, yet it is contingent on a collectivizing employment situation and on union recognition of white-collar union activities (BAIN 1970).

Hence, there are two forms of organization, professional closure and collective promotion, that both can provide the basis for white-collar unionization. This may explain why there are two contradicting hypothesis in the literature about social structuration and white-collar union growth (cf. BAIN, COATES & ELLIS 1973), for instance, Sturmthal's summary account of Western white-collar unionization amasses partly contradictory explanations (STURMTHAL 1966b). One school of thought, claims that unionization increases with the declining social position, or over time, with *proletarianization* (KLINGENDER 1935). The other assumes the inverse relationship, that white-collar unionization increases with status position and the degree of *professionalization* (KASSALOW 1965). The contradiction between the two hypothesis can be resolved, if we take account of the variations in organization that intervene in a social structural explanation of union growth. Thus unionization depends on the possibility and availability of professional closure in the case of higher grade white-collar employees, or on a open service union that can provide collective advancement in the case of lower grade white-collar employees.

COLLARLINE DIFFERENCES IN UNION DENSITY

According to Sturmthal, who summarized the findings of a comparative study on white-collar unionization in 1966, "white-collar employees are organized best where unionism in general is strong" (STURMTHAL 1966b: 376, italics removed). Similarly, Kassalow formulated as a general rule for Western Europe, that "it is probable that the higher the percentage of blue-collar unionism in a country, the higher the percentage of white-collar unionism" (KASSALOW 1969: 196). The thesis on a "spill-over effect" is largely based on cursory comparison in lack of systematic studies.[13] In fact, white-collar union density is comparatively higher in countries with a relatively high degree of blue-collar unionization (see Table 7.4), though these figures include public sector employees. There is, however, a considerable variation in the ratio of white-collar to blue-collar union density across countries. In some countries the difference between white-collar and blue-collar union density is small (a ratio close to one), while in others it is marked (Austria, Germany, United Kingdom and Sweden). Yet in recent years union density of white-collar employees has approached the figures for blue-collar workers more closely and in the Netherlands and Norway it is even equal.

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paid female workers could provide a solution to the salary competition (see "Postscript" to 1989 edition, LOCKWOOD 1958: 222)

[13] Due to lack of comparable data evidence is more impressionistic, cf. BEYME 1977: 46-7; STURMTHAL 1966: 376; KASSALOW 1969: 196, for newer comparisons see: BAIN & PRICE 1980, EBBINGHAUS 1988, VISSER 1989, 1990.

Table 7.3
White-Collar Union Density, Western Europe (1900-85)

	AU	BE	DE	FR	GE	IR	IT	NE	NO	SW	SZ	UK
White-collar density (%)												
1900	14				*15							
1913	42				*40						*25	12
1920	66	15	19	7	52			43	2	22	26	26
1930	65		18	10	50			36	3	26	30	22
1950	53	*28	44		34			36	12	51	38	33
1970	50	*38	55	22	26			34	59	62	26	36
1985	51		79		28			25	62	71	34	45

NOTE: (*) private sector only; FR 1940=1937
SOURCE: BE and 1900-13: own calculations; 1920-85: Labour force based on FLORA, KRAUS & PFENNING 1987; VISSER 1989

Seen from an institutional perspective, one can interpret the spill-over effect, the correspondingly high or low level of union density in the two status groups, by reference to the existence or lack of institutional arrangements (e.g. labour legislation) which are favourable to the organization of both blue-collar as well as white-collar labour. There exists a favourable climate of industrial relations in the Nordic countries which fostered also the organization of white-collar workers. Oonce union membership is accepted in a firm it will be more difficult to deny the same right to white-collar employees. Thus on a sector level one could argue that once a union organizes already the core blue-collar workforce in a given industry or workplace it will be more capable of organizing marginal groups (i.e. white-collar employees) - even against the resistance of employers. Yet this may be limited to those systems were blue-collar unions organize white-collar employees or are friendly to separate organizations. On a societal level, however, there is also an indirect effect of unionization, as blue-collar unionization compels other groups in society to become organized (cf. KASSALOW 1965: 38). The *proximity* to blue-collar workers can also be a favourable condition to the organization of white-collar employees. In Austria and Sweden, for example, factory supervisors (foremen) are well organized, partly due to their proximity to blue-collar workers at the shop floor. Furthermore, factory supervisor are mainly recruited from skilled blue-collar workers who have been already exposed to a pro-union environment and their particular contentious situation between management and rank-and-file forces them to become organized as well (cf. KASSALOW 1965: 42-6).

How can we explain the lower level of white-collar employees, particularly in the private sector, to join a collective organization? Studies often advanced the arguements based on individual choice, however, this is difficult to prove by comparing aggregate statistics. Nevertheless, one can reason that a number of structural factors intervene in the unknown individual decision process, they create or define the situation in which decisions to join or leave a union take place. One of the most prominent factors correlating with inter-industrial differences in union density refers to the concentration of employment. An economy of

scale effect in a union's recruitment efforts increase with the size of an employment site. "Organizing small groups of members or individual members in different establishments is difficult and costly" (STURMTHAL 1966b: 379). In fact, historically and still in some sector, white-collar employees are spread across small employment sites and are therefore difficult to organize, for instance, unionization among assistants in small shops is low compared to employees in large insurance offices. Moreover, with the size of the establishment, as Lockwood has pointed out, bureaucratic administration becomes dominant. This in turn is a more favourable climate to union organization compared to "paternalist" administration of face-to-face employer-employee interaction (LOCKWOOD 1958: 141-2). Thus the size effect due to organizational and situational factors seems to foster white-collar unionization, while collective organization in small places remains unlikely.[14]

Historically, white-collar employees often shunned collective action in the hope for individual advancement, though the chances for upward mobility have become more limited, notably for female and lower level clerks. As C.W. Mills observed, "there is a close association between the feeling that one *cannot* get ahead, regardless of the reason, and a pro-union attitude" (MILLS 1951: 307). As white-collar workers are subject to a career 'block' there is a strong tendency to organize collectively. "The existence of career 'blocks' (so-called balkanisation), undoubtedly is the major factor influencing unionisation among those of superior market capacity." (GIDDENS 1981: 191). Therefore, one can expect career blockage and therefore unionization to increase with bureaucratization and size (cf. also LOCKWOOD 1958: 141-2). Unionization is the more desirable the more employees are dependent on collective action and the more such action may be successful in improving their working and living conditions (cf. CROUCH 1982; cf. MÜLLER-JENTSCH 1986: 83).

With the extension of white-collar employment more and more grades and occupations became subject of collectively determined standardized job description, grading systems, salary schemes and employment regulations. This has also been part of the strategy of trade unions to include as many grades as possible under the jurisdiction of collective agreements, while employers and some higher echelons of employees prefer the individual fixing of contracts. The late and separate organization of professional and managerial staff (or *cadres*), reflects the more common individual employment regulation of that group.

The importance of *union recognition* for the explanation of white-collar unionization has been underscored by G.S. Bain for Britain (BAIN 1970). Yet it is useful to differentiate between union recognition by the state, the employer associations or individual employers.[15] A recognition by the employer association or the state may not automatically yield to union recognition at the workplace, sometimes employers in services were not members of the

[14] A British study provides evidence that "establishment size increases the probability of unionisation increases but at a decreasing rate" (BAIN & ELIAS 1985: 82). Similar results are supported by German surveys that show among salaried employees the unionization but also proneness to join increases with the size of the establishment (cf. Infas survey 1981, 1985, 1986).

[15] Historically, union recognition by German employers associations (1918) and legislation in Scandinvian countries in the 1930s, have been decisive for the wave in white-collar unionization in the interwar period.

industrial employers association, or the associations were to weak to compel member companies to follow peak agreements. Thus completeness and membership discipline are important factors to "top-down" union recognition, and as a popular saying goes, "if even the bosses need an organization they can hardly refuse that right to their employees" (KASSALOW 1965: 42). Yet, in service sector, such as commerce and finance, employer associations had a lower level of coordination and centralization had a diverse structure and was at distance from industrial employers, in fact, various employer associations existed without much coordination in these sectors.[16] Once blue-collar unions are recognized, management will be in a more difficult situation to refuse the right of organization to white-collar employees. Yet, a direct "*spill-over*" effect in non-manual dominated services is unlikely. In general, union recognition by management is likely to correlate with employment concentration, that is, the smaller the establishment the more prevail patriarchal employer-employee relations which are hostile to union organization. On the other hand, some large scale enterprises have aimed at undermining union activities by introducing their own staff associations.

Several other factors related to the structure and character of the labour market have been noted as hampering unionization. Labour turnover, more associated with female employment or part time employment, and small, private firms, for instance in commerce, hampers unionization, too. Part-time employees, often female employees, may not expect a substantial return from their union membership, nor have they been much welcomed by traditional unions which feared undermining of full employment conditions. Although unionization between female and male employees varies considerably, this is often more the result of gender specific job differences than unionateness, in fact, there are no more significant gender differences in unionization in Denmark where part-time workers are relative well organized.[17]

Compulsory membership, such as in a "closed shop" or "union shop" are relative uncommon in white-collar occupations, with the notable exceptions in the highly unionized co-operative companies, were check-off agreements are also very common. Where white-collar organization had successfully pressed for subsidized occupational welfare schemes, there was an additional incentive to join a union. In contrast to blue-collar worker, as long as white-collar employees were rarely strike prone and had a more limited risk of job-loss, unemployment and strike insurance were rare and a particular incentive. A very common union service were special white-collar vocational education, some were later co-financed by the state (for instance, in France, Germany and Switzerland). In Denmark, Sweden and Belgium, the high level of white-collar unionization can be attributed to the union-con-

16 The cooperative movements in commerce and finance, given their close link to the union movement, were amongst the earliest recognized unions and are still the best organized (cf. EBBINGHAUS 1988).

17 Scandinavian unions have developed more recently particular recruitment strategies for part-time workers, e.g. over 25% of all office members in Danish HK are part-time employees in the 1980s (cf. LO reports).

Table 7.4
Collarline Differences in Union Density in Western Europe

Country	Year	Blue-collar	White-collar	Ratio	Year	Blue-collar	White-collar	Ratio	Year	Blue-collar	White-collar	Ratio
Austria	1930	(31%)	(53%)	.	1961	71%	52%	1.4	1985	65%	51%	1.3
Denmark	1930	38%	18%	2.1	1960	65%	53%	1.2	1984	87%	79%	1.1
France	1930	7%	10%	.	1975	21%	22%	1.0				
Germany	1925	30%	33%	0.9	1961	36%	28%	1.3	1985	40%	28%	1.4
Britain	1931	25%	22%	1.4	1964	53%	30%	1.8	1979	63%	44%	1.4
Netherlands	1930	25%	36%	0.7	1960	42%	39%	1.1	1985	23%	25%	0.9
Norway	1930	20%	3%	6.7	1960	60%	55%	1.1	1985	61%	62%	1.0
Sweden	1930	39%	26%	.	1960	80%	54%	1.5	1985	92%	71%	1.3
Switzerland	1930	22%	29%	0.8	1960	35%	34%	1.0	1980	40%	34%	1.2

NOTE: Ratio: blue-collar density divided by white-collar density.
SOURCE: own calculations based on VISSER 1989; BAIN & PRICE 1980; 1983.

trolled unemployment schemes (see Chapter 6), at least since unemployment became an actual risk for white-collar employees, too.

Access to the workplace is also crucial for recruiting white-collar employees (cf. ADAMS 1975). In the German-speaking countries as well as in Belgium special provisions guarantee white-collar employees separate representation or voting procedures. The shop stewards play an important role in union-member contacts, not only by recruiting members but also by maintaining direct contact with these members. However, in the private service sector, one finds representative workplace structures only in larger or medium sized employment sites, like insurance head offices, bank institutes and larger outlets, department stores, supermarket chains and larger shops.

Summing up, evidence supports the observation that union density of white-collar employees falls behind the level of unionization amongst blue-collar workers (see STURMTHAL 1966a; BAIN & PRICE 1980; VISSER 1990). In most countries, the majority option of white-collar workers, in the private sector, has been to stay away from unions altogether (EBBINGHAUS 1988). However, there are several indicators that suggest that the collarline lost its significance in society as well as in politics. This is probably true also for unionization - especially if we differentiate between industrial sectors, within blue-collar and white-collar occupations and take account of levels of skill, location in the internal labour market of larger firms or the public sector, and the position in the authority structure. With white-collar growth and the blurring of the collarline, the structural problems of white-collar unionization have not ended, nor have the lines of conflict subsided but are redrawn on a somewhat higher level in the hierarchy. Instead of the old line between the initially numerous blue-collar workers and the white-collar employees through social policy legislation and employers' personnel policies, conflicts emerge between the mass of lower white-collar occupations and higher grades or professions with particular educational credentials. Let us consider now the impact of the collarline fragmentation on interest representation.

Table 7.5
Number of All-Grades and White-Collar Unions in Private Sector (1950, 1985)

1950	AU	BE	DE	FR	GE	IR	IT	NE	NO	SW	SZ	UK
Overall	16	32	119		33	109		327	125	156	66	720
private sector	12	21	30		13	26		117	38	56	25	174
all grades	10	18	5		9	4		52	14	21	9	13
white-collar	2	3	25		4	22		65	24	35	16	161
1985												
Overall	15	40	129		82	80	65	236	148	75	72	286
private sector	11	23	54		32	25	32	65	44	39	29	124
all grades	9	17	3		14	3	26	12	13	17	11	10
white-collar	2	6	51		18	22	6	53	31	22	18	114

NOTE: Number of unions includes locals; all countries 1950 or 1985, except for DE: 1953, GE: 1951, NO: 1956;
SOURCE: own calculations based on DUES database.

III
FROM SECTIONALISM TO SERVICE UNIONS

White-collar unions amplify union diversity and are a major challenge to labour unity. The separation of *collarline* interests had some advantages for class solidarity within each sphere, but hampered unity between the two groups. The wave of foundation of small, sectional white-collar unions multiplied centrifugal tendencies and amplified fragmentation within labour movements, at a time when the blue-collar union movement was about to consolidate its structure. But the same pressures toward centralization and coordination as in the case of blue-collar movements operated as well, albeit later and more slowly. White-collar union centres remained less centralized and empowered, they remained more internally fragmented than the blue-collar unions. Moreover, white-collar unions were less likely to have close links with a political party, particular a left party, given the more heterogeneous political orientations of their members. It will be argued that there is a relationship between political alignment and white-collar unionism, the closer the political linkage, the less likely it will be that white-collar employees will join and the more likely there is room for a separate union.

UNION STRUCTURE AND WHITE-COLLAR UNIONS

White-collar unions since their wave of foundation in the 1920s amplify union diversity. The process of fragmentation was not completed in the early postwar period, new organizations emerged, while some white-collar employees became integrated by all encompassing union centres or even unions. The highest fragmentation in terms of a large number of sectionalist white-collar unions are found in Britain with over 100 unions, but also in

Table 7.6
Membership Share (%) of All-Grades and White-Collar Unions in Private Sector (1950, 1985)

1950	AU	BE	DE	FR	GE	IR	IT	NE	NO	SW	SZ	UK
Overall	100%	100%	100%		100%	100%		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
private sector	70.8	68.5	23.2		71.5	15.9		72.3	61.4	67.1	61.9	26.7
all grades	58.5	58.5	7.7		64.3	4.7		63.9	49.4	55.8	45.0	16.1
white-collar	12.3	10.0	15.5		7.2	11.2		8.4	12.0	11.3	16.9	10.6
1985												
Overall	100%	100%	100%		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
private sector	64.9	64.5	37.5		64.7	15.8	57.1	51.2	45.3	53.0	60.9	22.1
all grades	43.1	45.7	4.9		53.3	1.6	54.5	40.1	28.6	33.7	40.5	6.0
white-collar	21.8	18.8	32.6		11.4	14.2	2.6	11.1	16.7	19.3	20.4	16.1

NOTE: all countries 1950, except for DE: 1953, GE: 1951, NO: 1956
SOURCE: own calculations based on DUES database.

Denmark and the Netherlands with over 50 unions (see Table 7.5). A large number of separate white-collar unions can be found in countries in which these unions have been able to set up their own confederations, outside the traditional main labour movements (Denmark, Norway, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland), except for United Kingdom where such attempts have failed. In Austria and Belgium, white-collar workers were organized separately by general white-collar unions (GPA; SECTA, LBC) within the main union confederations (ÖGB; FGTB, CSC). In Germany, given the strict industrial unionism principle adapted by the DGB in 1949, a cross-sector white-collar union (DAG) decided to organize outside the DGB instead of splitting up and merging with industrial unions. With the rather uniform increase in the white-collar salariat across Western Europe the patterns of organization have not become more alike in contrast to the thesis of convergence in industrial relations (see KERR 1960, 1983). Instead, the differences between countries seem to have been growing - Denmark being the most striking example of white-collar sectional interest organization. In Austria and Belgium, the growth of the general white-collar unions to one of the largest affiliates has added to internal conflict within each union movement. Fragmentation due to white-collar *sectionalism* has been relative common in all countries in the 1950s, ranking between 7% to 17% of total membership but 35 years later it had increased to between one-third in fragmented systems (Denmark) and 10% in countries with all encompassing unions (Germany, Netherlands) (see Table 7.6).

In order to evaluate the relative weight of separate interest representation for white-collar employees we can look at the measure of *associational monopoly* among white-collar employees (see Table 7.8). In the interwar years, when white-collar employment started to become a considerable share of the work force, the Austrian Free union centre (BFG) was most successful in integrating white-collar unions, granting the previously independent white-collar occupational unions a special "section" status. In Germany, the organization of white-collar employees in a collateral Socialist white-collar federation (AfA) was in the

Table 7.7
White-Collar Membership and Major Union within Major Union Centre

	AU	BE		DE	GE	IR	IT	NE	NO	SW	UK
Union Centre:	ÖGB	FGTB	CSC	LO	DGB	ICTU	CISL	FNV	LO	LO	TUC
Membership share (%)											
1950	12.3	5.9	.	9.6	5.4	.	.	9.2	7.6	7.2	.
1970	18.4	10.6	.	14.1	9.0	.	.	15.7	8.8	8.8	(10.0)
1989	21.7	17.5	.	15.7	14.7	.	.	13.4	9.7	9.4	.
Major Union:	GPA	SETCA	LBN	HK	HBV	IDATU	FIBA	DIBO	NHK	Hand.	MSF
Membership share (%)											
1950	10.7	5.9	8.5	7.9	1.4	9.3	.	5.3	5.9	6.9	.
1970	17.3	8.4	9.4	15.7	2.3	4.3	.	6.4	7.1	7.6	.
1989	20.7	14.9	18.6	22.7	5.2	3.7	2.1	13.9	7.6	12.5	7.5
rank	1st	4th	1st	1st	6th	5th	.	4th	3rd	4th	5th

Note: White-collar private sector membership; Ranking of affiliates by membership share within union centre; BE: SETCA 1987; LNB incl. CNE; DE: HK incl. public sector; GB: MSF 1988; IR: 1950: CIU.

course of the Weimar Republic more and more contested by two - Liberal and Nationalist - rival white-collar movements. In Switzerland, the neutral white-collar federation VSA received large support but could not over the long run absorb the independent white-collar unions and staff associations - in particularly not in banking, and in the public sector. In the Scandinavian countries, while the LO's - especially in Denmark and Norway - have attracted clerical and other groups of white-collar employees in the public sector, the majority of organized white-collar employees have combined in independent federations. In France, Italy and Belgium white-collar unionism was more successful within the Christian labour movement, except in the case of technicians.

The measure of associational monopoly (see Table 7.8) shows the postwar differences in the capacity of the main union federations to integrate white-collar workers. In Austria, all organized white-collar employees are either member of the general white-collar union in the private sector or member of all-grades (industrial) public sector unions. In Britain the overlarge majority of organized white-collar employees are in the main union federation (TUC), but they remain in separate unions and are poorly integrated. Although the inter-war cleavages have not been successfully overcome by the creation of an encompassing industrial union centre in Germany, the DGB does nonetheless represent more than half of all organized white-collar workers and has successfully fought out the competition from the general white-collar union (DAG), except in the service sector. In Denmark and Norway, the major labour organization have increased their share in white-collar unionization to over 40%. In the Netherlands the main federations, especially the Christian one, have increased their share in white-collar unionization mainly in the (semi-)public sector, but rival public and private white-collar organizations have mushroomed, too. In Sweden and

Switzerland, the benign neglect of the Swedish LO and the Swiss SGB becomes increasingly precarious as blue-collar employment declines relative to white-collar employment.

COORDINATION AMONG FRAGMENTED UNIONS

Since white-collar unionization in the private sector falls behind blue-collar workers, the question arises how can white-collar interests become voiced within an all encompassing union centre or through a rival separate union movement? Within the major encompassing unions, the membership (and share of delegates) of white-collar unions is constantly growing (see Table 7.7). Although, white-collar membership is thus still below one-quarter of a confederations membership, they tend to be concentrated in special general or service workers unions that have grown in size. In some countries, white-collar (quasi) general unions, that organize all white-collar occupations across most private sectors, have grown to importance within the major union centres. The white-collar general unions have become the largest single affiliate within the Austrian ÖGB, the Belgian Catholic CSC and Danish LO (organizing one-sixth of all members), they are third or fourth in the Belgian Socialist FGTB, Dutch FNV and Norwegian LO, while in the other cases they ranked 5th or 6th and organized only a smaller share of membership. These unions were either general white-collar unions (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Britain) or service workers unions in commerce and allied trades (Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden) including also few blue-collar workers.

When blue-collar union centres accepted white-collar unions or even became truly encompassing movements the question arose how were the special interests of the white-collar unions and members accommodated. In Britain, the TUC provided white-collar unions until 1981 group representation on its General Council via two "trade" groups (secondary and tertiary sector) besides two sections for public employees and civil servants.[18] This 'archaic' system of trade group representation that was remnant of the 1920's hope for industrial unionism, was changed in 1982 to a new system that acknowledged the increased role of "super" unions (including MSF) and medium sized white-collar unions (e.g. finance union).[19] In comparison, the German DGB with its all-grades industrial unions has provided some special recognition of white-collar employee representation by special congresses and a special union secretary at the level of the union centre and its affiliates. However, again white-collar employees, particularly in private sector, remain underrepresented with half the unionization rate of blue-collar workers.

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[18] For instance, on the 1970 TUC Congress, 45 white-collar unions with two million members (more than one-half in the public sector) were representing one-fifth of membership and 8 out of 37 General Council seats, while white-collar employment was about 45% at the time. However, a number of general and mixed unions encompassed a white-collar membership, sometimes granted special section status (700.000 members and 20 General Council seats, cf. LUMLEY 1973: App. 1-4).

[19] The new 1982 system gives 'automacity' in representation for larger unions (above 100.000 members) and some minority small union representation plus extra female delegates (cf. MAKSYMIW 1990: 7, 12-13).

Outside the encompassing labour movements, the coordination of the many, fragmented white-collar organizations was a long process and an evolution of their representative functions. The earliest common activities before the First World War were social policy committees that coordinated pressure group politics *vis-à-vis* the state. With recognition of white-collar unions as collective bargaining partner after the First World War, white-collar union centres (Germany, Switzerland) provided some form of coordination though only few matched the more centralized union centres. During the Weimar Republic, the three white-collar union centres (AfA, Ring, Gedag) were loose coordination structures (also with aligned blue-collar union centres) but especially in the Liberal and Christian-National camp, the main white-collar general union dominated union relations. The foundation of white-collar centres in Scandinavia since the 1930s was mainly a reaction to the increasing centralization of the major union centre in its incorporation into policy making and collective bargaining.

Still today white-collar confederations are less centralized and have less authority over their affiliates, particularly no right to collective bargaining. This is partly a consequence of the large fragmentation into many occupational unions and sometimes some larger general unions. Historically, white-collar unions were much less strike-prone and therefore had less need for a central strike fund and common action platforms. As long as pressure group politics was the main task for white-collar union centres, a loose coordination and a small consultative staff sufficed. However, the situation changed with increasing importance of collective bargaining, and particularly when blue-collar unions showed success in negotiating wage increases and employment conditions that white-collar employees had been granted by employers or state unilaterally. New forms of cooperation with blue-collar unions or bargaining cartels of white-collar unions (like PTK in Sweden) were established to coordinate union positions prior to and during negotiations. In some countries, larger white-collar unions that had long adhered to an occupational principle in internal organization remodelled their structure to fit bargaining by industry (e.g. Dutch unions and German DAG unions in the 1970s).

Table 7.8
Associational Monopoly among White-Collar Employees, Western Europe 1920-85

Confederation				Membership in % of all white-collar members 1920	1930	1940	1950	1960	1970	1980	1985
AU	Socialist	BFG	ÖGB	66	55	–	100	100	100	100	100
	Catholic		ZKCG	7	16	–					
BE	Socialist		FGTB	.	.	.	26	28	32	32	40
	Christian		ACV	.	.	.	74	72	68	68	60
	Liberal		CGSLB	.	.	.	*	*	*	*	*
DE	Socialist		LO	11	16	70	43	40	42	46	48
	employees		FTF	.	.	.	.	38	34	31	28
	staff		AC	.	.	.	.	6	7	8	7
GE	Socialist	Afa	DGB	48	30	–	62	49	53	61	62
	Christian	Gedag	CGB	29	35	–	–	4	4	4	4
	employees	GDA	DAG	18	25	–	21	18	15	12	12
	civil service		DBB	*	*	–	15	25	23	20	19
NE	Socialist	NVV	FNV	10	19	19	24	24	31	44	43
	Catholic		KNV	6	4	9	12	14	12		
	Protestant		CNV	6	7	10	12	13	12	18	21
	staff		MHP	.	.	.	.	.	6	13	13
	civil service		AC	.	.	.	7	6	6	12	11
NO	Socialist		LO	*	*	*	*	44	48	45	43
	employees		YS	.	.	.	.	.	.	17	18
	staff		AF	.	.	.	.	.	(6)	12	13
SW	Socialist		LO	32	37	34	28	25	21	18	18
	employees	DACO	TCO	.	.	(59)	64	66	69	65	68
	staff	SR	SACO	.	.	(6)	9	10	11	12	14
SZ	Socialist		SGB	6	11	16	19	17	16	15	16
	Catholic		CNG	0	1	1	2	3	3	3	4
	employees		VSA	74	60	53	41	44	43	41	42
UK	Labour		TUC	*	*	*	54	65	*	84	*

SOURCE: adapted from VISSER 1990: Table 7.21; and DUES database 1991

FROM SOCIAL POLICY TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

Social policy has reinforced collarline differences not only in terms of social distinctions but also in respect to organizational impacts. Social insurance schemes and their administration can provide an important incentive to sectionalist collarline interest politics.[20] Moreover,

[20] In Germany, social insurance funds are self-administred, white-collar sickness funds can provide more favourable schemes since they cover less occupational risks. Moreover, social insurance elections provided a means to sectionalist professional politics, thus the German DAG not only has

elections to works councils and other statutory participation committees provide in some countries special representation status to white-collar employees (Germany, Austria, Belgium) or to *cadres* (France). These institutions with their separate representation modes thus reinforced the social division and provided ample possibility for interest organizations to exploit sectionalist interest representation to legitimatize and promote their organizational separation.

The labour interests are also split along the collarline, in respect to income (wage) policy, industrial relations, and social policy. This caused particular strains on common positions within union centres and conflicts of interest representation *vis-à-vis* party and state. Since initially white-collar employees, particularly in the private sector favoured different, more harmonious labour relations than blue-collar workers, they had traditionally shown more reluctance to go on strike. Moreover, white-collar unions, given the lower degree of unionization and strike proneness but particularly given their larger fragmentation and loose coordination were in comparative disadvantage compared to blue-collar unions in wage bargaining. In fact, blue-collar unions were able to achieve and continue wage leadership in the postwar economic growth years, while white-collar unions fell behind. To overcome their disadvantage through fragmentation into many occupational unions, and being spread across rival and weakly centralized union centres, white-collar unions attempted to reform their coordination and organization structures. Bargaining cartels, like PTK- cartel for private sector white-collar unions in Sweden, were one first step towards centralization in bargaining. Moreover, white-collar general unions that were internally organized by occupational sections restructured their organization to better serve sector collective bargaining.[21]

PARTISAN ALIGNMENT AND POLITICAL HETEROGENEITY

Political alignment of white-collar employees is much more heterogeneous and more volatile, reflecting their more ambiguous class position and more mixed social background (cf. GIDDENS 1979, GOLDTHORPE 1984. Political white-collar unionism was often unable to attract more than a minority of white-collar employees, mainly those with working-class background. The reluctance to align to a Socialist movement has also been an important motive to create an explicitly politically "neutral" white-collar federation as in Switzerland (VSA, 1918), in interwar Germany (GDA, 1921), and in Sweden (DACO, 1931). Since white-collar workers tend to vote considerably more for bourgeois parties, political alignment of white-collar unions is a critical issue.

In Austria, while manual unions are dominated by the Socialist faction, in the largest ÖGB affiliate, the white-collar union GPA, the Socialists are in the minority. In Britain, a

its century-old sickness scheme but mobilizes still today one-third of votes in social elections of white-collar insurance schemes (BfA, DAK)

21 For instance, German DAG introduced industrial sections, while some British white-collar unions reorganized into broader sector unions (BIFU) or absorbed staff associations (ASTMS later MSF).

number of white-collar organizations has been reluctant to affiliate with the Labour Party, while some technicians' unions are known for their radical leadership. According to the 1913 Trade Union Act, unions need a majority vote before establishing a political fund, as consequence most partially white-collar unions had such funds but few white-collar unions (cf. LUMLEY 1973: 90-1).[22]

In respect to social policy, white-collar unions can come into conflict with the universalistic social policy of Socialist governments, for instance, the privately or publicly enforced superannuation became a dividing issue in Scandinavian welfare-states.[23] In general, universalistic welfare schemes and equalizing tax burden as advocated by Socialist party and union leaders found more resistance within the white-collar middle-class, especially in higher echelons. Wage and income policies that followed equalizing, solidaristic principles, though perhaps favoured by lower white-collar grades, spurred on indignation by higher earning and better educated white-collar workers to regain wage differentials through sectionalist unionism. The Socialist face the dilemma to appeal to and integrate white-collar employees within party and unions, while at the same time not to reinforce the collarline divisions and dilute its universalistic policy when attempting to accommodate the diverse interests.

CONCLUSIONS

The formation of white-collar unionism did not occur in a void but was a reaction to previous cleavage organization. The integration of white-collar unions into a unified labour movement or the emergence of rival separate white-collar union centres was contingent on the opening up and depolitization of the blue-collar movement. Yet the cleavage was on the one hand shaped by state and employers, but it was also partly promoted by the emerging white-collar, middle-class pressure groups that asked for further codification of the collarline. Once white-collar organizations existed, they reinforced the collarline cleavage for a considerable time through sectionalist interest formation and status pressure group politics. Since the craft-industry preceded, blue-collar unions had often already chosen an organization strategy that was exclusive or integrative towards non-mannual groups. Separate white-collar unions emerged in reaction to the early application of the industrial organization principle and the close links to a left political party of blue-collar union centres.

On the continent, white-collar separate unionism reflected the importance of social status destinctions and dividing social policy. In Scandinavia, it was more the role of the blue-collar union movement that favoured class solidarity and universal social policy that

22 Only few private white-collar unions or sections affiliated to the Labour Party in addition to sponsoring MP's, notably the now MSF-merged ASTMS and TASS, albeit a substantial share of its members contracted out of the political levy (cf. LUMLEY 1973: 92).

23 While the Swedish SAP-LO campaign gained from TCO's endorsement, while the Norwegian and Danish attempt were less successful in finding broader support (cf. ESPING-ANDERSEN 1985: 160-165)

Table 7.9
White-Blue Collar Cleavage

	MANIFEST COLLARLINE rival status centres	LATENT COLLARLINE separate status unions
Separate unions	*Worker vs. Status* benign neglect / rival centre SW, SZ, (DE)	*Worker plus Status* integrated affiliates marginal independent UK, IR, AU, BE,
Encompassing unions	*Unity vs. Status* encompassing / rival centre GE, NE	*Unity vs. cadres* encompassing / cadres separate FR, IT, (NO)

shunned off some white-collar groups. On the British Isles, white-collar employess became mainly organized by special organizations, though the fragmented union system and the possibility of opting out allowed them to eventually join the major union centre. The fourth pattern is given where status divisions exist but employer intransigence has postponed white-collar unionization, the major division separates the higher level employees (*cadres*) from other employees.

In the historical account, we have seen the intricate interaction between collarline distinctions in society and organizational decisions taken by the labour movement. Today, we can summarize the main patterns by four clusters of collarline transformation (see Table 7.9): (1) *worker* union movements that remained negligent (and left voluntary) to the organization of white-collar employees, thus separate *status* centres became early established; (2) *worker* union movements that accepted within the union centre *status* organizations for the sake of overall unity; (3) postwar labour *unity* movements that attempt to encompass all employees in industrial unions, however, they face resistance by traditional *status* organizations that formed separate union centres, (4) postwar political *unity* movements in which political alignment supersedes functional cleavages, except for higher grade *cadres*. The collarline is most entrenched and manifest in the Swedish and Swiss case, than through the existence of rival centres in Germany and the Netherlands, while the line is more internally accommodate in Austria and Belgium, more latent in Britain and Ireland, and finally most narrowly defined in France and Italy.

The *mobilization* pattern of white-collar unions differ between reference to professional skills or the same social situation (carrer blockage). Professional unions and promotional unions have some possibility to overcome the severe collective action problem of the individualist oriented white-collar salariat. The major factors explaining unionization are the availability of such union (union recognition and workplace access), the degree of bureaucratization, and the possibility for professional closure.

The *representation* of white-collar interests poses particular problems given the large degree of fragmentation, of minority status within encompassing unions, and the lower degree of centralization with white-collar confederations. They have also less linkeage to the

left political parties, but on the other hand are free to pressure all parties. Changes towards more centralization and more numerical weight have altered the picture in recent decades but provided more possibility for confrontation across the collarline cleavage. White-collar employees are increasingly unwilling to remain secondary in collective bargaining and union policy making.

8
THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE CLEAVAGE

> *In Western Europe, there is, of course, great variation from country to country concerning the rights of unionization and bargaining of public employees. At the outset it is necessary to distinguish between civil servants (usually nonmanuals whose job tenure is more or less permanent, unless they commit very grave offences), and nonestablished, or noncivil service public employees. (...) As far as this (latter) noncivil service group is concerned, their bargaining and strike rights have evolved to the point where they approach or equal those of employees in the private sector of the economy. (...) The status of the civil servant has undergone an enormous transformation in the past thirty or forty years. Civil servants were, for a long time, a highly privileged, special caste of workers, whose personal conduct was even subject of public scrutiny and regulation, let alone strikes, were nearly unthinkable. As for strikes, penal sanctions were generally provided. This state of affairs has changed substantially in every Western country* (KASSALOW 1969: 223)".

State traditions provide a further potential for labour divisions. Trade unionism originated from collective organization of wage labourers in response to the penetration of market economies, yet the situation in public employment was different. While liberal-market capitalism had replaced labour contracts for previous status relations, pre-capitalist state and status traditions continued in the civil service and became written into public law. In most countries, employment relations and collective bargaining follow very different rules in the public and government regulated sector. Employment security, status hierarchies, and grading systems, led to sectionalist interest of some grades and professions, particularly those with granted civil servant status and those engaged in academic or regulated professions. Certainly, with the growth of public administration, infrastructural and social services, a modern state bureaucracy emerged that resembled private enterprise administration (TORSTENDAHL 1991). However, one main qualitative difference to the market sector remained: public employment tends to be much more sheltered from market logic, from profit and cost-rentability considerations (BERGER & OFFE 1980). Political considerations matter more, leaving ample space for pressure group politics and political divisions over the expansion and regulation of public employment conditions. The *public-private* cleavage created the third challenge for labour unity to bridge the diverse interests in an increasingly interdependent "mixed" capitalist market and state regulated economies. With the rise of the Welfare States public employment expanded, though the state expansion reached its limits since the 1970s and privatisation programmes have been launched since the 1980s. This has only furthered the division between *market* and *state* for labour, too.

This chapter discusses the last of the three functional cleavages that intersect with the political cleavages. The public sector divide entails two intersecting divisions: the state-market division and the status-contract division. *First*, the *state - market* division derives from the particular nature of the employer - the state - and the type of services produced - mainly non-marketed public goods. The determination of labour demand, employment conditions, and remuneration are guided by political considerations, and less object to market logic and subject to productive measurement (cf. BERGER & OFFE 1980). Thus a manual worker may do the same job in the private and public sector (see Chapter 6), the determination of the employment and pay conditions differ considerably. *Second*, given the particular nature of the state and pre-capitalist state tradition, the state in order to guarantee loyalty and impartiality maintains *status relations* where public authority is delegated to its functionaries. While employment conditions of a part of the manual workers and clerks are defined by labour contract under private law, the status of civil servants tends to be *unilaterally* set by the state under *public law*. The public status-private contract division, although it largely overlaps with collarline differences (see Chapter 7), draws in the public sector an even more rigid division.

Following the scheme in the former chapters, the formation, mobilization and representation aspects of the public-private cleavage will be elaborated.

First, the *formation* of the public-private cleavage will be shown to interact with state structure and status traditions. The formation of two forms of public employees organization will be singled out: the staff association of civil servants and encompassing public sector unions. The integration of the two forms was the challenge to the labour union centres of the time. Yet in a number of countries separate civil service centres had emerged at the beginning of the Welfare state expansion. The variation in organizational forms reflect the differences in state tradition and the regulation of collective organization, bargaining, and strike rights.

Second, the *mobilization* strategies of status defense or professional closure and of open collective cartels differ considerably. Given a favourable environment, both mobilization strategies proof to be quite successful compared to some manual workers unions and white-collar unionization in the private sector. Therefore changes in the state-market division will affect the overall unionization.

Third, the *representation* pattern in the public sector represents the balance between the two forms of organization: the fragmentation into sectional professional interests or concentration into encompassing public sector unions. The particularities of collective bargaining and fragmentation in the public sector will be discussed. Finally, given the political control of public sector employment, 'clientelistic' politics become a crucial issue within public sector unionism. On the other hand, the more status conscious civil servants, the more heterogeneous their political alignment and distance to political unionism.

Table 8.1
The Rise of the Public Sector Employment

	AU	BE	DE	FR	GE	IR	IT	NE	NO	SW	SZ	UK
General Government Employment (in percent of labour force)												
1890	1.9	3.8		2.7				3.5	2.2	2.2	3.0	1.7
1910	4.7	4.8	4.4	2.7	5.5		4.4	4.6	3.4	3.5	5.7	4.1
1920	8.1	7.1	4.7	3.8	8.5		5.5	6.3	5.0	4.5	6.4	6.1
1930	7.6	6.5	4.2	3.4			5.1	5.8	4.7	4.7	5.8	5.6
1950	9.6	7.6	6.3	8.7	8.7		7.1	8.1	7.1	8.1	7.6	11.6
1970	12.5	9.3	10.4	12.9	10.9		12.0		10.1	10.8	8.3	
Public sector employees (in percent of dependent labour force)												
1920				13								14
1930				13						16		13
1950	21	19			15		14	19		23	12	19
1970	22	21	22	24	17	19	19	23	24	27	11	22
1985	28	26	33	28	20	25	24	26	29	38	13	24

NOTE: IR 1971, GB 1985 estimated; SOURCE: own calculations based on FLORA 1983, FLORA, KRAUS & PFENNING 1987, VISSER 1989

I
THE FORMATION OF THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE CLEAVAGE

The modern public administration became the prime model of modern bureaucracy and rationalization (WEBER 1922: 551-579), though it also conserved some pre-capitalist traditions. The modern constitutional state, in order to claim legal-rational legitimacy, regulated the civil service with lifelong tenure, depersonalized service, and merit based careers. The modern state transformed pre-capitalist status of personal services not into (capitalist) contract relations as in industry but to impersonal service relations that are based on status principles. Like private white-collar employees (see Chapter 7), *established* civil servants were initially a small status conscious group with no right to radical political activity, strike, unionization or even negotiation (KASSALOW 1969: 221). With the growth of the public sector, like in the case of private white-collar employment growth, this particular status diffused into a growing share of public employment, though internal differences increased with ongoing bureaucratization.

Over one century, impelled by two World Wars, public employment was extended far beyond traditional public administration into infrastructure, nationalized industries and welfare services. The level of public employment varies (cf. Table 8.1), however, between countries and over time (cf. ROSE 1985). Today, the public sector accounts between one-quarter and one-third of the total labour force, while it was normally below 10% before the First World War. Although the extension of public services following the First World War

augmented public employment by an average one-third over the interwar period, an explosion of the public sector occurred after the Second World War when public resources become transferred from 'warfare' to 'welfare'. While Germany was the leader in public sector employment until the Second World War, Beveridge's British welfare state with the national health service and nationalized basic industries became the postwar model. While most continental European welfare states nearly doubled their public employment over the last four decades, the Scandinavians and Low Countries extended their welfare states even beyond the British model. A substantial part of the employment growth was due to the extension of the social programmes, in particular education and health, while at the same time labour intensive services were cut, notably in basic industries (e.g. nationalized mining in Britain and France), public transportation (in particular: railways) and - in some former colonial countries - defence (cf. ROSE 1985: 21).

THE FORMATION OF PUBLIC SERVICE UNIONS

The origins of public sector unionism are twofold, quite similar to white-collar unionization in the private sector (see Chapter 7): the early status-conscious professional organizations of privileged civil servants and the collective mobilization of workers in communal and public services. An overview over the history of public sector unions remains sketchy since there are only few systematic studies[1]. The difficulty derives also from the diversity in pre-capitalist state traditions and special national paths towards bureaucratization and modernization.

In Britain, with its early craft labour movement and initially limited central state tradition, it is paradoxically in the state regulated sector that "industrial" unionism was to emerge, quite in contrast to the manufacturing sector. Besides the union in the nationalized mining sector (NUM), the post employees' union (UCW, 1920) and railway workers' union (NUR, 1913) were formed by amalgamations and organized all-grades within the sector, particularly the railway union was known as one of the first militant and politically active.[2] The two largest general unions (GMB, TGWU), originating from amalgamations of prewar unions in the 1920s (see Chapter 6), also organize in the public sector.[3] In competition to the general unions, the National Public Employee's Union (NUPE, 1928) and the National and Local Government Officers Association (NALGO, 1905) have grown particularly with female employment in local and NHS services to one amongst the largest British unions. The

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1 On the development of public service unions see the following studies CLEGG 1976, readers by STURMTHAL 1966, ROSE 1985, on Germany: KELLER 1983; on France: BIDOUZE 1979, SIWEK-POUYDESSEAU 1989.

2 Following a regional railway strike, the predecessor of NUR was declared liable (Taff Vale case) but achieved a repeal by parliament (Trade Union Dispute Act, 1906) and was a founding member of the Labour Party, its collective political levy became a legal dispute (Osborne judgement) that was again repealed (Trades Union Act, 1913).

3 GMB covers in particular municipal workers and national health service (NHS), while TGWU concentrates in public transport and docks.

First World War brought a surge in non-manual public sector unionism, although many had prewar predecessors. Civil servants are organized by a number of divisional unions (CPSA, CSU, SCPS) that initially catered for particular grades but increasingly branched out. Moreover, in the NHS a number of public service unions (COHSE) and non-TUC professional organizations (BMA, RCN, RCM) coexist. The British pattern is largely replicated in Ireland, where partly British unions coexist beside the main unions, in particular the large general union (IGTWU).

In Germany, with an authoritarian bureaucratic state tradition and politicised labour movement, only the communal worker union was affiliated to the Free union movement before 1914, while several unions for railways workers and post and telegraph employees remained independent or affiliated to the Christian or Liberal movement.[4] After the war, a railways union (since 1917 affiliated), the communal and transport workers unions were amongst the ten largest ADGB unions, though as many civil servants were independently organized.[5] Despite the attempt to unitary unionism after 1945, a very similar union structure reappeared in the public sector: the large ÖTV (follower of the 1930 merged commmunal and transport workers' union), a railways union and a post office union (both with many civil servants) and two civil service unions (teachers and since 1978: police), all within the DGB, *vis-à-vis* a multitude of *Beamte* organizations (as in Weimar Germany, matching the DGB *Beamte* membership). Similarly, in the Netherlands, neutral civil servants associations and partisan public sector unions coexisted, while in Switzerland, given the liberal weak central state tradition the pattern resembled the early British case: coexisting public sector unions and professional staff associations (lacking a particular *Beamte* status).

In Sweden, differently to Germany, not only the communal workers' union but also railway driver, post and telegraph workers' unions became early affiliated to the major labour union centre (cf. ÅMARK 1986), the latter unions merged to become the largest LO affilate (SF, 1970). However, civil servants and white-collar employees were organized outside LO during the interwar period, albeit some organizations date even further back. Four types of organizations became present in the public sector: manual unions, white-collar unions, higher civil servant organizations, and professional (academic) associations. Similarly, in Denmark and Norway different centres for white-collar and civil servants emerged, though the dividing line between manual and white-collar organizations are not as strict as in Sweden.

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4 In 1913, three Christian regional unions (55.700 members), two Liberal regional ones (9.000), four independent unions (132.200) organized railway workers (incl. construction) (Statistical Yearbook, 1915).

5 The Socialist-oriented public service unions organized about one million members, yet about as many were organized by status conscious civil service unions (DBB) in the interwar period (the Nazi abolished later all status related differences).

In France, since the Napoleonic reorganization of the civil service, the *grands corp de l'Etat* recruits its ranks from particular technical or administrative schools (*grands écoles*).[6] A further cleavage inherent in French state centralism is the division between state officials (*functionaire d'Etat*) with tenure and the socially inferior local officials and personnel with less secure employment status and lower wages. Professionalization was the initial drive to combine civil servants. Cadres and teachers considered themselves given the aims of central planning and national education as the modernizing *élite*. Thus French public sector unionism from its early origins remained fragmented into sectionalist professionalism and independent unionism but also incomplete national organization of the more 'peripheral' communal and welfare services. In comparison, the newly united Italian state never succeeded in establishing a French-type central state bureaucracy. As in the other three Catholic countries, the civil service was endangered to become servant of old traditional elites, the Catholic church interests or of political mandators, though measures to depoliticised and professionalize the administration had only partly success. In particular, the Italian public administration was affected by favouritism, *patronage* and clientelism that continued into the postwar period, this was reinforced by increased recruitment of southern Italians for public administration.

THE FORMATION OF PUBLIC UNION CENTRES

Historically, where civil servants had a particular duty obligation and were prohibited from political activity, strikes, and collective bargaining, close contacts with existing labour union centres were considered to be an *affront* against the state. Civil servants preferred to organize not only within their own status associations but formed their own independent peak associations. These organizations were to differ considerably from blue-collar *political* unionism of the time by stressing political neutrality and harmonious labour relations. Following the union recognition and the rising power of the labour movement, *civil service centres* were formed in a response to defend their status around the end of the First World War in Germany (DBB, 1918), the Netherlands (CRP, 1916; CMHA, 1917), Sweden (SR, 1917) and Norway (EL, 1918).[7] The German DBB grew considerable with interwar union recognition, general unionization and high inflation pressures, though banned from collective bargaining and strike right until today. A more contentious ADGB linked civil service centre emerged (ADBB) in competion but remained much smaller.[8] After the Second World

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[6] The later introduced *concours* (pre-entry examination), the *grands écoles* diploma, and seniority rules further reinforced the strong *esprit de corps* of the French civil service (cf. TORSTENDAHL 1991: 203-212).

[7] The Dutch and two Scandinavian federations of government officials remained docile, small staff associations (with a few 1000 members or less than 2% of all organized), they later joined in with larger, more rapidly growing professional organizations or associations of academics (Dutch MHP in 1974, Swedish SACO in 1974, Norwegian AF in 1975)

[8] The first major instance of a public sector strike in railways caused a rift between the politically neutral civil servant centre and Social-Democratic members, the latter group split-away (ADBB,

Table 8.2
Integration or Separation of Public Sector within Main Union Centres, Western Europe 1945-1989

	AU	BE	DE	FR	GE	IR	IT	NE	NO	SW	SZ	UK
civil servants (higher grades)	ÖGB	main	AC	(FEN) (ind.)	DBB DGB	(ind.) ICTU	(ind.)	AC	AF [EL]	SACO SR	(ind.)	TUC (ind.)
white-collar clerks (lower grades)	ÖGB	main	FTF	main	DGB DAG	ICTU (ind.)	main (auto)	MHP main	YS,YH LO	TCO	SGB (ind.)	TUC (ind.)
blue-collar workers (without *Beamte*)	ÖGB	main	LO	main	DGB	ICTU	main (auto)	main	LO	LO	SGB (FöV)	TUC

Note: see Table 8.(?); underlined: separate union centre from main centre(s); main: main union centres; ind.: independent unions; auto: autonomous and independent movements (COBAS, etc.).

War, while the German and Dutch labour movement attempted to build all-grades industrial unions, important civil servant centres reappeared (German DBB, 1949, Dutch AC, 1946) organizing today more than one-fifth of white-collar public employees (cf. VISSER 1990).

In a number of countries, white-collar employees in the public sector organized outside the major blue-collar union centres. White-collar employees' associations were founded in Sweden (TCO, 1937), Denmark (FTF, 1952) and Norway (ST, 1923, FSO, 1951). Facing the increasing power of Social-Democracy and LO unions, the success of establishing a forceful white-collar separate federation depended on building a broad *middle-class alliance* of public *and* private employees. Such an encompassing alliance was achieved by the Swedish TCO (old TCO and DACO merged in 1944), partly in Denmark (FTF, but independent unions coexisted), yet not in Norway with its fragmented union structure outside the LO (cf. FIVELSDAL 1965).[9]

However, in the majority of countries, public employees' union were more or less gradually integrated into existing labour union centres (see Table 8.2). The unions of railways workers, post office employees, municipal workers and teachers tended to be the earliest, unions of teachers, lower grade civil servants came second, and higher grades and health and other service workers last.

STATE TRADITIONS AND STATUS DIVISIONS

State traditions, the legacy of public law, and administrative structures have shaped the public sector employment relations, the internal divisions and the differentiation from the

1922), while a smaller organization of high ranking officials (comparable to the Scandinavian ones) coexisted.

9 By the same rank order, the degree of centralization and conduct of collective bargaining declines from the Swedish to the Danish to the Norwegian federations.

private sector. The legacy of authoritarian state traditions had an impact on an early encroachment of hierarchical, status oriented, semi-autonomous civil service, while early constitutional reform, liberalism and parliamentarism provided pressures for a more publicly accountable state bureaucracy. The territorial constitution, administrative structure and distribution of resources shaped the degree of centralization and standardization of employment conditions. Within public administration proper, in unitary states beside the central administration, and local (communal or county) administrations co-existed, though the degree of local autonomy over such matters as utilities, welfare institutions and education varied considerable.[10] These differences in centralization and territorial constitution were important in shaping the internal differentiation of public sector labour relations, especially to what degree the central government could intervene in public employment regulation and to what degree a fragmentation of responsibility hampered the centralization of public employer interests. Moreover, social differentiation could arise with different employment and authority relations.[11]

The *second* cleavage arose through state policy granting privileges and separating the employment status of public employees from private employees. The particular *status* attributed to state employees reflects the "continued importance of pre-capitalist legal forms (HEPPLE 1986b: 54)", particularly where public officials (*Beamte, embedsmaend, functionaire,* or *ambtenaar*) became modelled as politically neutral, bureaucratic functionaries *qua* legal authority (WEBER 1922) combined with a premodern duty to loyal service. These established civil servants enjoy in most countries considerable employment security (tenure) in return for special obligations of impartial service and state loyalty (cf. VOGEL-POLSKY 1986: 183-4).[12] However, even beyond the *established* civil servants, public employees profited from more employment security than in private enterprises since mainly budgetary constraints not sudden bankruptcy or economic cylces would determine continued employment.

An important element in maintaining status distinctions were special state *pensions*, yet the coverage and status distinctiveness varies across Europe. First, a large public pension system that covers a large share of public employment exists in Austria, Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy. Second, a privileged state pensions for civil servants only exists in Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. In liberalist (Switzerland) or universalistic state-dominated welfare systems (Norway, Sweden, Denmark) public sector pension have a more reduced scope (cf. ESPING-ANDERSEN 1990: 86-7).

In the continental tradition, civil servants are not employed by an individual contract under private law but according to *public law*. This has important consequences for the application of labour law, particularly dismissal procedures, strike and bargaining rights.

10 In federal states (German Reich and Federal Republic, Switzerland, Austrian Republic), an intermediary state level was an important, partly autonomous, tier in between the central and local administration.

11 For instance, the centralized privileged position of central state employees compared to local employees in France.

12 Dismissal is only possible in the case of severe break of law or regulations and as the consequence of disciplinary or legal measures.

In Britain and Scandinavian countries collective bargaining rights were eventually granted to trade unions (and the national government was relative free to negotiate within parliamentary budget control), while in countries with civil servants under public law collective bargaining was first established for non-established, lower ranking public employees and workers. Political activity or affiliation to political unions were prohibited to civil servants in prewar Germany but also for instance in interwar Britain (1927-45).

Furthermore the strike right of public employees varies considerably across countries and time (cf. HEPPLE 1986b, BEYME 1977: 189-90). Some state have exempted civil servants or prohibited strikes in important services (military police, railways, hospitals) or limited their extend, duration and arbitration. However, even where the strike right was not explicitly granted it became in some cases common practice.[13]

II
PROFESSIONALIZATION AND COLLECTIVE MOBILIZATION

Once public employees were free to collectively combine and their organizations were recognized by the government, they became organized in large numbers. This is remarkable for two reasons. First, industrial unionism was a strategy that developed from the *labour-capital* conflict in the private sector over labour productivity and a fair share of profits. Yet public unionism was successful among lower clerks and manual workers in non-marketed services as well. Second, white-collar employees, especially status conscious civil servants, were organized to a larger degree than white-collar employees in industry or private services. Apparently the conditions under which public employees can organize and the rational to join collective organizations have somewhat different bases in the state sector than in the market section. Nevertheless we find again two opposing principles of organization, similar to the ones discussed for the blue-collar and white-collar unionization (see Chapter 6 and 7): *status defense* and *collective solidarity*. These mobilization strategies operate, of course, under somewhat different conditions, given the particular employment conditions and labour relations in the public sector. A discussion of the context favouring high level of unionization in the state sector can reveal some of the particular factors inducing collective organization.

ESPRIT DE CORPS OR OPEN CARTEL

As much as craft unionism was a successful mobilizing strategy for skilled workers and professional unionism was so for white-collar professional workers, status-related strategies provide the base for organization of established civil servants and other higher-educated public employee groups. The public sector, particularly public administration, is

13 In Britain for police and post office employees, in France and Italy a duty of special notices in advance was stipulated.

commonly organized as a meritocratic, hierarchical bureaucracy. Recruitment into civil service is based on objective *merit* criteria, measured by university education credentials or professional certificates and in some cases universal entry examinations (*concours*). Education therefore determines entry chances and placement with a civil service rank from which one has a foreseeable career trajectory, mainly based on seniority rights. "In every major Western country the pattern is clear: government employs a higher proportion of educated personnel than the private sector (...). Everywhere the difference is great: it is four times higher in Germany and Italy, almost three times higher in France, and twice as high in Britain and the United States (ROSE 1985b: 37)." The better paid public sector jobs are much more closed than in the private sector where entry barriers and individual advancement tend to be more open.[14] Hence, professional closure is a successful rational strategy for civil servants. This accounts for the astonishing high organization rate of higher civil servants and professional employees, at least where special civil service status organizations or professional associations exist.

Even where collective negotiations are excluded and employment and pay conditions are set unilaterally by the state, collective organization may still play an important role. In fact, pressure group politics of status and professional interest *vis-à-vis* the government and parliament are particularly important in the public sector, given the governments and parliaments budget authority and regulatory capacity. Pressure group politics of civil servants *in lieu* of collective negotiations is a promising avenue. Civil servants were more represented within bourgeois political parties and most importantly knew "how to work the system".[15]

The same holds also even to a large degree for those in non-supervising "over crowded" grades that require educational or professional credentials but are characterized by large equalizing *corps*, for instance, teachers, police officers and nurses. For them, individual advancement can only be achieved by "climbing" the relative defined and seniority based promotion ladder (e.g. schoolmaster, senior officer, supervisor). Otherwise, only collective advancement through collective interest representation may bring improvement. The 'blocked' *corps* sectionalism prevails in the civil and professional public services: the multiple grade, department and staff associations as separate organizations or as sections are numerous within public sector unions.[16]

On the other hand, public employees unions with *collectivist* strategies followed similar strategies as general or industrial unions in the private sector (see Chapter 6). They used collective strategies to form an open *cartel*, gaining strength from encompassing organization. These largely manual public sector unions in railways and public transport, commu-

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[14] Although top salaries tend to be lower in the public sector, there are relatively more better paid positions available.

[15] Civil servants also had historically an advantage to other groups since they tended to be earlier enfranchised and more likely to be active in politics (see on Britain: ROUTH 1966).

[16] For instance, teachers are often organized according to school scheme, educational credentials and rank, civil servants often according to grade, corps and department.

nal services and utilities, were not very different to blue-collar unions in manufacturing. They tended to affiliate earlier to the labour union centre (and to the Labour party), collected money for strike funds and used the strike weapon were possible.[17] Favourable for collective organization in the public sector were a number of contextual factors, such as the centralization of employer associations, the bureaucratization and union recognition, as already discussed for white-collar employees (see Chapter 7) that were even more widespread than in private industry or services. A comparison with private sector unionization can reveal some of the specific environmental factors that foster public sector unionization.

BUREAUCRATIC STATE AND UNIONIZATION

For many Western European countries strong evidence has been provided that postwar unionization in the public or semi-public employment sector is higher than in the market sector (cf. CLEGG 1976, BAIN & PRICE 1980, ROSE 1985B, VISSER 1990). The differences in the level of unionization (see Table 3) are particularly marked in those countries where overall density is generally low or moderate (France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland), especially due to low (private sector) white-collar unionization (see Chapter 7). Given the more extensive public employment of non-manual employees, a generally higher level of density in public employment will contribute to the overall level of density of non-manual employees.[18] Moreover, in countries where public sector employment remains high, overall unionization remained higher than in other countries during the last decade of overall membership crisis.[19]

For the high overall unionization rates in Sweden, Denmark and Belgium, it has been claimed that union-led unemployment insurance schemes provided selective incentives (see Chapter 6), though this seems to be less an explanation in the case of public sector unionism. In countries with union-led schemes, public employees are not always covered, given tenure as established civil servants, or the selective incentive may be reduced, given the lower risk of job-loss in the public sector.[20] Moreover, since public sector unionization exceeds private sector unionization also in countries in which unemployment insurance is

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17 The three British "industrial" unions in nationalized mining (NUM), in railways (NUR) and postal services (UCW) are political industrial unions nearly uncommon in the productive sector.

18 For instance in 1985, the white-collar employees account for 80% of public employment (51% of market sector) in the Netherlands (cf. VISSER 1989) and 78% in Germany (Statistical Yearbook 1988), albeit some manual workers are considered established civil servants (*ambtenaar, Beamte*), particularly in railways and PTT.

19 The correlation of public employment and union density increased from 1970s to 1980s, see BEAN & HOLDEN 1992: 56.

20 In Belgium ca. 80% of all private and public employees are insured, though established civil servants are excluded; in Denmark all wage-earners are covered by union-led schemes, in Sweden the schemes are not compulsory; in Austria and Germany established civil servants are excluded from compulsory unemployment insurance; Dutch public employees have a separate scheme since 1922 (cf. FLORA 1986: Vol. IV).

Table 8.3
Public and Private Union Density in Western Europe

Country	Year	Public	Market	Ratio	Year	Public	Market	Ratio
Austria	1961	80%	59%	1.4	1985	71%	52%	1.4
Denmark					1984	82%	81%	1.0
France	(1975	43%	14%	3.1)	1985	(22%)	(6%)	(3.5)
Germany	1961	70%	27%	2.6	1985	58%	28%	2.1
Italy	1961	29%	26%	1.2	1985	43%	39%	1.1
Norway	1960	81%	53%	1.5	1980	95%	50%	1.9
Netherland	1960	67%	35%	1.9	1985	46%	17%	2.7
Sweden	1960	68%	70%	1.0	1985	87%	77%	1.1
Switzerland	1960	75%	30%	2.5	1980	61%	25%	2.4
U.Kingdom	1968	64%	37%	1.7	1979	82%	44%	1.9

NOTE: Ratio: public sector density divided by private sector rate; France 1985 estimated. SOURCE: own calculations based on VISSER 1989;

state provided other explanations have to be sought. In fact, the role of public sector unions seems to be reversed: less to secure insurance for the case of unemployment but expand employment chances and prevent job cuts in the first place.

In a comparative study of six countries, Hugh Clegg explains the higher unionization in the public sector "by variations in the extent and depth of collective bargaining and in support for union security" (CLEGG 1976: 27). An important condition for membership recruitment, particularly of white-collar employees, is (or better: was) *union recognition* by state and employers (cf. BAIN 1970), in fact both tend to be identical in the public sector. Once unionism is recognized by the central authority, public employees will hardly be obstructed from joining by superiors.[21] In fact, public unionism may serve the central government to centralize and control employment and pay conditions throughout the public sector, even in the more remote decentralized local authorities, departmental divisions or semi-public enterprises.

Moreover, due to the more bureaucratic structures, especially for white-collar employees (cf. LOCKWOOD 1958), advancement is more closely dependent on collective determination and less based on individual employer-employee agreement (Cf. CLEGG 1976: 23-27). "Public employment tends to be concentrated in large or even gigantic establishments making both organizing and 'servicing' easier and less costly. It is perhaps on accident then that the degree of unionization of municipal employees, (as in Sweden) (...), is less high than that of the white-collar employees of the central government. The average size of the establishment in the local government is most probably less than that of the central government, even though individual local establishments may be larger than many agencies of the central government (STURMTHAL 1966: 380)". Indeed, given the primacy of legal bureau-

21 For instance, in a statement of the British Treasury (1958), "civil servants are (...) encouraged (...) to belong to associations, for the existence of fully representative associations not only promotes good staff relations but is essential to effective negotiations on conditions of service (cit. in ROUTH 1966: 184)".

cratic rule in the public sector, the pay scales and grade system do not allow individual superiors-employee discretion of employment or pay conditions as in industry but require legalislative control. "Wages and working conditions are set down by regulations and decrees. The individual sees himself confronted by an overwhelming power. The protection of the union seems indispensable to him, if he is to influence his own fate at all (STURMTHAL 1966: 380)".

However, the comparison of private and public sector unionization, conceals intersecting differences in white-collar and blue-collar unionization. In most countries blue-collar density and public density (for both status groups) are much higher than white-collar density in the private employment sector (see Chapter 7). Due to the lack of cross-sectional data on membership or/and on dependent employment in most countries, we can only illustrate this effect with data from the Netherlands. The Netherlands represent one of the most advanced Welfare states in Western Europe (cf. VALL 1970): the share of public employment has doubled in the postwar period - every fourth employee was on the public pay-role in the 1950s, while every second employee is so today. Similarly, the share of white-collar employees doubled from some 30% in the 1950s to 60% in the 1980s (cf. VISSER 1989: Ch. 6). On the other hand, the Netherlands are one of the countries were a long-term decline in union density has accompanied the structural shifts in the dependent labour force. Over the whole postwar period one can observe that overall union density in the public employment sector had been always above the degree of organization in the private employment sector. In fact, before the 1980s, more than every second public or semi-public employee was a member of a union, while in the originally much larger private employment sector the degree was below 40%. Similarly in Germany, public sector unionization is the reverse of private sector pattern: white-collar employees are far better organized than blue-collar workers in the public sector and even better than blue-collar workers in the private sector.[22]

Unionization in the public sector is counter-intuitive also in respect to the high rate of female unionization that tends to be lower in the private sector. Female and part-time employment tend to be larger in the public than in the private sector. In the Scandinavian countries female and male unionization rates have nearly merged, particularly due to the mobilization success of female employees, including part-time workers, in the public sector.[23]

Given the special state pension system in most countries and status orientations of many civil service organizations, public employees tend to remain within their unions after retirement.[24] High pensioner rates are reported for unions with aging male manual work-

22 White-collar employees, particularly *Beamte*, are well organized, albeit not all by the main labour confederation (DGB) but half of all civil servants are organized by DBB.

23 The Scandinavian welfare state can be considered a "job creation machine" for female employees, they represent more than two-thirds of public employment in Sweden but only ca. 40% in Germany (cf. ESPING-ANDERSEN 1990: 202).

24 In fact, since the number of pensioners are often concealed unionization rates tend to be overestimated (cf. BAIN & PRICE 1980, VISSER 1989, 1990). Pensioners in 1985, for country (or where speci-

force as unions in railways, also in post offices, and in (nationalized) mining, while some civil servant organizations (e.g. German DBB, Dutch AC) retain a large pensioners share as well. With the growth of public employment and aging male manual or civil servant labour force structure the share of the non-active membership increased in most countries and major union centres. This may lead to strains in union finances, since special pension payment and lower dues rates are still common. Nevertheless, it also indicates the life commitment of public employees to their union but may increasingly change the function of unions as most notably in Italy.[25]

III
FROM SECTIONALISM TO CLIENTELISM

Given the two organizing strategies, sectionalist grades organizations and collective solidaristic unions, the question of integration or fragmentation of interests arises. It seems to be difficult to achieve labour unity through encompassing unions and prevent the emergence of sectionalist organizations. Differences in state traditions but also the interaction between dominant union principle, political orientation and integration or separation of special interests accounts for much of the large public sector union diversity. The degree of encompassing centralization and fragmentation vary considerable across countries: the degree to which the traditional political industrial unionism (see Chapter 6) was able to integrate interest representation of public employees. The particular character of the public sector compared to the private sector derives also from the different structure, character and realm of collective bargaining. Yet wage bargaining provides also the potential conflict not only between sectionalist and solidaristic interest organizations within the sector but between class organizations in the market and state sector. This spreads increasingly further into politics, where the traditional party-union linkages become obstacles in organization or provoke internal splits over market primacy or state expansion.

SECTIONALIST FRAGMENTATION AND CARTEL CONCENTRATION

The degree to which public sector unions became encompassing and were integrated into the major labour movement varies across countries (see Table 8.4). In Austria and Belgium, the main union centres were able to monopolize public service unionism and collective bargaining rights, public employees are highly concentrated in four unions (ÖGB), and in Belgium in one general union (FGTB, also CGSLB), or two general unions plus four teacher unions (CSC). High concentration also exists with four to five unions in the main union centres in Germany (DGB), Italy (CGIL, CISL), the Netherlands (FNV) and Switzerland

fied: union centre) AU: ÖGB ca. 16.0%, BE: CSC ca. 18.6%, DE: LO ca. 8.0%, GE: DGB 12.5%, IT: 28.4%, NE: 17.4%, NO: LO 17.0%, SW: LO 13.3%, SZ: 7.4%, (cf. VISSER 1989; DUES database).

25 The Italian unions centres, particularly Communist-led CGIL, retain a large share of public pensioners who participate in union (and party) social life and see their unions as welfare pressure group vis-à-vis the state.

Table 8.4
Number of National Unions in Public Sector (1950, 1985)

1950	AU	BE	DE	FR	GE	IR	IT	NE	NO	SW	SZ	UK
Overall	16	32	119		33	109		327	125	156	66	720
Public Sector	4	6	30		18	29		189	72	86	24	166
encompassing	4	3	7		3	.		4	10	11	3	3
sectional	-	2	21		10	25		179	59	72	18	150
rival union	-	1	2		5	4		6	3	3	6	13
1985												
Overall	15	40	129		82	80	65	236	148	75	72	286
Public Sector	4	12	54		46	28	26	162	90	30	31	102
encompassing	4	2	4		3	.	15	4	9	2	3	4
sectional	-	9	47		31	26	11	151	81	26	21	93
rival union	-	1	3		12	2	0	7	.	2	7	5

NOTE: Number of unions includes locals; all countries 1950 or 1985, except for DE: 1953, GE: 1951, NO: 1956. SOURCE: DUES database (own calculations).

(SGB), albeit many sectional unions emerged outside the labour union centres. In the Scandinavian countries with the coexistence of union centres for blue-collar workers, white-collar employees, and civil service or professionals organizations are threefold, not to speak of the more fragmented organization patterns of the latter groups. Within the three Scandinavian LOs, the Swedish LO is most concentrated, than the Danish LO and finally the Norwegian LO, thus in reverse relation to the degree of integration of white-collar employees within their ranks.

While public sector unions within the major union centres became increasingly concentrated, sectionalist civil service organizations and staff associations multiplied at the border. An increasing fragmentation into many sectionalist unions seems to be the common trend with the *growth to limits* of postwar Welfare States, except for countries where sectionalism was institutionally excluded (e.g. Austria, Belgium). There are more than forty non-DGB organizations in Germany, and over twenty non-SGB organizations in Switzerland. In the Netherlands and Britain, the number of sectionalist unions is particularly high, but has become curtailed as some staff associations merged or became absorbed by larger unions. Increasingly, these sectionalist organizations became what they had initially or traditionally abstained from in favour of interest group representation: they adopted militant strategies and pressed for recognition as collective bargaining partner.

In the early 1950s, public employees comprised still a small minority in the Socialist electoral support or in the membership of allied union centres. Public unionism comprised about one-sixth or one-fifth of membership in these confederations, with the exception of the Austrian ÖGB (29%), which profited from the extensive state sector, fears of cuts in civil servant privileges, and a monopoly in representation. With the growth of the Welfare state and public employment, particularly in Scandinavia and Austria, the Netherlands and Britain, a remarkable shift in union membership of the Socialist union centres occurred un-

Table 8.5
Membership Share (%) of National Unions in Public Sector (1950, 1985)

1950	AU	BE	DE	FR	GE	IR	IT	NE	NO	SW	SZ	UK
Overall	100%	100%	100%		100%	100%		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Public Sector	29.2	15.1	13.9		27.0	13.7		26.0	26.2	26.1	27.4	20.7
encompassing	29.2	12.4	5.5		21.7	.		7.1	17.4	15.3	16.0	2.6
sectional	.	2.3	5.8		3.3	10.3		12.5	8.6	8.5	7.9	9.0
rival union	.	0.4	2.6		2.0	3.4		6.4	0.2	2.3	3.5	9.1
1985												
Overall	100%	100%	100%		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Public Sector	35.1	19.1	25.5		34.6	26.3	28.8	45.5	48.1	45.4	32.7	41.1
encompassing	35.1	13.1	10.9		21.1	.	27.2	23.3	26.5	23.7	13.7	19.6
sectional	.	4.8	11.0		9.6	24.0	1.6	17.8	21.6	13.0	12.0	17.4
rival union	.	1.2	3.7		3.9	2.3	.	4.4	.	8.6	7.0	4.1

NOTE: all countries 1950, except for DE: 1953, GE: 1951, NO: 1956. SOURCE: DUES database (own calculations).

til the welfare growth came to its limit in the 1970s. By the mid-1980s, public unionism contributed over one-third in Austria, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, and the United Kingdom (see Table 8.5). In Britain, due to the severe membership losses in the private sector during the Thatcher government years, the public union share gained relatively, while absolute membership stagnated. In Germany, Belgium, Italy and Switzerland, the record of public unionism growth was less remarkable, partly due to competition by other organizations (Germany, Belgium), or slower employment growth (Switzerland). In France, the Socialist teachers union FEN is the fourth largest movement, the public sector accounts probably around three-fourth of combined membership of FO, CFDT and FEN, all three (particularly the latter two) movements are within the orbit of the Socialist party.

In terms of *associational monopoly* (see Table 7), the Austrian unitary ÖGB enjoys an undisputed monopoly in all sectors, including the public sector, in which the political composition is more diverse than in industry.[26] The Belgian Socialist unions lost not only among the private employees but also in the public sector to the Christian unions (with their more status related structure) that are today majoritarian, a considerable increase from 15% in 1920. In France and Italy, political cleavages are also more dominant, the Communists tend to receive somewhat less support in the public sector, particularly amongst teachers (organize separately in France) and civil servants, while the Italian secularized Christian centre and in France the anti-communist FO unions are overportionally represented in the public sector. However, in both countries independent *ad hoc* strike movements and in Italy (here not counted) autonomous and independent sectionalist

[26] However, internally it has a more heterogeneous partisan composition with public sector unions tending more to the left (as blue-collar unions) and some more to the centre (as white-collar unions).

Table 8.6
Public Sector Union Membership and Major Union within Major Union Centre

	AU	BE		DE	GE	IR	IT	NE	NO	SW	SZ	UK
Union Centre:	ÖGB	FGTB	CSC	LO	DGB	ICTU	CISL	FNV	LO	LO	SGB	TUC
Membership share (%)												
1950	29.2	21.0	.	5.8	26.3				18.0	19.2	.	>20.0
1970	29.4	26.6	.	8.5	29.1				26.1	24.5	.	>30.0
1989	36.0	22.5	19.0	17.5	30.2				41.2	39.5	30.0	>40.0
Largest Union:	GÖD	CGSP	CCOD	DKA	ÖTV	LGPSU		ABVA	NKF	SKAF	SEV	GMB
Membership share (%)												
1950	8.2	18.2	4.8	2.5	13.3	.		13.5	9.4	7.6	15.1	.
1970	8.5	23.3	6.1	2.7	14.6	1.3		20.6	13.3	15.1	13.4	.
1989	13.9	21.3	7.8	8.5	15.7	3.5	8.7	28.1	24.5	31.4	13.0	10.0
rank	3rd	2nd	6th	4th	2nd	5th	4th	1st	1st	1st	3rd	2nd

Note: White-collar private sector membership; Ranking of affiliates by membership share within union centre; unions mainly in public sector; DE without HK

movements have gained in importance and challenged the "big" five French and three Italian union centres.

In Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland, the main union movements (Socialist or Christians) faced severe competition from civil service centres or independent unions already since the interwar period. Those sectional organization represent today about one-quarter of public sector membership in Germany and more than one-third in the Netherlands and Switzerland. In the Scandinavian countries, the main labour centre depending on its degree of white-collar organization faces competition from white-collar unions and additionally professional associations.[27] In Britain and Ireland, a considerable share of overall membership tended to be organized by white-collar unions and professional associations not affiliated to the main union centres (TUC, ICTU) but some joined during the postwar movement, leaving mainly some organization of medical doctors and nurses outside the TUC realm.

27 The Norwegian LO profits from its larger share and the fragmentation outside, the Danish LO still makes inroads into public sector, mainly female and part-time employees but faces a strong white-collar centre (FTF) and smaller rivals, and the Swedish LO looses gradually in importance (from 55% in 1950 to 46% in 1980) compared to the cooperating TCO (ca. 40%) and the growing status defending SACO-SR (12%).

Table 8.7
Associational Monopoly in Public Sector, Western Europe 1920-89

Country	Centre	Type	1920	1930	1939	1950	1960	1970	1980
AU	ÖGB	(Soc.)	75.8	66.5		100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	ZCG	Chr.	10.9	20.9				-	
	Nat	Nat.	13.3	12.6					
BE	FGTB	Soc.	84.7	79.5	74.4				50.3
	CSC	Chr.	15.3	20.5	25.6				49.7
	CGSLB	Lib.							
DE	LO (DSF)	Soc.	53.8	58.8		37.0	32.0	39.8	48.0
	FTF	white					51.7	45.4	40.0
	AC	acad.					2.9	6.4	5.8
	others	ind.	46.2	41.2		63.0	13.4	8.4	6.2
FR	CGT(U)	Com.	51.4	36.5	100.0			35.6	
	CGT-FO	Synd.	48.6	63.5				18.8	
	CFDT	sec.						16.1	
	CFTC	Chr.						2.0	
	CGC	cadre						1.8	
	FEN	educ.						25.7	
GE	DGB (ADGB)	(Soc.)	17.6			78.9	63.7	63.1	66.5
	DBB	Beamte	47.0			13.8	25.4	25.8	24.6
	DAG (Afa,GDA)	white	19.5			4.4	3.8	3.6	3.9
	CGB (Gedag)	Chr.	15.9				3.2	2.7	3.5
	others	ind.				2.9	3.8	4.8	1.6
IT	CGIL	Com.				55.8	31.3	32.7	37.7
	CISL	sec.				37.2	52.9	49.7	42.8
	UIL	Soc.				7.0	15.7	17.6	19.5
NE	FNV (NVV)	(Soc.)	22.1	26.9	22.8	24.3	24.4	29.8	44.9
	NKV	Chr.	9.6	9.3	9.9	12.3	13.0	10.1	FNV
	CNV	Chr.	7.2	8.3	9.9	12.3	14.0	13.5	22.0
	AC	Beamte				6.9	7.3	8.2	16.5
	others	ind.	61.1	55.6	57.4	44.2	41.2	38.5	16.5
NO	LO (NAF)	Soc.	.	.	.	.	56.1	63.1	54.7
	AF (EL)	acad.					6.1	6.0	9.3
	YS (YH)	white					11.6	9.7	13.4
	others	ind.					26.3	21.1	22.6
SW	LO	Soc.	91.4	90.0	67.0	55.1	50.0	46.2	45.6
	TCO	white			27.8	35.9	40.5	41.6	42.9
	SACO-SR	acad.	8.6	10.0	5.3	9.0	9.5	12.2	11.5
SZ	SGB	Soc.	77.3	68.1	66.0	64.8	59.6	54.9	49.8
	CNG	Chr.	1.5	2.2	3.1	5.5	7.0	8.8	9.7
	others	ind.	21.2	29.7	30.9	29.7	33.3	36.3	40.6

NOTE: IR and UK not available; years vary slightly (see source), but note GE: 1925; including predecessors; Soc.: Socialist / Labour; Chr.: Christian; Sec.: secularized; Com.: Communists; Synd.: syndicalists; Lib.: Liberals; ind.: independent; white: white-collar; Acad.: academics; Beamte: civil servants.
SOURCE: own calculations based on VISSER 1989, DUES database.

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

The particular nature of the public sector arises from the determination of employment and pay conditions in the public sector in contrast to the private sector. Different to the private sector, in some countries all or part of the public employment conditions are *unilaterally* set by the public authority. The practice and scope of collective bargaining varies with the public law tradition, government or parliamentary authority, and the status of the civil service. Paradoxically, even in countries where the government promoted collective bargaining in the private sector, many states have long postponed or partly still excluded collective bargaining in favour of unilaterally fixed, politically determined employment and pay conditions. Thus where civil servants had or still have no bargaining rights, pressure group politics via parliament petition or government appeal remained an open strategy. The consequence of this was, however, that interest representation remained largely fragmented into many sectional interests of mainly those that were in higher echelons whithin public administration on whose cooperation governments of all political colours had to rely.[28]

Such unilateral, political settlement was much more problematic for the more rapidly expanding lower civil service, communal workers, education and welfare sector. These lower grades public employees became increasingly organized within strike prone unions allied (or close) to the labour movement. They fought "from below" for union recognition, collective bargaining and strike rights already before the First World War. With the demobilization after the war, public sector unionism became recognized in most countries, collective bargaining was initiated and strikes became a more likely option.[29] On the other hand, given several competing organizations, union recognition could become a political issue, as the state would have to decide on granting recognition rights.[30]

With the exception of nationalized industry, the employers' interests in the public sector are commonly organized outside the private sector employer associations (see UPHAM 1990, LANZALACO 1992). While in the private sector employer associations provide also pressure group activities, there is no need for state-employers in the public sector since public authorities can use the day-to-day political-administrative channels.[31]

Where multi-union bargaining existed, like in Scandinavia, the union centres created intermediary bargaining cartels to coordinate bargaining activities.[32] In addition, pressures

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28 Moreover the pay conditions for these higher civil servants were mainly based on political considerations, the maintenance of status position that would preclude bribery and guarantee loyalty to the state.

29 In Britain, following the Whitley recommendations (1918), local and national negotiating machinery was introduced for the civil service in 1919.

30 In Britain, it was enforced that only one civil servant organization per grade would be recognized, while for the non-established public employees multi-union bargaining remained common.

31 One does find some form of coordination of the various national or regional administrations, local authorities, public enterprises and welfare services, sometimes through initiative of the central government, in some cases formal coordinating bodies but rarely a peak association similar to the private sector.

32 In Norway: LO cartel, 1936, Denmark: LO cartel, 1953, FTF cartels, Sweden: TCO-ST cartels.

mounted to better centralize and coordinate public unions, particularly among unions for manual workers and lower white-collar employees. Indeed, collective bargaining was increasingly used by the central government to control and standardize employment conditions and pay structures throughout the central administration, the Länder administrations, local services and other public services. Compared to the private sector, today's pay structures are relatively uniform throughout the public sectors.[33]

However, a major difference between public and private bargaining is the difficulty to determine productivity (since profitability is outruled) within the public service and therefore other considerations have to be taken into account. When during the 1970s public sector debts and inflationary pressures mounted, governments were tempted to impose wage restrains serving a *Vorbild* (as an example) to private sector negotiations, this in turn instigated militancy in the public sector (cf. HYMAN 1978: 43-5). The public-private cleavage became a "*Sollbruchstelle*" (potential breaking point) within the main labour movement as the public sector unions became increasingly centralized (due to central bargaining), demanded favourable policy of incumbent allied political parties, and were to pass the leading productive sector unions in size and power. In fact, public sector unions (see Table 8.6) were the largest by the 1980s in Norway, Sweden, and the Netherlands, or were the second largest affiliate in Belgium and Germany, or third in Austria and Switzerland (see above). A conflict of interest emerged within the labour movement over 'fair comparison' between private and public sector wages. As financial limits and monetary pressures narrowed the margins for wage increases, it became a zero-sum game between market and state sector: "public financing is the private sector's loss (SWENSON 1991: 381)".

"CLIENTELISM" AND POLITICS

Before the first World War, higher civil servants were commonly apolitical and loyal "servants" of conservative or liberal governments. In some communes and public services, mainly manual workers were organized in the left political party and union movement. Where Socialist party entered early in government, in local, regional or most importantly: national government, political public unionism found more favourable conditions. Moreover, once governments recognized unions after the First World War, public employees could more easily receive their right to organize than private employees. With the growth of the Welfare state, particularly following the Second World War, public employment grew rapidly (ROSE 1985b), though under different welfare regimes, each with a particular welfare-labour market *nexus* (ESPING-ANDERSEN 1990). Where the Socialist party became the driving force of postwar welfare state growth, public employees, particularly in municipal, education and welfare services, profited from the *amicable* relationship to Socialist party and allied public service unions. Moreover, since the 1970s the leadership of Left political parties and allied union centres was increasingly recruited among public

[33] For instance, in the more decentralized Federal Republic of Germany, the same (federal) pay schemes apply to all employees, albeit with some local adjustments (cf. KELLER 1983).

unionists, symbolising a silent shift from traditional "Fordist" towards a postindustrial orientation within the labour movement.

Until the *growth to limits* (cf. FLORA 1986) of public welfare spending, public unionism was not a conflictarian but reinforcing element in internal union centre cohesion and party-union relations. Public unionism had developed into a kind of 'clientelistic' relationship, where public unions *via* their links to the incumbent Socialist party could promote public employment growth, largely influence recruitment policies and co-define grading schemes and seniority rules. Welfare state development maintained a labour intensive manual workforce and created primarily lower and medium white-collar jobs in the education and health sector, which were thought to provide new mobility chances to educated working-class children and job-seeking women. Also in terms of voting behaviour the public sector cleavages has been found to be an important cleavage, at least in Scandinavia (cf. HOEL & KNUTSEN 1989: 196).

However, with the crisis in public finances public unions faced employment stagnation or even reduction, budget cuts limiting possible wage and salary rises, privatisation of public services, particularly of state-owned companies, PTT and railways. The strong grip of public unionism on welfare state and the proliferation of clientelistic interests through party-unions linkages, or through autonomous strike movements provoked strong reactions against excessive "union power" (cf. DOGAN & PELASSY 1987: ch. 5).

On the other hand, higher grade public employees, particularly civil servants, tended to be politically more heterogeneous, if not traditionally allied to the bourgeois parties. Political unionism on the side of the lower public employees provoked initially state regulation and restrictions on political unionism, strike rights and politicisation of civil servants by the state that became only gradually relaxed with the integration of left parties into the democratic political system. Much like higher white-collar grades in the private sector, civil servants remained heterogeneous in political alignment. The higher the grade, the more civil servants tended to be organized by status organizations that were against solidaristic political class unionism and egalitarian taxation welfare politics. For instance, the Austrian election to personnel representation in the public sector show the split between "red" (Socialist) and "black" (Christian-Democratic) politics, the communal and railways workers vote largely for the Socialist fraction, while the federal and state employees but also part of the PTT employees favour the Christian camp.[34] Where civil servant centres exist, these organizations tend to go along with the political majority amongst their rank and informally ally with bourgeois parties, even in countries where Socialist parties are in government. Given the need for any political party in government to seek cooperation with the non-politically mandated civil service, pressure group activities of civil service organizations, even where they tend to be critical of the incumbent party, have good chances to be heard. Moreover, civil servants are conspicuously overrepresented in political parties and in par-

[34] For the Socialist fraction FSG (cf. the Christian FCG) voted 89% (6%) communal workers, 84% (9%) railways workers, 59% (36%) PTT employees, 31% (65%) federal and state employees (1977-79 *Personalvertretungen*), cf. PELINKA 1980: 191.

liament, given the professional advantages to know how the system works and often favourable exemptions from work during political activities, in fact, there is some truth to the view of a *Beamtenparlament* (parliament of civil servants) in public opinion. Among the unionized, union-sponsored or union-leaders in parliament, the public sector unions have therefore an advantage.[35]

CONCLUSIONS

The public-private cleavage is relative universal, although it leads to different forms of internal splits within the labour movement and within the sector as such. Like the organization of white-collar employees, the unionization of the public employees emerged in the context of the previous cleavage organization but also particular state traditions. The integration of public employees within the main labour union centre depended on whether political industrial unionism became an obstacle to encompassing union organization. The more political unionism and industrial unionism were dominant, the more likely sectionalist grades organization emerged, particularly were the state reinforced traditionally the status cleavage by rule-and-divide politics. It is in respect to the intra-sector cleavage, the differences between professional and solidaristic orientations that the impact of state traditions and pre-modern cleavage structures are most notable (see Table 8.8).

In Scandinavia with its Protestant-state professional bureaucracy, white-collar employees in private and public sector allied to form a joint movement against political industrial unionism, yet higher grades professional organizations emerged or remained independently. In Germany and the Netherlands, while public employees became integrated within encompassing public sector unions, given the particular *Beamte* status and legal-rational public administrations, sectionalist status and pressure groups organized independently. In the Anglo-saxon countries (but also Switzerland) with past liberal state traditions, numerous grades and staff associations coexist with larger public service unions in the decentralized local, welfare and education services. In the Catholic countries with a tendency toward politicisation and patronage, political cleavages (the Church-State and reform-revolution cleavages) remained more dominant than public vs. private cleavage. Besides some fragmentation due to independent civil service unionism, most public employees are organized along politico-religious lines (or integrated via fraction within a unitary movement as in postwar Austria).

The public-private cleavage entails in itself two divisions, one intra-class and one inter-class divisions. *First*, the state-market differences provides the potential for a conflict between industrial unionism and public sector unionism over the redistribution of national welfare growth. Ironically, in countries where public sector unions became highly concentrated and integrated within the main labour union centres, they are more likely to come

35 For instance, in the Xth German *Bundestag* of 230 unionized members of parliament (1983): 91 ÖTV, 42 teachers union, 10 others DGB public service unions and (mainly outside SPD) 51 DBB civil service unions (cf. NIEDENHOF & PEGE 1987).

Table 8.8
Integration and Separation of Civil Servants

	CIVIL SERVICE UNIONS INTEGRATED	CIVIL SERVICE CENTRE SEPARATED
DEMOCRATIC TRADITION	*General vs. Grades* Liberal-state autonomous UK, IR, (SZ)	*Labour vs. Academics* Scandinavia professionals SW, DE, NO
STATIST TRADITION	*Communes vs. Centre* Catholic countries *corps* AU, BE, FR, IT	*Labour vs. Bemate* legal authority public status GE, NE

into conflict within their "comrades" in the traditionally leading market sector. *Second*, the division between status and contract relations, between professional closure and collective solidarity, is the second intra-sector cleavage between middle-class and working-class interests. In most countries, this cleavage has not subsisted and may become more conflictarian as privatisation or public sector reforms will endanger traditional privileges.

The *mobilization* strategies in the public sector apply the same two principle as for other cleavages: closed or open mobilization strategies, once union recognition was granted. Due to the stress of education and professional credentials in the public sector, the strategy of "professional closure" is relative successful, as high unionization rates of professionals and civil servants indicate. Yet, also the strategy of open "collectivist" strategy has been more successful in mobilizing the majority of public employees, particularly since bureaucratization, career blocs, and political budget control gave an incentive to organize.

The *representation* of public employees' interests shows a similar division between sectionalist and solidaristic unionism. For status organizations, given the political heterogeneity of their members, sectionalist pressure group politics is the main channel of influence. The open public sector unions, on the other hand, were traditionally allied to the political labour movement, this provided a helpful channel of influencing government decisions when Socialists were incumbent, though in recent years, with strained public finances, the internal private-public cleavage within the labour movement became more manifest.

9
ENCOMPASSING UNION DIVERSITY

> *The model of democratization was 'too atomizing; it treated each case in isolation, without taking account of its connections with its surroundings, of the geopolitical position of the area in question. I began to study the links in space among the different cases, and became convinced of the decisive importance of interregional relationships, both in the process of nation-building and in the further structuring of mass mobilization'* (ROKKAN, *mimeo, cit in* TILLY 1984: 132, *cf.* ROKKAN 1980)

Europe shows bewildering variation in union diversity. And labour unity seems not to prevail in Europe. In the preceding two empirical parts on *political* and *functional* cleavages, we had been examining each cleavage in its own right, finding an exhausting variety in union diversity. We have asked for each conflict: *whether* it was present in a society and if so, *when* it came to the fore and *how* it was transformed into union organization? We found that in some countries labour unity is more or less attained in political terms, while it lacks social inclusiveness, while in many others the reverse is more the case. Moreover, each national labour movement went through distinct stages of responding to arising internal interest conflicts. As in the light of one conflict an organizational decision was taken, soon new challenges emerged - it seems like a *'never ending story'*. However, examining the sequence and interaction of previous to later mobilization of cleavages has given us a tool to understand the main ramifications in the diverging paths in union development across Europe. We will be reflecting again at the trend and future relevance of cleavages for union development in the concluding chapter (Chapter 10).

The contention of this chapter on *encompassing union diversity* is that there is some order in diversity. In singling out the main sources and forces that were involved in transforming cleavages into organization, we will see how there are systematic variations across Europe. Moreover, the model of sequencing of cleavages and the national channelling will be a guide to understand why some cleavages became more dominant than others and why they took different organizational forms. In this chapter, the task at hand is to try to encompass the extensive union diversity across Europe. After having studied diachronically each cleavage transformation it is now time to halt and take account. Thus we will take a more elevated position as an observer, drawing a *European map of union diversity* from a bird's-eye-view.

But *first* we will be scanning the structuring of union systems from a far distance. We need to look at the whole system of cleavages, to understand what kind of conflicts were more or less likely to be transformed. In addition, I shall give some overview over other cleavages that were not exposed in the historical chapters. That these other cleavages have

not been as dominant or manifest will provide us with an extra clue to understanding the salience of the six cleavages discussed thus far. *Secondly*, it will further be asked again what were the external forces that intervened in cleavage *crystallization*. We can now assess whether there is a relationship between the union environment and the structure of union systems. *Thirdly*, I will attempt to sketch ideal-type *clusters* of labour movements based on our reading of political cleavage structures. This will lead us to the final task of drawing a *European map of union diversity* spanned by Rokkanean "*master variables*". With the map of union diversity at hand, we can ask whether there is or will be a chance for *European labour unity*, at least in form of a most common denominator coordination around the main clusters at a higher *trans-national* European level?

I
MANIFEST AND LATENT CLEAVAGES

As we moved, in the last two parts, from one cleavage to the next, we found increasing differences in whether a cleavage became important or not. Why are some social cleavages to become crystallized and monopolized, while others remain absent or latent? Indeed, I would like to remind the reader to the distinction introduced earlier (see Chapter 2) between *manifest* and *latent* conflicts (MERTON 1948, cf. DAHRENDORF 1959). Accordingly we can also distinguish more or less manifest and latent cleavages in union systems. Looking at the six cleavages that became manifest, we have seen how they vary in universality. In the following we will be looking at the *universality* of the labour-capital cleavage and the sources of the cross-cutting cleavages again. I will stress first the importance of the sequence in organization formation for variations in the labour-capital cleavage. The second claim is the legacy of preindustrial social cleavages that became reinvigorated and mobilized once labour movements came into being. This will lead us to the consideration of other cleavages that - according to ROKKAN - had been important in the structuring of mass democracies but that have not played a dominant role in structuring labour movements. Moreover, I will be discussing briefly some additional, *latent* cleavages that have not yet become manifest cleavages but could come to the fore in the future.

THE UNIVERSAL LABOUR-CAPITAL CLEAVAGE REVISITED

LIPSET and ROKKAN'S (1967) claim that the labour-capital cleavage is relative universal was shown to be valid in respect to the emergence of a working-class party (and union centre) before the First World War (see Chapter 3). Certainly, the formation of a working-class party and union centre, whatever form they had, was a general phenomena in Europe, and as such has not added to differences between party (or industrial relations) systems. However, the character, orientation and base of Socialist parties varies across Europe, in particular, and most relevant here, the relationship between party and unions are multiple. In fact, ROKKAN (1968) and LIPSET (1983) discussed variations in the reformist or revolutionary character, signified by strong Communist labour movements and working-

class splits (see Chapter 5), but seemed to assume the preceding labour-capital cleavage to be ubiquitous and therefore less in need to be examined. Thus, differences in Western party systems were taken to derive form variations of the first three Rokkanean (pre-capitalist) cleavages (centre-periphery, urban-rural, Church-State) and a "possible" fifth cleavage (national-international), yet the fourth labour-capital cleavage was considered to be less important.

The *labour-capital* cleavage, as was shown (see Chapter 4), led to considerable differences in the timing, sequence and character of party and union formation and subsequent relations. This had important consequences for the further structuring of alternatives, not only in terms of the *reform-revolution schism* but - as was shown in this study - on all subsequent political and functional cleavages in union movements. The four patterns of party-union relations deriving from the labour-capital cleavage (the union-led, party-led, interdependent and independent party-union formation) had consequences for the integration of anti-Socialist, non-political, or politically heterogeneous Church-going workers, manual industrial workers, white-collar employees or civil servants. The flaw in the labour-capital "*universality*" thesis can be repaired without doing injustice to, but instead reinforcing, Rokkan's claim of the importance of each cleavage for the structuring of alternatives. As a consequence of the pre-capitalist cleavages, the distinct pre-industrial legacies and the permutations of elite strategies to integrate the working-class in polity and economy, the seemingly "universal" industrialization process became differently transformed into Socialist party and union alliances.

My claim is that history and politics matters, while the "logic of capitalism" - in both the Marxian or Modernist view - leads not necessarily to convergence in the organization of labour interests. The industrialization process swelled the "proletarian" labour force and led to population shifts from rural to urban, from agricultural to industrial areas all across Europe with the well-known variations in timing (cf. ROSTOW 1952). Yet, industrialization led hardly uniformly to working-class formation (cf. KATZNELSON & ZOLBERG 1986), and even less to uniform organization of labour interests. Certainly, the timing, rapidity and character of industrialization had an impact (cf. GALENSON 1952b, LORWIN 1958), albeit indirect and mediated, on the formation of working-class labour movements (cf. LAFFERTY 1971, ELIASSEN 1974). The economic development first of all set the conditions under which the functional cleavages became transformed, particularly, in respect to the *craft-industry* cleavage (see Chapter 6). The craft-industry cleavage and the labour-capital cleavage were *mutually* reinforcing - the persistence of sectionalist orientations or the cultivation of class solidarity ideology had been advanced by, and had consequences for, both *party* (cf. MARKS 1989) and *unions* (cf. FULCHER 1988, 1991).

THE PRE-INDUSTRIAL LEGACY OF LABOUR CLEAVAGES

While the thesis of the "*universality*" of the labour-capital cleavage has to be amended, Rokkan's contention in respect to party systems that "the decisive contrasts among the systems had emerged *before* the entry of the working-class parties into the political arena

(ROKKAN 1970: 113)" can be confirmed and shall be even extended to the corporate bargaining arena. For historical-sociologists it may not be surprising to ascertain that pre-industrial traditions shape the crystallization of labour interests and that historical continuities remain, despite uprooting social, political and economic changes. CROUCH, in the same vein, offers "a reminder that complex societies very rarely present *tabluae rasae*, even after events as shattering as two world wars, and that recent institutions and behaviour have deep historical roots (CROUCH 1986: 178)". In contrast to teleological convergence views of *modernization* theorists (cf. KERR et al. 1960), the formation of labour movements was the result of a *partial* modernization process (cf. RUESCHMEYER 1979), a junction of modern and pre-modern forces. This historical perspective will lead us to discern the origins of diversity in the specific conditions under which the path of development branched out and was further carved. Yet, in order not to be just a *credo* of a profession that legitimates its interest for history against their "timeless" sociology colleagues, one should single out which traditions had what effect and how this was preserved over time, despite the view of a constant changing society.

The *pre-industrial legacy* had an impact on both political and functional cleavage crystallization. The rise of an industrial workforce with industrialization and urbanization did not eradicate the impact of previous social distinctions, established political alignments or traditional cultural rootings. In respect to each political cleavage, the importance of pre-industrial cleavages have been highlighted: the political, religious and cultural traditions all moulded the crystallization of political cleavages within the labour movement. By the formation of the first national union centres in the 1890s, a century of partial political integration or exclusion of the "lower estates" had passed since the French Revolution of 1789. The impact of liberal state traditions and early suffrage reform in comparison to authoritarian state traditions and exclusive strategies have been mentioned as important in shaping the formation of the labour-capital cleavage, the persistence of *lib-lab* traditions or their replacement by Marxian Socialist ideology (see Chapter 3). The importance of the religious factor and State-Church relations prior to the educational mobilization of the working class, led to the preserving of religious identity or of secularisation (or even dechristianization) within the working-class (see Chapter 4). The preserving of local and work communities in opposition to the centralizing Nation-State, and the failure of national cultural integration, were a profound base for the emergence of revolutionary *counter-cultures* (see Chapter 5).

Even more striking is the pre-industrial legacy on functional cleavages, since these remain most closely linked to divisions in the labour process and thus should be subject to the convergent pressures of economic development. Yet, since DURKHEIM (1893), sociologist have stressed that the division of labour is a *social* division, one that reflects social differentiations and power relations in society (cf. RUESCHMEYER 1986). The persistence of pre-industrial craft traditions intervened not only in the "organization of work in industry" (RUESCHMEYER 1986: Ch. 5), but had also an important impact on union organization: the degree of sectionalist or class solidarity (see Chapter 6). In respect to the white-collar

cleavage, it was stressed how much pre-industrial *status* distinctions where reinforced and expanded by paternalistic employers and state strategies to *rule-and-divide* labour (see Chapter 7). Finally, pre-industrial *state traditions* had their impact on status relations within the civil service and the scope of unilateral state intervention (see Chapter 8). These historical legacies were not to determine the future - say an observer in 1890 was to predict 1990 - but set the predispositions on which the further development draw.

PERIPHERAL CLEAVAGES AND NATIONAL LABOUR

ROKKAN's cleavage typology (1970) proposed *five* cleavages that emerged as a result of the Industrial, National, and International Revolution (see Table 9.1).[1] However, not all of these cleavages were of *salience* to labour unity, some remained peripheral (centre-periphery, rural-urban), other cleavages (Church-State, Revolution-Reform) were more or less limited to some countries or time periods (see Chapter 4 and 5). The explanation for the variations in cleavage salience across Europe, compared to party systems, derives from the particularity of divisions *within* labour and the *national* integration of labour. The two peripheral cleavages, though of some historical or regional importance, hardly led to schism in *national* labour movements, particularly since the labour movement had become so much integrated within the national polity and economy. Working-class party and unions became stepwise oriented towards, if not drawn into, the national electoral channel and the national bargaining channel (see Chapter 2). As the diffuse political regulatory power and the local labour (and producer) market became increasingly national, the organization of labour interests were compelled to reorganize on the national level as well. After a century, the national parties and union centres are so much taken for granted that the long-term difficult process of centralization and national integration is often overlooked. Until this was achieved, the rural-urban cleavage and the centre-periphery cleavage had long challenged national labour unity and union centralization.

The *centre-periphery* cleavage became increasingly encompassed by national central unions and union centres in an attempt to eliminate politicized localist and sectionalist regional independent organizations (see Chapter 4). Historically, until the end of the *Habsburg* Empire, different left party and union organizations existed for the language groups in the Austro-Hungarian multi-cultural "nation-state". Also in the German *Reich* (until 1933), the Polish immigrant workers had, for instance, their own union organizations. On the British Isles, the centre-periphery cleavage led to the formation of regional union centres (ITUC) as a consequence of the national-functional hierarchical integration of the

[1] Inconsistently, LIPSET & ROKKAN (1967: 47) propose four critical junctures (Reformation, National Revolution, Industrial Revolution, and as a "suggestion": Russian Revolution) and four cleavages (centre-periphery, State-Church, Land-Industry, Owner-Worker), while 33 pages earlier they state that the four cleavages were the result of the two twin process of National Revolution and International Revolution (LIPSET & ROKKAN 1967: 14; see also ROKKAN 1970: 131 and 101 respectively). In my view there are five cleavages and three junctures (cf. also FLORA 1981) to which one would be "tempted to add" a sixth national-transnational cleavage.

Table 9.1
Political Cleavages (based on Rokkan)

CRITICAL JUNCTURE	CLEAVAGE	CONFLICT
(I) NATIONAL REVOLUTION	(1) *centre-periphery* (2) *State-Church*	national (dominant) vs. local (minority) culture secular vs. religious control of culture
(II) INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION	(3) *urban-rural* (4) *labour-capital*	urban-industrial vs. rural-agrarian production employers vs. workers
(III) INTERNATIONAL REVOLUTION	(5) *revolution-reform* (6) *trans-national*	national integration into polity vs. world revolution national protection vs. interdependence

SOURCE: Scheme *frei nach* (based on) ROKKAN (1970: 101, 131), LIPSET & ROKKAN (1967: 14, 47), see also FLORA (1981).
NOTE: concepts vary in source; own suggestion: for sixth cleavage see text.

British TUC in 1895 when local trades union councils were excluded from direct representation within the congress.[2] After the Republic of Ireland was established, the "national question" led to a split over the British-based (Protestant-led) unions and the formation of a national Irish (Catholic-led) union centre (CIU, 1944). The two organizations merged later to form a new union centre (ICTU, 1957) that includes both Irish unions in the Republic and the North as well as the Irish sections of British-based unions. The domiance of the national question has helped to deemphasize a *manifest* religious split (see Chapter 4), between Catholic and secular Socialist union movement in the Republic, though 'nationality' represents a *quasi* religious split through British or Irish-based unions in the North.

While in most countries, regional differences became less divisive in labour relations, the *centrifugal* language conflicts in Belgian "society" and national party system led also to a regionalization tendency, albeit it still laggs behind the political parties (the Socialists split in 1978, the Christian party in 1968). The Christian white-collar union, given the importance of language for clerks and the segmentation of the labour market for their profession, was the first to start a process of devolution (it split in 1980) that may continue to affect all Belgian unions. Today, in French-speaking Switzerland, on the Danish independent islands, and recently in Northern Italy (efforts to build local unions allied to the *Leghe*), there are smaller regional union organizations that coexist with the national ones. Outside the scope of this study, there exit regional-linguistic labour movements besides the two main Spanish union centres, most notably in Basque country, Catalonia and Galicia. Otherwise, however, the *centre-periphery* cleavage remained less prone to lead to organizational splits in *national* labour movements.

Nevertheless, besides organizational splits, regional variations in unionization may be considerable, reflecting regional disparities and partially segregated labour markets. The

2 Regional congresses with partly TUC affiliated and partly independent unions emerged in Scotland (STUC), in Ireland (ITUC) and later and most incompletely in Wales (Wales TUC, 1974).

regional differences in the Italian labour movement are outstanding, while the two non-Communist union centres organize more than one-third of their members in the South (including the islands), the Communists only one-quarter. Regional clustering of voting patterns for Communists, Socialists and Christian-Democrats (cf. TODD 1990), and scattered indications of similar patterns for unions, underline the claim developed in this study of regional *social milieus* or urban ghettos that provide the stronghold for cleavage organizations. For a better understanding of the regional clustering of territorial cleavages (centre-periphery, rural-urban) and segmentational cleavages (labour-capital, state-church, reform-revolution) regional analysis could provide more insights than comparative national analysis, albeit this is beyond the scope and possibility of this study.

URBAN WORKERS AND AGRARIAN LABOURERS

The *urban-rural* (land-industry) cleavage had a more historical than enduring impact on the alliance chances of Socialist parties and the importance of peripheral-rural opposition for labour movements. The organization of agrarian labourers was a difficult task and in most countries a belated and largely unsuccessful attempt. An exception is the Italian labour movement that organizes extensively not only agrarian labourers but also tenant farmers (besides small shopkeepers). Historically, the *agrarian question* was a challenge to both working-class party and unions. Given the large differences in agriculture and landholding structures across Europe, industrial and urban workers found that the possibility for red-green alliances were differently foreclosed. Since Moore's path-breaking thesis (MOORE 1966) a long debate on the impact of agrarian-labour versus agrarian-bourgeois alliance structures on the stability of political systems ensued (most recently: cf. ESPING-ANDERSEN 1985, STEPHENS 1989, RUESCHMEYER, STEPHENS & STEPHENS 1992, LUEBBERT 1991). There are two forms of alliances between urban workers and rural peasants; on the one hand, political alliances between red and green parties, and on the other, the mobilization of agricultural labourers (and small tenants) by labour movements.

In respect to the impact of rural-urban cleavages on labour unity, it can only be briefly indicated that all three political labour movements attempted with varying success to build social and political alliances. In the case of the Socialist labour movement, the Scandinavians (in particular the Swedes) were most successful in building red-green alliances exactly at the moment when democratic regimes were most endangered (see Chapter 3). Christian parties, especially the Austrian and Belgian pillarized Christian-Democratic parties, build on a triple alliance of farmers, employers and workers associations (see Chapter 4). Finally, in respect to the Communist movement, a major difference in the alliances of the French and Italian Communist movement is the latter's openness to agricultural labourers and small farmers (see Chapter 5). Nevertheless, the union movement remained largely dominated by the urban craft and industrial workers. Many unionists hold the view, often based on ideological convictions or statistical observations, that agricultural work was only a transitory state and was soon to be swallowed by industrialization.

Indeed, until the First World War, the collective organization of agricultural labourers and tenant farmers (e.g. the South-Italian *Fasci*, the 1907 farmer revolts in France) was rare and largely dissociated from the industrial worker movement (cf. TILLY, TILLY & TILLY 1975). Although in most interwar countries agricultural wage labour was still a sizeable force but remained difficult to organize, agriculture had declined to below 10% by the 1950s with few exceptions.[3] Thus with declining agricultural sector and less important increased unionization in the sector, the drag of lower unionization in agriculture became less notable (cf. VISSER 1990: 41) and with it the labour movement's conern or debate over the agrarian question.

NATIONAL LABOUR AND TRANSNATIONAL CLEAVAGES

With increasing international dependency nation-states and economies became interdependent in both politico-military and political-economic relations, not to speak of the intensification of global communication and cultural exchanges. The Bolshevik Revolution and the postwar East-West division demonstrated that revolutionary changes of a society were difficult to maintain if the revolution remained homemade and could not be exported to neighbouring and other countries. The *reform-revolution* cleavage, that cut across labour unity, operated on a world scale, it led to the East-West competition of two politico-economic systems: the capitalist Market economy and the planned State economy. After each of the two wars, European Labour was divided whether to follow the national reformist road to Socialism that aimed at gradually transforming Market economies or the international revolutionary fight to replace a Market economy by Socialism. Of course, one should add that the evolutionary theory of the "logic of industrialism" of KERR (KERR et al. 1960, KERR 1983) predicted the long-term convergence of the two models to a "third" optimal way in between market allocation and state planning.

A possible *sixth* cleavage, besides the revolution-reform cleavage, derives also from the increasing international interdependency: the *national-transnational* cleavage. With the dependency from World Markets and international political cooperation (in particular the increasing European integration), the Nation-State loses some of the national sovereignty and possibility to intervene into the national economy. The first Socialist government under Mitterand under the French Fifth Republic, for instance, faced the impossibility to maintain a national Keynesian demand-side economic policy against the increasing World economic and monetary pressures (cf. HALL 1986). The increasing political and economic integration

[3] Between the two wars, agricultural wage labourers (including fishers) varied between around one-quarter of all wage and salary earners in most countries (Austria, Denmark, France, Ireland and Norway) to below 10% in Britain (and small peasant Switzerland), albeit in Italy over 40% worked in agriculture (FLORA, KRAUS & PFENNING 1987). With the exception of sudden wave in the early 1920s, agricultural labourers remained most difficult to organize, less than 15% were unionized (cf. VISSER 1990: 42-3). Since the 1950s agricultural had declined to below 10% of the dependent labour force (in Denmark and Ireland: 1960s, Italy: 1970s), while unionization in the smaller, increasingly regulated sector increased, particularly in Austria, Scandinavia and Italy.

Table 9.2
Functional Cleavages

CRITICAL JUNCTURE	CLEAVAGE	CONFLICT
(I) WORKPLACE ORGANIZATION	(1) *craft-industry*	skilled craft vs. less skilled factory workers
	(2) *insider-outsider*	core (tenured) vs. peripheral employment
(II) EDUCATIONAL MOBILIZATION	(3) *white-blue collar*	status vs. class; service vs. productive workers
	(4) *female-male*	equal opportunity vs. established position
(III) (INTER)NATIONAL MARKET REGULATION	(5) *public-private*	public regulation vs. market logic
	(6) *exposed-sheltered*	export dependent vs. protected domestic markets

NOTE: (see text).

within Europe, and the European Community in particular, is a new challenge to labour unity. This may contribute to a new cleavage, a conflict between interest groups that profit from the mobility of capital, goods, services and labour, and those that loose out given the loss of national social protection. The *national* labour movements, both party and unions that had become increasingly integrated within the national channels of interest representation, may realize how much they have grown dependent on the national power resources and regulation capacities, while transnational (and decentralized) action will be in future demand. I will return to the difficulties of transnational organization of labour again at the end of this chapter.

ADDITIONAL AND CONCEALED FUNCTIONAL CLEAVAGES

The analysis of functional cleavages was limited to the three most salient, manifest organizational splits (see Table 9.2): the craft-industry, white- vs. blue-collar, and public-private cleavage. However, other latent conflicts derive from labour market segmentation and differences in social position of employees, albeit they have been less transformed into separate organizations. I would like to point briefly at three *latent* functional cleavages: the gender, the insider-outsider, and the domestic-export cleavage. These conflicts are still mainly *concealed* and thus internal to national unions and union movements. They add further strains on the accommodation of the "traditional" functional cleavages discussed in this study, as they partly reinforce, partly cross-cut existing organizational splits.

With the increasing participation of women in previously male employment position, conflicts over the organization of women emerged. A number of status defensive organizations, for instance, male office clerks against female typists, mobilized male workers and led to social closure strategies (see Chapter 7). In some countries, coalition and political rights were initially limited, most notably suffrage was commonly extended to women only after the First World War, in some Catholic countries after the Second World War, and in Switzerland only in 1974. In some countries, separate union organizations for

female employees were founded and remained existent for a long period.[4] However, an open organization strategy was largely adopted, the best long-term solution for the interest of both female and male employees was to organize both. In order to prevent undercutting of male labour by "cheap" female labour, unionists attempted in a long battle to rise the wage level and improve the working conditions for women as well, a struggle that is still going on. However, except for female dominated services, in particular the public welfare sector, trade unions still tend to overrepresent male manual workers and underrepresent female non-manual employees. The particular employment situation for women (e.g. temporal positions, part-time work, service jobs) has often hampered union organization, as a consequence women are underrepresented and feel not attracted by male-dominated inert unions.

The *insider-outsider* cleavage, is the latent conflict between those that are traditionally well organized and those that are largely unrepresented is situated in the workplace and employment situation (cf. HEINZE et al. 1981, SABEL 1981). The insider are the *Stammbelegschaft* (the core employment) that have received tenure-like job security and collective mobility through union-controlled dismissal procedures and internal labour markets. The outsiders are those that are excluded from participation in this primary labour market, mainly the unskilled workers, the immigrants, the part-time employees, the untrained young, the unemployed. Even more than in the case of the gender cleavage, the insider-outsider cleavage remains latent and concealed, since the outsider have less possibility for voice (within existing unions) or exit (organize separately). They neither have much resources for collective action and given their diverse social composition and hope of individual advancement lack collective identity. Again, the salience of the cleavage depends largely on the organization strategy of unionists, their conception of class solidarity, to include or exclude those in peripheral employment positions. Again differences between labour movements across Europe are large as to whether unions are open to, and particularly make an effort to organize, foreign workers and the unemployed.

The third, still largely concealed functional cleavage, the *domestic-export* cleavage that follows from the same international changes as my suggested sixth political (national-transnational) cleavage. With the international division of labour and world trade, the core sectors of the economy become tied to the international economy, while other peripheral sectors remain domestic in orientation. An analysis of the weight of exposed and protected sector union movements can be linked to neo-corporatist behaviour (CROUCH 1990), this finding links up with the insights on the impact of World Markets on small export-oriented European states (KATZENSTEIN 1985), the economic impact of centralized negotiations (cf. FLANAGAN, SOSKICE, and ULMAN 1983), and the importance of 'encompassing organization' that internalize national economic development for internationally competitive economies (OLSON 1982). With the shift within union movements from main industrial sectors to service and public sector, from industrial workers to white-collar employees, even in the so

[4] For instance, the Danish female workers union, a parallel organization to the male general union.

far nationally centralized union movement *centrifugal* decentralizing tendency will commence, furthered by flexibility and decentralization efforts of employers (cf. BAGLIONI & CROUCH 1990). But the exposed core *versus* sheltered periphery cleavage cuts not only across national union movements, it also is latent within multi-sector unions in conflicts about preserving non-competitive industries or firms for the sake of employment security.

II
CLEAVAGE CRYSTALLIZATION AND UNION DIVERSITY

For an understanding of union diversity, we have to consider not only the legacy of social cleavage structures and the emergence of new conflicts, but the forces that are involved in the process of cleavage crystallization and transformation. We have seen that, for instance, the religious factor as such provides only the potential for union cleavages, more important is the interaction of the main actors, in this case the Nation-State and the Church. For each cleavage, the main actors involved in the formation of cleavages were singled out. I shall summarize briefly the main *figurations* of actors that led to cleavage crystallization. This will lead us to the question to what degree cleavage structures of party systems and employer association systems have had a "spill over" effect on union cleavage systems. In the functional cleavage chapters, we have found some interdependence of party and unions and some compulsion through employers centralization on the development of union systems, nevertheless, the influence is far from being unidirectional and universal. A *third* important "player" in the game of cleavage crystallization was the state. In particular,the state rule-and-divide, and as was already mentioned the state structure and traditions had an impact on cleavage formationand also on cleavage institutionalization.

CLEAVAGE CRYSTALLIZATION AND FIGURATIONS

A comparative cleavage analysis tends for practical and conceptual reasons to stress mainly structural factors. This study has pointed, however, also to the role of strategic actors and alliance building in the process of cleavage transformation. Rokkan himself stressed the role of "political entrepreneurs" in building alliances, choosing mobilizing strategies and the arena (ROKKAN 1977: 564). More generally he considered the role of mobilizing agencies, the political, cultural and economic agencies (ROKKAN 1977: 566-8) in the process of transforming cleavages into organizations. A similar conceptualization can be found in ELIAS' *figuration* sociology (ELIAS 1970), that stresses the interdependence of actors. For instance, SWAAN analyzes the power relations and coalitions of the four-sided figuration (the petty bourgeoisie, employers, workers, the regime) that played a crucial role in the creation of social security institutions (SWAAN 1988: 167-177).

The figuration that gave rise to the *labour-capital* cleavage was the interplay between political agencies (State, party) and economic agencies (employers, unions). Yet my structural analysis took the strategies of state and employers largely as given, due to a

pragmatic and conceptual choice. They were considered to be external structural constraints (or thresholds) on the *opportunity structure* of party and unions. Additional historical analysis could provide further insights on the role of these agencies in the process of cleavage formation. Similarly, the analysis of party and union relations was mainly structural, looking at the organizational foundation and consolidation process. Again, further insights could be derived from historiography of party and union leaders and their strategic decisions, though the aim of this study is mainly limited to the structural constraints of union formation.

The *Church-State* cleavage added a fifth "player", the cultural agency: the Church. In the case of the trans-national Catholic Church, the power and influence spread from the Vatican to the hierarchical clergy to the Catholic action groups, though the dependency from Rome as well as Papal policy varied between countries and over time. In the Calvinist (and Protestant dissident movements) power over cultural identity was much more diffuse and fragmented, a disadvantage in strategic political alliance and organization building (though individual lay leaders, like the Dutch Calvinist Kuypers had more *Spielraum* as political entrepreneurs). In contrast to the rise of the Socialist labour movement, the Church had a more important role than the party in the Christian union movement, though in postwar secularizing Europe the Christian-Democratic party gained in importance (e.g. Italian and Austrian Christian-Democratic party members played a key role in founding a separate union centre and unified movement respectively).

The *third* political cleavage, the *revolution-reform* cleavage was initially an internal labour conflict (reformist and revolutionary adherents within party and unions) but after the Russian revolution in 1917, the International (Moscow-led party) became the additional strategic actor (a political but also cultural agency that had casted ideological identity). Again, the strategies and influence of the Moscow-led Communist International varied across time and had different implanting in each movement leading to the organizational diversity despite the ideological unity (cf. TANNAHILL 1978). Again, "exceptionalist" historiography has often stressed the role of leadership and intellectuals that led to different developments, while this study concentrated on the impact of structural differences from a comparative view.

Also in respect to the *functional* cleavages coalitions of agencies and social groupings have been formative. In particular, state and employers policy to rule-and-divide by granting special status to skilled workers, white-collar employees, or civil servants has played an important role in obstructing labour unity. Moreover, middle-class groups and civil service corps, the beneficiaries of these policies, mobilized themselves and struck strategic alliances to defend and extend their privileged status. The analysis of figurations can reveal a more dynamic perspective of changes in power relations and interdependencies of elite strategies, it can build into the comparison some element of agency, though it often requires for all practical reasons limitations to historical case studies.

POLITICAL PARTIES AND CLEAVAGE STRUCTURES

In the part on political cleavage structuration, the interaction in the formation phase between political and economic interest organization and the subsequent multiple links between party and unions were discussed. In terms of political cleavages, we find thus a large degree a *congruence* of cleavage structure in party systems and union systems. As a general rule, countries with high fragmentation in the party system tend to have a higher fragmentation in the union system (though one party at least would be subtracted from correlations, since it will be most closely related to "capital"). The classical opponents, the British two party system and the French multi-party system find their correspondence in a weak but encompassing British union centre (TUC) and many rival unions in France. In countries in which the Church-State cleavage led to party divisions (in the Southern and mixed countries), the cleavage also cross-cut the labour-capital cleavage, thus giving rise to Christian union movements. Yet the unions could rely only on a section of all-class support of the allied Christian party and had often a minority role within the party (see Chapter 4). The analysis of the revolution-reform cleavage showed as well a close link between party and union systems, particularly where the Communist party found large support, political schism within the labour movement occurred (see Chapter 5).

Again, sequencing and timing of party and union development provides a key to understand the congruence or divergence between party system and union system. Where union movements emerged relative early and preceded political party formation, it is the cleavage structure of the union system that put its stamp on the labour cleavages in the party system. Whereas in all the other cases, political splits provoked also deep rifts in the union movement, thus political cleavages spread out from the party to the union system. Although the thesis of party-led pillarization (STEINIGER 1977) may not hold in all cases for union formation (see Chapter 4), we can expect an overlap of party and union cleavages in pillarized systems, as cleavage-organizations in the political and corporate channel seek alliances through linkages. The major exceptions to party-union parallelism are the postwar *unified* labour movements in Austria and Germany, and outside the scope of this analysis, the failure of Iberian Christian unionism and the overcoming of Communist-split Finnish unionism (cf. VISSER 1990: 107-109).

However, a number of cross-cutting political cleavages (urban-rural, centre-periphery) may add to the number of parties without necessarily increasing the number of union centres. Moreover, new left and other parties, as well as the social movements, that emerged since the 1960s have not provoked organizational splits in the established union movements but led to a further dealigning of union centres from traditional party linkages. For instance, the Danish LO faced internal splits between old supporters of the Social-Democratic party and new militants of the new leftist party. Similarly, the environmental movement and the Green party added to internal union conflicts between traditional "materialist" unionists and younger "postmaterialist" militants, for instance, in the nuclear energy debate in Germany and Sweden (cf. JAHN 1991). Although the integration of these new political groupings remains a challenge to the relative inert union movements, given

the heterogeneous composition of the new social movements and the high institutional thresholds for new political unionism, they did not mobilize so much *against* but through or outside existing unions.

An other factor that leads to divergence between party and union system is the different impact of functional cleavages. While functional cleavages have gained in salience within union system, we find a opposing trend that functional cleavages decline in party systems as class-based or socially based political parties become increasingly encompassing catch-all parties (cf. KIRCHHEIMER 1966). As LEDERER (1912b) pointed out - in an early, seminal article - political parties, even working class parties, have in the long-run to consider the public interests, while functional organizations push for their sectional interests and attempt to press political parties in their clientele's interest. With Lederer we may ask: Why is there no *Angestelltenpartei?* While the functional cleavages gave in many countries rise to sectional union organizations (see Chapter 7 and 8), they never really provided the base for a white-collar or public employee's political party, though some smaller middle class parties tried to court salaried employees and civil servants. As was pointed out, the more encompassing and the more white-collar grades and public employees are organized, the more politically heterogeneous is the social base of a union. White-collar and civil service organizations have commonly no particular links to political parties but instead use pressure group politics to gain broad support among bourgeois and labour parties. The same social changes, the growth of white-collar and public employment, have thus had very different effects on party and union systems, particularly in the countries where sectionalist interest organizations emerged.

EMPLOYERS ASSOCIATIONS AND CLEAVAGE STRUCTURES

Given my thesis developed earlier (Chapter 1 and 2) that trade unions as collective and corporate organizations are locked into the social structure and linked to the organizational system, we would also expect employers associations to be divided by social cleavages. On the other hand, we may expect cleavage structures of employers associations to have an impact on, or in turn reflect, cleavages in union systems. LANZALACO (1990), also adopting Rokkan's cleavage analysis, claims that business associations are "*più numerosi* e di *natura differente*" (more numerous and of different kind) than cleavages in union systems (LANZALACO 1990: 58). Moreover, he finds that in each country the degree of segmentation varies between the business and union systems. More careful and differentiating comparison, however, reveals some of the reasons for this surprising and contradicting finding. The comparison of the organization of *capital* and *labour* are faulty if the differentiation of business interests into employers and trade associations are not taken into account. In a number of countries, these two functions are combined within one organization (Britain since 1960s, France, Belgium, Italy, Ireland), while in others they have been separated (Germany, Sweden). The emergence of separate employer associations in Germany and Sweden, besides the pre-existing multiple pressure group associations of industry and commerce, was an attempt of capital to create strong, central employers

associations with enough resources for fierce lock-outs in response to rising labour movement and industrial unrest (cf. on Sweden: FULCHER 1990).

A priori, we would expect employer interests to be more politically divided than trade interests which would reflect more functional interest differences. In fact, if we compare only employer interests *vis-à-vis* the unions, we find similar pressures towards politico-religious segmentation, yet these were less strong and were partly overcome. Religious belief, Catholic as well as Calvinist, forced some Church-going employers to oppose liberal capitalism and rely on special links to religious parties, quite like Christian workers. Yet, such religious orientations remained more limited to small shopkeepers and medium-sized factory owners, particularly in areas with strong religious "pillarized" sub-cultures in the Netherlands, Belgium, France and Switzerland. Particularly, where Liberal and religious parties cooperated as in Belgium and Switzerland, the dominant (initially Liberal) employers association became increasingly a representation of all employers. Other political cleavages were only rarely found with the exception, for instance, of Italian communist or socialist shop keepers and tenant farmers (independent but not employers) that joined the respective union movement.

In terms of the functional cleavages, one finds again less salient cleavages in employers interest organization. The main cleavages were the historical split and today more internal divisions between large industry and small and medium sized, the missing integration of service employers (commerce, finance), and the frequent separate organization of public sector employers (often divided by level and authority). The functional fragmentation of course provides obstacles for centralized collective bargaining and national economic management. However, there is no clearcut one-to-one relationship between employers association and union structures, but an interaction that led in some countries to more centralization of both and in others tended to remain fragmented.

In general, employers interest organization seems to be more concentrated, more politically and functionally encompassing than union systems, while business interests are often more functionally but even less politically differentiated. This may explain why in the debate on the "two logics of collective action", OFFE and WIESENTHAL's (1980) claim that capital has advantages in collective organization compared to labour, has been criticised for being at odds with the fragmentation of business interests associations (cf. WAARDEN 1990). Thus in respect to "class interests" in the labour market *capital* (employer associations) and *labour* (unions) seem to drive towards encompassing organization and achieve strength through unity, whereas producer interests (trade associations) in the product market remain largely fragmented (cf. STREECK 1988). Indeed, capital has a dual task to organize labour market and producer market interests, though one could also claim that labour is potentially split between labour market and comsumer interests.

STATE AND CLEAVAGE STRUCTURES

Cleavage structures are structures through being embedded into political institutional arrangements, some even enshrined into law. Moreover, as I have stressed before, the state

is one of the collective actors (or players) in the figuration bringing about cleavage-organizations of labour by rule-and-divide. The national configuration of interest systems can be seen - in a Rokkanean view - as an outcome of the 'sequential interaction' of state (and administrative) structures and the organization of society" (LEHMBRUCH 1988: 142). Not dissimilar to the "freezing of party systems" (LIPSET & ROKKAN 1967), LEHMBRUCH has observed that "these network patterns may then form new sediments, that is, acquire institutional momentum and become self-sustaining" (LEHMBRUCH 1988: 145). The degree to which political institutions monopolize "political space" or share it with organized interests depends on the impact of pre-capitalist state traditions and preserved pre-modern autonomous corporate structures (CROUCH 1986). Thus cleavage structuration of labour is interactive and contingent on the role of the state and administrative elites in integrating labour into polity and economy or excluding and amplifying divisions.

Several statutory or state-induced institutional arrangements have been indicated in reinforcing and freezing cleavage structures of labour, such as partisan works councils and social insurance scheme elections, institutionalized corporatist representation of labour, or status dividing corporate social security schemes. Through the "attribution of public status to interest groups", the state can "regulate the type and scope of their activities" (OFFE 1981: 223). State traditions define also whether the state intervenes into industrial relations or based on liberal-market conceptions leaves the regulation to voluntary agreement between capital and labour. SORGE observed that workplace representation was introduced by the state (instead of bipartite voluntary arrangements) in those countries in which the state had been more repressive in terms of coalition and strike right (SORGE 1976). Moreover, industrial relations rules, particularly enshrined in legislation are inert due to risks of change even during crisis or particularly under uncertainty, following a decreased learning curve in ageing systems, and increased complicated decision making structures (ARMINGEON 1992: 170-2).

III
MAPPING UNION DIVERSITY

Finally, there remains the task of encompassing the wide diversity of unionism in a conceptual map - a difficult, if not "risky", enterprise (cf. TILLY 1984). Certainly, such a map abstracts from national and historical particularities and contingencies, but it can provide additional insights by systematizing the most important factors that led to differences and similarities across countries. The fist step is to reflect on commonalities and derive some clusters of similar developments. This is surely more an intellectual device than a statistical derivation, it is a interpretative view of long-term configurations. Yet such typologies only steer the wish to go one step further, to look at variables that might account for the placement of countries according to the type (or outcome). A possible device are the rigid comparative tools of *Boolean* algebra as developed by RAGIN (1987). However, these "true and false" table lack the beauty of the encompassing comparison in form of a *conceptual*

Table 9.3
Four Clusters of European Unionism

CLUSTER	CLEAVAGE	PARTY-UNION	COUNTRIES
Labourist unionism	labour-capital	party <-- union	UK, IR, (DE), (SZ)
Solidaristic unionism	labour-capital	party --> union	SW, NO, (AU), GE
Segmented pluralism	Church-State	party <-> union	NE, BE, SZ, (AU), (GE)
Polarized pluralism	revolution-reform	party >-< union	FR, IT, (NO), (GE)

Note: -> unidirectional, <-> mutual, >-< independent influence (see Chapter 4).

map, as developed by ROKKAN (1975, 1980). The advantage of these maps is that they provide a tool to place countries along "master variables" and to map common clusters. This provides us with a view of *union diversity* but also of *labour unity* across Europe. This will be the final task: to reflect on how to find a common denominator of union diversity across Europe upon which European labour unity could be build.

FOUR CLUSTERS OF EUROPEAN UNIONISM

Given union diversity in Europe, many students of European union history either claimed the 'uniqueness' of each national labour movement, or generalizing from one to three models of union development with one large or important country for each case in mind. Both comparative strategies stress at the end the 'exceptionalism' of each individual or model country, provoking the question of *"how many exceptionalism are there?"* (ZOLLBERG 1986), and what is the normality from which they depart? Many historians of European union history, for instance recently SLOMP (1990), take the large nations, Germany, France and Britain as the three models for all Western European union movements. Surely within the international labour movement, as well as across borders, the large national labour movements influenced the development in smaller countries, while the reverse was less the case. Nevertheless, there is a danger of *Großmacht* historical sociology, for the sake of convenience or sheer disregard, to readily discard developments in smaller nations. Like many comparativists from small or peripheral countries, ROKKAN felt uneasy in generalizing on the basis of the experience of large countries *only*, instead he called for the inclusion of small countries (ROKKAN 1968) and the systematic study of Europe as a World region (ROKKAN 1975). As a first step the construction of ideal-type models that represent clusters is a legitimate device, however, the subsequent challenge is to specify how deviations from these models can be placed along "master variables" in an encompassing map.

Four ideal-types of union systems have been developed in this study that represent distinct *clusters* of national union systems across Western Europe (see Table 9.3). From the outset it should be stressed that countries may fall in between and even move over time

between these ideal-types that remain heuristic labels for particular configurations of cleavage structures. The four cluster primarily cover the political cleavage structures, also a linkage to functional cleavages will be discussed later. Each cluster represents a particular configuration of cleavage structures, they represent different outcomes of the structuring of alternatives. The four (in particular the first two) clusters derive from the labour-capital cleavage, the last two from the Church-State cleavage and the last from the reform-revolution cleavage. The cleavage clusters can be short-named as (1) labourist unionism, (2) solidaristic unionism, (3) segmented pluralism, and (4) polarized pluralism.

First, *labourist unionism* derives from the early political and economic integration of sections of the working class. As a consequence, liberal craft unions emerged and preceded mass working-class parties, most notably in the United Kingdom and Ireland, and partly Denmark and Switzerland (see Chapter 3). The Socialist party was formed on the initative of the trade unions, initially as a pressure group for favourable union legislation. Only gradually, with the rise of general and industrial unions the movement gained a more radical socialist ideology over *lib-lab* orientations, albeit the labour party remained under the influence of the (collectively) allied unions in Britain and Ireland until recently when pressures toward more independence have mounted.

Second, *solidaristic unionism* emerged in countries in which the political integration of the working class was retarded (see Chapter 3). Socialist political parties were forced to concentrate resources and mobilize for suffrage reform, while the incipient union movement supported the primacy of political unionism (cf. LIPSET 1983, MARKS 1989). The party became the leader and initiated further centralization and coordinating of the union movement. Class ideology further reinforced the building of centralized industrial unions, the counter-mobilization of employers bolstered the need for open cartel and solidaristic strategies (cf. FULCHER 1988, 1991). However, in a number of countries cross-cutting cleavages intervened hampering the mobilization of the working-class and limiting the alliance possibility of socialists.

Third, *segmented pluralism* (cf. LORWIN 1971) led to fragmented labour movements in countries in which the Church-State cleavage cross-cut the labour-capital cleavage, that is in Catholic and mixed religious countries (see Chapter 4). Two competing networks of organizations and segmented social milieus were build under the leadership of the party in the case of Socialist labour movements, and under the initiative of Church circles in the case of the Christian movement. Both "camps" maintained their position through social closure, reinforcing thereby structural inertia. While in Austria and Germany, the interwar *Lager* were unable to stabilize through elite accommodation, the consociational countries (Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland) preserved and institutionalized a complex system of pillarized accommodation (cf. LIJPHART 1968). The post-1945 Austrian and German labour movement attempted to internally accommodate the Church-State cleavage and thus came closer to the second ideal-type European cluster.

Fourth, *polarized pluralism* (SARTORI 1976) was the result of the revolution-reform cleavage in response to the two preceding cleavages. The labour schism occured where

national or cultural integration was lacking or belated (cf. ROKKAN 1968), particularly in France and Italy, but also in interwar Germany and Norway (see Chapter 5). In the two catholic countries not only the Church-State split had led to a fragmentation of labour but also the left party was split into opposing proponents of a more or less revolutionary path to Socialism. Employer intransigence and partial exclusion from political integration reduced the possibility to achieve improvements via economic means. Thus in countries where the party-union links was incomplete, political fractionalization was common, and syndicalism claimed union independence, thus unionism became a political affair. The resistance unity pacts broke down during the 1940s as the political party currents within the union movement buoyed again union schism.

A CONCEPTUAL MAP OF POLITICAL UNION DIVERSITY

The proposed four clusters highlights some of the differences, yet some national labour movements seem to fall somewhere in between. *How can we encompass the variety of transformations of cleavage structures into union systems?* Rokkan has developed in his last years an ingenious heuristic tool of encompassing comparison: the *conceptual maps of Europe* (ROKKAN 1975, cf. FLORA 1981, TILLY 1984) for systematizing the development of Nation-States. Such conceptual maps take into account the "decisive importance of interrelations" - the geopolitical differentiation across space. They place each country along the relevant conceptual axis, though being confined to two dimensional representation on paper. This kind of cross-tabulation of country cases goes beyond a mere "scattergram" of a number of quantitative or qualitative variables. It allows to map diversity as the result and in the context of particular configurations, while highlighting (regional or analytical) clusters of countries with similarities. One shortcoming, however, is the "flatness" (TILLY 1984: 139) of the maps - it is difficult to incorporate changes in time other than by "moves" (or time arrows) along the map to account for dynamic changes in the configurations.

The conceptual map of *political union diversity* in Western Europe presented here (see Table 9.4) is a sketch of the main configurations that account for the three political cleavages and four *ideal-type* configurations discussed before. The map plots three axes along two dimensions one downwards and two across the page. Following Rokkan's map, it groups downwards along a NORTH-SOUTH AXIS: the religious factor - the northbound distance from Rome, that is the decreasing Catholic trans-national influence. In the horizontal direction, it sketches two dimensions across the WEST-EAST AXIS: the economic and political integration of the working-class into polity and economy. The second dimension is the speed, balance and timing of national (and cultural) integration - particularly in the right hand corner this leads to the persistence of local community structures that remain resistant to the centralizing state. Thus countries are plotted by their distance from England (left, upper hand) as the bedrock of the *Industrial Revolution*, from which it spread into other countries. At the far, lower end, countries with a belated industrialization but with political upheavals are placed, that is, countries coming close to the French *National Revolution*.

Table 9.4
A Conceptual Map of (Political) Union Diversity in Western Europe

<-WEST-EAST->	POLITICAL INTEGRATION		UNBALANCED INTEGRATION		NATIONAL INTEGRATION	
	EARLY	GRADUAL	POSTWAR	INTERWAR	EARLY STATE	LATE NATION
PROTESTANT NORTH	*Labourist* Britain	*(Labourist)* Denmark			*Solidaristic* Sweden	*Solidaristic* Norway
"MIXED" CENTRE		*Segmented* Switzerland	*Einheit* <— W.Germany	*Lager* German Reich	*Segmented* Netherlands	*Nation-split* Ireland
CATHOLIC SOUTH		*Segmented* Belgium	*Einheit* <— Austria (II Rep.)	*Lager* Austria (I Rep.)	*Polarized* France	*Polarized* Italy

The first, *labour-capital* cleavage has led in some countries to rather reformist labour movements (England and Denmark, also Switzerland and Belgium), countries with early industrialization and urban craft unionism (compared to its surrounding countries). In these countries the split between Liberals and socialists was retarded or less pronounced, both political movements had pushed together for political citizenship rights (the cluster spreading from England "eastwards").

The second, *Church-State* cleavage has led to segmentation (*verzuiling*) in those countries were Catholics had mobilized against the secular Nation-State and in countries with mixed religious composition (the cluster of countries in the Southern and Central part). Yet segmentation, as has been pointed out above, has not led everywhere to peaceful accommodation, in fact in two configurations segmentation degenerated. Historically, in Germany and Austria, segmentation turned into *Lager*-building with pro-system, anti-system and indifferent camps. Only after the end of the Nazi regime, these two countries (under international pressure) found a *Einheits*- accommodation of centrifugal tendencies, be it the German depolitized "unity" DGB or the Austrian fraction-integrating ÖGB.

Thirdly, the *reform-revolution* cleavage led to further segmentation in France and Italy, where the integration of the working-class into society was most retarded and incomplete. In other countries, this cleavage had led to historically confined waves of radicalization: in Norway in the 1920s, in Ireland in the 1910s-20s (becoming overshadowed by the national question), in Sweden and the Netherlands, small pockets of syndicalist radicalism contented the reformist labour movement. In both interwar Austria and Germany Communist *Lager*-opposition added centrifugal tendencies, while after the war, due to the particular geopolitical situation within Coldwar-Europe and the integration of the working-class into society, they had lost in virulence.

A CONCEPTUAL MAP OF FUNCTIONAL UNION DIVERSITY

Correspondingly to the political cleavages, one can sketch a conceptual map of *functional union diversity* in Western Europe (see Table 9.5). It covers the main configurations that account for the three functional cleavages. It also plots three axes along two dimensions one

Table 9.5
A Conceptual Map of (Functional) Union Diversity in Western Europe

<-WEST-EAST-> (Relations)	EARLY INDUSTRIALIZATION FIRST	SECOND	UNEVEN INDUSTRIALIZATION POSTWAR	INTERWAR	LATER INDUSTRIALIZATION CENTRE	PERIPHERY
VOLUNTARIST NORTH	*craft-general* Britain	*craft-general* Denmark			*status split* Sweden	*status division* Norway
CORPORATIST CENTRE		*status division* Switzerland	*(inclusive)* <--- W.Germany	*status split* German Reich	*status split* Netherlands	*Big unionism* Ireland
PATERNALIST SOUTH		*inclusive* Belgium	*inclusive* <--- Austria (II Rep.)	*status division* Austria (I Rep.)	*fragmented* France	*(fragmented)* Italy

downwards and two across the page. Again it groups downwards along the NORTH-SOUTH AXIS the division of state and society in the 'political space' (CROUCH 1986) that corresponds here largely with the religious factor - the northbound distance from Rome and Social-Catholic teaching. Voluntarist industrial relations remain largely clustered in the Protestant North, though historically with distance from England state intervention and regulation increases. The mixed countries share liberal and corporatist, voluntarist and paternal traditions, while in the South employer paternalism and state intransigence and state corporatist traditions are most dominant.

In the horizontal direction, it sketches across the WEST-EAST AXIS the economic development, mainly the industrialization and its pace, balance and diffusion. It follows much the same placement as in the political map. Thus again countries are plotted by their distance from England (left, upper hand) as the bedrock of the *Industrial Revolution*, from which it spread into other countries. An other dimension that is of relevance here is the "central belt" of countries that were exposed to the persistence of an urban network of smaller cities with entrenched guild and mutual self-help traditions along the axes from Flanders to Northern Italy (cf. ROKKAN 1975), though a shortcoming of the conceptual map here is that it places countries not regions for the sake of convenience.

The *craft-industry* cleavage (see Chapter 6) divides European union movements into countries in which craft-general unionism and those with dominant industrial unionism (Britain and Denmark). The early developed countries with entrenched craft tradition saw the consequential rise of general unions that foreclosed further union centralization and industrial unionism. In the other countries industrial unionism became more or less dominant within the main union movement (with the exception of Ireland that continued the British induced pattern).

The *white-blue collar* cleavage (see Chapter 7) adds further to fragmentation through internal or external splits within the union movements. In union movements with an early industrial union principle, white-collar unions emerged independently leading to an "industrial split" between industrial manual workers and service employees (particularly in Scandinavia and Switzerland). In postwar Austria and Germany, as well as in Belgium and

the Netherlands, inclusive all-grades union centres were formed, though in Germany and the Netherlands, past *status* distinction persisted and gave rise to rival unions.

The *public-private* cleavage (see Chapter 8) added further fragmentation internally and externally. Here state traditions and the growth of the public sector challenged the traditional industrial unionism, leading to potential internal conflicts in the main union movements and the separate organization of sectionalist interests of higher (educated) employees, particularly civil servants.

REMAINING WHITE SPOTS ON THE EUROPEAN MAP

For various methodological, theoretical and pragmatic reasons, this study draws a European map of union diversity covering "only" twelve Western European countries (see Chapter 1). There remain white spots on the map, particularly the democratized Southern countries (Spain, Portugal, Greece), two 'peripheral' Nordic countries (Finland and Iceland) and all (former) East European Socialist economies. The Southern and Nordic countries are not completely *terra incognita* thanks to recent interest in more encompassing European comparisons but would have required more careful research before they can be integrated into the map of union diversity as presented here. At least for the first two groups, the map could be extended without major revisions of the "master variables" - the countries would be placed at the Southern and Northern fringes. The - of Mid-1970s democratized - Southern countries (with the exception of Greece) are part - with France and Italy - of the "polarized pluralism" cluster, with more regional disparities in Spain than France and Italy. The two missing Nordic countries (Iceland and Finland) are part - with the Scandinavian welfare state - of the dominant "solidaristic unionism" cluster, though they share with interwar Norway the coexistence of syndicalist-communist union movements and a tendency towards "polarized pluralism".

A future task for labour historians and industrial relation specialist will be to map the past (pre-Communist) and future (post-1989) union cleavage structures of East European *coming-into-being* market economies. The oldest, East European "Free" union movement, the over a decade old Polish *Solidarnosc*, faces much of the same basic problems that were shown in the historical analysis of Western European labour movements: the differentiation and division of labour between a political and economic interest representation, between party and unions. A comparison of the new emerging East European with the past West European development may provide new insights into similarities and dissimilarities of labour organization. The debate remains open whether pre-Communist cleavages are concealed but frozen and will break out once the political and economic system stabilizes, or whether new cleavages or no persistent cleavages will materialize given the long-term social equalization and the sudden democratic transition (cf. KITSCHELT 1992). With increasing mobility of capital from West to East and labour from East to West, the challenge of labour unity in union diversity will become increasingly an - even more encompassing - challenge to European labour.

EUROPEAN COORDINATION AND NATIONAL CLEAVAGES

As economic and political integration enhances in Europe, European labour faces the challenge to organize at trans-national level. However, working-class parties and unions are veritable *national* organizations, but the challenge to today's labour movement is to adapt to a weakening of the regulatory capacity of the Nation-State. Both the transfer of power to a transnational level and the growing dependence on world markets call for unity of labour at the transnational level, particularly in a more integrated and enlarged European community (cf. VISSER & EBBINGHAUS 1992). However, union movements are also drawn into the opposite direction by recent trends toward regionalization of politics and decentralization in industrial relations, thus they need also to adapt to the *sub*-national level, thus there emerges a *Janus*-faced dual challenge to the national labour movements. This challenge meets the obstacle of national union diversity, the large variety of institutionally and socially embedded national union movements across Europe. Neverthless, from the European map, we can see several clusters around which a European union movement can be formed or after which it can be modelled. However, the challenge is to encompass and not exclude one or the other cluster.

Until the 1970s the main divisions of European labour reflected conflicts of segmentational, functional, and territorial nature (see VISSER & EBBINGHAUS 1992). Besides the national political and functional cleavages, national labour movements had different conceptions about the territorial scope of transnational cooperation at the European level (EEC, EFTA or beyond?), for various economic and political considerations, thus adding a *territorial* cleavage. Given the persistence of the political and functional cleavages in both national and international labour movements, the formation of an encompassing trade union confederation at the European level was a late but considerable achievement.

With the foundation of the *European Trade Union Confederation* (ETUC) in 1973 and the subsequent transfer of the Christian European union organization in 1974 and of other union centres, some of the most persisting and salient political cleavages have been overcome at the European level. Nevertheless, labour lagged between one and two decades behind the European political and economic integration process and the peak organization of capital (UNICE, 1958). The overcoming of most political schism is not merely a "spill-over" of the European integration process. It was, for the first time, a *proactive* attempt to respond at a particularly favourable moment of national concertation and at an uncertain conjuncture of European integration (the EC enlargement). National concertation of rival union movements in corporatist arrangements, co-ordinated industrial action, and tentative merger talks in the early 1970's opened the avenue for a unification of labour at the transnational level. The ETUC profited from the search of national reconciliation and in turn provided the forum for further contacts between rival national union movements. The realignment of labour was more successful at the European than at the international level (the 1970s international merger talks aborted), given the more pragmatic and conciliatory orientation of European union centres (cf. WINDMULLER 1980) and the more "limited" diversity than on a global scale.

Until 1973, an uncoordinated set of pressure group associations had been established, for each ideological camp (Socialist, Christian, Communist) and for the main regional cooperation areas (EEC, EFTA). The voting procedure was changed from unanimity to a two-third qualified majority in the ETUC, thus introducing some supra-nationality rule, but making it at the same time impossible to decide against the veto of British, Scandinavian and other EFTA unions. A contentious issue remained the affiliation demands of the Communist union movements, today however only the French and Portuguese Communist unions remain excluded.[5] The integration of various functional cleavages, was less complete but also less salient to the formation of unity peak association at the time.[6] Moreover, since the early 1950's there exist two European organizations of public service unions (CIF) and for managerial and professional staff (CIC). The major Nordic white-collar unions (Danish FTF, Finish TVK, Swedish TCO), all cooperating with the blue-collar union centres, are represented in the ETUC. With the recent addition of the German DAG, the representational monopoly of the ETUC in the growing white-collar and public sector is thus not really impaired. The formation of the ETUC was not only a major effort to encompass major segmentational and functional cleavages, but to create a unitary European peak association that is more than a mere EEC pressure group organization - a response to the increasing regional economic integration in Western Europe.

However, the concentration of power and authority resides in most union movements at the level of national sectoral unions thus foreclosing macro-level arrangements. The main difference to national union movement is that the ETUC until today lacks the "hierarchical ordering" and "functionally differentiation" important for interest intermediation (SCHMITTER 1974). At a sectoral level, trans-national cooperation, the International Trade Secretariats (ITS), have a long history of mainly independent, parallel development in respect to the international (cf. WINDMULLER 1984). Similarly, the European sector organizations (EIC) formed mainly independent and remained incompletely integrated into ETUC. Attempts to integrate the sector organizations within the ETUC failed (STÖCKL 1986: 29-30), since British and Scandinavian unions feared further decision-making *impasse* and a weakening of international strategies against multinationals. National traditions and institutional arrangements are still so different that they can hardly be encompassed by

5 The Italian Communist CGIL (after having changed its status to a mere associate of the WFTU in 1973) was accepted by the ETUC in 1975. This application demand was supported by the other two Italian union centres (CISL and UIL), yet a minority was against (German DGB, French CGT-FO, and the Belgian, Luxembourg, and Swiss Christian union centres). The French CGT (and similarly the Portuguese *Intersindical*) had been refused affiliation in 1980 since it remained allied to the Communist party and International. The Spanish Communist CCOO became recently affiliated (January 1991), while it had failed a decade earlier, thus French CGT remains the sole large union centre outside the ETUC. (cf. BARNOUIN 1986: 26-40; DEBUNNE 1987: 57-8, 61-6)

6 Among the organizations that remained outside the ETUC were a number of white-collar or public sector peak associations, in particular the German civil service confederation DBB and white-collar union DAG (recently accepted), the French teachers federation FEN, and the Swiss white-collar federation VSA.

general rules. Moreover, one particular institution in industrial relations in a country may serve quite a different function than in an other, making harmonization a difficult task (SCHREGLE 1981). Furthermore, a number of important national union confederations are not entitled to collective agreements, such as the British TUC, the German DGB, or the Swiss SGB and thus will not be able to transfer this right to the ETUC or co-sign any agreement. This holds similar for the side of capital; the private and public employers associations (UNICE and CEEP) are both not entitled to sign binding agreements.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter I have argued that labour movements have become increasingly intricated into national systems of interest representation. The once international labour movement, in order to become a credible counter force against state and employers, had to adapt to the national circumstances. In the effort to achieve labour unity on a national level, labour movements became subject to the internal conflicts and forces within their nation. For achieving labour unity, labour movements mobilized along the social cleavages present in the society at the time. Yet the formation of class solidarity was hampered by existing social cleavages that were reinforced by other agencies and led in many cases to counter-mobilization. As national labour movement attempted to align along social cleavages for national mobilization and representation, a number of non-national and concealed cleavages remained largely suppressed and latent. These may lead to new internal or even external cleavage lines in the future.

The cleavage structures in each country reflected not only the "nationalization" of labour, that is, its adaptation to the national social cleavages, but was also the result of the particular national configuration in which it emerged. Of crucial importance were also the structure, traditions and strategies of the political system and parties, the employers and their associations, and the state and her institutions. Hence, union diversity derives from the particular interaction of these agencies, the potential cleavages and the opportunity structure for organizations. While this study had to limit the scope of systematic comparison to the latter two factors, further studies on the impact of agencies could surely reveal further insights in the process of cleavage crystallization.

The conceptual maps of union diversity attempted to systematize the variations of political and functional cleavages. This was not to "test" the validity of cleavage analysis but to derive the main clusters and "master variables". These are interpretative abstractions of configurations under which labour movements formed in Europe. Following ROKKAN, I consider these maps as a device to generate hypothesis for further elaboration (ROKKAN 1980). They lead also to further reflection about the extension of the analysis to the "white spots" on the European map, the non-covered countries in the Northern periphery, Southern Europe and more recently Eastern Europe. It also suggests a new perspective in analyzing European labour unity, not just to study "EC" organizations but the interaction of

national diversity *and* transnational cooperation. The challenge of European labour remains very much what it always has been since the early days of union development: to strife for *labour unity in union diversity*.

10
CONCLUSION: FROM DIVERSITY TO UNITY?

> *While there are common themes in many European labor movements and industrial relations systems, the variations and differences in union, management, and public thinking and behaviour, in laws, in traditions, and in circumstances are so wide that a general answer is likely to be vague. There is 'Unity and Diversity' (a title I gave to an earlier book) in European labor. But there is less unity and more diversity between the movements and systems of the countries of Europe today than earlier. It requires a very high level of abstraction to make statement of general or even fairly widespread validity. Below this level, however, there is a wide range of questions of great significance and interest. And it is precisely in this area that we encounter the high degree of diversity that is of most interest to the intelligent observer.* (STURMTHAL 1983: 252)

As a concluding step, with the map of union diversity at hand (see Chapter 9), one would like to follow the path that European unions are going. *Will in the future labour unity replace union diversity?* We will turn from our concern about the origins of diversity to a reflection on the persistence in union diversity and the changes toward more labour unity. For some observers of current events, the map of union diversity reflects merely past history, as Europe marches relentlessly towards political and economic integration. Unions all over Europe face similar international challenges and crisis symptoms are a global feature. However, at the beginning of the Introduction (Chapter 1), I have warned against a too rapid adaptation of a convergence view in industrial relations. My contention remains that, although there are similar social changes and global pressures, social cleavages will remain the sources of national union diversity and a challenge to European labour unity.

In this conclusion, I will not restate the historical path of union diversity but stress the claim on the persistence of cleavage structures in union systems. I should immediately add that my contention is not to rule out change but to stress that there are no *tabulae rasae*, that the possibilities for adaptation are limited, though not determined, by entrenched past strategic decisions. In the last chapter, I have stressed in the explanation of union diversity in Europe, the "structuring of alternatives" (ROKKAN 1977), the different ramifications in the path of national union development across Europe. If this view is valid, we have to doubt the thesis of a fast convergence of union systems around a European average or towards the most dominant model.

I shall discuss three sets of arguments for cleavage continuity or discontinuity. My aim is to line out the main factors that lead to change but not necessarily to union convergence or

eradication of cleavages. *First*, I shall contend claims that cleavage decline will unfreeze cleavage structures. In addition the evidence on convergence and centralization will be weighted against that of divergence and fragmentation. *Secondly*, I shall restate the two processes of social closure and opening that had been discussed in each cleavage chapter: segmentation versus desegmentation and pillarization versus depillarization. *Thirdly*, the salience of political and functional cleavages will be weighted against each other. In concluding, while looking at new cleavages, I shall restate my contention that *old* social cleavages may last much longer than continuing social change makes us believe.

I
DIVERGENCE OR CONVERGENCE?

Persisting divergence or progressive convergence are the two opposing paradigmatic perspectives in the social sciences. The question of "divergence or convergence?" as such, of course, can never be answered definitively and yet we can balance *pros* and *cons*. The argument about a convergence of cleavage structures across Europe can be derived from the literature on cleavage decline. Though cleavage analysis can reveal insights about the origins of past diversity, since the 1970s, critics claim, there has been a decline of the significance of social cleavages. We have encountered some evidence in the part on political cleavages, that worker, religious or radical alignments lost some of their past grip. Nevertheless, the argument I am forwarding is that cleavage-organizations have the capacity to continue despite changes in the social structure that dissolve gradually the base from which the cleavages originated and upon which the organizations mobilized. The common social and global economic pressures will not necessarily lead to similar solutions and uniform outcomes. Organizational *inertia* and institutionalization, but also the structured alternatives for adaptation and new alliance formations, provide strong forces for continuity and survival despite secular change, though there are systematic variations between countries and organizations.

FROZEN CLEAVAGES OR CLEAVAGE DECLINE

Can we still subscribe to Lipset and Rokkan's freezing hypothesis "*the party systems of the 1960's reflect, with few but significant exceptions, the cleavage structures of the 1920's*" (LIPSET & ROKKAN 1967: 50)? Can the freezing hypothesis be extended to union systems and does it hold for the 1960's or even today? There is empirical evidence for a freezing of party systems, at least until the 1960s (cf. ROSE & URWIN 1970). Since that time, however, increased electoral volatility, shifts in electoral alignment, and emergence of new parties suggested change instead of persistence (cf. PEDERSEN 1979, MAGUIRE 1983, FRANKLIN et al. 1992). On the other hand, it was found that electoral changes across the labour-capital divide have tended to decline since the 1920s (cf. BARTOLINI & MAIR 1990). "While Lipset and Rokkan were concerned with the stabilization of *cleavages* and the party systems which reflected these cleavages, the evidence of electoral change over time is based on measures

of the stability / instability of the votes of *individual parties*" (MAIR 1990: 14). Indeed, empirical studies test electoral volatility at the individual or aggregate level, expecting direct correlations between social cleavages and party choices to be a strong test of the freezing thesis.

Few of those researchers with the electoral data at hand seem to have taken notice of the very next sentence following the freezing hypothesis: "This is a crucial characteristic of Western competitive politics (...): *the party alternatives, and in remarkably many cases the party organizations, are older than the majorities of the national electorates*. To most of the citizens of the West the currently active parties have been part of the political landscape since their childhood or at least since they were first faced with the choice between alternative 'packages' on election day." (LIPSET & ROKKAN 1967: 50). Applied to union systems, the *freezing thesis* is that potential union members can only choose from a limited set of historically bound organizations to represent their labour market interests *vis-à-vis* the state and employers at the national level or in a given sector or occupation. Moreover, for any individual or group, opportunities to create a new organization are limited, because the *first mobilizing agencies* have an advantage (ROKKAN 1977) and high *organizational costs* in terms of institutional arrangements (e.g. union recognition) are levied on new organizations. Yet while organizational 'exit' may be difficult as in the 1960's, 'voice' can be a viable option to protest against *inert* representation structures, as the "resurgence of class conflict", particular wildcat strikes, in the late 1960s (cf. CROUCH & PIZZORNO 1978).

What remains to be explained is less the stability of electoral or membership alignments *per se*, but the persistence or change of cleavage-organizations. How much have cleavage systems changed since the phase of 'befestigte Gewerkschaften' (BRIEFS 1952) (entrenched unionism) of the 1920's. Of the prewar Socialist oriented union movements in the twelve countries studied here, there are still ten that exist, seven still exist as such and three have become more encompassing (AU, GE, NE), whereas the two French and Italian movements, given the lack of (or incomplete) party-union linkages, never consolidated. Surely there were changes in terms of membership support and alignment, nevertheless there remains long-term continuity (see Chapter 3). Since the 1920's the TUC has gained somewhat in overall *associational monopoly*, thus more unions chose to align with it, but the level of support to the Labour party have decreased since the 1950s (after the 'opting in' period, 1927-46). In the Scandinavian countries it was found that Socialist party and LO unions faced a postwar stabilization of mobilization patterns (i.e. party turnout and density rate). Similarly, in the *consociational* countries, the cross-cutting labour-capital and Church-State cleavages froze party and union mobilization levels at a medium range. Like the Scandinavian movements, the Socialist unionism in the *segmented pluralist* countries faced limits set by the white-collar cleavage. In the two countries with a significant change (Austria and Germany), unified union movements were build by strategic alliance building after the war, the integration of Christian unionists within the *Einheit* union movement (though the interwar strength of the Socialists had already a claim on 70-80% of union

members). In the Dutch merger (FNV, 1977/1981) of Socialist and Catholic unions, it was the rapid decline of the latter that made such a move necessary.

Indeed, in terms of the two other political cleavages, important changes occurred, though more in terms of changes in importance and strategy than mere cessation. In three of seven union movements with a past religious split, these organizations continued (Belgian and Swiss Catholics, Dutch Calvinists), two unions secularized (French and Italian), two became integrated (and accommodated) within unitary labour movements (Austrian, German, also Dutch Catholics). Thus facing ongoing secularisation, Christian unions struck different alliance strategies (see Chapter 4). In the French and Italian countries, in which the Christian-Democratic parties had been vital in reestablishing the movement, the organization became increasingly independent and secular when in France the MRP withered away and in Italy the DC became the unaltered leading governing party. The Dutch Protestants and Swiss Catholics showed furthermore astonishing survival as minority movements, while the Belgian Christian movement opened itself to non-Church goers and became the dominant union movement. Hence, cleavage organization once established have a considerable ability to maintain pre-modern cleavage structures and organizational continuity through strategic adaptation and institutional securities. If cleavages remain important for "packaging" interests, have union system become more alike in other respects?

CONVERGENCE OR DIVERGENCE ?

How much have national union systems converged or does union diversity persist? According to the "logic of capitalism" we would expect unions to become more alike as they serve similar functions within capitalist systems. Convergence of union systems, of course, can be measured in many ways. Given the conception of labour unity, provided earlier (see Chapter 1), as one of strength and encompassingness, I will turn to two aspects: the mobilization potential (measured by union density and union growth rates) and representation patterns (operationalized by associational monopoly and concentration).

The overall level of unionization (much like industrial dispute) are not only very dissimilar across Western Europe, but also they tend to diverge on the long-run (cf. KORPI 1983, KAELBLE 1987, VISSER 1989). Certainly there were phases of universal convergence in which national labour movements seemed to become alike. The post-1917 upsurge in collective mobilization led to unidirectional upward pushes in the early 1920s in all Western European countries. However, the unprecedented high level of mobilization was not to last into the economic and political crisis of the late 1920s, bringing the European countries, particularly those with sudden influx of new members down to some band of 10 to 40% in union density. However, following the Global Depression, national labour movements diverged with persisting mass unemployment in the 1930s. The Scandinavian and Belgian unions gained due to their control of unemployment insurance, while in other countries unions stagnated or declined until the outbreak of war (or were suppressed by authoritarian regimes). Again, after the war and labour's outstanding role in the resistance,

a widespread wave in unionization and union recognition gave the impression of a general convergence. In fact, the 1950s showed all signs toward convergence, the same upward trend (with the exception of French Communists). In this situation, modernization theorists coined their convergence thesis (KERR et al. 1960) and the thesis of the *"withering-away"* of industrial disputes (ROSS & HARTMANN 1960).

However, by the mid-1970s, the traditional mobilization patterns of unions had changed, after the resurgence of industrial conflict (cf. CROUCH & PIZZORNO 1978) new groups had entered the unions, but also different forms of workplace representation became institutionalized (cf. SORGE 1976). After the OPEC crisis, unionization level diverged considerably, some labour movements were hit by severe losses in elections and in union membership, others remained better fitted to resist, especially where union-led unemployment insurance provided incentives to stay in a union. By the mid-1980s, the incremental growth of the Swedish, Danish and Belgian unions became highly organized, the Norwegian, Austrian, Irish and German unions were able to consolidate through institutional arrangements their medium position, the Italians had regained in strength, the Dutch, French and British unions lost - for similar and different reasons - considerably, thus coming close to their interwar level. Certainly, the membership crisis has by now affected all countries, yet the situation is different and the opportunities for change, too. Hence, union diversity persisted not only in terms of variations in labour unity by cross-cutting cleavages, the mobilization of labour diverged considerably across Europe. Instead of convergence we perceive a persistence, if not divergence, of unionization patterns across Europe.

CENTRALIZATION OR FRAGMENTATION?

How fragmented or encompassing are national union movements? Given the political cleavage structures, the number of union centres, the number of main actors *vis-à-vis* the state and employers, varies considerable. Certainly, in some countries political schism are only peripheral, representing a small minority of dissidents, while most union members are organized by the main union movement. The mere number is not a good indicator, better are indicators that weight the importance at least quantitatively by membership. We have found in the preceding chapter that political fragmentation in union systems corresponds to the fragmentation of party systems (see Chapter 9). We found the effective number of union centres varies between bipolar (labour-capital) political systems with one to two union centres and segmented pluralism with two to three union centres and polarized pluralism with up to five union centres. The trend toward political union fractionalization has persisted or even grown as the non-partisan functional union centres play an increased role *vis-à-vis* the traditional leading political union centres.

Indeed, this study has shown an increasing fragmentation along functional lines in most countries (see Part Three). Although most main union movements were able to absorb nearly all unions of manual workers by the 1950s, not all were able to encompass all manual workers within few, large industrial unions (see Chapter 6). Thus while the main

union centre have a near associational *monopoly*, they face internal fragmentation, especially where affiliates showed a skewed size distribution and had frequent jurisdictional disputes due to overlapping domains. On the other hand, the more successful union movements were in establishing manual industrial unions, the more difficult it was to encompass the other functional cleavages. The *blue-white collar* cleavage was shown to add to union fragmentation, particularly in countries where the main union movement was closely linked to a Socialist party and had adopted class solidaristic industrial unionism (see Chapter 7). The *public-private cleavage*, moreover, led to fragmentation, be it internally within the main union movement or externally through further sectionalist white-collar, professional or civil service organizations (see Chapter 8). Further universal, secular trends (deindustrialization, decline in manual work, public sector restructuration) will amplify in the future the potential and actual fragmentation of union movements.

II
EXCLUSIVE OR INCLUSIVE LABOUR UNITY

If the "logic of capitalism" has not been the driving force towards convergence, it has often indirectly provided the compulsion to labour unity. There are general pressures toward encompassing organization: it is the more rational strategy to prevent internal competition of labour and to gain in power *vis-à-vis* employers and the state. However, an inclusive strategy is not the most effective mobilizing strategy, given the collective action problem of large organizations (cf. OLSON 1965). The argument forwarded in this study is that at an early stage cleavage-organizations maintain themselves through *exclusive* strategies. Yet once they are compelled to change toward an *inclusive* strategy and become increasingly integrated, destabilizing processes in form of depillarization and desegmentation undercut the very bases of cleavages. In discussing these two proceses, we will return to the key concepts of *system integration* and *social integration* (cf. LOCKWOOD 1964, STREECK 1987) as developed earlier (see Chapter 2) in order to place once again the clusters of union movements into a grid that summarizes the pillarization and segmentation processes.

LABOUR UNITY AND SOCIAL CLOSURE

Social cleavages are *per se* a "*set of social relationships which implies some level of external closure*" (BARTOLINI & MAIR 1990: 218). In this study, we have found that *social closure* processes were at the very root of the capital-labour and cross-cutting class cleavages. We often assume *labour unity* to be equated with class solidarity, though over the setting of the boundary of "labour" (or class) long disputes arose. In fact, "it would be a mistake to underestimate the extent to which members of class organisations - both parties and unions - have sought to improve their position through a monopolisation of this social relationship and through its closure *vis-à-vis* the external world. One need only recall the debates within the Second International on the 'peasant question'; the resistance of the skilled working

class to the incorporation into the movement of unskilled workers; or even the more recent problems experienced by immigrant workers" (BARTOLINI & MAIR 1990: 218).

Social closure was found to be the initial base of cleavage mobilization for political and functional cleavages. The labour-capital, Church-State, revolution-reform cleavages build upon and reinforced existing *Gemeinschaft* (community) bonds among the urban craft workers, the religious Church-going, or the radical working class communities (see Part II). Politico-religious group identity was transferred from generation to generation through the family or community. Later, new members were further socialized through the well-tied net of social and cultural organizations. Similarly, in the case of craft-industry, white-blue collar, public-private cleavages, social closure was the initial mobilization strategy of craft unions, white-collar professional associations, or civil service *corps* organizations (see Part III). These social cleavages had much of ascribed attributes, at least social mobility chances were seen to be conveyed by social origin, they remained visible signs of group distinction. In the preceding chapters, it has been stressed that strategies of social closure where important for the early phase of cleavage formation. Social closure entails both external and internal closure (cf. WEBER 1922). *External* closure counter-mobilized against an opponent, thus reinforcing group *identity*, while *internal* closure ties group bonds and thus reinforces group *solidarity*. Labour unity was equated with group solidarity and identity, social closure is the process to reinforce *unity*.

However, as has been noted for each cleavage, in the long-run this strategy became devalued by secular changes and competitive pressures. Increased differentiation and integration of political systems and labour markets required a shift in strategy from community to association, from *Vergemeinschaftung* to *Vergesellschaftung* (cf. WEBER 1922). With the expansion of electoral and labour markets, with the successful competition by rival labour movements, with the growth of unskilled labour, with the blurring of the collarline, with the welfare state growth - a closed mobilization strategy became self-defeating. The strategic choice for political *entrepreneurs* was to see the need for "opening up" to new groups but also the capacity of the unions to adopt an encompassing strategy. Yet, in many cases, structural inertia and encroached traditions prevented adapatation at an early stage and the long-term oriented inclusive strategy was not adapted. Where the early integration failed, the spiral of sectionalist social closure of the new opponents started again, to the detriment of long-term overall labour unity. Moreover, to encompass cross-cutting cleavages by an inclusive strategy is to promote cross-group solidarity, and to stress the unity of *labour*.

LABOUR UNITY AND PILLARIZATION

The twin process to social closure was organizational interlocking or *pillarization*. Building on the Dutch sociological and political science literature, I have followed Rokkan's call for a "generalized concept of *verzuiling*" (ROKKAN 1977) by showing its fruitfulness in understanding political and functional cleavage organizations. Both party and unions maintain organizational links for at least two reasons: reinforcing group identity through

social closure and pool resource for mobilization against opponents. The *figuration* that gave rise to the cleavage-organizations, the interdependences and the consolidation process shaped the initial linkage between party and unions (or other cultural agencies). Through pillarization, cleavage-organizations could shelter their followers from external influences. Moreover, through *associational* closure they could maintain social bonds, especially when primary community bonds lost in importance or were not given (e.g. in the *diaspora*). On the other hand, alliances with other organizations in the same economic, as well as in other, political channel helped mobilizing resources and support against contenders. Or as ROKKAN summarized the importance of pillarization for Norwegian parties: "votes count, resources decide" (ROKKAN 1966).

We have found the degree of interlocking most prominent where organizations in both channels had to mobilize jointly in opposition against relative closed political and economic systems (pre-war German and Swedish Social Democrats, the prewar Belgian and Austrian Catholic labour movement, the postwar French and Italian Communists). The party or Church provided the inner core of cleavage crystallization and ideology building around which the social and organizational life turned in concentric circles. However, in the historical analysis the "up" and "downs" of pillarization have been shown. At the peak of pillarization in the Netherlands in the late 1950s, for instance, at the time when social scientists coined the theory of *"verzuiling"* (pillarization), it had become a *frozen* structure that lacked much contact with reality and showed a decade later the signs of depillarization.

• As a consequences of secular changes, party and union leaders face strategic choices to adapt the organizational structure. We have witnessed the postwar trend for party and unions to deemphasize, more or less, earlier or belated, the institutional links and to open to new social groups. Here, organizational *inertia* and entrenchment of linkages in the early phase of consolidation limited in many cases the ability to reorganize, thus the *Spielraum* for independent action varied considerable. The more these organizations were dependent on each other and the more decisions had been entangled, the more difficult was a change towards flexibility. In the case of the British Labour Party, the Dutch Catholic union movement, or the French Communist labour movement we have seen how strongly pillarized organizations can become inert and inflexible, clinging to a shrinking group of faithful supporters. On the other hand, the functional cleavage-organizations, lacking a clear political ally, attempted to use mainly a pressure group strategy. However, in contrast to the political labour movement they lacked cohesion within their own circle, never really matching the degree of centralization within the historically politically unified union centres.

SYSTEM INTEGRATION OF LABOUR

Cleavage-organizations formed in a process of social closure and counter-organization through the mobilization of group interests against a *contender* (cf. TILLY 1978). However, once "dissident" party and unions passed the thresholds of incorporation and recognition,

Figure 10.1
Typology of Labour's Social and System Integration



once they become integrated into polity and economy, cleavage-organizations became institutionalized and consolidated. Through the process of *system integration* (see Chapter 2), cleavage-organizations that reflected conflicts in the labour market became thus integrated into the political and industrial relations system. Similar conceptions have been develop in DAHRENDORF'S thesis of the "institutionalization of class conflict" (DAHRENDORF 1959), BRIEFS' concept of "*befestigte* Gewerkschaften" (BRIEFS 1952, 1980, CF. EICKHOF 1973), and LIPSET & ROKKAN's freezing of party system thesis (LIPSET & ROKKAN 1967). Following our theoretical propositions (see Chapter 2), we expect cleavage-organizations not only to consolidate and become structurally inert but to become increasingly drawn into political exchange and accommodation. In highly pillarized systems, we found a entangled network of intra-cleavage and cross-cleavage organizational linkages. With system integration, elite interactions and political exchange became common between former 'friends and foes' (cf. LIJPHART 1968, SCHOLTEN 1987).

However, the more successful party and unions are to claim their participation, i.e. the more they became integrated into the system, the more these organizations are endangered to develop into highly institutionalized hierarchical organizations that sell their 'elite deals' to their constituency. Indeed, much in the vein of MICHELS' "iron law of oligarchy" (1911), the danger is that cleavage-organizations become detached from their social base and through institutional arrangements monopolize representation against expression of "new comers" that voice emerging or underrepresented interests. The process of depillarization or organizational linkages have been noted since the 1960s, at the peak of frozen cleavages systems. With hindsight, we know that neither pillarized consociationalism, nor social-democratic corporatism remained a stable system of interest intermediation (cf. SCHOLTEN

1987, LASH & URRY 1987, BAGLIONI & CROUCH 1990), though neither seems to be there a complete "End".

SOCIAL INTEGRATION OF LABOUR

Parallel to system integration, even as a result to the very success of cleavage-organization, *social integration* gradually undercuts the social base of these cleavages. Not only the organizations of labour but also their members and constituency became integrated into society. With social integration, occupation, class, and religion lost much of their primacy as a determinant of one's life chances and social behaviour. Social closure as a mobilizing strategy required encircled life spheres, while increased social differentiation fosters the "Kreuzung socialer Kreise" (SIMMEL 1908), the crossing of social life spheres. This enhances multiple allegiance and individualization, thereby undermining the closure mechanism for the "Selbsterhaltung der socialen Gruppe" (SIMMEL 1898), the maintenance of a social group. Processes, like the decline in working-class party alignment, secularisation, deradicalization have been often noted in the debate on the decline in cleavage salience (and in the "End of Ideology" debate).

Although these processes seems to be secular, labour movements differ between countries as to how much they are affected from a loss of party and union alignments through continuing social change and social integration. In systems with high pillarization and strong opposing cleavages, labour movements were able to maintain allegiance to a higher degree and longer than in other countries, as was indicated by corresponing differences in worker alignment to Left parties (see Chapter 3). In recent research on decline in social-class determinants of voting behaviour, a decline in "cleavage politics" is found to have started in Britain and France before the 1960s, in Denmark and Belgium in the 1960s, and somewhat more gradually in the Netherlands and Sweden, and even later in Norway and Italy (FRANKLIN et al. 1992: 394), there seems to be a relationship between lack of pillarized cleavage organization (France, Britain) and political industrial unionism (Denmark, Sweden, Norway) and pillarization (Belgium, Netherlands, Italy).

SYSTEM AND SOCIAL DIFFERENCES

The developed concepts of system integration and social integration (see Chapter 2) can also help to map the different degree of union integration in a historical, comparative view. The grid of labour's integration distinguishes horizontally the ideological distance and degree of system integration, and vertically the degree of social integration or segmentation (see Figure 10.1). Early integration in polity and economy but also in terms of lacking pre-industrial social differences has led to the emergence of bipolar party systems and *Labourist* unionism (United Kingdom, Ireland), a system that is largely dominated by the labour-capital cleavage. In the case of the socially relative homogeneous Scandinavian countries, at least until the accession to power of the Social-Democratic parties in the 1930s, the labour movement remained united against the bourgeois bloc and promoted *solidaristic* "class"

ideology (Sweden, Norway), while Denmark takes an in between status of early economic integration.

In countries with social pre-industrial segmentation, the two different regimes dependened largely on the traditions and timing of elite accommodation. In the case of *segmented pluralism*, system integration of the cleavage-organizations preceded the Second World War, in *polarized pluralism* with a strong reform-revolution cleavage system opposition and employers and state intransigence remained for long dominant. In the case of Austria and Germany, the postwar *Einheit* (unity) labour movement had struck an important change towards system integration and encompassing social segmentation.

From this scheme of the historical political union clusters, an intricating problem of achieving labour unity can be visualized. For establishing a truly encompassing union movement not a "convergence" is required but in fact at least four different institutional adaptations, in graphical form, in order to "meet" in the middle, each cluster has to move in a different way. More theoretically formulated: each union system is historically embedded into a particular social structure (segmentation) and into an institutionalized web of inter-organizational relations. In order to achieve inclusive unionism not only an encompassing organization has to be formed on the basis of existing ones but the very boundary of labour unity and labour's alliances will have to be redrawn.

III
OLD AND NEW CLEAVAGES

Finally, the question arises to what degree old cleavages are still salient or new cleavages become more important. Like in the case of party systems, newly emerging organizations cause much interest and are often taken as indication of incessant change. In the discussion of social integration and system integration we have seen that cleavage organizations can become increasingly detached from their original cleavage base. The freezing of a cleavage system depends on the ability of the existing organizations to monopolize their representational claims. The danger, however, is that cleavage-organizations become inert, inflexible and exclusive, thus new, sectional interests may form separate organizations. Moreover, there is the possibility that cleavage-organizations fail to adapt, and lacking institutional security ultimately fail. Hence, the freezing of cleavage systems is more an empirical question on how adaptable organizations are, though there is good reason to belive that old organizations have comparative advantages through institutionalization but the disadvantage of *inertia*. I will suggest the following hypothesis: *first*, a depoliticization of party-union relations; *second*, intensifying functional cleavages in union systems; *third*, new political cleavages are secondary in union movements.

POLITICAL CLEAVAGES LOOSE IN SALIENCE ...

From the discussion of the three cleavages and the mapping of the differences it became evident that the two cross-cutting cleavages, the *Church-State* and *revolution-reform* cleavage,

although important in some countries and in some periods, are less universal and overall less salient than the universal *labour-capital* cleavage. The *Church-State* cleavage accounts today for the split of seven union centres (incl. French CFDT and Italian CISL) out of 22 politically aligned union centres in Western Europe, while the *revolution-reform* cleavage accounts for only two (French CGT, Italian CGIL) or three (incl. the tiny Swedish SAC). Both trans-national movements, the Rome-led Catholic labour movement and the Moscow-led Communist labour movement have not succeed to overcome the dominance of the national, reformist road to Socialism, with the significant exceptions.

A number of processes have to be mentioned that lead to depolarization and decline in political cleavage salience. A short list of structural changes should suffice to indicate the context in which the new challenges emerge and to which the old political cleavage organizations have to adapt. The initial party-union relations come increasingly under pressure by processes that lead both party and unions in diverging directions (cf. TAYLOR 1989). Three trends are of particular relevance for a evaluation of "continuity and change" of political cleavages in union structures.

First, both party and unions are challenged by social change that undermines their social base, their core membership and supporters. Thus both party and unions have to open up to new supporting groups. Ever since BERNSTEIN's thesis (1898), the route for Socialist labour movement has been laid out: the party is to deemphasize its 'class' character and build on broader social alliances (cf. PRZEWORKSI 1980, PRZEWORKSI & SPRAGUE 1986). Much like the aim of working-class parties is to adopt the image of a catch-all *Volkspartei* (KIRCHHEIMER 1966) without losing its old followers and identity, the union movement ventures to include new occupational groups in modern, all-grades, service-oriented unions without alienating the solidarity-oriented blue-collar workers. Such a change in the appeal of long standing organizations as party and unions compromises not only a trade off, losing old sections while opening up for new sections, it can also meet internal and external opposition to change. Socially embedded organizations may have a leadership and membership that overrepresents the old sections and have vested interests in remaining faithful to the old appeal. As has been pointed out at the beginning, organizations are not in a void and can choose the optimal strategy. Instead, they are dependent on the path taken and the powerplay between vested interests, many of the alternatives have been preselected or are constrained by earlier organizational decisions, following a "*nested game*" (cf. TSEBELIS 1990, KOELBLE 1992).

Second, while party and unions may have been close allies during the struggle for recognition and participation, once the party attained government responsibility and when the unions finally took seats at the bargaining table with employers and the state, their primary interests became less congruent. A governing Socialist party may want the unions to abstain from industrial disputes and high wage demands, while the allied unions would like the party to implement employment programmes and labour relations reforms. With the growth to limits of modern welfare states and public expenditures, the allied political parties cannot as easily deliver the services unions expect.

Third, if we look at each cleavage line we would expect a decline in cleavage salience given the following processes. The *labour-capital* cleavage has become less salient through the decline of the core supporters, the manual, industrial working-class and the rise of female, non-manual, service sector, and public employment. While the old social networks, the old working class communities - the traditional stronghold of the labour movement - stagnated or declined, new social groups that are more politically heterogeneous and volatile, and less easily unionized become increasingly dominant. The *Church-State* cleavage has become less salient through the process of secularisation that will in the long-run overtake even the encapsulated pillarized religious communities. The leadership of religious party and unions has become increasingly independent from the Church and adopted a more secular, interdenominational orientation (German CDU, Dutch CDA), there is also a convergence with the general labour movement (Dutch FNV merger, secularizing CISL and CFDT). The *revolution-reform* cleavage has become less salient, it may have even been completely discredited by the recent events in Eastern Europe (since the Communist labour movement was heavily externally legitimated, the loss of the Soviet model is of importance)! Communist unions and parties faced the same social structural challenge as socialist movements elsewhere, the decline in working-class support. The integration of (or alliance with) new social movements since the late 1960s within a party and union under "democratic centralism" has not been too successful, particularly due to the emergence of New Left parties and Green parties.

... BUT FUNCTIONAL CLEAVAGES SPUR ON

In the case of union movements, a number of functional lines of cleavages have become more important, while political cleavages have declined in salience. We have examined the three main functional cleavages: the craft-industry, white-blue collar, public-private cleavages (see Part Three), and mentioned a number of latent cleavages (see Chapter 9). The growing importance of these cross-cutting non-political cleavages led to an increase in heterogeneity within the major politically allied union-centre or in a loss of the monopoly status of this centre *vis-à-vis* other non-political rival unions. The relationship between working-class party and allied union (see Chapter 3) became increasingly under tension as both attempted to adapt to the social change and build broader social alliances. For the working-class party to change towards a catch-all *Volkspartei* open to new social groups is to give up some of its core identity for the sake of voter maximisation. For the allied union centre to become all encompassing and integrate the status conscious white-collar employees and civil servants is to lose some of its internal cohesion and class solidarity. Hence, there seems to be a "trade-off" for a union centre between strong political alliance and egalitarian union policy and the possibility to organize sections outside the core blue-collar industrial workforce.

In the last chapter I have pointed at the fact that not all functional cleavages have become manifest yet. The public-private cleavage most notably entails not only the status cleavage between civil servants and other public employees, it also can lead to a market

sector versus public sector divide. The interests between private sector workers (and as tax payers) versus the public sector employees has the potential to become as was pointed out a zero-sume game (see Chapter 8). This divide would cleave the main encompassing union centres and further strain party-union links. Recent rifts between private and public sector unions within large union centres have pointed into this direction (cf. SWENSON 1991). The other latent functional cleavages may further devide the labour movement from within, especially in times of enduring high unemployment and economic restrucuration.

Differences in the organization of functional interests are as diverse as in the case of the discussed political cleavages. In fact, we have found functional interests to lead to even more union diversity and obstacles toward labour unity. Thus we can expect from an increase in salienc of functional cleavages an increase in union diversity. Even where established cleavage organization have long been in a monopoly situation and were successful in exluding peripheral sectionalist interests from collective bargaining and participation in corporatist arrangements, this may not hold for the future. Under the constraints of current economic crisis, sectionalism comes more to the fore, and it can less easy be tapped by more encompassing interest organizations. A number of potential conflicts have found recent attention, for example, the "autonomous" union movements (COBAS) in Italy, or the volatile strike movements in France. Regionalist tensions have also grown in impact on parties and unions in countries such as Belgium and Italy.

NEW POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CLEAVAGES

Finally, a note on new or emerging cleavages that may cross-cut, or overlay the old three political cleavage lines, though this will not lead everywhere to new organizational splits. Instead it is more likely that these challenges will work from inside or outside the established organizations. This stems from the fact that, different to earlier times, the transformation of cleavages into organization has become more difficult. The stage is already set by the old cleavage-organizations that have often secured their position through institutional arrangements. The organization costs to establish a new party or a new union are relatively high, though they vary considerably between political systems (e.g. thresholds for entering parliament) and industrial relations systems (e.g. recognition as bargaining partner). Some of the new cleavages have actually become expressed in volatile new social movements that do not want to become entrenched into bureaucratic mass organizations but maintain non-parliamentary or *ad hoc* collective actions. The question for the future will be whether these new movements are temporary phenomena or become drawn into one of the two channels of political or economic participation.

The list of new, potential cleavages runs rather long, partly because it is not yet clear what will become the more important, enduring line of conflict in the future (see ALBER 1989). It is questionable, however, whether *value* cleavages, for instance, *post-materialism* (INGLEHART 1977) is comparable to the social cleavages *à la* Rokkan that provided enduring conflicts and the base for social groupings. Labels, like post-materialist, post-industrial, anti-establishment, have been coined to describe the phenomena of value change in society,

particularly among young cohorts and new social groups that are highly socially mobile (thanks to higher education) but feel politically excluded. If they do not abstain from politics altogether, they become politically mobilized outside the traditional parties and unions. Although the ecological movement has found in some countries expression in new political parties (Greens), ecological issues have led more to internal discussions within unions about such issues as nuclear policy and economic growth strategies, not necessarily to new organizational forms. In fact, one of the divergences between party and unions is and will be the depoliticization of the union movements. As unions become increasingly non-politicized interest groups of functional interests, we may even see political cleavages to become more and more passed over in future industrial relations.

THE PERSISTENCE OF OLD CLEAVAGES

However, old cleavage-organizations, following the thesis of the first mobilizing agency, have possibility to survive, not only by adapting to social change but to reinforce old cleavages. This study was mainly about the diversity in interest organization, it excluded largely the question what party and unions actually do. This is certainly a subject in itself to study the policies of party and unions and the differences in transforming interests into politics. Nevertheless, there is also a feedback mechanism by which the policies of party or unions may further reinforce cleavage structures. This may provide a further clue for why cleavage organizations persist. Politics can foster or hamper the process of social integration, it can reinforce social divisions or mend them. At several instances, I have pointed at social policy measures that on the pressure of interest groups have reinforced the social cleavage, for instance, particularistic white-collar pension politics in prewar Germany. Social policy can also serve the reverse purpose of attempting to prevent or mend social cleavages and build and maintain broader social alliances, as for instance, universalistic social policy in Sweden. Hence, politics may matter, not only in terms of shaping the configuration under which cleavages become transformed into organizations, but also as a means of these organizations to persist.

Other means to maintain cleavage organizations are practices that derive from the pillarization of organizations. Organizations can attempt to control the system of interest representation and thus exclude other organizations and interest groups, like new social movements, from direct access. I have pointed at various occasions to the institutional arrangements by which pillarized cleavage-organizations have raised "tolls on entry" for new interest organizations to become part of the political or industrial relations system. Organizational costs may be so high that the "entry" option for new interests to become organized is rather limited. Yet there remains an individual "exit" option to withdraw (abstaining from elections, quit membership) and an occasional collective "voice" option (e.g. protest votes, wildcat strikes). Established parties and unions today are alarmed by an increasingly the symptoms of a crisis in their support base, they face a reluctant constituency, disloyal voting behaviour or membership withdraw. As "exit" and "voice" options are too much foreclosed, "loyalty" degenerates.

Although there is a decline in the salience of political cleavages, an intensification of functional cleavages and a depoliticization of party-union relations, my conclusion is that union diversity remains with us for the future. I have pointed at several process why social cleavages lead to organizational splits in the labour movement. I have also pointed at processes by which cleavage organizations maintain themselves but also at processes that challenge the initial cleavage base. For the sake of convenience for the reader, I have ventured in providing "generalizations" on European union diversity in a short form of twelve theses (at the end of the chapter). These are more propositions and elements toward an approach than a deductive theory. My aim was to contribute to an analytical understanding of the processes underlying the transformation of cleavages into organizations. A full fledged theory would need further elaborations. This study aimed at generating hypothesis that can be further extended and "tested" by national, historical or comparative investigations.

This study attempted to provide a long-term view of the development of union diversity across Europe. Such an approach helps us to understand the underlying processes of division in labour unity. My approach was to study the problems of labour unity by examining the reverse problem: *where does union diversity come from?* And further, *how does union diversity persist?* The approach undertaken was sided toward a structural view, it attempted to show how strongly cleavages are institutionalized within organizational structures. This was not to rule out individual choice but to show the structuring of the alternatives under which individuals make choices of how to adapt to a new situation. Party or union leaders, but also party and union members have tried in the past to change the existing organizations and they will continue to do so. However, they have always had to struggle with those structural constraints that dated from older days. Moreover, change may pose difficulties not only for organizational inertia and institutionalization, as was examined here, but also because it is difficult to replace the ideological *Weltanschauung* with which one grew up and find a new consensus about the future course.

Hence, labour movements are slow in adaptation, despite the challenges of social and system change to cleaved union organizations. Strategic decisions may be taken, yet the set of alternatives is bounded due to previous, organisationally and socially entrenched decisions and internal vested interests. Certainly, party and unions will adapt to some of these changes, they will attempt to redefine the new role of party and unions in a changing society. But if any broad guess can be made, one cannot expect a radical change. In times of change and crisis, when we do not know what the future will bring, old ideologies often go a long way, and the already established structures will only slowly adapt, sometimes they will try to shape the environment and exploit the potential lines of conflict for their own purpose. Thus in the light of the European challenge and despite the described changes and new potential lines of conflict, one should not easily discard the old cleavages. They will stay with us, for good or worse to *labour unity and union diversity*, for a long time to come.

TWELVE THESES

(1) *Union diversity derives from cleavages:* Cleavages, i.e. enduring interest conflicts, lead to union diversity. Cleavages are the base of labour unity - social mobilization and alliance building. Unions, as collective (membership) organizations are embedded in the social structure and as corporate (representative) actors seek alliances against contenders in polity or economy.

(2) *Universal and cross-cutting labour cleavages*: The labour-capital cleavage led universally to working-class party and unions. However, the timing of political and economic integration and party-union sequence (and different party-union relations) led to diverse cleavage transformation with long-term consequences. Pre-industrial and new cleavages intersect with the labour-capital cleavage, thus adding to further diversity.

(3) *Freezing and inertia hypothesis:* Existing cleavage-organization have advantages to monopolize representation and become institutionally secured. Yet frozen cleavage systems enhance further structural inertia and lack of adaptation to social change.

(4) *From closure to openness*: Cleavage-organizations mobilize by external and internal closure. However, an Exclusive strategy meets limits through competition. Unions when adapting inclusive strategies are forced to seek alliances beyond the initial cleavage base, thereby lowering internal unity. Moreover, social integration undercuts the cleavage-base and group solidarity.

(5) *From pillarization to integration:* Unions seek alliances with other organizations in order to mobilize additional resources and support. Pillarization leads to structural inertia and lack in flexible adaptation to changes. Moreover, system integration binds unions in cross-cleavage consensus finding that preempt initial cleavage basis.

(6) *Functional supersedes political cleavages*: Functional cleavages gain in importance, while political cleavages become less salient (as consequence of system and social integration), the functional cleavages lead to external unions the more union movements are politically cleaved.

(7) *New political cleavages remain internal:* New political cleavages and value changes lead less to schism in labour movements but to gradual internal change and distancing from existing party links. New social movements have less potential to split than sectionalist industrial unrest. The latter can mobilize social closure against encompassing strategy of main labour movements.

(8) *Party-union distancing:* As a consequence of increased salience of functional cleavages, party and unions in order to encompass new social groups tend to deemphasize former ties, the more encompassing union movements are the less they can maintain close linkages with one political party.

(9) *National channelling:* Labour movements have become increasingly drawn into the national political and industrial relations systems with increased national regulation and labour market integration, therefore trans-national or sub-national cleavages became less manifest in union movements.

(10) *Structuring of union diversity*: The sources of union diversity have been the persistence of preindustrial cleavages, but also their subsequent mobilization by cleavage organizations. The more entrenched early cleavage organizations became through social closure, the more likely separate organization emerge through counter-mobilizing external social closure.

(11) *Divergence in union diversity*: Union diversity has remained over time, the attempts towards encompassing union movements have led to more labour unity and some convergence but labour unity is endangered by the growth of functional cleavages and sectionalist organizations.

(12) *European integration*: European labour unity faces the obstacle of entrenched union diversity. Cooperation is hampered by nationally institutionalized union diversity. Cooperation thus far lacks hierarchical ordering and functional differentiation, transfer of authority and inclusion of sectoral unions, the prerequisites to labour unity.

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APPENDIX

Table A.1
Foundation and Name of Socialist Parties, Western Europe

Country	Abbrev.	Founded	Name (Changes)
AU	SPÖ	1889	Sozialistische Partei Österreichs (1874 illegal; 1889 unity; 1945: refounded)
BE	POB	1885	Parti Ouvrier Belge / Belgische Werkliedenpartij (1877, regional merger)
	PS/SP	1945	Parti Socialiste / Socialistische Partij (reform of POB, 1978 regional split)
DE	DSF	1878	Socialdemokratiet i Danmark (predecessor 1871, -1961: SDF)
	VS	1967	Venstresocialistierne (left break-away of DSF)
FR	SFIO	1905	Séction Française de l'International Ouvrière (1905 merger: 1880 POF and others; see PCF)
	PS	1969	Parti Socialiste (1969 reform of SFIO)
GE	SPD	1875	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (merger ADAV, 1863 & SDAP, 1869)
IR	IrLP	1922	Irish Labour Party (1912 union congress; 1944: Nationalist split; 1950 merger)
IT	PSI	1892	Partito Socialista Italiana (1919: pro-Comintern; 1921/22 schism: PCI, PSU)
	PSDI	1947	Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano (PSI break-away, 1966-9 PSI alliance)
NE	SDAP	1894	Sociaal-Democratische Arbeiderspartij (reformist break-away from SDB (1882))
	PvdA	1946	Partij van de Arbeid (reformed SDAP, left Christians; 1970: DS'70 right wing split)
NO	DNA	1887	Det Norske Arbeiderpartei (1918-23: pro-Com.; split 1921: mod. (-1927), 1923 NKP
SW	SAP	1889	Socialdemokratsiska Arbetareparti
SZ	SPS	1888	Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz (predecessor 1880; 1904 Socialist party)
UK	Lab.	1906	Labour Party (1900 LRC: formed by TUC, ILP (1893), co-op, &c.; 1918: indiv. members)

SOURCE: compiled from LANE & ERRSON 1991; JACOBS 1989; LINDEN 1990; PATTERSON & THOMAS 1977; WENDE 1981

Table A.2
Foundation and Name of Socialist Union Centres, Western Europe

AU	BFG	1893	Bund Freier Gerwerkschaften (before 1920s: "Reichsverband")
	ÖGB	1945	Österreichischer Gerwerkschaftsbund (unitary, but dominant FSG Socialist fraction)
BE	CGSB	1898	Confédération Générale du Travail Belgique (-1937: CS within POB party)
	FGTB	1945	Fédération Générale du Travail Belgique (merger of CGSB and resistance movement)
DE	LO(DSF)	1898	De Samenvirkende Fagforbundet (1886: Copenhagen only; later: LO i Danmark)
FR	CGT	1903	Confédération Générale du Travail (merger of 1892 Bourses and 1886 CGT congress)
	CGT-FO	1947	CGT-Force Ouvrier (reformist break-away from Communist-led CGT)
GE	ADGB	1891	Allgemeiner Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (1891: Commission, 1919: ADGB)
	DGB	1949	Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (unitary; 1947: Bi-zonal; 1949: West Germany)
IR	ITUC	1894	Irish Trade Union Congress (British- and Irish-based unions)
	ICTU	1959	Irish Congress of Trade Unions (merger ITUC and 1944 Nationalist break-away CIU)
IT	CGL	1906	Confederazione Generale del Lavoro (1924 suppresed)
	UIL	1948	Unione Italiana del Lavoro (reformist break-away of Communist-led CGIL)
NE	NVV	1905	Nederlands Verband van Vakvereiningen (reformist breaw-away from 1893 NAS)
	FNV	1981	Federatie Nederlands Vakbeweging (1981: merger, 1976: federation of NVV and NKV)
NO	LO(NAF)	1899	Norsk Arbeidernes Faglige Landsorganisajon (1920s: syndicalist, later: LO)
SW	LO	1889	Landsorganisationen i Sverige
SZ	SGB	1880	Schweizer Gewerkschaftsbund (1905 reformed)
UK	TUC	1863	Trades Union Congress (1895 reformed; GFTU 1899 reform failed later)

Source: Compiled from LAUNAY 1990; LINDEN & ROJAHN 1990; VISSER 1989, 1990; DUES database 1992.

Table A.3
Foundation and Name of Christian Parties, Western Europe

AU	CP	1895	Christlichsoziale Partei (parl. 1891-)
	ÖVP	1945	Österreichische Volkspartei (reformed CP)
BE	KP/PC	1884	Katholieke Partij / Parti Catholique (1936 regional)
	CVP/PSC	1945	Christene Volkspartij / Parti Social Chrétien (1968 regional)
DE	KRF	1970	Kristeligt Folkeparti
GE	Z.	1870	Zentrum (1919 Bavarian break-away)
	CDU	1945	Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (in Bavaria CSU)
FR	PDP	1924	Parti Démocrate Populaire
	MRP	1944	Mouvement Républicain Populaire
	CDS	1965	Centre des Démocrates Sociaux (-1976 CD)
IT	PPI	1919	Partito Populare Italiano
	DC	1943	Democrazia Christiana
NE	RKSP	1904	Roomsch-Katholieke Staatspartij (*1904)
	KVP	1945	Katholieke Volkspartij (1980 -> CDA)
	ARP	1879	Anti-Revolutionaire Partij (1980 -> CDA)
	CHU	1897	Christlich-Historische Union (CHK- 1908 merger; 1980 -> CDA)
	CDA	1980	Christlich Demokratischer Appell (merger; 1975 federation)
NO	KrF	1933	Kristelig Folkeparti
SW	KDS	1964	Kristdemokratiska Samhällspartiet
SZ	KK	1912	Schweizerische Konservative Volkspartei (1881 KU)
	CVP	1957	Christlichdemokratische Volkspartei (-1970 KCVPS)
	EVP	1917	Evangelische Volkspartei (1919 national)

Source: FOGARTY 1957, IRVING 1979, MADELEY 1991, RIGHART 1986, WENDE 1981, JACOBS 1989

Table A.4
Foundation and Name of Christian Union Centres, Western Europe

AU	ZCG	1909	Zentralkomission der Christlichen Gewerkschaften Österreichs (1902 League)
	FCG	1945	Fraktion Christlicher Gerwerkschafter (fraction within ÖGB)
BE	CSC	1912	Confédération des Syndicats Chrétiens / Algemeen Christelijke Vakververbond (ACV)
FR	CFTC	1919	Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens
	CFDT	1964	Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail (secularized); but CFTC split-away
GE	CGD	1899	Christliche Gewerkschaften Deutschlands (1919 incl. prot. white-collar unions)
	CGB	1959	Christlicher Gerwerkschaftsbund Deutschlands (refounded, merger with Saar unions)
IT	CIL	1918	Confederazione Italiana dei Laboratori
	CISL	1950	Confederazione Italiana dei Sindacati Lavoratori
NE	NKV	1909	Nederlands Katholieke Vakbeweging (1981 FNV-merger with NVV)
	CNV	1909	Christelijk Nationaal Vakverbond
SZ	CNG	1909	Christlich Nationaler Gewerkschafts-bund
	SVEA	1920	Schweizerischer Verband evangelischer Arbeitnehmer (1981 -> CNG)

SOURCE: FOGARTY 1957; LAUBIER 1985: CH. 2; LAUNAY 1991; RIGHART 1986; SCHOLL 1964; VISSER 1989, 1990

Table A.5
Foundation and Name of Communist (and Leftist) Parties, Western Europe

Country	Abbrev.	Founded	Name (Changes)
AU	KPÖ	1918	Kommunistische Partei Österreichs
BE	PCB	1921	Parti Communiste de Belgique (merger of FCW and Jacquemottians)
DE	DKP	1919	Danmarks Kommunistiske Parti (name: 1920)
	SF	1958	Socilistisk Folkeparti (break-away)
FR	PCF	1920	Parti Communiste Français (SFIO majority)
GE	USPD	1917	Unabhängige Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD break-away)
	KPD	1918	Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (1920: rest-USPD joined)
	DKP	1969	Deutsche Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (newly formed, after suppression)
IR	CPI	1921	Communist Party of Ireland (1923, 1948 merger with IWL, 1933, 1970 reformed)
IT	PCI	1921	Partito Communista Italiano (PSI 1919-21 pro-Comintern; PSI break-away)
NE	SDP	1909	Sozialdemokratische Partij (SdAP break-away)
	CPN	1918	Communistische Partij Nederland (change of SDP)
NO	NKP	1923	Norges Kommunistiske Parti (DNA 1918-23 pro-Comintern; DNA break-away)
SW	VPK	1917	Vänsterpartitet Kommunisterna (1921 Comintern, schism 1924, 1931, 1967, 1977)
SZ	KPS	1921	Kommunistische Partei der Schweiz (1940 suppressed)
	PTS	1944	Parti du Travail Suisse/Partei der Arbeit
UK	CP	1920	Communist Party of Great Britain (merger of left BSP and SLP)

SOURCE: Collected from JACOBS 1989, MCINNES 1975, TANNAHILL 1978, WALLER & FENNEMA 1988, WENDE 1981.

Table A.6
Foundation and Name of Communist (and Syndicalist) Union Movements in Western Europe

Country	Abbrev.	Founded	Name (Changes)
AU	FGE	1945	Fraktion Gewerkschaftliche Einheit (fraction within ÖGB)
BE	OSR	1920s	Opposition Syndicale Révolutionaire (within CGTB)
	CBSU	1940s	Syndicats Uniques (merged to form FGTB)
DE	FS	1918	Fagoppositionens Sammenslutning (within DSF)
FR	CGT-U	1921	CGT-Unitaire (CGT break-away, 1936 merged again)
	CGT	1944	CGT (Communist-led by 1947, break-away of Socialist CGT-FO)
GE	FAUD	1897	Freie-Arbeiter Union Deutschlands (syndicalist)
	BRI	1924	Bund revolutionärer Industrieverbände (1927 change in name)
IT	USI	1912	Unione Sindacale Italiana (syndicalist, supressed 1926)
	CGIL	1944	Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (Communist-led by 1947)
NE	NAS	1892	Nationaal Arbeids Secretariat (syndicalist since 1905 schism)
	EVC	1944	Eenheids Vak Centrale (Communist, schism 1958, end 1960-4)
NO	NFO	1913	Norsk Fagopposition (within NALF/LO, pro-Comintern majority)
SW	SAC	1910	Sveriges Arbetares Centralorganisation (Syndicalist, later Communist)
UK	NUM	1924	National Minority Movement (1921 British RILU-bureau)

SOURCE: Collected from GALENSON 1953a; KENDALL 1975; LINDEN & THORPE 1990, WALLER 1990.

Table A.7
Foundation and Name of White-Collar Union Centres (mainly private sector), Western Europe

AU	1917		Ständige Delegation der freigew. Angestelltenverbände (predecessor: 1907, 1919 BFG)
DE	1952	FTF	Fællesrådet for danske Tjenestemands- og Funktionærorganisationener
	1953	FR	Hovedorganisationen for Arbejdsleder- og Tekniske Funktionærforeninger i Danmark
	1972	AC	Akademikernes Centralorganisation (predecessor: AS 1962)
FR	1944	CGC	Confédération Générale des Cadres (1980: CGC-CFE)
GE	1919	AfA	Allgemeiner freier Angestelltenverbände (predecessor: 1913, -1933)
	1919	Gedag	Gesamtverband Deutscher Angestelltenverbände (-1933, refounded 1950s)
	1921	GDA	Gewerkschaft der Angestellten (-1933)
	1949	DAG	Deutsche Angestellten-Gewerkschaft (1945 in British zone)
	1951	ULA	Union der Leitenden Angestellten
NE	1923	VVH	Verbond van Vakorganisaties van Hoofdarbeiders (1929: joined liberal NVC)
	1966	NCHP	Nederlands Centrale voor Hoger Personeel
	1974	MHP	Vakcentrale voor Middelbare en Hogere Personeel
NO	1974	AF	Akademikernes Fellesorganisasjon
	1951	FSO	Funksjonærenes Sentralorgansisasjon (-1965: form new YH)
	1965	YH	Yrkesorgansisasjonennes Hovedsammenslutning (1977: merged to form YS)
	1977	YS	Yrkesorganisasjonnenes Sentralforbund
SW	1917	SR	Statsjänstemännenes Riksförbund (1973: joined SACO)
	1931	DACO	De Anställdas Centralorganisationen (1943: merged with TCO)
	1937	TCO	Tjänstemännens Centralorgnisation (1943: merger with DACO)
	1947	SACO	Sveriges Akademikers Centalorganisation (1974: merged with SR)
SZ	1918	VSA	Vereinigung Schweizerischer Angestelltenverbände

SOURCE: EBBINGHAUS 1988; VISSER 1989; BAIN & PRICE 1980;

Table A.8
Foundation and Name of Public Sector Union Centres, Western Europe

Nation	Founded	Abbrev.	Name
DE	1952	FTF	Fællesrådet for danske Tjenestemands- og Funktionærorganisationener
	1953	CO-I	Statsjenestemændenes Centralorganisation I
	1972	AC	Akademikernes Centralorganisation (predecessor: AS 1962)
FR	1948	FEN	Fédération de l'éducation Nationale
GE	1918	DBB	Deutscher Beamtenbund (1928: joins Christian-National union centre)
	1922	ADBB	Allgemeiner Deutscher Beamtenbund (DBB break-away, cooperation with ADGB and AfA)
	1949	DBB	Deutscher Beamtenbund (newly founded)
		DRB	Deutscher Richterbund
IT			
NE	1916	CRP	Centrale van Rijkspersoneel (1920-22: with Liberal ANC, 1946-: with AC)
	1917	CMHA	Centrale van Middelbare en Hogere Ambtenaren (1974: merged to form MHP)
	1946	AC	Ambtenaren-Centrale
	1966	NCHP	Nederlands Centrale voor Hoger Personeel
NO	1918	EL	Emberstsmenneses Landsforbundet (1975: merged to form AF)
	1923	ST	Statstjenestemanns Sentralorganisasjon (1977: merged to form YS)
	1951	FSO	Funksjonærenes Sentralorganisasjon (-1965: form new YH)
	1965	YH	Yrkesorgnsisasjonennes Hovedsammenslutning (1977: merged to form YS)
	1974	AF	Akademikernes Fellesorganisasjon
	1977	YS	Yerkesorganisasjonnenes Sentralforbund
SW	1917	SR	Statsjänstemännenes Riksförbund (1973: joined SACO)
	1937	TCO	Tjänstemännens Centralorgnisation (1943: merger with DACO)
	1947	SACO	Sveriges Akademikers Centalorganisation (1974: merged with SR)
SZ	1903	FöV	Föderativverband des Personals öffentlicher Verwaltungen und Betriebe (SGB cartel)

SOURCE: VISSER 1989; BAIN & PRICE 1980;

Table 8.1.1: Votes of Socialist and Labour Parties, Western Europe 1890-1944

	AU	BE	DE	FR	GE	IR	IT	NE	NO	SW	SZ	UK
	SPÖ	BWP	SD	SFIO	SPD	ILP	PSI	SDAP	DNA	SAP	SPS	Lab.
1890	.	0.1	7.0	.	19.7	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1892	.	0.2	9.0	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1893	.	.	.	8.4	23.3	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1894	.	13.2	.	.	.	.	.	0.2	0.3	.	.	.
1895	.	.	11.0	.	.	.	6.8	.	.	.	.	.
1896	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	6.8	.
1897	.	.	.	.	.	.	8.9	3.0	0.6	.	.	.
1898	.	14.8	14.0	11.2	27.2	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1899	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	9.6	.
1900	.	22.5	.	.	.	.	13.0	.	3.0	.	.	1.8
1901	.	.	17.1	.	.	.	.	9.5	.	.	.	.
1902	.	.	.	10.4	.	.	.	.	.	3.5	12.6	.
1903	.	.	20.4	.	31.7	.	.	.	9.7	.	.	.
1904	.	20.6	.	.	.	.	21.3	.	.	.	.	.
1905	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	11.2	.	9.5	14.7	.
1906	.	.	25.4	10.0	.	.	.	.	16.0	.	.	5.7
1907	21.0	.	.	.	29.0	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1908	.	14.5	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	14.6	17.6	.
1909	.	.	28.7	.	.	.	19.0	13.9	21.6	.	.	.
1910	.	.	28.3	13.1	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	7.1
1911	25.4	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	28.5	20.0	.
1912	.	9.3	.	.	34.8	.	.	.	26.3	.	.	.
1913	.	.	29.5	.	.	.	17.6	18.5	.	.	.	.
1914	.	.	.	16.8	.	.	.	.	.	36.4	10.1	.
1915	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	32.1	.	.	.
1917	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	31.1	30.8	.
1918	.	.	28.7	.	.	.	.	22.0	31.6	.	.	21.9
1919	40.8	36.6	.	21.2	37.9	.	32.3	.	NSD	.	23.5	.
1920	36.0	.	32.2	.	21.6	.	.	.	——	29.7	.	.
1921	.	34.8	.	.	.	.	24.7	.	9.2	36.2	.	.
1922	.	.	.	.	.	21.3	.	19.4	.	.	23.3	29.4
1923	39.6	.	.	.	.	10.6	.	.	.	.	.	30.5
1924	.	.	36.6	20.1	26.0	.	.	.	8.8	41.1	.	33.0
1925	.	39.4	.	.	.	.	.	22.9	DNA	.	25.8	.
1926	.	.	37.2	.	.	.	.	.	——	.	.	.
1927	42.3	.	.	.	.	9.1	.	.	36.8	.	.	.
1928	.	.	.	18.0	29.8	.	.	.	.	37.0	27.4	.
1929	.	36.0	41.8	.	.	.	.	23.8	.	.	.	37.0
1930	41.1	.	.	.	24.5	.	.	.	31.4	.	.	.
1931	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	28.7	29.2
1932	.	37.1	42.7	20.5	20.4	7.7	.	.	.	41.7	.	.
1933	.	.	.	.	18.3	5.7	.	21.5	40.1	.	.	.
1935	.	.	46.1	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	28.0	37.8
1936	.	32.1	.	27.5	.	.	.	.	42.5	45.9	.	.
1937	.	.	.	.	.	10.3	.	21.9	.	.	.	.
1938	.	.	.	.	.	10.0	.	.	.	.	.	.
1939	.	30.2	42.9	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	25.7	.
1940	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	53.8	.	.
1943	.	.	44.5	.	.	15.7	.	.	.	.	28.6	.
1944	.	.	.	.	.	8.8	.	.	.	46.5	.	.

Table 8.1.2: Votes of Socialist and Labour Parties, Western Europe 1945-1989

	AU	BE			DE	FR	GE	IR	IT	NE	NO	SW	SZ	UK
	SPÖ	both	PS	SP	SD	SFIO	SPD	ILP	PSI	PvdA	DNA	SAP	SPS	Lab.
1945	44.6	.	.	.	32.8	23.8	.	.	.	.	41.0	.	.	47.7
1946	.	31.6	.	.	.	17.9	.	.	20.7	28.3	.	.	.	.
1947	.	.	.	.	40.0	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	26.2	.
1948	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	8.7	8.7	25.6	.	46.1	.	.
1949	38.7	29.7	.	.	.	.	29.2	.	.	.	45.7	.	.	.
1950	.	34.5	.	.	39.6	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	46.1
1951	.	.	.	.	.	14.5	.	11.4	.	.	.	.	26.0	48.8
1952	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	29.0	.	46.0	.	.
1953	42.1	.	.	.	41.3	.	28.8	.	12.7	.	46.7	.	.	.
1954	.	37.3	.	.	.	.	.	12.1	.	.	.	.	.	.
1955	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	27.0	46.4
1956	43.0	.	.	.	.	15.2	.	.	.	32.7	.	44.6	.	.
1957	.	.	.	.	39.4	.	31.8	9.1	.	.	48.3	.	.	.
1958	.	35.8	.	.	.	15.5	.	.	14.2	.	.	46.2	.	.
1959	44.8	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	30.4	.	.	26.4	43.8
1960	.	.	.	.	42.1	.	.	.	.	.	.	47.8	.	.
1961	.	36.7	.	.	.	.	36.2	11.6	.	.	46.8	.	.	.
1962	44.0	.	.	.	.	12.4	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1963	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	13.8	28.0	.	.	26.6	.
1964	.	.	.	.	41.9	.	.	.	.	.	.	47.3	.	44.1
1965	.	28.3	.	.	.	.	39.3	15.4	.	.	43.1	.	.	.
1966	42.6	.	.	.	38.3	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	48.0
1967	.	.	.	.	.	18.9	.	.	.	23.6	.	.	23.5	.
1968	.	28.0	.	.	34.1	16.5	.	.	14.5	.	.	50.1	.	.
1969	.	.	.	.	.	.	42.7	17.0	.	.	46.5	.	.	.
1970	48.4	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	45.3	.	43.1
1971	50.0	27.2	.	.	37.3	.	.	.	.	24.6	.	.	22.9	.
1972	.	.	.	.	.	.	45.8	.	9.6	27.3	.	.	.	.
1973	.	.	.	.	25.6	19.1	.	13.7	.	.	35.3	43.6	.	.
1974	.	26.7	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	39.3
1975	50.4	.	.	.	29.9	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	24.9	.
1976	.	.	.	.	.	.	42.6	.	9.6	.	.	42.7	.	.
1977	.	27.0	.	.	37.0	.	.	11.6	.	33.8	42.3	.	.	.
1978	.	(25.4)	13.0	12.4	.	22.8	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1979	51.0	.	.	.	38.3	.	.	.	9.8	.	.	43.2	24.4	36.9
1980	.	.	.	.	.	.	42.9	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1981	.	(25.1)	12.7	12.4	32.9	36.6	.	9.9	.	28.3	37.2	.	.	.
1982	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	9.4	.	30.4	.	45.6	.	.
1983	47.6	.	.	.	.	.	42.7	.	11.4	.	.	.	22.9	27.6
1984	.	.	.	.	31.6	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1985	.	(28.3)	13.8	14.5	.	.	.	.	.	.	40.8	44.7	.	.
1986	43.1	.	.	.	.	31.3	.	.	.	33.3	.	.	.	.
1987	.	(30.6)	15.7	14.9	29.3	.	37.0	6.4	14.3	.	.	.	18.4	30.8
1988	.	.	.	.	29.8	36.6	.	.	.	.	.	43.2	.	.
1989	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	9.5	.	31.9	34.3	.	.	.

Table B.2.1: Seats of Socialist and Labour Parties, Western Europe 1890-1944

	AU	BE	DE	FR	GE	IR	IT	NE	NO	SW	SZ	UK
	SPÖ	BWP	SD	SFIO	SPD	ILP	PSI	SDAP	DNA	SAP	SPS	Lab.
1890	.	0.0	2.9	.	8.8	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1892	.	0.0	2.0	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1893	.	.	.	5.5	11.1	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1894	.	18.4	.	.	.	.	.	0.0	0.0	.	.	.
1895	.	.	7.0	.	.	.	3.0	.	.	.	.	.
1896	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0.4	0.7	.
1897	.	.	.	.	.	.	3.1	2.0	0.0	.	.	.
1898	.	18.4	10.5	10.0	14.1	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1899	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0.4	2.7	.
1900	.	21.1	.	.	.	.	6.5	.	0.0	.	.	0.3
1901	.	.	12.3	.	.	.	.	6.0	.	.	.	.
1902	.	.	.	7.8	.	.	.	.	.	1.7	4.2	.
1903	.	.	14.0	.	20.4	.	.	.	3.4	.	.	.
1904	.	17.5	.	.	.	.	5.7	.	.	.	.	.
1905	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	6.0	.	5.7	1.2	.
1906	.	.	21.1	9.1	.	.	.	.	8.1	.	.	4.3
1907	17.3	.	.	.	10.8	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1908	.	20.5	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	14.8	4.2	.
1909	.	.	21.1	.	.	.	8.1	7.0	8.9	.	.	.
1910	.	.	21.1	12.8	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	6.3
1911	20.4	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	27.8	7.9	.
1912	.	21.0	.	.	27.7	.	.	.	18.7	.	.	.
1913	.	.	28.1	.	.	.	10.2	15.0	.	.	.	.
1914	.	.	.	17.4	.	.	.	.	.	37.8	10.1	.
1915	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	15.4	.	.	.
1917	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	37.4	10.6	.
1918	.	.	28.1	.	.	.	.	22.0	14.3	.	.	8.8
1919	42.4	37.6	.	10.9	38.7	.	30.7	.	NSD	.	21.7	.
1920	37.7	.	32.4	.	22.2	.	.	.	——	32.6	.	.
1921	.	36.6	.	.	.	.	23.0	.	5.3	40.4	.	.
1922	.	.	.	.	.	13.3	.	20.0	.	.	21.7	23.1
1923	41.2	.	.	.	.	9.2	.	.	.	.	.	31.1
1924	.	.	37.2	18.1	26.6	.	.	.	5.3	45.2	.	24.6
1925	.	41.7	.	.	.	.	.	24.0	DNA	.	24.7	.
1926	.	.	35.8	.	.	.	.	.	——	.	.	.
1927	43.0	.	.	.	.	8.5	.	.	39.3	.	.	.
1928	.	.	.	16.4	31.2	.	.	.	.	39.1	25.3	.
1929	.	37.4	41.2	.	.	.	.	24.0	.	.	.	46.7
1930	43.6	.	.	.	25.2	.	.	.	31.3	.	.	.
1931	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	26.2	7.5
1932	.	39.0	41.9	21.3	20.7	4.6	.	.	.	45.2	.	.
1933	.	.	.	.	18.5	5.2	.	22.0	46.0	.	.	.
1935	.	.	45.9	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	26.7	25.0
1936	.	34.7	.	33.7	.	.	.	.	46.7	48.7	.	.
1937	.	.	.	.	.	9.4	.	23.0	.	.	.	.
1938	.	.	.	.	.	6.5	.	.	.	.	.	.
1939	.	31.7	43.2	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	24.1	.
1940	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	58.3	.	.
1943	.	.	44.6	.	.	12.3	.	.	.	.	28.9	.
1944	.	.	.	.	.	5.8	.	.	.	50.0	.	.

Table B.2.2: Seats of Socialist and Labour Parties, Western Europe 1945-1989

	AU	BE			DE	FR	GE	IR	IT	NE	NO	SW	SZ	UK
	SPÖ	both	PS	SP	SD	SFIO	SPD	ILP	PSI	PvdA	DNA	SAP	SPS	Lab.
1945	46.1	.	.	.	32.4	25.7	.	.	.	.	50.7	.	.	61.4
1946	.	34.2	.	.	.	16.5	.	.	20.7	29.0	.	.	.	.
1947	.	.	.	.	38.5	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	24.7	.
1948	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	9.5	9.1	27.0	.	48.7	.	.
1949	40.6	31.1	.	.	.	.	32.6	.	.	.	56.7	.	.	.
1950	.	36.3	.	.	39.6	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	50.4
1951	.	.	.	.	.	17.3	.	10.9	.	.	.	.	25.0	47.2
1952	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	30.0	.	47.8	.	.
1953	44.2	.	.	.	42.3	.	31.0	.	12.7	.	51.3	.	.	.
1954	.	40.8	.	.	.	.	.	12.9	.	.	.	.	.	.
1955	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	27.0	44.0
1956	44.8	.	.	.	.	16.2	.	.	.	33.3	.	45.9	.	.
1957	.	.	.	.	40.0	.	34.0	8.2	.	.	52.0	.	.	.
1958	.	39.6	.	.	.	9.5	.	.	14.1	.	.	48.1	.	.
1959	47.3	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	32.0	.	.	26.0	41.0
1960	.	.	.	.	43.4	.	.	.	.	.	.	49.1	.	.
1961	.	39.6	.	.	.	.	38.1	11.1	.	.	49.3	.	.	.
1962	46.1	.	.	.	.	13.8	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1963	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	13.8	28.7	.	.	26.5	.
1964	.	.	.	.	43.4	.	.	.	.	.	.	48.5	.	50.3
1965	.	30.2	.	.	.	.	40.7	15.3	.	.	45.3	.	.	.
1966	44.8	.	.	.	39.4	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	57.8
1967	.	.	.	.	.	25.1	.	.	.	24.7	.	.	25.5	.
1968	.	27.8	.	.	35.4	12.1	.	.	14.4	.	.	53.6	.	.
1969	.	.	.	.	.	.	45.2	12.5	.	.	49.3	.	.	.
1970	49.1	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	46.6	.	45.7
1971	50.8	28.8	.	.	40.0	.	.	.	.	26.0	.	.	23.0	.
1972	.	.	.	.	.	.	46.4	.	9.7	28.7	.	.	.	.
1973	.	.	.	.	26.3	18.8	.	13.2	.	.	40.0	44.6	.	.
1974	.	27.8	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	50.2
1975	50.8	.	.	.	30.3	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	27.5	.
1976	.	.	.	.	.	.	43.1	.	9.0	.	.	43.6	.	.
1977	.	29.2	.	.	37.1	.	.	11.5	.	35.3	49.0	.	.	.
1978	.	(27.4)	15.1	12.3	.	21.5	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1979	51.9	.	.	.	38.9	.	.	.	9.8	.	.	44.1	25.5	42.4
1980	.	.	.	.	.	.	43.9	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1981	.	(28.8)	16.5	12.3	33.7	56.5	.	9.0	.	29.3	41.9	.	.	.
1982	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	9.6	.	31.3	.	47.6	.	.
1983	49.2	.	.	.	.	.	38.8	.	11.6	.	.	.	23.5	32.2
1984	.	.	.	.	32.0	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1985	.	(31.6)	16.5	15.1	.	.	.	.	.	.	45.2	45.6	.	.
1986	43.7	.	.	.	.	35.6	.	.	.	34.7	.	.	.	.
1987	.	(34.0)	18.9	15.1	30.9	.	37.4	7.2	14.9	.	.	.	20.5	35.2
1988	.	.	.	.	31.4	46.8	.	.	.	.	.	44.7	.	.
1989	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	9.0	.	32.7	38.2	.	.	.

Table 8.3.1: Votes of Christian-Democratic and Religious Parties, Western Europe 1890-1944

	AU	BE		FR	GE			IR	IT	ME						MO	SZ	
	Cath.	Cath.		Cath.	Cath.			Cath.	Cath.	Chr.	Cath.		Prot.			Prot.	Cath.	Prot.
Year	CP	KP/PC	other	PDP	both	BVP	DZP	FG	PPI	big 3	RKSP	other	ARP	CHU	other	KrF	KK	EVP
1890	.	52.9	.	.	.	.	18.6	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1891	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	(49.7)	20.2	.	29.5	.	.	.	.	.
1892	.	53.7	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1893	.	.	.	.	.	.	19.1	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1894	.	51.1	1.2	.	.	.	.	.	.	(44.2)	20.3	.	17.1	6.7	.	.	.	.
1896	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	23.0	.
1897	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	(57.2)	20.3	.	26.2	10.7	.	.	.	.
1898	.	48.5	2.0	.	.	.	18.8	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1899	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	20.8	.
1900	.	48.5	3.0	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1901	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	(49.9)	15.7	.	27.4	6.7	.	.	.	.
1902	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	23.1	.
1903	.	.	.	.	.	.	19.8	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1904	.	49.8	2.2	.	.	.	.	.	0.5	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1905	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	(48.6)	13.1	.	24.7	10.8	.	.	22.5	.
1907	52.3	.	.	.	.	.	19.4	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1908	.	48.6	1.1	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	20.5	.
1909	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	4.0	(51.3)	12.8	.	27.9	10.6	.	.	.	.
1911	45.4	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	19.1	.
1912	.	51.0	1.9	.	.	.	16.4	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1913	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	6.0	(46.4)	21.5	.	14.5	10.5	.	.	.	.
1914	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	21.1	.
1917	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	16.5	.
1918	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	(49.9)	30.0	2.0	13.4	6.5	0.4	.	.	.
1919	35.9	36.6	2.1	.	.	.	19.0	.	20.5	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	21.0	0.8
1920	41.8	.	.	.	(17.8)	4.2	13.6	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1921	.	37.0	4.3	.	.	.	.	.	20.4	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1922	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	(54.5)	29.9	1.4	13.7	10.9	1.6	.	20.9	0.9
1923	44.0	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1924	.	.	.	.	(17.3)	3.7	13.6	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1925	.	36.1	2.5	.	.	.	.	.	.	(50.8)	28.6	1.6	12.2	9.9	3.0	.	20.9	0.9
1927	41.4	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1928	.	.	.	.	(15.1)	3.1	12.1	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	21.4	0.7
1929	.	35.4	3.1	.	.	.	.	.	.	(51.7)	29.6	1.1	11.6	10.5	3.3	.	.	.
1930	35.7	.	.	.	(14.8)	3.0	11.8	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1931	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	[illegible]	.	.	.	21.4	1.0
1932	.	38.5	0.2	3.2	(15.0)	3.1	11.9	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1933	.	.	.	.	(14.0)	2.7	11.2	.	.	(50.4)	27.9	2.1	13.4	9.1	3.4	0.8	.	.
1935	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	20.3	0.7
1936	.	27.7	1.1	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	1.3	.	.
1937	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	34.8	.	(52.7)	28.8	2.8	16.4	7.5	2.5	.	.	.
1938	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	33.3	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1939	.	32.7	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	16.8	0.9
1943	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	23.1	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	20.8	0.4
1944	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	20.5	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.

Table B.3.2: Votes of Christian-Democratic and Religious Parties, Western Europe 1945-1989

	AU	BE			DE	FR	GE			IR	IT	NE					NO	SW	SZ	
	Cath.	Cath.			Prot.	C	Cath.		Cath.			Prot.	Cath.	Chr.			Cath.	Cath.	Chr.	Cath.	Prot.
	ÖVP	Both	CVP	PSC	KRF	CD(S)	Both	CDU	CSU	FG	DC	CDA	KVP	ARP	CHU	other	KrF	KdS	CVP	EVP
1945	49.8	.	.	.	.	24.9	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	7.9	.	.	.
1946	.	42.5	.	.	.	26.3	.	.	.	.	35.2	(51.5)	30.8	12.9	7.8	2.1	.	.	.	.
1947	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	21.2	0.9
1948	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	19.8	48.5	(53.4)	+32.3	13.2	9.2	2.4	.	.	.	.
1949	44.0	+43.6	.	.	.	.	(34.1)	28.3	5.8	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	8.4	.	.	.
1950	.	47.7	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1951	.	.	.	.	.	12.5	.	.	.	25.8	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	22.5	1.0
1952	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	(48.9)	+30.4	11.3	8.9	3.1	.	.	.	.
1953	41.3	.	.	.	.	.	(46.0)	37.1	8.8	.	40.1	.	.	.	.	.	10.5	.	.	.
1954	.	+42.0	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	32.0	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1955	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	23.2	1.1
1956	46.0	.	.	.	.	11.1	.	.	.	.	.	(50.0)	31.7	9.9	8.4	2.9	.	.	.	.
1957	.	.	.	.	.	.	(50.2)	39.7	10.5	26.6	.	.	.	.	.	.	10.2	.	.	.
1958	.	46.5	.	.	.	11.1	.	.	.	.	42.4	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1959	44.2	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	(49.1)	31.6	9.4	8.1	2.8	.	.	23.3	1.4
1961	.	+42.3	.	.	.	.	(45.3)	35.8	9.6	32.0	.	.	.	.	.	.	9.3	.	.	.
1962	45.4	.	.	.	.	7.9	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1963	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	38.2	(49.2)	31.9	8.7	8.6	3.0	.	.	23.4	1.6
1964	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	1.8	.	.
1965	.	+34.8	.	.	.	.	(47.6)	38.0	9.6	34.1	.	.	.	.	.	.	7.8	.	.	.
1966	48.3	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1967	.	.	.	.	.	14.1	.	.	.	.	.	(44.5)	26.5	9.9	8.1	2.9	.	.	22.1	1.6
1968	.	(31.7)	20.0	11.7	.	10.5	.	.	.	.	39.0	.	.	.	.	.	.	1.5	.	.
1969	.	.	.	.	.	.	(46.1)	36.7	9.5	34.1	.	.	.	.	.	.	7.8	.	.	.
1970	44.7	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	1.8	.	.
1971	43.1	(30.1)	19.7	10.4	2.0	.	.	.	.	.	.	(36.7)	21.8	8.6	6.3	4.0	.	.	20.7	2.1
1972	.	.	.	.	.	.	(44.9)	35.2	9.7	.	38.7	(31.3)	17.7	8.8	4.8	4.0	.	.	.	.
1973	.	.	.	.	4.0	3.8	.	.	.	35.1	.	.	.	.	.	.	11.9	1.8	.	.
1974	.	(32.3)	23.3	9.1	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1975	42.9	.	.	.	5.3	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	21.1	2.0
1976	.	.	.	.	.	.	(48.6)	38.0	10.6	.	38.7	.				.	.	1.4	.	.
1977	.	(35.9)	26.2	9.8	3.4	.	.	.	.	30.5	.	31.9	CDA	CDA	CDA	3.7	9.7	.	.	.
1978	.	(36.3)	26.2	10.1	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1979	41.9	.	.	.	2.6	.	.	.	.	.	38.3	.	.	.	.	.	.	1.4	21.5	2.2
1980	.	.	.	.	.	.	(44.5)	34.2	10.3	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1981	.	(26.5)	19.3	7.1	2.3	.	.	.	.	36.5	.	30.8	.	.	.	4.6	8.9	.	.	.
1982	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	39.2	.	29.4	.	.	.	4.9	.	1.9	.	.
1983	43.2	.	.	.	.	.	(42.7)	30.8	11.9	.	32.9	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	20.4	2.1
1984	.	.	.	.	2.7	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1985	.	(29.2)	21.3	8.0	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	8.3	.	.	.
1986	41.3	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	34.6	.	.	.	3.9	.	.	.	.
1987	.	(27.5)	19.5	8.0	2.4	.	(44.3)	34.4	9.8	27.1	34.3	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	20.0	2.1
1988	.	.	.	.	2.0	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	2.9	.	.
1989	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	29.3	.	35.3	.	.	.	4.1	8.5	.	.	.

Table B.4.1: Seats of Christian-Democratic and Religious Parties, Western Europe 1890-1944

	AU	BE		FR	GE			IR	IT	NE						NO	SZ	
	Cath.	Cath.		Cath.	Cath.			Cath.	Cath.	Chr.	Cath.		Prot.			Prot.	Cath.	Prot.
Year	CP	KP/PC	other	PDP	both	BVP	DZP	FG	PPI	big 3	RKSP	other	ARP	CHU	other	KrF	KK	EVP
1890	.	68.8	.	.	.	.	26.7	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1891	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	(46.0)	25.0	.	21.0	.	.	.	.	.
1892	.	60.5	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1893	.	.	.	.	.	.	24.2	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1894	.	67.8	0.7	.	.	.	.	.	.	(40.0)	25.0	.	15.0	0.0	.	.	.	.
1896	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	21.1	.
1897	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	(45.0)	22.0	.	17.0	6.0	.	.	.	.
1898	.	71.7	1.3	.	.	.	25.7	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1899	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	21.8	.
1900	.	56.6	0.7	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1901	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	(57.0)	25.0	.	22.0	10.0	.	.	.	.
1902	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	21.6	.
1903	.	.	.	.	.	.	25.2	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1904	.	55.4	1.8	.	.	.	.	.	0.6	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1905	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	(48.0)	25.0	.	15.0	8.0	.	.	21.6	.
1907	58.0	.	.	.	.	.	26.4	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1908	.	52.4	0.6	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	21.0	.
1909	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	3.1	(60.0)	25.0	.	25.0	10.0	.	.	.	.
1911	43.2	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	20.1	.
1912	.	54.3	1.1	.	.	.	22.9	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1913	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	5.7	(46.0)	25.0	.	11.0	10.0	.	.	.	.
1914	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	19.6	.
1917	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	22.2	.
1918	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	(50.0)	30.0	3.0	13.0	7.0	0.0	.	.	.
1919	40.6	39.2	0.0	.	.	.	21.6	.	19.7	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	21.7	0.5
1920	46.4	.	.	.	18.5	4.6	13.9	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1921	.	41.9	1.1	.	.	.	.	.	20.2	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1922	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	(59.0)	32.0	0.0	16.0	11.0	1.0	.	22.2	0.5
1923	48.5	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1924	.	.	.	.	17.8	3.9	14.0	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1925	.	40.1	1.6	.	.	.	.	.	.	(54.0)	30.0	1.0	13.0	11.0	3.0	.	21.2	0.5
1927	44.2	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1928	.	.	.	.	15.9	3.3	12.6	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	23.2	0.5
1929	.	38.0	3.2	.	.	.	.	.	.	(53.0)	30.0	0.0	12.0	11.0	4.0	.	.	.
1930	40.0	.	.	.	15.3	3.4	12.0	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1931	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	23.5	0.5
1932	.	42.2	0.0	2.6	15.4	3.4	12.0	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1933	.	.	.	.	14.2	2.8	11.4	.	.	(52.0)	28.0	2.0	14.0	10.0	4.0	0.7	.	.
1935	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	22.5	0.5
1936	.	30.2	1.0	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	1.3	.	.
1937	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	34.8	.	(56.0)	31.0	2.0	17.0	8.0	2.0	.	.	.
1938	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	32.6	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1939	.	36.1	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	23.0	0.0
1943	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	23.2	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	22.2	0.5
1944	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	21.7	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.

Table B.4.2: Seats of Christian-Democratic and Religious Parties, Western Europe

	AU	BE			DE	FR	GE			IR	IT	NE					NO	SW	SZ	
	Cath.	Cath.			Prot.	Cath.	Chr.			Cath.	Cath.	Chr.	Cath.	Prot.			Prot.	Prot.	Cath.	Prot.
	ÖVP	Both	CVP	PSC	KRF	CD(S)	Both	CDU	CSU	FG	DC	CDA	KVP	ARP	CHU	other	KrF	KdS	CVP	EVP
1945	51.5	.	.	.	.	27.0	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	5.3	.	.	.
1946	.	45.5	.	.	.	29.0	.	.	.	.	37.2	(53.0)	32.0	13.0	8.0	2.0	.	.	.	.
1947	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	22.7	0.5
1948	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	21.1	53.1	(54.0)+	33.0	13.0	9.0	2.0	.	.	.	.
1949	46.7	49.5	.	.	.	.	(37.1)	31.1	6.0	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	6.0	.	.	.
1950	.	50.9	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1951	.	.	.	.	.	15.1	.	.	.	27.2	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	24.5	0.5
1952	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	(51.0)+	32.0	12.0	9.0	2.0	.	.	.	.
1953	44.8	.	.	.	.	.	(50.5)	39.8	10.7	.	44.6	.	.	.	.	.	9.3	.	.	.
1954	.	+45.5	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	34.0	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1955	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	24.0	0.5
1956	49.7	.	.	.	.	13.1	.	.	.	.	.	(51.3)	32.7	10.0	8.7	2.0	.	.	.	.
1957	.	.	.	.	.	.	(54.3)	43.7	10.7	27.2	.	.	.	.	.	.	8.0	.	.	.
1958	.	49.1	.	.	.	12.3	.	.	.	.	45.8	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1959	47.9	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	(50.0)	32.7	9.3	8.0	2.0	.	.	24.0	1.0
1961	.	+45.8	.	.	.	.	(48.5)	38.5	10.0	32.6	.	.	.	.	.	.	10.0	.	.	.
1962	49.1	.	.	.	.	8.0	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1963	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	41.3	(50.7)	33.3	8.7	8.7	2.7	.	.	24.0	1.0
1964	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0.0	.	.
1965	.	36.3	.	.	.	.	(49.4)	39.5	9.9	32.6	.	.	.	.	.	.	8.7	.	.	.
1966	51.5	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1967	.	.	.	.	.	8.1	.	.	.	.	.	(46.0)	28.0	10.0	8.0	2.7	.	.	22.5	1.5
1968	.	(32.5)	23.6	9.0	.	5.5	.	.	.	.	42.2	.	.	.	.	.	.	0.0	.	.
1969	.	.	.	.	.	.	(48.8)	38.9	9.9	34.7	.	.	.	.	.	.	9.3	.	.	.
1970	47.9	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0.0	.	.
1971	43.7	(31.6)	22.2	9.4	0.0	.	.	.	.	.	.	(38.7)	23.3	8.7	6.7	3.3	.	.	22.0	1.5
1972	.	.	.	.	.	.	(45.4)	35.7	9.7	.	42.4	(32.0)	18.0	9.3	4.7	3.3	.	.	.	.
1973	.	.	.	.	4.0	4.4	.	.	.	37.5	.	.	.	.	.	.	12.9	0.0	.	.
1974	.	(34.0)	23.6	10.4	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1975	43.7	.	.	.	5.1	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	23.0	1.5
1976	.	.	.	.	.	.	(49.0)	38.3	10.7	.	41.7	.	CDA	CDA	CDA	.	.	0.0	.	.
1977	.	(37.7)	26.4	11.3	3.4	.	.	.	.	29.1	.	32.7				2.7	14.2	.	.	.
1978	.	(38.7)	26.9	11.8	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1979	42.1	.	.	.	2.9	.	.	.	.	.	41.4	.	.	.	.	.	.	0.0	22.0	1.5
1980	.	.	.	.	.	.	(45.5)	35.0	10.5	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1981	.	(28.8)	20.3	8.5	2.3	.	.	.	.	39.2	.	32.0	.	.	.	4.0	9.7	.	.	.
1982	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	42.2	.	30.0	.	.	.	4.7	.	0.0	.	.
1983	44.3	.	.	.	.	.	(49.0)	38.4	10.6	.	35.7	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	20.5	1.5
1984	.	.	.	.	2.9	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1985	.	(32.5)	23.1	9.4	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	10.2	.	.	.
1986	42.1	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	36.0	.	.	.	3.3	.	.	.	.
1987	.	(29.2)	20.3	9.0	2.3	.	(44.9)	35.0	9.9	30.7	37.1	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	21.0	1.5
1988	.	.	.	.	2.3	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0.0	.	.
1989	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	33.1	.	36.0	.	.	.	4.0	8.5	.	.	.

(+) incl. minor other parties or independent candidates

Table B.5.1: Votes of Communist and Leftist Parties, Western Europe 1890-1944

	AU	BE	DE	FR		GE		IR		IT		NE		NO		SW		SZ	UK	
	KPÖ	PCB	DKP	PCF	left	KPD	left	CPI	left	PCI	left	CPN	left	NKP	left	VPK	left	PST	CP	l
1891	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	1.0	.	.	.	.	.	.	
1895	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
1897	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
1901	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
1905	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
1906	.	.	.	.	2.3	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
1910	.	.	.	.	16.1	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
1913	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	5.3	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
1914	.	.	.	.	13.6	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
1917	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	8.0	.	.	.	
1918	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	2.3	0.7	.	.	.	.	.	.	
1919	.	.	.	.	16.2	.	7.6	.	.	.	2.0	.	.	DNA	.	.	.	.	.	
1920	0.9	.	0.4	.	.	2.1	17.9	.	.	.	.	.	.	——	.	6.4	.	.	.	
1921	.	0.0	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	4.6	0.6	.	.	21.3	.	4.6	3.2	.	.	
1922	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	1.8	0.4	NKP	.	.	.	1.8	0.2	
1923	0.7	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	——	.	.	.	.	0.3	
1924	.	.	0.5	9.8	11.7	8.9	0.3	.	.	.	.	.	.	6.1	18.4	3.6	1.5	.	0.3	
1925	.	1.6	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	1.2	0.4	.	.	.	.	2.0	.	
1926	.	.	0.4	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
1927	0.4	.	.	.	.	.	.	1.1	.	.	.	.	.	4.0	.	.	.	.	.	
1928	.	.	.	11.3	18.8	10.6	0.1	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	6.4	.	1.8	.	
1929	.	1.9	0.3	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	2.0	0.6	.	.	.	.	.	0.2	
1930	0.6	.	.	.	.	13.1	0.0	.	.	.	.	.	.	1.7	.	.	.	.	.	
1931	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	1.5	0.3	3
1932	.	2.8	1.1	8.3	19.8	16.9	.	0.1	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	3.0	5.3	.	.	
1933	.	.	.	.	.	12.3	.	.	.	.	.	3.2	1.3	1.8	.	.	.	.	.	
1935	.	.	1.6	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	1.4	0.1	2
1936	.	6.1	.	15.3	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0.3	.	3.3	4.4	.	.	
1937	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	3.4	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
1939	.	5.4	2.4	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	2.6	.	
1940	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	3.5	0.6	.	.	
1944	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	2.7	.	.	.	.	.	.	10.3	0.2	.	.	

Table 8.5.2: Votes of Communist and Leftist Parties, Western Europe 1945-1989

	AU	BE	DE		FR		GE	IR		IT		NE		NO		SW		SZ	UK	
	KPÖ	PCB	DKP	left	PCF	left	KPD	CPI	left	PCI		KPÖ	PCB	DKP	left	PCF	left	KPD	CPI	left
1944	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	2.7	.	.	.	.	.	.	10.3	0.2	.	.	.
1945	5.4	.	12.5	.	26.1	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	11.9	.	.	.	.	0.4	0.2
1946	.	12.7	.	.	28.6	.	.	.	.	18.9	1.5	10.6	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1947	.	.	6.8	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	5.1	.	.
1948	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	2.6	22.3	7.1	7.7	.	.	.	6.3	.	.	.	.
1949	5.1	7.5	.	.	.	.	5.7	.	.	.	.	.	.	5.8	.	.	.	.	.	.
1950	.	4.7	4.6	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0.3	.
1951	.	.	.	.	26.7	.	.	0.0	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	2.7	0.1	.
1952	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	6.2	.	.	.	4.3	.	.	.	.
1953	5.3	.	4.3	.	.	.	2.2	.	.	22.6	4.5	.	.	5.1	.	.	.	.	.	.
1954	.	3.6	.	.	.	.	.	0.0	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1955	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	2.6	0.1	.
1956	4.4	.	.	.	25.9	.	.	.	.	.	.	4.7	.	.	.	5.0	.	.	.	.
1957	.	.	3.1	.	.	.	.	0.2	.	.	.	.	.	3.4	.	.	.	.	.	.
1958	.	1.9	.	.	18.9	.	.	.	.	22.7	4.6	.	.	.	.	3.4	.	.	.	.
1959	3.3	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	2.4	1.8	.	.	.	.	2.7	0.1	.
1960	.	.	1.1	6.1	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	4.5	.	.	.	.
1961	.	3.1	.	.	.	.	.	0.0	.	.	.	.	.	2.9	2.4	.	.	.	.	.
1962	3.0	.	.	.	21.9	2.0	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1963	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	25.3	6.1	2.8	3.0	.	.	.	.	2.2	.	.
1964	.	.	1.2	5.8	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	5.2	.	.	0.2	.
1965	.	4.6	.	.	.	.	.	0.0	.	.	.	.	.	1.4	6.0	.	.	.	.	.
1966	0.4	.	0.8	10.9	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0.2	.
1967	.	.	.	.	22.5	2.1	.	.	.	.	.	3.6	2.9	.	.	.	.	2.9	.	.
1968	.	3.3	1.0	8.1	20.0	3.9	.	.	.	26.9	4.4	.	.	.	.	3.0	.	.	.	.
1969	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0.0	.	.	.	.	.	1.0	3.5	.	.	.	.	.
1970	1.0	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	4.8	.	.	0.1	.
1971	1.4	3.1	1.4	10.7	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	3.9	8.6	.	.	.	.	2.6	.	.
1972	.	.	.	.	.	.	0.3	.	.	27.2	7.8	4.5	10.4	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1973	.	.	3.6	7.5	21.4	4.9	.	0.0	1.1	.	.	.	.	.	11.2	5.3	.	.	.	.
1974	.	3.2	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0.1	0.5
1975	1.2	.	4.2	7.0	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	2.4	.	.
1976	.	.	.	.	.	.	0.3	.	.	34.4	4.9	.	.	.	.	4.8	.	.	.	.
1977	.	2.7	3.7	6.6	.	.	.	0.0	1.7	.	.	1.7	3.3	0.4	4.2	.	.	.	.	.
1978	.	3.3	.	.	20.6	6.3	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1979	1.0	.	1.9	9.6	.	.	.	.	.	30.4	5.2	.	.	.	.	5.6	.	4.2	0.1	0.4
1980	.	.	.	.	.	.	0.2	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1981	.	2.3	1.1	14.0	16.1	2.8	.	0.0	4.6	.	.	2.1	4.6	0.3	4.9	.	.	.	.	.
1982	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0.0	3.7	.	.	1.8	3.9	.	.	5.6	.	.	.	.
1983	0.7	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	29.0	6.5	.	.	.	.	.	.	3.6	0.0	12.1
1984	.	.	0.7	14.2	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1985	.	1.2	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0.2	5.5	5.4	.	.	.	.
1986	0.7	.	.	.	9.7	2.1	.	.	.	.	.	0.6	2.5	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1987	.	0.8	0.9	18.1	.	.	.	0.0	6.1	26.6	4.6	.	.	.	.	.	.	2.6	0.0	10.2
1988	.	.	0.8	15.5	11.2	1.2	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	5.8	.	.	.	.
1989	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0.0	6.8	.	.	.	.	.	10.4	.	.	.	.	.

Table 8.6.1: Seats of Communist and Leftist Parties, Western Europe 1890-1944

	AU	BE	DE	FR		GE		IR		IT		NE		NO		SW		SZ	UK	
	KPÖ	PCB	DKP	PCF	left	KPD	left	CPI	left	PCI	left	CPN	left	NKP	left	VPK	left	PST	CP	l
1891	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0.0	.	.	.	.	.	.	
1895	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
1897	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	1.0	.	.	.	.	.	.	
1901	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	1.0	.	.	.	.	.	.	
1905	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	1.0	.	.	.	.	.	.	
1906	.	.	.	.	3.1	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
1910	.	.	.	.	16.2	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
1913	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	5.3	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
1914	.	.	.	.	14.2	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
1917	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	4.8	.	.	.	
1918	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	2.0	1.0	.	.	.	.	.	.	
1919	.	.	.	.	16.4	.	5.2	.	.	.	1.4	.	.	DNA	.	.	.	.	.	
1920	0.0	.	0.0	.	.	0.9	18.3	.	.	.	.	.	.	——	.	3.0	.	.	.	
1921	.	0.0	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	2.8	0.2	.	.	19.3	.	3.0	2.6	.	.	
1922	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	2.0	0.0	NKP	.	.	.	1.0	0.2	
1923	0.0	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	——	.	.	.	.	0.0	
1924	.	.	0.0	4.5	9.2	9.1	0.0	.	.	.	.	.	.	4.0	16.0	1.7	0.4	.	0.2	
1925	.	1.1	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	1.0	0.0	.	.	.	.	1.5	.	
1926	.	.	0.0	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
1927	0.0	.	.	.	.	.	.	0.7	.	.	.	.	.	2.0	.	.	.	.	.	
1928	.	.	.	2.3	17.8	11.0	0.0	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	3.5	.	1.0	.	
1929	.	0.5	0.0	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	2.0	0.0	.	.	.	.	.	0.0	
1930	0.0	.	.	.	.	13.6	0.0	.	.	.	.	.	.	0.0	.	.	.	.	.	
1931	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	1.1	0.0	3
1932	.	1.6	1.4	2.0	19.8	17.1	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0.9	2.6	.	.	
1933	.	.	.	.	.	12.5	.	.	.	.	.	4.0	1.0	0.0	.	.	.	.	.	
1935	.	.	1.4	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	1.1	0.2	2
1936	.	4.5	.	11.8	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0.0	.	2.2	2.6	.	.	
1937	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	3.0	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
1939	.	4.5	2.0	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	2.1	.	
1940	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	1.3	0.0	.	.	
1944	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	2.9	.	.	.	.	.	.	6.5	0.0	.	.	

Table B.6.2: Seats of Communist and Leftist Parties, Western Europe 1945-1989

	AU	BE	DE		FR		GE	IR		IT		NE		NO		SW		SZ	UK	
	KPÖ	PCB	DKP	left	PCF	left	KPD	CPI	left	PCI	left	CPN	left	NKP	left	VPK	left	left	CP	left
1945	2.4	.	12.2	.	28.4	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	7.3	.	.	.	.	0.3	0.5
1946	.	11.4	.	.	30.5	.	.	.	.	18.7	1.3	10.0	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1947	.	.	6.1	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	3.6	.	.
1948	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	3.4	22.8	5.7	8.0	.	.	.	3.5	.	.	.	.
1949	3.0	5.7	.	.	.	.	3.7	.	.	.	.	.	.	0.0	.	.	.	.	.	.
1950	.	3.3	4.7	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0.0	.
1951	.	.	.	.	17.8	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	2.6	0.0	.
1952	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	6.0	.	.	.	2.2	.	.	.	.
1953	2.4	.	4.6	.	.	.	0.0	.	.	24.2	3.2	.	.	2.0	.	.	.	.	.	.
1954	.	1.9	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1955	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	2.0	0.0	.
1956	1.8	.	.	.	27.0	.	.	.	.	.	.	4.7	.	.	.	2.6	.	.	.	.
1957	.	.	3.4	.	.	.	.	0.7	.	.	.	.	.	0.7	.	.	.	.	.	.
1958	.	0.9	.	.	2.2	.	.	.	.	23.5	3.7	.	.	.	.	2.2	.	.	.	.
1959	0.0	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	2.0	1.3	.	.	.	.	1.5	0.0	.
1960	.	.	0.0	6.3	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	2.2	.	.	.	.
1961	.	2.4	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0.0	1.3	.	.	.	.	.
1962	0.0	.	.	.	8.8	0.4	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1963	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	26.3	5.1	2.7	2.7	.	.	.	.	2.0	.	.
1964	.	.	0.0	5.7	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	3.4	.	.	0.0	.
1965	.	2.8	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0.0	1.3	.	.	.	.	.
1966	0.0	.	0.0	11.4	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0.0	.
1967	.	.	.	.	15.3	0.6	.	.	.	.	.	3.3	2.7	.	.	.	.	2.5	.	.
1968	.	2.4	0.0	8.6	7.0	0.0	.	.	.	28.1	3.7	.	.	.	.	1.3	.	.	.	.
1969	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0.0	0.0	.	.	.	.	.
1970	0.0	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	4.9	.	.	0.0	.
1971	0.0	2.4	0.0	9.7	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	4.0	8.0	.	.	.	.	2.5	.	.
1972	.	.	.	.	.	.	0.0	.	.	28.4	4.6	4.7	10.0	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1973	.	.	3.4	6.3	15.4	2.7	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	10.3	5.4	.	.	.	.
1974	.	1.9	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0.0	0.2
1975	0.0	.	4.0	7.4	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	2.0	.	.
1976	.	.	.	.	.	.	0.0	.	.	36.0	3.3	.	.	.	.	4.9	.	.	.	.
1977	.	0.9	4.0	6.9	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	1.3	3.3	0.0	1.3	.	.	.	.	.
1978	.	1.9	.	.	18.1	2.1	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1979	0.0	.	0.0	9.7	.	.	.	.	.	31.9	4.3	.	.	.	.	5.7	.	3.5	0.0	0.2
1980	.	.	.	.	.	.	0.0	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1981	.	0.9	0.0	14.3	9.1	3.0	.	.	2.4	.	.	2.0	4.0	0.0	2.6	.	.	.	.	.
1982	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0.0	1.2	.	.	2.0	3.3	.	.	5.7	.	.	.	.
1983	0.0	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	30.5	5.7	.	.	.	.	.	.	2.5	0.0	1.1
1984	.	.	0.0	14.9	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1985	.	0.0	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0.0	3.8	5.4	.	.	.	.
1986	0.0	.	.	.	5.8	2.3	.	.	.	.	.	0.0	2.0	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1987	.	0.0	0.0	17.7	.	.	.	.	3.0	28.1	4.0	.	.	.	.	.	.	2.5	0.0	1.2
1988	.	.	0.0	13.7	4.3	1.6	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	6.0	.	.	.	.
1989	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	4.8	.	.	.	.	.	10.9	.	.	.	.	.

SOURCES: own datacollection based on MACKIE & ROSE 1990; FLORA 1981: Ch. 1, 2; and own updates.

Table C.1.1: Socialist (Labour) Union Membership, Western Europe 1890-1944

	AU	BE	DE	GE	IT	NE	NO	SW	SZ	UK
	BFG	CGSB	LO(DSF)	ADGB	CGL	NVV	LO(NALF)	LO	SGB	TUC
1890	.	.	.	259,000	.	.	.	.	3,460	1,593,000
1891	.	.	.	555,318	.	.	.	.	.	1,094,000
1892	46,606	.	.	237,100	.	NAS	.	.	.	1,155,000
1893	.	.	.	223,500	.	———	.	.	9,495	721,000
1894	.	.	.	246,500	.	15,728	.	.	.	1,100,000
1895	.	.	.	259,200	.	18,700	.	.	.	1,000,000
1896	98,669	.	.	328,200	.	25,400	.	.	9,203	1,076,000
1897	.	.	.	412,400	.	15,000	.	.	.	1,093,191
1898	.	.	61,000	493,700	.	12,950	.	.	.	1,184,241
1899	119,334	14,000	75,000	580,500	.	26,100	1,600	75,046	.	1,200,000
1900	98,898	31,311	77,000	680,427	.	12,444	4,800	87,150	.	1,250,000
1901	119,050	21,125	73,000	677,500	.	8,881	7,600	84,658	.	1,200,000
1902	135,178	8,826	64,621	733,200	.	10,526	7,500	79,090	.	1,400,000
1903	154,665	14,378	63,000	887,698	.	7,934	7,900	95,640	25,047	1,500,000
1904	189,121	20,000	65,000	1,052,108	.	NVV	9,000	163,472	30,736	1,423,000
1905	323,099	34,184	69,000	1,344,803	.	———	15,600	173,270	38,892	1,541,000
1906	488,270	42,491	78,000	1,689,785	.	18,960	25,300	288,790	62,387	1,555,000
1907	501,094	55,840	91,000	1,865,506	190,422	26,200	39,000	372,452	72,464	1,700,000
1908	482,279	67,412	96,697	1,831,731	258,515	32,334	47,200	324,782	66,865	1,777,000
1909	415,256	73,366	98,643	1,892,568	292,905	36,685	43,200	216,158	66,180	1,705,000
1910	400,565	68,844	101,563	2,128,021	302,400	40,660	45,900	170,352	74,654	1,647,715
1911	421,905	77,104	105,000	2,421,465	383,770	44,378	53,100	159,852	78,119	.
1912	428,363	129,126	107,067	2,583,492	309,671	52,195	60,800	171,044	86,313	1,662,133
1913	415,195	126,745	115,000	2,525,042	327,312	61,447	63,800	194,504	89,392	2,001,633
1914	240,700	129,177	121,529	1,502,811	320,858	84,261	67,600	101,207	65,177	2,232,446
1915	177,100	.	133,776	994,853	233,863	87,598	78,000	110,708	64,972	2,682,357
1916	166,900	.	150,522	944,575	201,291	99,511	78,900	140,802	88,628	2,850,347
1917	311,100	.	179,284	1,277,709	237,560	128,918	93,900	186,146	148,946	3,082,352
1918	412,910	.	255,134	2,866,012	249,039	159,449	107,500	222,185	177,173	4,532,085
1919	772,146	576,890	277,392	7,337,477	1,150,062	190,942	143,900	258,996	223,588	5,283,676
1920	900,800	687,610	279,300	7,890,100	2,200,000	247,748	142,600	280,029	223,600	6,505,482
1921	1,079,800	689,236	244,400	7,568,000	1,128,915	216,617	96,000	252,361	179,400	6,417,910
1922	1,049,900	580,545	232,100	7,895,100	401,054	196,806	83,600	292,917	154,700	5,128,648
1923	896,800	568,715	233,100	7,138,400	211,016	180,340	85,700	313,022	151,400	4,369,268
1924	828,100	545,715	237,000	4,618,400	201,049	184,493	92,800	360,337	151,500	4,328,325
1925	807,500	525,039	237,000	4,156,500	.	190,179	95,900	384,617	150,000	4,350,982
1926	756,400	526,221	155,600	3,977,300	.	196,959	93,100	414,859	153,800	4,365,619
1927	772,800	530,575	156,000	4,150,200	.	203,042	94,200	437,974	165,500	4,163,994
1928	766,200	518,658	156,000	4,653,600	.	217,390	106,200	469,409	176,400	3,874,842
1929	737,300	504,605	250,200	4,906,200	.	251,487	127,000	508,107	186,700	3,673,144
1930	655,200	502,781	259,100	4,821,800	.	271,009	279,200	553,456	194,000	3,744,320
1931	582,700	522,476	269,500	4,417,900	.	315,023	144,600	589,176	206,900	3,719,401
1932	520,200	572,171	300,000	.	.	336,158	153,400	638,593	224,200	3,613,273
1933	500,000	591,976	301,800	.	.	321,806	157,500	633,351	229,800	3,367,911
1934	.	580,074	354,700	.	.	298,555	172,500	653,331	223,400	3,294,581
1935	.	545,119	381,300	.	.	285,649	214,600	701,186	221,400	3,388,810
1936	.	573,839	423,400	.	.	283,382	268,300	757,376	218,400	3,614,551
1937	.	546,469	451,600	.	.	293,654	316,000	840,234	222,400	4,008,647
1938	.	581,951	473,100	.	.	306,226	340,000	897,947	225,500	4,460,617
1939	.	546,224	509,200	.	.	319,099	352,500	961,216	223,100	4,669,186
1940	.	.	515,800	.	.	331,278	306,300	971,103	212,600	4,866,711
1941	.	.	529,500	.	.	.	293,800	991,285	217,300	5,079,094
1942	.	.	547,200	.	.	.	299,700	1,023,139	231,300	6,024,411
1943	.	.	563,800	.	.	.	280,500	1,038,808	250,200	6,642,317
1944	.	.	579,400	.	.	.	.	1,069,287	267,600	6,575,654

Table C.1.2: Socialist (Labour) Union Membership, Western Europe 1945-1989

	AU	BE	DE	FR	GE	IR	IT	NE	NO	SW	SZ	UK
	ÖGB	FGTB	LO	FO	D		~~ÖGB~~	FGTB	LO	FO	DGB	ICTU
1945	.	307,247	604,300	.	.	76,366	.	237,745	339,900	1,106,900	312,900	6,671,100
1946	924,274	381,239	604,600	.	.	83,014	.	301,346	407,000	1,147,000	367,100	7,540,400
1947	1,238,088	370,772	613,900	350,000	.	94,601	.	331,480	442,400	1,194,200	381,600	7,791,500
1948	1,278,686	385,779	623,100	350,000	.	101,950	.	368,191	456,300	1,238,600	393,500	7,937,100
1949	1,279,520	400,783	635,800	350,000	.	105,476	.	381,643	473,600	1,255,900	380,900	7,883,400
1950	1,290,581	415,787	656,400	350,000	5,451,343	113,789	.	405,919	488,400	1,278,400	377,300	7,827,900
1951	1,310,200	446,388	662,400	350,000	5,912,125	117,698	.	418,776	503,400	1,313,200	382,800	8,020,100
1952	1,318,327	541,228	671,100	350,000	6,004,476	119,635	.	433,683	515,600	1,338,800	389,200	8,088,500
1953	1,320,343	540,128	687,700	350,000	6,051,221	118,045	.	454,088	526,000	1,350,900	393,100	8,093,800
1954	1,347,639	535,543	686,600	350,000	6,103,343	120,516	.	463,458	538,600	1,354,600	400,900	8,107,000
1955	1,398,446	545,366	687,400	350,000	6,104,872	122,424	.	467,338	542,100	1,384,500	404,000	8,263,700
1956	1,427,301	543,710	705,500	360,000	6,124,547	122,682	.	500,332	545,400	1,404,300	414,300	8,304,700
1957	1,438,755	565,790	714,900	370,000	6,244,386	118,474	.	486,249	540,900	1,422,500	426,500	8,337,300
1958	1,458,310	580,101	719,100	380,000	6,331,735	116,467	.	476,892	543,500	1,447,200	430,200	8,176,300
1959	1,474,929	588,126	753,100	390,000	6,273,741	292,661	.	486,739	541,400	1,467,100	431,400	8,128,300
1960	1,501,047	573,884	776,500	400,000	6,378,820	299,122	.	506,963	541,600	1,485,700	437,000	8,299,400
1961	1,518,004	562,357	789,500	415,000	6,382,036	308,581	.	507,202	562,000	1,501,200	445,400	8,312,900
1962	1,518,096	546,289	802,400	430,000	6,430,428	319,732	.	512,209	565,100	1,522,700	451,000	8,315,300
1963	1,531,695	570,117	817,200	445,000	6,430,978	317,428	.	528,609	568,600	1,547,300	451,100	8,325,800
1964	1,539,600	579,280	834,000	460,000	6,485,471	333,452	.	527,211	571,000	1,563,300	450,700	8,771,000
1965	1,542,813	600,411	829,200	475,000	6,574,491	340,007	.	535,746	574,300	1,564,600	449,600	8,867,500
1966	1,542,979	609,308	835,100	490,000	6,537,160	341,145	.	556,269	574,000	1,587,600	444,200	8,787,300
1967	1,512,405	616,651	849,400	500,000	6,407,733	345,642	.	563,219	570,200	1,607,100	441,200	8,725,600
1968	1,514,016	641,301	865,300	560,000	6,375,972	355,366	648,400	560,562	574,100	1,625,100	436,500	8,875,400
1969	1,517,100	659,225	894,400	600,000	6,482,390	375,579	714,200	564,835	582,300	1,659,700	434,800	9,402,200
1970	1,520,300	669,998	896,000	617,000	6,712,547	389,883	780,000	611,401	594,400	1,680,100	436,700	10,002,200
1971	1,526,400	718,158	909,500	627,000	6,868,662	391,364	825,000	623,765	601,900	1,733,100	437,900	9,894,900
1972	1,542,000	765,825	924,200	616,000	6,985,548	396,183	842,900	633,142	603,700	1,771,500	441,400	10,001,400
1973	1,559,500	799,089	930,100	629,000	7,167,523	402,380	901,900	664,083	613,800	1,807,600	446,400	10,002,200
1974	1,580,400	827,864	947,800	630,000	7,405,760	418,485	965,100	677,133	635,800	1,863,500	455,200	10,363,700
1975	1,587,500	881,960	1,011,700	640,000	7,364,912	423,874	1,032,600	702,143	655,000	1,918,100	471,600	11,036,300
1976	1,604,700	916,994	1,087,200	639,000	7,400,021	428,919	1,104,900	706,574	673,700	1,961,200	474,700	11,515,900
1977	1,619,100	929,220	1,141,600	649,000	7,470,967	446,547	1,160,089	730,428	692,200	2,017,800	468,500	11,865,400
1978	1,628,100	903,610	1,212,000	649,000	7,751,523	468,855	1,285,004	745,306	712,700	2,057,300	463,100	12,128,100
1979	1,641,500	945,844	1,249,600	661,000	7,843,565	484,233	1,326,918	749,932	721,000	2,089,400	459,000	12,172,500
1980	1,661,000	957,792	1,279,800	665,000	7,882,527	495,285	1,346,900	744,079	748,000	2,126,800	459,900	11,601,400
1981	1,677,300	957,714	1,325,300	683,000	7,957,512	492,213	1,357,290	1,026,723	755,000	2,140,800	459,200	11,006,000
1982	1,672,500	955,461	1,364,700	686,000	7,849,003	486,987	1,358,004	998,821	751,400	2,161,800	458,900	10,510,200
1983	1,660,500	940,074	1,380,000	705,000	7,745,913	483,458	1,351,514	946,248	745,100	2,195,800	456,200	10,082,100
1984	1,672,800	947,997	1,399,100	712,000	7,660,346	485,670	1,344,460	918,535	759,300	2,238,600	451,200	9,855,204
1985	1,671,381	932,954	1,411,800	720,000	7,719,468	470,810	1,306,250	903,334	769,600	2,226,900	443,600	9,585,729
1986	1,671,217	880,624	1,444,300	652,000	7,764,687	.	1,305,682	900,825	785,600	2,217,508	441,196	9,243,297
1987	1,652,839	874,712	1,435,500	585,000	7,757,039	.	1,343,716	911,733	787,400	2,221,998	442,637	8,797,192
1988	1,643,586	874,712	1,412,800	517,000	7,797,077	.	1,397,982	931,406	783,900	2,212,392	442,020	8,652,318
1989	1,644,408	874,712	1,423,000	450,000	7,861,120	.	1,439,216	967,088	782,200	2,197,024	441,449	8,405,000

Table C.2.1: Socialist (Labour) Union Density (Gross %), Western Europe 1890-1944

	AU	BE	DE	GE	IT	NE	NO	SW	SZ	UK
	BFG	CGSB	LO	ADGB	CGL	NVV	LO	LO	SGB	TUC
1890	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0.5	11.3
1891	.	.	.	4.4	.	.	.	.	.	7.8
1892	.	.	.	1.9	.	.	.	.	.	8.2
1893	.	.	.	1.7	.	.	.	.	1.1	4.7
1894	.	.	.	1.9	.	.	.	.	.	7.2
1895	.	.	.	1.8	.	.	.	.	.	6.5
1896	.	.	.	2.4	.	2.3	.	.	1.0	7.0
1897	.	.	.	2.9	.	.	.	.	.	7.0
1898	.	.	7.9	3.4	.	.	.	.	.	7.6
1899	.	.	9.6	3.7	.	1.8	0.3	5.4	0.0	7.6
1900	1.6	1.4	9.9	4.0	.	.	0.8	6.4	.	7.8
1901	1.9	0.9	9.3	4.5	.	.	1.3	6.1	.	7.5
1902	2.1	0.4	8.2	4.5	.	0.8	1.3	5.6	.	8.6
1903	2.4	0.6	8.0	5.7	.	0.6	1.3	6.8	2.1	9.1
1904	2.9	0.9	8.2	6.6	.	.	1.5	11.6	2.6	8.6
1905	4.9	1.5	8.7	8.3	.	.	2.6	12.3	3.3	9.2
1906	7.4	1.8	9.8	10.2	.	1.4	4.1	20.4	5.2	9.2
1907	7.5	2.4	11.4	10.3	2.0	1.8	6.3	26.3	5.9	9.9
1908	7.1	2.8	12.1	10.7	2.7	2.2	7.6	23.1	5.4	10.3
1909	6.0	3.1	12.3	10.9	3.0	2.2	6.9	15.4	5.3	9.8
1910	5.8	2.9	12.7	12.1	3.1	2.7	7.3	10.4	5.9	9.4
1911	6.0	3.2	13.1	13.5	3.8	2.9	8.2	10.4	6.1	.
1912	6.1	5.3	16.6	14.2	3.1	3.3	9.2	11.0	6.2	9.3
1913	5.9	5.2	17.5	13.7	3.2	3.9	9.4	12.2	6.4	11.2
1914	3.4	5.2	18.1	8.0	3.1	5.2	9.8	6.3	4.7	12.4
1915	.	.	19.6	5.2	2.3	5.3	11.0	6.8	.	14.8
1916	.	.	18.1	4.9	2.0	5.9	10.9	8.4	.	15.7
1917	.	.	25.3	6.5	2.4	7.5	12.6	11.1	.	16.9
1918	.	.	35.3	14.5	2.5	9.0	14.1	13.1	.	24.7
1919	41.0	25.8	37.7	36.5	11.3	10.4	18.5	14.9	18.6	28.7
1920	45.7	30.3	37.3	38.8	21.2	11.4	18.0	13.5	18.6	35.2
1921	52.7	29.9	25.0	36.7	10.6	11.2	12.0	14.7	15.0	34.6
1922	48.9	24.8	28.2	37.8	3.8	9.9	10.3	16.8	12.8	28.8
1923	40.7	23.9	27.9	33.7	2.0	9.2	10.6	17.7	12.5	24.3
1924	37.0	22.6	27.8	21.5	2.0	9.3	11.4	20.1	12.4	23.9
1925	36.3	21.5	27.4	19.5	.	9.4	11.7	21.1	12.2	23.8
1926	34.1	21.2	17.7	18.3	.	9.6	11.3	22.5	12.3	23.7
1927	34.9	21.1	17.5	19.1	.	9.7	11.4	22.2	13.0	22.4
1928	34.7	20.3	17.2	21.3	.	10.0	12.7	24.7	13.7	20.6
1929	33.8	19.5	27.3	22.5	.	11.2	15.1	26.4	14.0	19.4
1930	30.2	19.2	22.2	22.1	.	10.8	33.1	28.1	13.5	19.6
1931	26.9	20.1	28.4	20.2	.	13.6	17.0	30.0	15.2	19.3
1932	24.1	22.0	30.5	.	.	14.8	17.9	32.3	16.3	18.7
1933	23.3	22.8	30.1	.	.	14.0	18.2	31.7	16.7	17.3
1934	.	22.3	34.4	.	.	12.8	19.8	32.5	16.1	16.9
1935	.	21.0	36.2	.	.	12.1	24.4	34.6	15.9	17.3
1936	.	22.1	39.2	.	.	11.6	30.2	37.1	15.7	18.4
1937	.	21.0	40.8	.	.	11.9	35.2	40.8	15.9	20.3
1938	.	22.4	41.8	.	.	12.2	37.5	43.3	16.1	22.5
1939	.	21.0	43.8	.	.	12.8	38.4	46.0	15.9	23.5
1940	.	.	38.2	.	.	13.3	33.0	46.1	15.1	24.3
1941	.	.	44.0	.	.	.	31.3	46.5	15.3	25.3
1942	.	.	44.9	.	.	.	31.5	47.3	16.1	29.9
1943	.	.	45.5	.	.	.	29.1	47.5	17.3	32.8
1944	.	.	46.1	.	.	.	.	48.2	18.3	32.4

Table C.2.2: Socialist (Labour) Union Density (Gross and Net %), Western Europe 1945-1989

	AU	BE		DE	FR	GE		IR	IT		NE		NO		SW	SZ		UK
	ÖGB	FGTB		LO	FO	DGB		ICTU	UIL		FNV(NVV)		LO		LO	SGB	TUC	
	gross	gross	net	gross	gross	gross	net	gross	gross	net	gross	net	gross	net	gross	gross	net	gross
1945	.	12.3	.	47.3	.	.	.	10.4	.	.	.	.	34.3	.	49.5	21.0	.	32.7
1946	52.7	15.2	.	46.7	.	.	.	11.2	.	.	12.9	12.7	40.3	.	50.5	24.3	.	36.8
1947	64.5	14.8	.	47.2	2.9	.	.	12.7	.	.	12.1	11.9	43.4	.	51.9	24.8	.	37.9
1948	64.6	15.3	.	47.3	2.9	.	.	13.6	.	.	13.5	13.2	44.3	.	53.2	25.2	24.1	38.3
1949	62.9	15.8	.	47.9	2.9	.	.	14.0	.	.	13.7	13.4	45.7	.	53.3	24.0	22.5	37.9
1950	62.2	16.3	.	45.0	2.8	32.9	31.0	15.0	.	.	14.4	14.0	46.7	.	53.6	23.3	22.0	37.2
1951	62.4	17.5	.	48.8	2.8	34.7	32.6	15.4	.	.	14.6	14.3	47.8	.	54.4	23.2	21.8	37.9
1952	62.9	21.1	.	48.8	2.8	34.4	32.1	15.7	.	.	14.9	14.5	48.5	.	54.2	23.0	21.7	38.1
1953	62.8	21.0	.	49.3	2.8	33.8	31.4	15.7	.	.	15.4	14.9	49.0	.	53.4	22.6	21.3	37.9
1954	63.1	20.7	.	48.6	2.8	33.0	30.5	16.1	.	.	15.2	14.7	49.7	.	52.4	22.6	21.2	37.4
1955	63.8	21.0	.	47.8	2.7	32.1	29.5	16.5	.	.	15.1	14.5	49.6	.	52.3	22.3	20.9	37.7
1956	63.3	20.8	.	48.7	2.8	31.5	28.8	16.7	.	.	15.8	15.2	49.5	.	51.9	22.3	21.0	37.4
1957	62.7	21.6	.	48.9	2.8	31.5	28.8	16.3	.	.	15.1	14.5	48.4	.	51.5	22.4	21.1	37.3
1958	62.7	22.0	.	48.5	2.9	31.5	28.7	16.1	.	.	14.7	14.0	48.5	.	51.3	22.4	21.1	36.7
1959	62.8	22.2	.	50.0	2.9	31.2	28.4	40.8	.	.	14.9	14.1	47.9	.	50.9	21.6	20.2	37.2
1960	63.4	21.6	17.9	48.8	3.0	31.4	28.5	42.1	.	.	15.2	14.4	47.8	.	50.5	21.5	20.1	37.3
1961	63.5	21.0	17.3	50.2	3.0	31.0	28.0	43.8	.	.	14.9	14.0	48.7	.	49.7	20.9	19.5	36.9
1962	63.1	20.0	16.5	49.8	3.1	30.9	27.7	45.2	.	.	14.6	13.7	48.2	.	49.1	20.3	19.0	35.5
1963	63.5	20.6	16.9	49.6	3.2	30.6	27.2	44.3	.	.	14.8	13.8	47.7	.	49.3	19.7	18.5	36.2
1964	63.4	20.4	16.7	49.5	3.2	30.6	26.9	45.9	.	.	14.5	13.5	47.2	.	49.3	19.3	18.1	37.9
1965	63.0	20.9	17.0	48.4	3.2	30.7	26.9	46.2	.	.	14.4	13.4	46.7	.	48.6	19.0	17.8	37.9
1966	63.0	21.0	17.1	48.0	3.3	30.5	26.5	45.7	.	.	14.8	13.6	45.8	.	48.1	18.6	17.4	37.3
1967	62.4	21.2	17.1	48.0	3.3	30.5	26.2	45.9	.	.	14.8	13.6	44.8	.	48.8	17.9	16.7	37.4
1968	62.8	21.9	17.6	48.2	3.6	30.3	26.1	46.3	4.8	4.7	14.5	13.3	44.9	.	48.8	17.4	16.3	38.3
1969	62.6	22.1	17.7	49.1	3.8	30.2	25.9	48.5	5.2	5.1	14.4	13.1	44.2	.	49.1	17.1	16.0	40.6
1970	62.1	22.4	17.9	48.3	3.7	30.7	26.4	49.9	5.6	5.5	15.4	14.0	48.8	.	48.1	17.2	16.0	43.4
1971	60.9	23.6	19.0	48.1	3.7	30.8	26.5	50.0	5.9	5.7	15.4	13.8	44.8	.	48.6	16.7	15.6	43.3
1972	60.2	25.0	20.2	47.5	3.6	31.3	26.9	49.6	5.9	5.8	15.4	13.7	43.7	.	49.2	16.4	15.3	43.6
1973	58.9	25.6	20.9	47.3	3.6	31.6	27.1	49.6	6.2	6.0	15.6	13.8	44.1	.	49.9	16.2	15.2	43.0
1974	58.6	25.9	21.3	47.1	3.5	32.6	28.0	50.6	6.6	6.4	15.6	13.8	44.9	.	50.5	16.4	15.4	44.4
1975	58.5	27.4	22.6	50.1	3.6	32.6	28.0	50.3	6.9	6.7	16.0	14.1	44.2	.	50.7	17.8	16.7	46.8
1976	58.5	28.1	23.3	52.3	3.5	32.9	28.3	50.0	7.2	7.0	15.8	13.9	43.5	.	51.4	18.3	17.2	48.3
1977	58.1	28.3	23.5	53.3	3.5	33.2	28.6	50.8	7.4	7.1	16.2	14.2	43.7	.	52.5	17.9	16.8	49.5
1978	57.8	27.3	22.8	55.9	3.5	34.1	29.5	52.1	8.2	7.8	16.3	14.3	44.0	37.6	53.1	17.6	16.4	50.3
1979	58.0	28.2	23.5	56.4	3.5	34.1	29.5	52.4	8.3	7.9	15.9	13.9	43.8	37.5	53.2	17.2	16.0	49.9
1980	58.4	28.4	23.6	56.7	3.5	32.5	28.2	52.1	8.3	7.8	15.3	13.3	45.6	38.5	53.4	16.9	15.7	47.3
1981	58.5	28.2	23.4	57.6	3.5	33.7	29.1	49.8	8.3	7.8	20.5	17.5	44.9	37.5	53.5	16.5	15.4	45.3
1982	58.2	28.0	23.1	58.7	3.5	31.5	27.1	48.3	8.3	7.7	19.4	16.4	44.2	.	53.9	16.5	15.3	43.5
1983	58.0	27.5	22.5	58.7	3.6	31.0	26.5	47.5	8.2	7.5	18.2	15.2	43.1	.	54.3	16.4	15.3	41.9
1984	58.2	27.8	22.7	59.1	3.6	30.5	25.9	47.5	8.1	7.3	17.4	14.3	43.5	.	55.0	16.1	15.0	40.6
1985	57.7	27.5	22.4	.	3.8	30.5	25.8	45.8	7.8	6.9	16.8	13.7	42.9	.	55.1	15.7	14.5	39.0
1986	57.0	26.1	21.2	.	3.2	30.3	25.6	.	7.6	6.7	17.4	14.2	.	.	55.6	15.5	13.0	37.5
1987	56.4	25.9	21.1	.	2.9	30.0	25.3	.	7.8	6.7	16.0	13.0	.	.	56.5	15.4	12.9	35.9
1988	56.1	25.9	21.1	.	2.5	29.9	25.1	.	8.0	6.8	15.9	12.9	.	.	55.8	14.9	12.4	35.1
1989	56.1	25.8	21.0	.	2.2	29.9	25.0	.	8.2	6.8	16.3	13.3	.	.	54.8	14.7	12.3	34.3

Table C.3.1: Christian Union Membership, Western Europe 1890-1944

	AU	BE	FR	GE		IT	NE	SZ		
	ZCG	CSC	CFTC	GCGD	GEDA	CIL	NKV	CNV	CNG	SVEA
1890	.	.	230	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1891	.	.	320	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1892	.	.	413	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1893	.	.	667	.	76	.	.	.	.	.
1894	.	.	858	.	160	.	.	.	.	.
1895	.	.	1,001	5,500	572	.	.	.	.	.
1896	.	.	1,130	8,055	2,352	.	.	.	.	.
1897	.	.	1,467	21,000	7,737	.	.	.	.	.
1898	.	.	1,719	34,270	18,277	.	.	.	.	.
1899	.	.	1,966	56,391	32,014	.	.	.	25	.
1900	7,913	.	2,042	76,744	40,205	.	.	687	40	.
1901	.	.	2,258	84,497	45,744	.	.	918	88	.
1902	.	12,060	2,452	84,667	46,112	.	.	1,386	88	.
1903	.	14,787	2,802	91,440	50,216	.	.	3,002	158	.
1904	.	14,759	3,210	107,556	56,126	.	.	1,756	742	.
1905	.	17,860	3,673	188,106	75,695	.	.	2,307	2,870	.
1906	18,164	20,055	3,974	247,116	90,413	.	.	2,500	3,828	.
1907	27,018	30,231	4,516	284,649	107,668	.	.	1,112	3,610	.
1908	35,610	39,517	4,941	260,767	120,133	.	.	786	3,809	.
1909	30,072	40,537	5,400	280,061	120,275	.	11,650	6,587	3,278	.
1910	46,533	49,478	5,465	316,115	121,012	.	15,541	7,480	3,200	.
1911	45,523	71,235	5,982	350,574	122,126	104,614	16,403	7,792	3,198	.
1912	44,603	82,761	6,545	350,930	131,195	111,000	21,096	7,944	3,293	.
1913	37,237	102,177	7,254	341,735	148,079	113,000	29,048	11,023	1,592	.
1914	22,693	123,000	7,818	218,197	111,988	103,326	35,257	12,327	1,568	.
1915	13,666	.	8,148	162,425	80,500	99,000	40,338	15,013	2,705	.
1916	13,785	.	8,259	178,907	27,836	89,000	54,855	20,506	4,620	.
1917	18,607	.	8,475	293,187	20,783	.	69,139	28,008	8,158	.
1918	20,556	.	8,832	538,559	147,698	.	91,804	46,338	16,069	.
1919	30,725	65,000	70,000	1,000,770	356,170	500,000	141,002	66,997	16,677	.
1920	64,478	156,631	65,000	1,105,894	463,199	1,190,000	146,030	73,819	14,827	.
1921	78,737	200,102	90,000	1,028,900	422,845	989,000	142,035	71,332	12,475	2,883
1922	78,105	186,668	73,000	1,033,506	460,086	.	117,115	61,365	11,030	3,433
1923	79,377	.	65,000	806,992	408,773	.	98,054	53,265	10,211	3,746
1924	80,128	172,841	63,000	612,952	393,559	.	91,905	50,042	9,755	4,018
1925	77,220	133,056	62,000	582,319	411,113	.	90,475	48,327	14,037	4,120
1926	76,122	145,634	65,000	643,508	418,700	.	96,403	51,217	18,093	5,327
1927	78,906	155,079	72,000	720,059	456,980	.	102,076	52,704	18,842	6,233
1928	100,987	168,853	79,000	763,843	501,635	.	110,384	57,518	21,339	6,290
1929	107,657	181,407	86,000	792,872	557,420	.	130,894	71,300	33,577	6,266
1930	111,939	203,788	85,000	778,863	591,520	.	145,815	80,288	38,592	6,510
1931	108,420	239,299	84,000	698,472	593,800	.	176,646	101,454	40,471	8,836
1932	100,606	300,800	88,000	.	.	.	192,655	115,006	41,305	10,664
1933	.	301,010	92,000	.	.	.	190,396	115,606	40,570	11,635
1934	.	.	97,000	.	.	.	179,717	112,196	39,539	11,982
1935	.	297,183	106,000	.	.	.	173,535	108,514	38,435	12,729
1936	.	280,796	275,000	.	.	.	168,661	108,235	39,910	12,996
1937	.	304,999	320,000	.	.	.	170,623	110,395	39,712	12,583
1938	.	325,711	305,000	.	.	.	177,909	113,885	40,300	12,750
1939	.	339,869	270,000	.	.	.	186,943	121,179	39,700	12,525
1940	.	.	.	.	.	.	174,027	114,858	36,800	11,500
1941	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	36,118	11,557
1942	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	38,188	12,025
1943	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	42,348	10,634
1944	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	42,500	10,500

Table C.3.2: Christian Union Membership, Western Europe 1945-1989

	BE	FR		GE	IT	NE	SZ			
	CSC	CFDT	CFTC	CGB	CISL	NKV	CNV	CNG	SVEA	CSC
1945	204,959	300,000	.	.	.	182,821	93,994	46,700	11,200	
1946	307,611	365,000	.	.	.	224,885	119,051	44,700	13,400	
1947	336,553	380,000	.	.	.	251,510	131,560	47,200	13,800	
1948	401,432	320,000	.	.	.	269,552	147,551	48,200	15,100	
1949	453,140	330,000	.	.	.	296,431	155,987	48,100	15,500	
1950	471,532	335,000	.	2,840	1,189,882	311,434	166,188	49,600	16,600	
1951	505,479	350,000	.	6,301	1,337,848	321,480	174,750	50,100	16,900	
1952	520,844	350,000	.	13,206	1,322,038	334,714	181,995	64,300	16,400	
1953	535,252	340,000	.	21,282	1,305,361	347,268	191,138	64,200	16,200	
1954	537,661	323,000	.	26,953	1,326,542	360,986	199,693	70,500	16,300	
1955	544,698	333,000	.	33,121	1,342,204	381,733	206,283	73,200	15,600	
1956	557,738	366,000	.	46,142	1,706,818	411,991	215,956	75,200	15,400	
1957	570,438	403,000	.	49,364	1,261,839	395,047	218,473	78,000	15,100	
1958	596,304	415,000	.	51,935	1,654,242	395,869	218,449	79,700	15,100	
1959	614,406	408,000	.	147,623	1,283,892	400,396	219,019	78,000	14,600	
1960	634,754	422,000	.	148,138	1,324,398	411,785	223,788	79,700	14,700	
1961	642,980	433,000	.	186,193	1,398,864	417,764	224,869	84,000	15,000	
1962	643,510	455,000	.	179,872	1,435,626	418,526	227,481	89,900	14,900	
1963	676,878	500,000	.	177,924	1,503,555	418,845	229,803	93,400	13,800	
1964	695,164	420,000	75,000	175,464	1,515,154	407,652	229,270	92,600	15,000	
1965	708,407	471,000	70,000	162,417	1,467,990	411,981	234,524	92,500	14,800	
1966	732,802	480,000	70,000	153,524	1,490,807	425,299	240,734	92,700	14,600	
1967	759,987	492,000	70,000	144,556	1,522,864	428,447	240,684	91,600	14,200	
1968	774,960	565,000	80,000	136,284	1,626,786	409,414	240,013	90,500	14,100	
1969	799,447	594,000	80,000	139,830	1,641,289	400,239	238,207	92,900	13,900	
1970	811,905	611,000	80,000	190,282	1,807,586	401,804	238,200	93,700	13,900	
1971	846,497	635,000	83,000	190,670	1,973,333	399,732	238,867	94,800	13,800	
1972	897,590	669,000	84,000	195,067	2,184,279	395,360	235,762	97,800	13,800	
1973	925,134	699,000	87,000	201,185	2,214,099	397,919	229,973	98,900	13,900	
1974	975,563	703,000	87,000	211,491	2,472,701	355,170	224,511	99,800	13,800	
1975	1,042,234	738,000	90,000	224,196	2,593,545	356,466	225,976	106,100	13,800	
1976	1,078,968	746,000	94,000	231,841	2,823,780	345,344	258,342	107,000	14,800	
1977	1,100,675	745,000	96,000	244,753	2,809,802	341,897	295,343	101,300	15,100	
1978	1,113,505	726,000	99,000	248,946	2,868,737	335,542	300,958	101,300	15,000	
1979	1,129,571	698,000	102,000	266,321	2,883,097	326,875	303,775	101,400	14,900	
1980	1,151,817	667,000	105,000	288,420	3,059,845	310,046	302,321	103,300	14,700	
1981	1,169,317	657,000	109,000	294,916	2,988,813	.	346,036	105,400	10,100	
1982	1,176,428	664,000	111,000	297,234	2,976,880	.	335,226	111,400	.	
1983	1,169,392	613,000	114,000	299,771	2,953,411	.	316,920	109,600	.	
1984	1,166,460	623,000	117,000	306,329	3,097,231	.	302,802	107,600	.	
1985	1,190,543	588,000	120,000	307,075	2,953,095	.	298,276	106,900	.	
1986	1,205,568	562,000	116,000	307,472	2,975,482	.	294,115	102,397	.	
1987	1,212,107	536,000	113,000	307,529	3,080,019	.	291,938	104,054	.	
1988	1,207,144	510,000	109,000	306,847	3,288,279	.	291,118	107,857	.	
1989	1,241,154	485,000	106,000	304,963	3,379,028	.	298,834	108,054	.	

Table C.4.1: Christian Union Density (in %), Western Europe 1900-1944

	AU	BE	FR	GE		IT	NE		SZ	
	ZCG	CSC	CFTC	GCGD	GEDAG	CIL	NKV	CNV	CNG	SVEA
1900	0.1	.	0.0	0.5	0.2	.	.	.	0.0	.
1901	.	.	0.0	0.6	0.3	.	.	.	0.0	.
1902	.	0.5	0.0	0.5	0.3	.	.	0.1	0.0	.
1903	.	0.6	0.0	0.6	0.3	.	.	0.2	0.0	.
1904	.	0.6	0.0	0.7	0.4	.	.	0.1	0.1	.
1905	.	0.8	0.0	1.2	0.5	.	.	0.2	0.2	.
1906	0.3	0.9	0.0	1.5	0.5	.	.	0.2	0.3	.
1907	0.4	1.3	0.0	1.6	0.6	.	.	0.1	0.3	.
1908	0.5	1.7	0.0	1.5	0.7	.	.	0.1	0.3	.
1909	0.4	1.7	0.0	1.6	0.7	.	0.7	0.4	0.3	.
1910	0.7	2.1	0.0	1.8	0.7	.	1.0	0.5	0.3	.
1911	0.7	2.9	0.0	2.0	0.7	1.0	1.1	0.5	0.3	.
1912	0.6	3.4	0.1	1.9	0.7	1.1	1.3	0.5	0.2	.
1913	0.5	4.2	0.1	1.9	0.8	1.1	1.8	0.7	0.1	.
1914	0.3	5.0	0.1	1.2	0.6	1.0	2.2	0.8	0.1	.
1915	.	.	0.1	0.9	0.4	1.0	2.4	0.9	.	.
1916	.	.	0.1	0.9	0.1	0.9	3.2	1.2	.	.
1917	.	.	0.1	1.5	0.1	.	4.0	1.6	.	.
1918	.	.	0.1	2.7	0.7	.	5.2	2.6	.	.
1919	1.6	2.9	0.6	5.0	1.8	4.9	7.7	3.6	1.4	.
1920	3.3	6.9	0.5	5.4	2.3	11.4	6.7	3.4	1.2	.
1921	3.8	8.7	0.7	5.0	2.0	9.3	7.3	3.7	1.0	0.2
1922	3.6	8.0	0.6	4.9	2.2	.	5.9	3.1	0.9	0.3
1923	3.6	.	0.5	3.8	1.9	.	5.0	2.7	0.8	0.3
1924	3.6	7.2	0.5	2.9	1.8	.	4.6	2.5	0.8	0.3
1925	3.5	5.4	0.5	2.7	1.9	.	4.5	2.4	1.1	0.3
1926	3.4	5.9	0.5	3.0	1.9	.	4.7	2.5	1.4	0.4
1927	3.6	6.2	0.6	3.3	2.1	.	4.9	2.5	1.5	0.5
1928	4.6	6.6	0.6	3.5	2.3	.	5.1	2.7	1.7	0.5
1929	4.9	7.0	0.7	3.6	2.6	.	5.8	3.2	2.5	0.5
1930	5.2	7.8	0.6	3.6	2.7	.	5.8	3.2	2.7	0.5
1931	5.0	9.2	0.6	3.2	2.7	.	7.6	4.4	3.0	0.6
1932	4.7	11.6	0.7	.	.	.	8.5	5.1	3.0	0.8
1933	.	11.6	0.7	.	.	.	8.3	5.0	2.9	0.8
1934	.	.	0.8	.	.	.	7.7	4.8	2.9	0.9
1935	.	11.4	0.9	.	.	.	7.3	4.6	2.8	0.9
1936	.	10.8	2.3	.	.	.	6.9	4.4	2.9	0.9
1937	.	11.7	2.6	.	.	.	6.9	4.5	2.8	0.9
1938	.	12.5	2.5	.	.	.	7.1	4.6	2.9	0.9
1939	.	13.1	2.2	.	.	.	7.5	4.9	2.8	0.9
1940	.	.	.	.	.	.	7.0	4.6	2.6	0.8
1941	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	2.5	0.8
1942	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	2.7	0.8
1943	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	2.9	0.7
1944	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	2.9	0.7

Table C.4.2: Christian Union Density (Gross and Net Density in %), Western Europe 1945-1989

	BE		FR				GE		IT		NE				SZ			
	CSC		CFDT		CFTC		CGB		CISL		NKV		CNV		CNG		SVEA	
	gross	net	gross	net	gross	net	gross	net	gross	net	gross	net	gross	net	gross	net	gross	net
1945	8.2	.	.	.	2.6	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	3.1	.	0.8	.
1946	12.3	.	.	.	3.1	.	.	.	.	.	9.6	9.4	5.1	5.0	3.0	.	0.9	.
1947	13.4	.	.	.	3.2	.	.	.	.	.	9.2	9.0	4.8	4.7	3.1	.	0.9	.
1948	15.9	.	.	.	2.7	.	.	.	.	.	9.9	9.6	5.4	5.3	3.1	.	1.0	.
1949	17.9	.	.	.	2.7	.	.	.	.	.	10.7	10.4	5.6	5.5	3.0	.	1.0	.
1950	18.5	.	.	.	2.7	.	0.0	0.0	10.0	9.2	11.0	10.7	5.9	5.8	3.1	.	1.0	.
1951	19.8	.	.	.	2.8	.	0.0	0.0	10.6	9.5	11.2	10.9	6.1	6.0	3.0	.	1.0	.
1952	20.3	.	.	.	2.8	.	0.1	0.1	10.7	9.6	11.5	11.1	6.3	6.1	3.8	.	1.0	.
1953	20.8	.	.	.	2.7	.	0.1	0.1	10.3	9.4	11.7	11.3	6.5	6.3	3.7	.	0.9	.
1954	20.8	.	.	.	2.5	.	0.1	0.1	10.3	9.2	11.9	11.4	6.6	6.3	4.0	.	0.9	.
1955	21.0	.	.	.	2.6	.	0.2	0.2	10.4	9.0	12.3	11.8	6.6	6.4	4.0	.	0.9	.
1956	21.4	.	.	.	2.8	.	0.2	0.2	13.1	11.2	13.0	12.5	6.8	6.6	4.1	.	0.8	.
1957	21.7	.	.	.	3.1	.	0.2	0.2	9.6	8.6	12.3	11.7	6.8	6.5	4.1	.	0.8	.
1958	22.6	.	.	.	3.1	.	0.3	0.2	12.5	10.9	12.2	11.5	6.7	6.4	4.1	.	0.8	.
1959	23.2	.	.	.	3.0	.	0.7	0.7	9.8	8.5	12.2	11.5	6.7	6.4	3.9	.	0.7	.
1960	23.8	19.8	.	.	3.1	.	0.7	0.7	10.0	8.8	12.4	11.6	6.7	6.4	3.9	.	0.7	.
1961	24.0	19.8	.	.	3.2	.	0.9	0.8	10.1	9.0	12.3	11.5	6.6	6.2	3.9	.	0.7	.
1962	23.6	19.4	.	.	3.3	.	0.9	0.8	11.1	10.0	12.0	11.1	6.5	6.1	4.1	.	0.7	.
1963	24.5	20.1	←	—	3.6	.	0.8	0.8	11.2	10.2	11.7	10.9	6.4	6.0	4.1	.	0.6	.
1964	24.5	20.1	2.9	.	0.5	.	0.8	0.8	11.3	10.3	11.2	10.4	6.3	5.9	4.0	.	0.6	.
1965	24.6	20.1	3.2	.	0.5	.	0.8	0.7	11.1	9.9	11.1	10.2	6.3	5.9	3.9	.	0.6	.
1966	25.2	20.5	3.2	.	0.5	.	0.7	0.7	11.3	10.1	11.3	10.4	6.4	5.9	3.9	.	0.6	.
1967	26.1	21.1	3.2	.	0.5	.	0.7	0.6	11.4	10.3	11.3	10.3	6.3	5.9	3.7	.	0.6	.
1968	26.4	21.3	3.6	.	0.5	.	0.6	0.6	12.0	11.0	10.6	9.8	6.2	5.7	3.6	.	0.6	.
1969	26.8	21.5	3.7	.	0.5	.	0.7	0.6	12.0	10.9	10.2	9.2	6.1	5.6	3.6	.	0.5	.
1970	27.1	21.7	3.7	.	0.5	.	0.9	0.8	13.0	12.0	10.1	9.1	6.0	5.5	3.7	.	0.5	.
1971	27.8	22.4	3.8	.	0.5	.	0.9	0.8	14.0	13.0	9.9	8.8	5.9	5.4	3.6	.	0.5	.
1972	29.2	23.7	3.9	.	0.5	.	0.9	0.8	15.3	14.2	9.6	8.5	5.7	5.2	3.6	.	0.5	.
1973	29.7	24.2	4.0	.	0.5	.	0.9	0.8	15.3	14.3	9.3	8.2	5.4	4.9	3.6	.	0.5	.
1974	30.6	25.1	3.9	.	0.5	.	0.9	0.8	16.9	15.4	8.2	7.2	5.2	4.7	3.6	.	0.5	.
1975	32.3	26.7	4.1	.	0.5	.	1.0	0.9	17.3	15.6	8.1	7.1	5.1	4.6	4.0	.	0.5	.
1976	33.0	27.4	4.1	.	0.5	.	1.0	0.9	18.4	16.6	7.7	6.6	5.8	5.1	4.1	.	0.6	.
1977	33.5	27.9	4.0	.	0.5	.	1.1	1.0	17.9	15.9	7.6	6.4	6.5	5.8	3.9	.	0.6	.
1978	33.6	28.2	3.9	.	0.5	.	1.1	1.0	18.3	15.9	7.3	6.2	6.6	5.8	3.8	.	0.6	.
1979	33.7	28.0	3.7	.	0.5	.	1.2	1.0	18.0	15.6	6.9	5.9	6.4	5.7	3.8	.	0.6	.
1980	34.1	28.4	3.5	.	0.5	.	1.2	1.0	18.9	16.1	6.4	5.4	6.2	5.4	3.8	.	0.5	.
1981	34.5	28.6	3.4	.	0.6	.	1.2	1.1	18.4	15.2	.	.	6.9	6.0	3.8	.	0.4	.
1982	34.5	28.4	3.4	.	0.6	.	1.2	1.0	18.2	14.7	.	.	6.5	5.5	4.0	.	.	.
1983	34.2	28.0	3.1	.	0.6	.	1.2	1.0	17.9	14.3	.	.	6.1	5.1	3.9	.	.	.
1984	34.2	27.9	3.1	.	0.6	.	1.2	1.1	18.7	14.6	.	.	5.7	4.7	3.8	.	.	.
1985	35.1	28.6	3.1	.	0.6	.	1.2	1.0	17.6	13.1	.	.	5.5	4.5	3.8	.	.	.
1986	35.7	29.0	2.8	.	0.6	.	1.2	1.0	17.4	12.5	.	.	5.7	4.7	3.6	3.3	.	.
1987	35.9	29.2	2.6	.	0.6	.	1.2	1.0	17.8	12.3	.	.	5.1	4.3	3.6	3.3	.	.
1988	35.7	29.1	2.5	.	0.5	.	1.2	1.0	18.7	12.7	.	.	5.0	4.1	3.6	3.3	.	.
1989	36.6	29.8	2.4	.	0.5	.	1.2	1.0	19.2	12.4	.	.	5.0	4.2	3.6	3.3	.	.

Table C.5.1: Communist (and Syndicalist) Union Membership and Density (%), Western Europe 1900-1944

	FR				GE				IT		NE		SW	
	CGT		CGTU		BRI		FAUD		USI		NAS		SAC	
	members	gross	members	gross	members	gross	members	gross	members	gross	members	gross	members	gross
1900	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	8,881	.	.	.
1901	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	10,526	.	.	.
1902	100,000	0.9	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	7,934	0.6	.	.
1903	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	6,000	0.5	.	.
1904	158,000	1.4	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	5,000	0.4	.	.
1905	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	3,250	0.2	.	.
1906	203,273	1.8	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	3,718	0.3	.	.
1907	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	3,414	0.2	.	.
1908	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	3,674	0.3	.	.
1909	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	3,454	0.2	.	.
1910	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	5,247	0.3	.	.
1911	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	6,180	0.4	.	.
1912	400,000	3.3	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	8,097	0.5	.	.
1913	276,000	2.2	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	9,697	0.6	3,700	0.2
1914	206,000	1.7	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	9,242	0.6	4,500	0.3
1915	40,000	0.3	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	10,510	0.6	4,900	0.3
1916	77,000	0.6	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	14,309	0.8	9,300	0.6
1917	238,000	1.9	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	23,068	1.3	15,200	0.9
1918	490,000	3.9	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	33,626	1.9	20,300	1.2
1919	995,000	7.8	.	.	.	.	111,675	0.6	500,000	4.9	51,570	2.8	24,100	1.4
1920	1,193,000	9.2	.	.	.	.	100,000	0.5	.	.	37,125	1.7	32,300	1.6
1921	489,000	3.8	349,000	2.7	.	.	71,747	0.3	.	.	31,391	1.6	28,800	1.7
1922	490,000	3.8	365,000	2.8	.	.	62,231	0.3	.	.	23,280	1.2	30,800	1.8
1923	491,000	3.8	380,000	2.9	.	.	.	.	.	.	13,759	0.7	32,800	1.9
1924	491,000	3.8	396,000	3.0	.	.	.	.	.	.	13,753	0.7	37,400	2.1
1925	505,000	3.9	413,000	3.2	27,000	0.1	21,000	0.1	.	.	13,615	0.7	37,200	2.0
1926	525,000	4.0	431,000	3.3	31,650	0.1	18,000	0.1	.	.	13,698	0.7	36,200	2.0
1927	535,000	4.1	405,000	3.1	30,000	0.1	20,000	0.1	.	.	14,250	0.7	32,000	1.6
1928	555,000	4.2	370,000	2.8	49,350	0.2	17,000	0.1	.	.	16,079	0.7	28,000	1.5
1929	566,000	4.3	411,000	3.1	48,000	0.2	.	.	.	.	17,361	0.8	26,300	1.4
1930	577,000	4.4	323,000	2.4	49,000	0.2	9,584	0.0	.	.	16,929	0.7	28,200	1.4
1931	560,000	4.2	294,000	2.2	.	.	4,000	0.0	.	.	20,199	0.9	30,900	1.6
1932	533,000	4.1	259,000	2.0	.	.	.	.	.	.	22,512	1.0	34,000	1.7
1933	510,000	4.0	260,000	2.0	.	.	.	.	.	.	19,562	0.9	36,600	1.8
1934	491,000	3.9	264,000	2.1	.	.	.	.	.	.	12,956	0.6	36,100	1.8
1935	786,000	6.3	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	12,018	0.5	35,500	1.8
1936	2,584,000	21.2	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	11,356	0.5	33,200	1.6
1937	3,959,000	32.5	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	11,207	0.5	31,200	1.5
1938	3,469,000	28.2	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	10,652	0.4	30,600	1.5
1939	2,500,000	20.2	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	10,330	0.4	27,900	1.3
1940	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	23,300	1.1
1941	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	23,400	1.1
1942	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	22,600	1.0
1943	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	22,100	1.0
1944	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	21,900	1.0

Table C.5.2: Communist (and Syndicalist) Union Membership and Density (%), Western Europe 1945-89

	FR		IT			NE		SW	
	CGT		CGIL			EVC		SAC	
	members	gross	members	gross	net	members	gross	members	gross
1945	4,473,000	38.9	.	.	.	162,323	.	22,100	1.0
1946	4,979,000	42.4	.	.	.	124,365	5.3	22,200	1.0
1947	4,549,000	38.2	.	.	.	176,873	6.4	21,400	0.9
1948	2,856,000	23.8	.	.	.	133,153	4.9	20,500	0.9
1949	2,823,000	23.5	.	.	.	135,242	4.9	20,000	0.8
1950	2,915,000	23.3	4,640,528	39.0	36.3	139,499	4.9	19,900	0.8
1951	2,746,000	21.9	4,490,776	35.5	32.7	.	.	19,500	0.8
1952	2,337,000	18.5	4,342,206	35.2	32.6	.	.	19,600	0.8
1953	1,979,000	15.7	4,074,648	32.2	29.6	.	.	19,000	0.8
1954	1,657,000	13.1	4,134,417	32.2	29.1	.	.	17,200	0.7
1955	1,579,000	12.3	4,194,235	32.5	29.0	.	.	17,000	0.6
1956	1,500,000	11.6	3,665,989	28.1	25.1	.	.	16,600	0.6
1957	1,239,000	9.5	3,137,800	23.9	21.5	.	.	16,200	0.6
1958	1,350,000	10.2	2,595,490	19.6	17.0	.	.	16,700	0.6
1959	1,398,000	10.4	2,600,656	19.8	17.2	.	.	17,000	0.6
1960	1,410,000	10.4	2,583,170	19.6	16.8	.	.	17,600	0.6
1961	1,411,000	10.3	2,531,254	18.3	15.7	.	.	18,000	0.6
1962	1,415,000	10.1	2,610,843	20.2	17.3	.	.	18,700	0.6
1963	1,405,000	10.0	2,625,580	19.5	16.9	.	.	19,800	0.6
1964	1,422,000	9.8	2,711,842	20.2	17.4	.	.	20,500	0.6
1965	1,432,000	9.7	2,542,933	19.2	16.3	.	.	21,700	0.7
1966	1,433,000	9.5	2,457,945	18.6	15.4	.	.	22,800	0.7
1967	1,434,000	9.4	2,423,480	18.2	15.2	.	.	23,000	0.7
1968	1,600,000	10.3	2,460,961	18.2	15.2	.	.	23,900	0.7
1969	1,685,000	10.5	2,626,388	19.1	16.0	.	.	23,800	0.7
1970	1,693,000	10.3	2,942,517	21.1	18.1	.	.	23,500	0.7
1971	1,679,000	10.0	3,138,396	22.3	19.2	.	.	22,600	0.6
1972	1,669,000	9.8	3,214,965	22.6	19.5	.	.	21,700	0.6
1973	1,682,000	9.6	3,435,576	23.7	20.5	.	.	21,100	0.6
1974	1,685,000	9.5	3,826,622	26.1	22.1	.	.	20,000	0.5
1975	1,708,000	9.5	4,081,399	27.3	22.8	.	.	19,000	0.5
1976	1,665,000	9.1	4,313,131	28.2	23.2	.	.	18,500	0.5
1977	1,607,000	8.6	4,490,065	28.7	23.1	.	.	18,100	0.5
1978	1,475,000	7.8	4,527,962	28.9	22.6	.	.	17,900	0.5
1979	1,359,000	7.1	4,583,474	28.6	22.0	.	.	18,000	0.5
1980	1,249,000	6.5	4,599,050	28.4	21.6	.	.	18,200	0.5
1981	1,257,000	6.5	4,595,011	28.3	21.0	.	.	17,600	0.4
1982	1,117,000	5.7	4,576,020	27.9	20.1	.	.	17,100	0.4
1983	1,046,000	5.3	4,556,052	27.6	19.1	.	.	18,000	0.4
1984	998,000	5.0	4,546,335	27.5	18.4	.	.	16,100	0.4
1985	871,000	4.6	4,592,014	27.3	17.7	.	.	15,500	0.4
1986	772,000	3.8	4,647,038	27.2	16.8	.	.	.	.
1987	701,000	3.5	4,743,036	27.4	16.3	.	.	.	.
1988	651,000	3.2	4,867,406	27.7	16.0	.	.	.	.
1989	600,000	2.9	5,026,851	28.5	15.9	.	.	.	.

SOURCES: own data collection; DUES database (MZES, University of Mannheim); Visser 1989, 1992.
NOTE: BE 1945- and FR: net membership figures (excluding estimated non-active).